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Abstract 
2 
This thesis presents a study on the legal and moral foundations of copyright in 
the "Shari'a" (Islamic Law), with reference to various schools of "figh" (Islamic 
Jurisprudence). By following the methodological principles and proofs in the 
sources of Shari 'a, the study provides the main authoritative groundings for 
copyright. Examination of copyright in the Shari 'a was performed by collecting and 
investigating the available references and citations relating to the subject. The 
material was obtained from various Islamic sources and through the fiqh 
terminology. 
Accordingly, the concepts of "hagq" (right), "milkiyya" (ownership), "mal" 
(wealth) and "manfa `a" (utility) and their definitions made by the leading scholars, 
were examined in order to understand the precise standing of copyright in Shari 'a. 
The analyses of these essential definitions revealed that the key factor of these 
concepts is the approval of Shari `a. Under Shari `a, however, copyright may be 
considered as hagq whose classifications in fiqh can be applied to copyright. 
Copyright is manfa'a and mal and can be owned. This understanding can provide an 
enough room for copyright in Shart'a. 
This study investigated evidence of copyright starting from the original sources 
of Shari'a Qur'an and Sunna (the prophetic traditions and practices), and the 
subsidiary sources such as "Qiyds" (the analogy). The study argues for the 
legitimacy of copyright on the ground that it reflects principles of justice and 
honesty, respects right and property, and reduces injustice enrichment. There are 
some "ahädith " (Prophet's traditions) which may support the idea of copyright. The 
application of giyds showed some clear cases which can be applied to copyright. An 
investigation on the supplementary sources of Shari'a; "Maclaha" (the public 
interest) "'Ur f' (custom) and "al-Qawä `id al-Fiqhiyya" (legal maxims) supports 
copyrights. Therefore, copyright has received support from separate and cooperative 
evidence. The religious approval of copyright can only be gained, if a given work 
meets necessary conditions of originality, legality and the public interest. The 
duration of copyright leaves some scope for differences of view as to whether 
copyright should be eternal or for specified limited periods, with a discrepancy in 
theoretical and practical reasoning but the view of perpetual copyright appears to be 
more evident according to Shari 'a. 
The range of arguments dealt with in the study ought to dispel any doubt about 
the acceptance of copyright in Islamic law. The introduction of copyright within 
Islamic law is an extension and a logical part of "ijtihdd" (conscientious reasoning) 
of Shari 'a. Copyright may be governed by the principles of Shari `a inasmuch as it is 
strengthened. Finally, the research shows how Shari 'a is a responsive and evolving 
system and provides guidance to serious and complex issues such as copyright with 
its international burden and interest. 
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Note of Transliteration 
The following transliteration will be used in this thesis: 
Arabic Symbol Arabic Symbol 
A T 
B b Z 
T 
TH GH 
J F 
H '3 Q 
KH . K 
D j L 
DH M 
R N 
Z 
_,. H 
S A A 
SH j W 
$ Y 
P 
Short vowels: Long vowels: 
A ä 
I i 
U jü 
10 
"Ta marbüta" will be represented as (a) unless another word comes after it in 
which case it will be represented as (t). "Alif mammdüda" or "Alif magsnra" 
will be represented as (a). 
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Introduction 
1.1 Research Objectives 
The study is structured on the hypothesis that "figh" (Islamic Jurisprudence) 
has enough sources and tools to accommodate modem concepts such as copyright. 
Fugahä' consider that Shari 'a is a total and indivisible system that covers religion, 
law and morality, where all matters are governed directly or indirectly by general 
rules. Agreeing with many verses, ' Shari 'a can provide appropriate solutions for 
contemporary issues if a systematic and comprehensive study is made. 
Therefore, the research aims to answer a number of important questions 
regarding the support or otherwise of copyright in Islamic teachings: has Shari'a2 
provided scope for copyright or at least sufficient understanding for the concept of 
copyright. What could be the basis of copyright in Shari'a? How far can copyright 
be recognized under Shari'a and how far can Shari'a recognize the idea of 
copyright. Should authors or copyright-owners be able to rely on Shari'a in 
combating the violation of their rights when the man-made law and technologies fail 
to provide protection? Should Shari 'a recognize copyright in the same way as it 
clearly does for other rights? Are there conditions in Shari 'a that intellectual works 
must comply with in order to attain copyright recognition? Does Shari'a make 
intellectual products more accessible for those who are willing to use them in order 
to maximize the widespread dissemination of knowledge? 
Answering these questions may help in resolving other related questions such as 
whether Shari 'a could in general be expected to provide appropriate solutions to 
contemporary difficult issues as such? How can Shari 'a tackle serious and difficult 
issues such as copyright in the modern sense. Such questions may divide jurists, 
For more detailed evidence on that, see p. 120 in this thesis. 
Z Shari'a "designates the rules and regulations governing the lives of Muslims, derived in principal 
from the Qur'än and hadith" which is closely associated with fiqh". See Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
(Leiden, E. J. Brill. 1971) (Second Edition) Shad'a Entry, hereinafter; EI2. 
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because they touch upon some of the fundamental principles governing rights, 
property and the organization of Utihäd in a modern society. 
Although the focus of this study is primarily on copyright, copyright is only 
one example of how our understanding of arguments using Shari`a and its tools can 
be clarified by approaching such cases. It presents how figh might be applied to the 
issue of copyright and the adequacy of traditional arguments in dealing with new 
cases. 
Supplementary to this, the discussion of terminology may reveal some 
interesting differences betweenfiqh schools which can contribute to the comparative 
studies in ftgh. Moreover, the research will produce a body of materials and findings 
accompanied by a discussion, which may contribute to a building foundation on 
which other researchers can work more effectively towards a full and coherent 
Islamic system of copyright. 
1.2 The Significance of this Study 
The importance of this study stems from both Shari `a and copyright and, 
therefore, the combination of these subjects has a much greater significance. 
Copyrights or copyright is defined as "The exclusive right to reproduce or 
authorize others to reproduce artistic, dramatic, literary, or musical works". 3 
However, copyright occupies a significant position in the modem era and in view of 
rapidly developing communications and technologies, the question of copyright can 
be expected to become increasingly more important. 
Generally, in the Muslim world, copyright has not received as much attention as 
it has had in the writings of the Western scholars. Scholars have given relatively 
little attention to copyright in spite of the fact that the position of copyright in 
Shari `a comes to be seen as a source of uncertainty in figh. In fact, the legitimacy of 
copyright and the concept of the right to intellectual property in Shari `a is still, to a 
3 Martin, Elizabeth, Oxford Dictionary of Law, (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 110, hereinafter 
Martin, Oxford Dictionary of Law. 
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large degree if not completely so, a matter of debate. 
Compared with other subjects, such as family law, there has been relatively 
little literature on copyright under Islamic law. The role of Utihad4 is what is mostly 
needed for new problems such as copyright in order to find Islamic solutions in a 
systemic way. 
Copyright receives a substantial level of protection from national and 
international laws and legal machinery, but copyright is subject to denial in many 
ways. Successful works in every field have been subject to piracy, to the extent that 
in many cases the true owner often does not receive a monetary gain. In the Arab 
publication world and Arab academia, the widespread piracy of the works of Sayyd 
Qutb has been seized upon by many writers as a notable example of the scale and 
impact of the violation of copyright. 
Despite the wide recognition and universal acceptance of copyright laws, 
copyright requires the realization and elaboration of its position within the context of 
Shari 'a by a comprehensive elaboration. Muslim lawyers can contribute hugely to 
the development of figh if they proceed from a basis founded in Shari `a. The 
demand for an elaboration on the Islamic view of copyright is one that is often more 
discussed than fulfilled. 
Copyright needs to be understood in both its religious and legal context. Using 
the distinctive sources of Islamic law and systematically applying its methodology 
can contribute more effectively towards recognizing copyright, without offending 
Islamic principles. 
The religious approval of copyright is crucial to its recognition and protection, 
especially where judicial authority and the enforcement of law are weak or 
unavailable. The religious question regarding infringement of copyright is needed, 
when people attempt circumvention of "fair dealing" or similar exceptions. 
Moreover, in the Muslim world companies produce computer programs that cannot 
The process of deriving legal rules from the sources of the Islamic law. See Karnali, Mohammad 
Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Kuala Lumpur, ILMIAH Publishers, (Third Edition) 
(2000). p. 366, hereinafter: Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence. 
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be opened unless the user affirms their legality by oath. 5 
The continuous usage and reliance on oath in various legal systems 
demonstrates the potential significance of the religious and ethical factor to protect 
rights of individuals and institutions. This indicates that the religious roots of 
copyright are even longer and probably more important in their historical effect that 
it first appears. The ethical framework offiqh has more scope for the investigation of 
copyright, since law has been equated with morality in Shari 'a. 
The importance of this subject is perhaps most keenly appreciated when the 
question rises regarding the ability of Shari 'a to govern a modem society. Though 
Shari'a is often an important factor in Muslim countries, there is some criticism that 
it is outdated and incompatible with the ideals of modem life. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable for a researcher to seek justification for copyright from Shari-'a in the 
same way as other researchers seek justification for it from Locke's theory. Research 
on the normative foundations of copyright in Shari 'a is needed to identify an Islamic 
theory of copyright. 
Besides the historical and theoretical aspects, this study also can be of practical 
importance. The question of whether or not copyright can be recognized under 
Shari`a is very important because Muslim States possess the sovereignty to apply 
Shari `a as a domestic law. Most of Muslim States declare in their Constitutions that 
Islam is the official religion of the state and Shari 'a is the only source or one of the 
main sources of legislation. 
Shari `a has a considerable influence on legislation as well as the daily life of 
more than one billion Muslims worldwide even though many Muslim States do not 
apply it fully. Presumably, a decision by a Muslim State to enact copyright based on 
Shari `a would definitely have an impact in safeguarding intellectual property. 
In addition, if the idea of copyright is established on religious grounds and 
accepted on that bias, this study will help in resolving at least a part of the 
S See al-Mawsü'a al-Dhahabiyya lil a1-I3adith al-Sharif, CD, 1996, First Issue, Jeddah, $akhr 
Computer Programs' Company. Hereinafter: Al-Mawsü'a al-Dhahabiyya. 
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international problem, namely, how to prevent the violation of copyright in theory. 
The Islamic resolution of copyright may serve national and international interests. 
The internationalization of copyright has been expanding to a large degree by the 
strong pressure that began after the agreement of TRIPS 6 The debate touches upon 
the issue of what one can consider as an international dimension and which requires 
every culture and society to address carefully. Therefore, the researcher is required 
to present the views and solutions advanced by Shari `a to resolve this international 
issue. It is argued that the discussion of copyright infiqh plays a much more central 
role than is commonly thought. 
Therefore, there is significance in recognizing copyright as one of the first steps 
for researchers to claim protection and finally arrive at their full system in Shari `a. 
1.3 The Scope of the Research 
It is imperative to identify an appropriate copyright regime in Shari 'a. 
However, first, it is necessary to eliminate or reduce the legal uncertainty of 
copyright infiqh. This study attempts to explore roots to copyright in Shari `a. 
This study considers the question of the figh of copyright at its most basic level 
and is not meant to be a definitive work which expounds all aspects of copyright 
according to Shari `a. In addition, the research will not cover all schools of figh but 
will be confined within the mainstream schools offiqh. The scope of the study will 
be limited by the following objectives: 
1. To provide an overview of the literature review on copyright in 
chronological order with necessary comments. 
2. To analyze the concept of right in Shari `a which is fundamental to the 
subject. 
3. To analyze the definitions of ownership, wealth and utility which are very 
highly relevant to copyright. 
6 An abbreviation of an international agreement (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) was reached in Uruguay by the World Trade Organisation (WOT) in 1994. 
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4. To identify evidence on copyright from the original sources of Shari `a. 
5. To identify evidence on copyright from the supplementary sources of 
Shan`a. 
6. To identify any condition or qualification for copyright in Shari 'a. 
7. To examine the objections to copyright raised by some scholars poses. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The plan is to identify and present evidence regarding copyright and to do so 
objectively and dispassionately according to the "usül al-figh" (principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence). Research on copyright within Shari `a will be approached by its own 
methodology. With Shari `a, the order of research follows the rank of its sources. 
According to the famous "hadith" (prophetic tradition) of Mu`ädh, 7 the standard for 
researching copyright is by pursuing them in the original sources of Shari `a, i. e. the 
Qur'an and the Sunna first and then in the secondary sources. 
Therefore, this study first to the elaboration of the all related words to 
copyright, such as "hagq " (right), "milkiyya" (ownership), "mdl" (wealth) and 
"manfa `a" (utility). The clearest way to approach copyright based on Shari `a is to 
study it deeply through its own language and terms. Copyright must be stated in 
terms acceptable and recognizable to fiqh and must be judged according to Islamic 
principles. 
Then the study explores the Qur'an and the Sunna to identify the basic 
framework upon which copyright may be built. The plan is to use all related texts as 
much as possible. Secondly, by using the rules of usz7l al-fiqh the study will apply 
the supplementary sources of Shari'a, namely "Qiyas" (the analogy), "Maslaha" 
(the public interest) "`Urf' (custom) and "al-Qawä `id al-Fiqhiyya" (legal maxims) 
to copyright. 
This study attempts a comprehensive examination of the possible foundations of 
7 For the full text of this hadith, see p. 115. 
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copyright in Shari `a by using the tools of analytical research and critical 
examination provided by usül al-figh. An exact understanding of theoretical and 
applied u$ al al-frgh gives one a better grasp in the enquiry of copyright. It is 
therefore, necessary to examine all Shari `a sources on which copyright should be 
based and evaluate the justifications for each piece of evidence. This can achieve the 
systematization of copyright according to the rules of Shari 'a. 
As far as methodology is concerned, this study will be committed to the 
mainstream jurisprudential tools and to the standard method in figh. This study will 
be consistent with the rules of until al-fiqh that fugahä' from al-Shäfi`i on ward have 
articulated and applied. Detailed and acknowledged rules have to be followed by the 
researcher in order to build the right foundations and to avoid mistaken results. 
By using the rules of fiqh and evidence from Shari `a, this study will examine 
copyright within that framework and without discarding its principles. This will be 
the process of applying the theoretical principles of Shari `a and its tools to copyright 
without adopting concepts or methods that are contrary to such sources. Arguments 
for and against copyright must only be derived from Shari `a. 
In addition, this study is not a proposal for the Islamic justification of Western 
ideas on copyright or an apology. Shari `a and other legal systems have resulted from 
inhabiting different mental and historical backgrounds which lead, inevitably, to 
taking different approaches to many matters. 
Despite many commonalities existing between Shari `a and modem laws, there 
is no need to make a comparison between Islamic law and other laws as regards 
copyright because there is no complete counterpart based on Islamic law. It would 
also appear to be far too early to make such comparison. 
It is important to say that the research will not be confined to a particular 
Muslim country because the issue at hand is still in an abstract and theoretical phase. 
There is no essential difference in principle or in results if a study focuses on a 
particular country. It is incorrect to assume that the law of a Muslim State represents 
the Islamic view of copyright simply because it is from that country. The current 
attitudes of legislative authorities in many Muslim States do not refer to Shari `a 
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when enacting laws regarding copyright. Admittedly, there is no demand for 
copyright, even from within Islamic or academic societies, to be compliant with 
Shari 'a in the same way as we have seen, for example, with regard to the demand 
for financial services. 
This study is mostly devoted to the discussion of technical terms within Islamic 
Jurisprudence but an introductory section in each chapter will benefit those who 
want to learn about the subject in a general way. These introductions give a cursory 
assessment of the research and arguments within the framework for reference 
established. 
It should be mentioned that the study is not written with a faith-oriented 
community in mind. This approach has the advantage of being academically 
approved in both Muslim and non-Muslim circles. Finally, it should be noted that, as 
in traditional textbooks of fiqh references to the male gender includes also the 
female unless otherwise mentioned. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The research is designed to provide a systemic study to deal with copyright. In 
addition to the introductory chapter, this thesis is divided into a further six chapters. 
In general, each chapter starts first by providing a general introduction to the topic 
and ends with a brief summary. 
At the beginning of this study, there will be a survey of the various opinions by 
contemporary scholars on the subject of copyright together with their approaches 
and accompanied by some concluding remarks. The survey will recount the 
development of copyright in fiqh in order to enhance a full understanding and 
support a further treatment. 
Chapter one will review the definitions of "hagq" (right), because "hagq" is 
the core of copyright. In order to study copyright in Shari `a, it is necessary to 
explore the notion of right and its classifications in fiqh. Another issue in this 
essential chapter is how to apply these definitions and classifications correctly to 
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copyright to provide the central structure upon which copyright can be investigated 
and to prevent one from drawing wrong conclusions. 
Chapter two will support the previous chapter by surveying the terms relate to 
the notion of copyright, namely, property, wealth and utility in Shari 'a. This task is 
to clarify these terms to reduce its legal uncertainty in Shari `a. The chapter will 
present a collection of the key concepts necessary for providing a ruling on 
copyright in Shari'a. The chapter will conclude by recognizing the nature of 
copyright which underlies and affects its ruling in Shari'a and the difficulties it 
entails. Once these fundamental issues are clarified, it is possible to research the 
main problem by applying the method described above. 8 
In chapter three, the study will attempt to find guidance regarding copyright in 
the original sources, i. e. Qur'än and Sunna. Therefore, this chapter is divided into 
two sections. The first one will seek evidence from Qur'an and the second will 
present evidence from Sunna. 
Chapter four will pursue other arguments from supplementary sources of 
Shari `a for copyright, namely "giyds" (analogy) "maslaha" (the public interest) 
"`urf' (custom) and "al-Qawd'id al-Fiqhiyya" (legal maxims). Therefore, the focus 
will be on cases, aspects or rules in Shari 'a which can be implemented. Accordingly, 
this chapter is divided into three main sections. 
In chapter five, the study will seek to find conditions and qualifications for 
copyright to harmonize its recognition and its use with other rights and interests. The 
chapter will seek to identify conditions regarding originality of a work, legality and 
its duration from general evidence. 
Chapter six will review the critical observations of copyright that are made by 
some scholars and based on some indications in Shari `a. The various objections to 
copyright withinfiqh will be discussed carefully throughout this chapter. 
8 Seep. 16 of this thesis. 
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1.6 Notes on Sources 
In preparing this study, the most relevant research literature in Arabic and 
English will be consulted. The materials related to copyright is scattered widely in 
the vast wealth of Islamic sources. The following are the most important sources 
used in this study and a specific list of sources is set out at the end of the study. 
While recognizing the difficulty of translating Qur'an, the study will consult 
"The Holy Qur'än English translation of the meaning and Commentary" by 
Abdullah Yusuf Ali, which has been accepted by many scholars. The translation of 
the Qur'än is quoted by identifying the chapter and the verse numbers. 
In order to obtain deeper insight into interpretations of specific texts, one has to 
consult the most authoritative commentaries, such as Tafsir al-Tabari and Tafsir al- 
Qurtubi in Qur'än and Sharh Sahib Muslim by al-Nawawi and Fath al-Bari Sharh 
Sahib al-Bukhäri by Ibn Ijajar in IIadith. 
The study has been based on the standard collections of Hadith such as 'Faith 
al-Bukhäri, Sahih Muslim, Sunan Abü Dawüd and so on, combining their available 
translations with the observation of the Arabic texts closest to the meaning. 
Translations of the collections of Hadith on http: //www. muslimaccess. com/ 
sunnah/hadeeth, made by Professor Ahmad Hasan, have been consulted. 'Ahadith 
are quoted by identifying their resource and number. 
To arrive at satisfactory applications of usül al-fiqh tools on many different 
occasions there is a line of authorities which supports the study such as al-Bahr al- 
Muhit by al-Zarkashi, al-Furüq by al-Qaräfi, Qawa `id al-'Ahkttm by al-'Izz Ibn 
`Abd al-Saläm and al-Muwäfagat by al-Shätibi.. Reference will be made to 
Majallatal-'Ahkäm and its translation by Tyser. 
Unless otherwise indicated, this study is based on the authoritative original 
Arabic textbooks in fiqh. For fiqh details, reference has been made to specialist 
books in the field from various schools offiqh, such as al-Mudawwana by Suhnün, 
Badä'i ` a1-Sandi` by al-Käsäni, al-Majmü ` by al-Nawawi, al -Mughni by Ibn 
Qudäma, al-Muhalld by Ibn IIazm and others. Reference is also made to the 
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Encyclopedia of Islam as well as al-Mawsil `a al-Fiqhiyya by the Ministry of Awgäf 
and Islamic Affairs in Kuwait. 
The research has used many modem writings such Hagq al-Ibtikär by al- 
Dirayni, Fiqh al-Nawäzil by Abü Zayd, Mudawwanat al-Fiqh al-Mäliki by al- 
Ghiryäni, Intellectual Property Laws and Islam in Malaysia by Azmi, Principle of 
Islamic Jurisprudence by Kamali and other books. It must be acknowledged that this 
study has benefited from these sources and all previous works on the subject in a 
variety of ways and to different degrees. 
In addition, it should be noted that Shari `a does not have the equivalent 
divisions and terms as other legal systems as regards common law or civil law. 
Paying insufficient attention to special terminology may mean that results elude the 
researcher. 
There will be engagement with Arabic linguistic books such as Täj al-Lugha 
by al-Jawharl and terminology books such as al-T`arjät by al-Jurjäni to provide 
precise understanding of words relating to the topic. 
In this study the author faced two difficulties. First, there is a shortage of 
sources in English on the Islamic law. As a result, the author arrived at a second 
obstacle, which was the translation from Arabic to English with the attendant 
problematic comparison of terminology between legal systems. In general, the 
author has translated the Arabic materials unless otherwise stated. It is important to 
remind the reader that a translation can not fully capture the sense of the original. 
Whenever an Arabic word is first introduced, it appears in quotes with its 
translation in English in brackets then it appears without translation. In some cases 
when it will be thought helpful to remind the reader of the English translation, the 
English translation is repeated. 
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1.7 An Analytical Review of Literature on Copyright in Shari `a 
1.7.1 Islamic Educational Traditions and Copyright 
This section aims to introduce readers to copyright within Shari `a and to trace 
the evolution of its understanding through the documented history. This brief 
account chronicles the history of copyright in Islamic writings. This account is 
indispensable to exploring the position of copyright in Shari `a. As far as can be seen 
in available documentation, copyright, as perceived today, is not found in Shari `a. 
However, the root of the idea of copyright and many elements it encompasses are 
not recent, even if the terms (intellectual property, copyright and author's rights) did 
not emerge until modem time. 
Based on solid evidence from Shari `a, there are well-established Islamic 
educational traditions that emphasize the importance of honesty and demand that 
only the 'creator of a literary work was entitled to praise and honor. 9 There is no 
doubt that scientific honesty is long established and its significance was widely 
acknowledged. However, no copyright, as it exists in its current form, was sought. 
Furthermore, under Islamic principles, plagiarism is religiously sinful, morally 
condemnable and socially disreputable. 1° 
This is in a context that all aspects of knowledge, teaching, writing and learning 
are connected firmly with the religious precept of deeds and charity. As Shari'a 
emphasizes, many fuquha' are keen to ensure a maximized widespread 
dissemination of knowledge, " as matter of piety. For example, al-Shäfi`i (d. 204 
9 Al-Büli, Muhammad, Qacläyd Fiqhiyya Mu'ä., ira, Damascus, Maktabat al-Färäbi, (1992) (Fourth 
edition), p. 82 and post, hereinafter: al-Büfi, Qadäya Fiqhiyya Mu'd ira. 
10 Ibn Hajar, Ahmad, Intigäd al-1'tirdd Hamdi al-Salafi and Sub1 T al-Sämirä'i, (eds. ), Riyadh, Dar 
al-Rushd, (1993) (First Edition). A1-Suyüli, Jallil al-Din, Al(äriq bayn al-Musannif wa al-Sdriq, 
Qäsim al-Sämirä'i (ed. ), Riyadh, Majallat 'Alam al-Kutub, 4 Feb. 1982 /Rabi' al-Thäni 1402 AH, 
vo1.2"d, issue. It is referred to in AND Zayd, Bakr, Fiqh al-Nawazil, Jeddah, Maktabat al-$adiq, 
(1409AH/1988) (First edition), vol. 2, p. 91- p. 98. p. 128, hereinafter: Abu Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawäzil. 11 Shalaby, Ahmad, History of Muslim Education, Beirut, Dar al-Kashshaf, (1954), p. I 65., hereinafter: 
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AH/820) said: "I wish I had taught this knowledge without being attributed to me". 12 
Many fuqaha' give a general "Ydza" (authority or license) for any Muslim directly 
' to narrate their books, for example, al-Nawawi (d. 676AH/1278). 
From a financial perspective, it is to be noted that beside teaching and 
authorship, many authors had other professions such as merchants, judges, copyists 
or craftsmen. Other authors were sponsored by caliphates, princes and the 
institutions of "Awagäf ' (endowments). Another relevant point is that in Arabic 1° 
literature, the reproduction of works was the job of "warrägin or nussäkh" 
(copyists). 15 It required time, skills and expense that are similar to the production of 
the work itself. It was an arduous task and one of low income. 
Furthermore, religious and customary respect for scholars was practiced and 
defended by the public. Thus, in Muslim societies copyright is some extent protected 
pursuant to general standards of morals particularly that of honesty. 16 Indeed, there 
is a distinction between these general standards on the one hand and the 
establishment of relevant laws which protect copyright, on the other. However, the 
ethical treatment of copyright needs to be appropriate to its time, condition and 
society. " 
Only after the invention of the printing press was there a clear need for the 
Shalaby. 
12 Ibn al-'Imäd al-Hanbali, 'Abd al-Hayy, Shadharät al-Dhahab, Beirut, Dar Ihyä' al-Turäth al- 
'Arabi, (N. D), vol. 1, second division, p. 10. 
" Ijäza is an authority or license to narrate a hadith, book or fatwa. See EI2, Entry: Ijdza. Al- 
Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, Kuwait, Dhät al-Saläsil, Wizärat Awgäf wa al-Shu'iin al-Islämiyya, (1409AH 
/1990) (Second Edition), vol. 1, p. 310, Ijäza'entry, hereinafter: al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya. Dr Ma'tüq, 
$älih, al-Ijaza al-'Amma wa Isti'mäl al-Muhaddithin lahä, Dubai, Majallat al-Diräsdt al-Islämiyya 
wa 1-Arabiyya, 5 issue, (1413AH/1992), p. 99 and post, hereinafter: $älih, al-Ijäza. Al-Tahhän, 
Malunud, Taysir Muclalah al-Ijadith, Riyadh, Maktabat al-Ma`ärif, (1417AH /1996) (Ninth edition), 
P, 156, hereinafter: al-Tahhan, Taysir. 
Shalaby, p. 34, p. 167. Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawazil, vol. 2, p. 1 12, p. 98. 
15 Abu Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawdzil, p. 80-83. Shalaby, p. 89. Azmi, Dr. Mohammad Mustafa, Studies in 
Early Hadith Literature, Indina USA, American Trust publications, (1992) (Third Edition), p. 195, 
hereinafter: Azmi Hadiith Literature. 
16 Habib, Mustafa Salman, Copyright under Islamic Law, an article available online at 
hhtt : //www. geocities. com/Eureka/Concourse/5023/paae3. htm1, hereinafter: Habib, Copyright under 
Islamic Law. 
17 Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. Al-BÜIi, Qa4dya Fiqhiyya Mu'äsira, p. 84. Abü Zayd, Fiqh 
al-Nawazil, p. 103. 
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protection of copyright. The attention to copyright came at a time when technology 
could enable the reproduction of works at a level never before imagined. 
Increasingly, the rapid scientific development that has lead to reproduction and 
distribution of works on a massive scale has made the resolution of the issue of 
copyright in Shari'a very pressing. These developments have given genuine authors 
and publishers a strong incentive to establish rights based on Islamic justifications 18 
beside ordinary legal protection. 
This demand by authors and others also presents a challenge in that Shari `a did 
not treat this subject in the same way as other legal systems: it has its own approach, 
terms and divisions. Copyright will not be found ready-made under one or more 
common headings. 
Various Islamic sources have provided a rich source of literature on principles, 
indications and rules relating to copyright. For example, lengthy discussions took 
place in on fiqh and al-hadith about the validity of the consideration for teaching 
Qur'än and "al-hadiith" (the prophetic tradition). 19 This may cover the grounds of 
economic orientation of copyright. 
Moreover, other sources of literature of "71m Mmuc alah al-Hadith X20 appear 
to constitute the foundations of moral rights. For example, the institution of "ijäza ", 
which is particularly relevant to the protection of moral rights of authors, has been 
established in the Islamic educational traditions. To a large extent, the rules of Uäza 
have also been applied to figh, history, literature books and medicine21 in order to 
'$ See the publisher's introduction of al-Dirayni, Fathi and others, Hagq al-Ibtikär f al-Fiqh al-Islämi 
al-Mugärin, Beirut, Mu'assasat al-Risäla, (1400 AH/1981) (First edition), hereinafter: Al-Dirayni, 
Hagq al-Ibtikär. 
19 Al-Qurtubi, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Ansari, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, the first volume translated by 
Aisha Bewley, London, Dar Al-Taqwa, (2003), I, p. 228., hereinafter: Bewley, Tafsir al-Qurtubi. In 
Arabic see al-Qurlubi, Muhammad b. Abmad al-An$RrT, al-Jämi' li-'Ahkäm al-Qur'an, Mu$tafä al- 
Badri (ed. ), Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, (1420 AH/2000) (First Edition) vol. I p. 229, hereinafter: 
Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami'. Ibn Rushd, the second, Abii al-Walid Muhammad b. Ahmad, Bidäyat a! - 
Mujtahid wa Nih iyat al-Mugtasid, translated by Nyazee, Imran 
Ahsan Khan, The Distinguished 
Jurist's Primer, Reading, UK. Garnet Publishing Ltd. (2003) (First Edition), ' vol. II, p. 268, 
hereinafter: Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee. 
20 The science comprises a collection of rules, measures and terminology that can verify the 
authenticity of the prophetic traditions and classify them. EI2, Entry: 11adith. 
21 Shalaby, p. 149. 
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reach correct scientific and authentic conclusions and establish a proper profession. 
As required by this discipline, there are very detailed and critical rules on the 
reception, narration and transmission of traditions ahdfiith. 22 
1.7.2 Copyright in contemporary writings on figh23 
The research will review the most outstanding contributions of scholars and 
researchers regarding copyright in Shari 'a in Arabic and in English. In attempting to 
address copyright as a modem institution in Shari 'a, some contemporary scholars 
and researchers have written significant works on it, albeit attracting some criticism. 
In the beginning, some scholars were dismissive of copyright, while others were 
silent. Mufti Muhammad Shafi'24stated that according to Shari 'a a registration of 
copyright or a transaction in it is invalid because copyright is not property. 
Therefore, it was argued, authors have no right to prevent others from publishing 
their works unless the person who copies the work changes or distorts it. In his 
reasoning, the registration of copyright leads to hoarding which is clearly prohibited 
in Shari `a. 25 Indeed, Shari 'a prohibits any action which causes hoarding or harm to 
the public, but there are no justifications for the claim that copyright is not property. 
Balance can, however, be achieved between copyright and the public interest. 
This line of thought has also been expressed in the draft constitution produced 
by Ilizb al-Taharir. Article 175 of this constitution states that, "Once a book has 
been printed and published, nobody has the right to reserve the publishing and 
printing rights, including the author. i26 Here, not only the absence of evidence 
prevents researchers from discussing this particular article but also the political 
dimension of the whole constitution eclipses its merits or demerits. 
22 Azmi, Vafiith Literature, p. 188 and post. 
23 In the 1900 and post. 
24 Former Mufti of Pakistan d. 1986. 
25 Abu Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawäzil, vol. 2, p. 93-94. (This Fatwd is issued in 1362 AH11943). 
26 An-Nabahani, Taqiuddin, The System of Islam, London, al-Khilafah Publications, (1423 AH/ 
2002), p. 160. 
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Similarly, in his rhetorical article, al-Kurd-1 reaches the conclusion that there is 
no justification to claim copyright under Islamic Law. 27 His argument assumes that 
because copyright lead to monopoly over knowledge and to the concealment of 
knowledge, both are prohibited in Islam. Also, his contention is that copyright is a 
mere right which cannot be subject of exchange. Accordingly, he has concluded that 
the economic consideration for copyright is void. He explained that once an author 
publishes his work delivering up his knowledge, he no longer has an exclusive right 
over it. With slight change, al-Kurd-1 has confirmed this understanding in his recent 
fatwa which provides that intellectual works can be copied and published unless the 
state, with its discretionary power, orders otherwise and the public is obliged to 
abide by laws. 28 
It can be argued that contrary to al-Kurdi's conclusion, the recognition of 
copyright does not necessarily produce those prohibited results, that is, monopoly 
over and concealment of knowledge. 29 Although the prohibition of the sale of an 
abstract right is controversial in figh, there is a question of whether or not copyright 
can be classified as an abstract right. This conclusion is very far from being the only 
justified answer. 
This "anti-copyright" view expressed by al-Kurdi has been challenged by Dr al- 
Nähi who wrote an essay supporting the legitimacy of copyright in Islamic Law. 30 
The essay tends to focus on "`urf" (custom) without starting to research the subject 
in the original sources, that is Qur'an and the Surma. According to the rules of us171 
al-fiqh (the principles of Islamic jurisprudence), the resort to 'urf is only authorized 
if a judgment of the new case cannot be found in those original sources. 
27 Al-Kurdi, Alined, Hukm al-Islam fi Huqüq al-Nashar wa al-Ta$nif wa al-Tawzi', Amman, Huda 
al-Islam Majallat (1401 AH11980) vol. 25 p. 58-64., hereinafter: al-Kurdi. 
28Available online at: http: //www. islam. Qov. kw/demo/fatwaa/fatwaa detail. php? fatwaa id=1542, 
dated on 17/12/2005. 
29 Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikär, p. 100. 
3' Al-Näht, $alä$, Ijaqq al-Mu'allif fi al-Qawänin al-Wad`iyya al-Mua`ä$ira wa fi al-Shari'a al- 
Islämiyya, Amman, Huda al-Islam Majallat (1401 AH/1980), vol. 25 p. 37-57. Hereinafter: Al-Näht, 
Ilagq al-Mu'allif. 
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Defending publishers' rights Mu'assasat al-Risäla31 initiated a project which 
aimed to examine copyright from the Shari 'a standpoint. The project had sought to 
engage a number of scholars in this subject through their research in order to present 
the findings in one collective book. 
The project was a good attempt but the outcome consisted of only a few replies. 
Mu'assasat al-Risäla published a collection of these essays written by some 
interested scholars under the title "Hagq al-Ibtikär ft al-Fiqh al-Isldmi al- 
Mugdrin". 32 Obviously, there are sound educational benefits and religious 
justifications for institutional attempts to reach a ruling on copyright. It has found 
appreciation both academically and popularly. From this point, it seems that 
copyright in modernfigh is beginning to show signs of development. 
One of the essays published by Mu'assasat al-Risäla was the work of al- 
Dirayni, which is one of the most perceptive studies on copyright. Following the 
heading chosen by al-Zargä, 33 al-Dirayni grouped the full range of intellectual 
property (patent, copyright, trademark, trade name and industrial design) under one 
common heading "Huqüq al-Ibtikdr" (the rights of invention). However, he defined 
generally and convincingly "ibtikär" (the invention) as the source of these rights. 
Without defining "hagq" (right), which is more important, the study submitted a 
brief survey of the definitions of wealth, ownership, and utility through the various 
schools offiqh. 
In addition, al-Dirayni tried to qualify jurisprudentially the productions of mind 
distinctive from the expression instrument or method used to convey them. He 
considered that the productions of mind, including copyright, could be regarded as 
money capable of exchange and described them as an absolute and real right. 34 He 
suggests that the term of protection of copyright after death of the author should be 
" An Arabic publisher situated in Beirut. 
32 Al-Dirayni, Ilagq al-Ibtikdr. The book took its title from the major and most important essay 
undertaken by Fathi al-Dirayni. 
33 Al-Zargä, Muýlafa, al-Maakhal lid Nazariyyat al-11tizdm al-'. 4mma f al-Figh al-Islämi, Damascus, 
Dir al-Qalam, (1420AH11999) (First Edition), p. 3 1, hereinafter: Al-Zargä, Nazariyyat al-Iltizdm. 
34 Al-Dirayn7, Hagq al-Ibtikar, p. 39 and 43. 
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sixty years. To justify this conclusion, "giyäs" (the analogy) was drawn to the 
maximum term given by Shari `a to an individual to use an "wagf" (endowment) of 
land or a house. 35 The research did not endeavor to extract the judgment of 
copyright on the basis of evidence found in the Islamic sources systemically. Al- 
Dirayni's approach may be questioned because the examination of a new issue in 
fiqh should start from the Qur'an, the Sunna, "ßmä"' (the consensus) and qiyas in 
that order. The study by al-Dirayni remains influenced by the civil law 
classifications of rights. Despite their popularity in Arabic law textbooks, these 
classifications are not entirely Islamic. It is not clear whether al-Dirayni considers 
that rights are wealth or not 36 
Al-Dirayni's opinion on the duration of copyright seems to be compatible with 
the term given by copyright laws (fifty to seventy years), more than from the correct 
application of giyi s. It is somewhat inaccurate because there is no similarity or 
rationale to support this application of giyäs. Without enough evidence, al-Dirayn1 
claims that al-Qaräfi (d. 684 AH/1285) disapproved the financial value of "Utihädät" 
(legal opinions) and invention or being capable of being the subject of inheritance. 37 
Another shortcoming with al-Dirayni's work is that, it did not distinguish 
copyright clearly from other branches of intellectual property. The study would have 
done better if it had treated these various branches distinctly. 
Although al-Dirayni's study has not gone unchallenged, it remains a highly 
enlightening work and distinctive contribution to copyright in Islamic Law and one 
that has influenced a number of writers on this topic. It introduces copyright to 
Shari `a for the first time. 
Al-Sanbahli wrote the article "What Nazar Hawl al-IIukm al-Shari li-Hagq 
al-Tasnif"38 in the same book (Hagq al-Ibtikär ft al-Fiqh al-Islämi al-Mugdrin), 
35 Ibid, p. 121. This issue will be treated in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
36 Compare between al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikär, p. 78 and p. 88. 
37 Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikdr, p. 55,58. Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawdzil, vol. 2 p. 91. 38A1-Sanbahli, Burhän al-Din, Muhammad Wijhat nazar bawl al-Hukm al-Shay 7 1-hagq al-Tasnif, al- 
Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikär. p. 149-159. It was an essay written under the supervision of Sheikh Abü al- 
Hasan al-Nadawi. Al-Sanbahli, Burhän al-Din, Muhammad , Qa4ayd Fiqhiyya Mua'nyira, 
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recognizing only a single justification for copyright under Shari 'a. It is an analogy 
which was drawn between an author and an artisan who combined his physical with 
mental work and time spent and which deserves legitimate ownership of the work. 
Accordingly, the author is entitled to benefit from his work. It is not different from 
the Locke's39 theory that some Western commentators have used to justify 
intellectual property. ao 
Secondly, there is some confusion in the claim by al-Sanbahli that a publishing 
contract is invalid because it contains "gharar" (uncertainty or risk) which is 
prohibited. 1 Shari `a requires that the price and the consideration of a contract must 
be precisely described, known and fixed at the time of concluding the contract. 
According to al-Sanbahli's argument a publishing contract is uncertain because it 
depends on the percentage of the number of books sold. Therefore, the common 
contract for publication of a work is void for gharar. It seems that the reasoning is 
literal. A publishing contract can be categorized with other acceptable contracts, if 
one accepts the claim of gharar as well-founded. 
Another point, which is disputable, relates to the application of giyäs. Al- 
Sanbahli likened copyright after death of the author to "wall "' (patronage or 
allegiance). 42 Then he claimed that because the right of inheritance cannot be sold 
the heir of an author cannot obtain a return for copyright. He considered that the heir 
receives a mere right. 43 Therefore, the heirs can only sell a work in the original draft 
that the author has not sold. The permission to publish, it is argued, cannot be sold 
because the prophetic hadith indicates that wall' cannot be subjected to sale. This 
Damascus, D5r al-Qalam, (1988) (First Edition), p. 36-48. Majallat al-Majma'al-Fighi al-Islämi, 
Jeddah, Räbita al-'dlam al-Isldmi, (1409AH / 1988) (First Edition) Issue5, vol. I1I, hereinafter: 
Majallat al-Majma. 
39 The English philosopher John Lock 1632-1704. 
40 Bently, Lionel and Sherman, Brad, Intellectual Properly, London, Oxford University Press, (2004) 
(Sixth Edition), p. 34, hereinafter: Bently, and Sherman, Intellectual Property. Drahos, Peter, A 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, Aldershot. Brookfield USA, (1996), p. 41 and post, hereinafter: 
Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property. 
41 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford UK, (1979) (Second Edition), p. 146 
42 A relationship established between a master and a slave after emancipation which confers some 
mutual rights on them, for example the former can inherit from the latter in some cases. See EI3, 
Entry: walä. 
43 Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikär, p. 153. 
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judgment seems to be inconsistent with the correct application of giyäs. 
In 1409AH/1988, the theoretical analysis of copyright under Islamic Law made 
significant progress as expressed in a number of studies. The Fiqh Academy44 
discussed papers presented by many scholars regarding branches of intellectual 
property. 45 This approach appears to be ill-conceived because these branches have 
grown and become more sophisticated, independent, and each area has its own 
subject, function and characteristics. Any study should treat each branch as 
distinguishable even though they possess some common grounds, not least the fact 
that they are parallel to tangible property. In addition, there is the educational and 
practical interest that one cannot set out the whole of intellectual property without 
dividing it into different parts. This type of generalization across the various 
branches of intellectual property may result in mistaken judgments. 
After lengthy discussion, the Fiqh Academy concluded that patent, copyright, 
trademarks and industrial design are private, protected and legitimate rights. Also, 
they said that these rights have financial value, their owners are free to deal with 
them and the violation of these rights is prohibited. 6 With this decision, the trend 
towards the approval of copyright was further strengthened. However, the decision 
needs to be followed by other steps in order to develop common guidelines that may 
lead to the establishment of an Islamic intellectual property system. Later on, the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy of India reached a similar conclusion that the sale of modern 
rights, such as patents and copyright, is generally permissible. 7 
With this generalization, copyright was approached by the Fiqh Academy in 
three essays byfuqaha'. One of them was al-Bü I's essay. 48 At the beginning he used 
44 The council consisting of scholars has been appointed by Muslim states. The ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the Organization of Islamic Countries OIC established this council in their twelfth 
conference held in Baghdad 2.6.1981. 
45 In its fifth session in Kuwait in 10`s -15th December 1988. See Majallat al-Majma, Issue 5, vol. 111. 
2267-2579. 
46 Majallat al-Majma , Issue p. 2267-2579. 47 In its third session in Bangalore, India, in 8u' -11th June 1990, h : //ifa- 
india. or english/decision Sale of Rights. html 
48 Majallat al-Majma, Uaqq al-Ibtikär aw al-Ibdd', Issue 5, vol. 111, p2398-2406. Al-Büti, 
Muhammad, Qadäyd Fiqhiyya Mu `dsira, p. 82. 
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the definitions of al-Zargä and al-Dirayni of right which have met with criticism on 
many jurisprudential grounds. 
Al-Bnti confirmed that it is an established principle in the SharPa that 
authorship bestows intellectual property rights upon the author. He pointed out 
briefly that copyright can be established on several clear and fundamental values 
such as the prohibition against plagiarism, the rules related to honesty and the 
approval of 'urf of copyright. He argued that it is new situation when an author 
claims to derive economic benefits from intellectual property. The significance of 
this work lies in the analogy made between many old and new cases. For example, 
al-Miti made an analogy between, on the one hand, a book or a tape which conveys 
an idea or interest and, on the other, a container which contains substance. He 
argued that the object of a sale contract of a book is the book itself but not the ideas 
included in the book. 
Next we must consider the study made by Usmani, under the title "Bay' al- 
Huqüq al-Mujarrada ", which means the sale of abstract rights. Usmani only spent a 
few pages on copyright and the majority of the study is devoted to present his 
detailed classifications of "huqüq" (rights), without an elaboration on the meaning 
of "hagq ", which is the key issue of copyright. 
However, Usmani did recognize copyright relying on a single hadith, and 
reached to the conclusion that it is permissible to sell copyright basing this on `urf. 
Usmani did not provide other grounds to support copyright in Shari 'a. His study 
mentioned some of the criticisms leveled against the acceptance of copyright under 
Shari `a but successfully refuted them. 9 It is interesting to note that he is the son of 
Mufti Muhammad Shaf ' who rejected the notion of copyright, 50and Usmani took 
the opportunity to respond to his father's objections to copyright. 
An influential study and one which is comparative with the law is the study of 
49 Majallat al-Majma, Issue 5, vol. III, p2357-2388. Usmani, Muhammad, Buhüth J Qacläya 
Fiqhiyya Mu'äsira, Damascus, Dar al-Qalam, (1419 AH /1998) (First Edition), p. 77-126. Usmani, 
Muhammad Taqi, Contemporary Fataw, Lahore, Idara-e-Islamiat, (2001), p188, also available online 
at: http: //www. albalagh. net. 
50 See p. 25 here. 
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al-Nashmi entitled "al-Hugzsq al-Ma `nawiyya al-Ism al-Ty ri : 51 It started with the 
definition of hagq in law and Shari 'a and proceeded to categorize copyright (as 
patents and trademarks) under the title of "al-Huquq al-Ma `nawiyya" (moral rights). 
He asserted that there is no difficulty in categorizing copyright under "huqüq 
yniyya" (real rights) 52 The rational behind this classification is not apparent. Fiqh 
does not have the same civil law classification of rights. Nonetheless, al-Nashmi 
concludes with an approval of the sale of this kind of right as a general rule and 
applied and extended this reasoning to trade names and to computer programs 53 
With helpful historical background, Abü Zayd approached this subject in a 
chapter of his book "Fiqh al-Nawäzil ". 54 It provides a useful starting point for a 
brief survey of the printing press and copyright in Islamic history and jurisprudence 
up to the time of his publication. 
Instead of attempting to define hagq, Abü Zayd discussed briefly copyright 
notices, copyright registration, copyright infringement and fair use. Then he 
suggested that the correct terminology for copyright is "milkiyyat al-t'dtff' (the 
ownership of authorship). The issue of a correct term for copyright remains 
outstanding as his suggestion may lead to unnecessary ambiguity. 
A further point of notice is that Abii Zayd briefly referred to some ahadith and 
some useful rules of figh for the purpose of recognizing an author's economic rights. 
No authority, however, is given to support the recognition of "al-hagq al-'ädabi" 
(the author's moral rights). The study presented arguments disapproving of an 
author's economic rights without setting out replies to or commenting on them. Abü 
Zayd concludes by advising the authors of religious books not to seek to profit from 
their works unless they are in need. 
The judgment on copyright is left somewhat vague in Abü Zayd's work. It is 
51 Al-Nashmi, Ajyl, al-Huqüq al-Manawiyya al-Ism al-Tyäri, Majallat Majma', Issue 5, vol. 111, 
p. 2271-2349. Al-Nashmi, Ajyl, al-ffuquq al-Ma'nawiyya li al-Barämy wa 'Ahkäm Naskhihä, al- 
Majlis al-Awrubbi, Dublin, The European Council for Fatwa and Research (First issue) (June 2002), 
120 and after. Also available online at: http: //www. e-cfr. org/englindex4. shtml 52 
Al-Nashmi, al-hluqüq al-Ma'nawiyya U al-Bardmij wa 'Ahkäm Naskhihä, p. 171. 
53 Ibid, p. 120 and after. 
54 Abi! Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawdzil, vol. 2, p. 77 and after. 
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necessary to point to the fact that the boundaries of what is ethically desirable and 
what is legally enforceable must be certain. However, Abu Zayd's essay is important 
as it enables researchers to confirm and add to their information and knowledge on 
the subject. 
Starting with a strict reply to al-Kurdi's article, Abü al-Khayr wrote a book of 
"al-Ilagq al-Mali lil-Mw'allif t al-Fiqh al-Islämi wa al-Qänün al-Masri". 55 In 
spite of its title, the entire work is based mainly on Egyptian copyright law with 
limited reference to copyright in Shari `a. After presenting some of al-Dirayni's 
arguments that accommodate copyright in Islamic jurisprudence, he added other 
evidence very briefly. Following al-Dirayni' opinion, Abü al-Khayr argued that 
copyright should last for 60 years after an author's death, which is not accurate. He 
did not give evidence on why he defined "ibtikär" (invention) with "ijtihäd" 
(conscientious reasoning). 
As an official religious institution, the Permanent Committee for "Iftä "` 
(Islamic Rulings) answered questions regarding copyright. It is worth mentioning 
the question and the answer. "Is the copying of software which I did not buy on my 
hard drive for my own use permissible or not? Answer by the Permanent Committee 
for Iftaa (Islamic Rulings), chaired by Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Biz: It is not 
permissible to copy software without permission from the original author or the 
copyright holder based on the following three ahadeeth of the Prophet,: (I) "Muslims 
are to honor their agreements (with others); " 2) "A Muslim's wealth is forbidden for 
others to use without his permission and,.,; " (3) "Whoever is the first to acquire a 
mubah (something lawful to acquire) is entitled to keep it. " This, of course, applies 
to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, because the right of a non-believer is 
respected in the same manner as a Muslim's right. " 56 
55 Abü al-Khayr, `Abd al-Sami', al-Hagq al-Mali Ii al-Mu'allif fi al-Fiqh al-Isldmi wa al-Qänün al- 
Micri, Cairo, Maktabat Wahba, (1988) (First Edition). 
56 Fatäwa al-Lajna al-dä'ima lil-Iftä, A1}mad 'Abd al-Razzäq al-Dwish(ed. ) Riyadh, al-Ri'äsa al- 
`Amma lil-Iftä wa al-Babüth, (1421AI-I/2000) (Third Edition), vol. 3, p. 188, Fatwa No. 18453, dated on 
12/l/1417AH, hereinafter: Fatäwa al-Lajna al-dä'ima. The translation of the first fatwa is by al- 
Jumuah Magazine, vol. 11, Issue 2, (May June 2000). 
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Anotherfatwa stated that it is permissible to copy or sell useful tapes or books 
without the consent of the original authors or the copyright holders unless the 
original owner explicitly does not allow that. 57 This fatwa is not, however, of itself a 
ground or the result of the Saudi Copyright Laws (1410AH) or (1423AH) although, 
`Izzät attempted to justify the Saudi Copyright Law in his book based on some of the 
previous studies looked at here 58 In fact, apart from referring to the succession 
according to Shari `a and the lunar calendar, the Saudi Law is no different from other 
secular laws. 
Answering the question of whether it is obligatory to abide by the standard 
notice in modem books that "rights of publications are reserved to the author or 
publisher" al-Sistäni stated that to abide by the notice is not obligatory but it is 
preferable to seek permission, especially from the author. 59 On the same theme, al- 
Tabarizi stated that copyright is not a "Shar `i" (religious) right but a believer should 
not do anything which deprives another of his work. However, he argues that if 
copyright has been infringed the author is not allowed to claim remedies. 
6° There are 
two serious problems with this approach. First, no authority or evidence is given to 
support thesefatawa. Second, they reduce copyright to a marginal status. 
A similar position was taken by al-Khalili set out in more detail but less 
extremism. He concluded that there is no justification for the hoarding of knowledge 
and thus no need to abide by the notice. He went on to say that, if the reproduction 
or copying of a work would harm an organization which has been established for the 
dissemination of knowledge, copyright should be observed. However, he argued that 
this is only applicable to those who want to copy for profit and there was no 
restriction on people who wanted to copy for learning. 
61 
57 Fatwa No. 18845 dated on 30/5/1417AH. 
58 'Izzät Mahmüd Muhammad Farid, Nizäm Himäyat Huqüq al-Mu'allif, Riyadh, the University of 
Imam Muhammad b. Sa'üd al-Islämiyya (1992/1413AH)., hereinafter: `Izzät , Nizdm. 59 Al-Sistäni, 'Ali al-Husayni, al -Mustahdäthat min al-Masäi'1 al -Shar'iyya, London, Mu'assasat 
al-Imdm'All, (1996/1416AH) (Second Edition), p. 28. These fatäwa translated by Hamid Mavani. It is 
also available online at: httn: //www. al-islam. org/laws/contemporary/index. html. 
60 Al-Tabarizi , www. TABRIZI. 
ORG, The official website of Grand Ayatolla Jawad Tabrizi's Office 
61 Al-Khalt1T, Ahmad Ibn Ilamad, Fatdwa al-Mu'ämaldt, Oman, Där al-Ajyäl, (1423AH/2003), 
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According to the fatawa of al-Sistäni and al-Khalili, copyright is redundant 
because respecting it is only recommended not compulsory. Most importantly, 
experience has shown that such a view could lead to the encouraging the denial of 
copyright and to the epidemic of piracy. This approach also ignores the fact that 
piracy has major consequences for daily life. And there is no inevitable conflict 
between copyright and the dissemination of knowledge. 
Although these fatäwa are not detailed studies, but they have great significance 
for Islamic societies because they arise from authoritative quarters in the name of 
religion and "the Islamic Shari `a is, in our terminology, both a code of law and a 
code of morals. "62 
Al-Najjär attempted to qualify the concept of moral rights of the author in figh 
in his book "al-Ilimäya al-Mugrarra li-Iluqüq al-Mw'allifiyyn ft al-Fiqh al-Islämi 
Mugdrana bil-Qänün ". 63 He presented the high religious and social position given to 
the sciences and scholars in the Qur'an and the Sunna. Indeed the author's moral 
rights and the high religious position given to sciences and scholars are close to each 
other but not identical. Therefore, the arguments for them cannot be identical. Al- 
Najjär also tried to explain the nature of the author's moral rights but he stated the 
social and economic consequences of authorship. He associated "isnäd"64 (the chain 
of the narrators) with the author's right of attribution or paternity. The evidence 
provided by al-Najjar in establishing isndd does not support copyright totally. 
However, al-Najjar represents strong arguments for the recognition of copyright 
even though this was dealt with only briefly and not in a systematic way. 
In a few pages of his book, al-Mu `ämalät al-Mäliyya Mu `äsira ft al-Fiqh al- 
IsldmY, Shubrr summarized some of the previous studies regarding copyright in 
Shari `a without any addition to support either the recognition of copyright or 
124. ý2 
Coulson, Noel J., Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence, The University of Chicago & 
London, (1969) p. 79. 
63 Al-Najjär, `Abd Allah, al- Iimäya al-Muqarrara I! - fuqüq al-Mu'allfyyn ft al-Fiqh al-Islämi 
Mugärana bi-lgänün' , Cairo, Där al-Nahclha, al-'Arabiyya(1990) (First Edition)., hereinaßer: Al- Naj j a-r. 
64 EI2, Entry: Isndd. 
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definition of hagq. Shubir applied the definition of ibtikär to be the definition of 
huqüq al-ibtikär attributing that to al-Dirayni. 65 
Al-Shanqiti devoted one chapter in his book "Diräsa Shar'iyya li-'Ahamm al- 
`Uqz d al-Mäliyya al-Mustahdatha" to a discussion of the transfer of financial rights 
(including copyright). 66 He drew no distinction between the author's moral rights 
and his economic rights. As regards the sale of copyright, he restated al-Dirayni's 
arguments. The study produced a good flowchart of rights as well as strong 
arguments in favor of the succession of copyright. This indicates that there is a 
considerable advance towards the confirmation of copyright in Islamic Law. 
Subsequently, the development of the notion of copyright under Shari `a seems 
to have reached some degree of "maturity" with a discussion during the Seventh 
Seminar on Contemporary zakdt Issues 1417AH 1997 of zakdt (alms) on intellectual 
property which included copyright. 67 The investigation was based on an initial 
premise which implied that copyright was recognized and well established infiqh. 
The seminar concluded, however, that the owner of intellectual property is not 
obliged to pay zakdt on intellectual property, unless the proceeds of intellectual 
property reach the level of nisdb68 or above. One needs to bear in mind that, the 
difference among scholars as to whether zakdt is payable immediately or, 
alternatively, after the passage of one lunar year in which the money is held in 
possession. 
It must be pointed out those arguments in other modern writings counter the 
ones set out so far and lead to some uncertainty and resistance to the concept of 
copyright. For example, Samära wrote an essay arguing that intellectual property is a 
65 Shubir, Muhammad 'Uthmän, al-Mu'dmalät al-Mäliyya Mu'dsira ft al-Fiqh al-Islämi, Amman, 
Dar al-Nafa'is, (1418AH/1998) (Second Edition), p. 47 and after. hereinafter: Shubir, al-Mu'dmaldt 
al-Maliyya. 
66 A1-Shangiti, Muhammad Mu$tafa, Dirasa Shar'iyya li- Ahamm al-'Uqüd al-Mäliyya al- 
Mustahdatha, al-Madina al-Munawwara, Maktabat al-'Ulüm wa al-IHikmm, (1422 AH/2001) (Second 
Edition), vol. 2, p. 739 and post, hereinafter: al-Shangiti. 
67 Bayt al-Zakdt al-Kuwayti, The Works and the Studies of the Seventh Seminar on Contemporary 
Zakdt Issues, Kuwait, 22-2411 2/1 41 7AH 29/4-1/5 1997, p. 593 and post, hereinafter. Bayt al-Zakdt 
Seminar. Al-Qaradägh?, 'Ali, Buhath fi al-Mu'amalät al-Mdliyya Mu'äsira, Beirut, Dar al-Bashä'ir 
al-Islamiyya, (1422 AH/2001) (First Edition), p. 393 and post, hereinafter: al-Qaradaghi. 
68 nisab is a minimum amount of a given kind of wealth for which zakät alms is due. 
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Western idea designed with the purpose of supporting the imperialist enterprise and 
to spread Western values and thus incompatible with Shari 'a. 69 
Another example is the book "ljuqüq al-Milkiyya al-Fikriyya ft al-Manzür al- 
IsldmF" by Muräd who summarized many of the previous studies in a somewhat 
confusing way. 70 The book made no effort to distinguish between different branches 
of intellectual property. Muräd accepted the international protection of intellectual 
property" but described this protection as a colonialist idea72 and Western "bid'a" 
(innovation) 73 Muräd referred to the argument that developing countries would 
benefit from joining the international protection of intellectual property as that 
would encourage the scientific research and development74 but dismissed this 
connection as false. 75 
Muräd refers to the abuse of intellectual property made by some companies76 
and the negative impact on poor countries of the International Agreements. " He 
agreed that intellectual property generally have been used to a large extent as 
instrument by powerful countries and companies but that intellectual property is not 
exclusive to such countries and companies for ever. 
From this perspective, al-Husyyn doubts the validity of the basis of an author's 
economic rights. 78 Al-Huýyyn described copyright as an alien concept in the Islamic 
legal system, one created by law and not by Shari 'a and one borrowed from the 
69 Samara, Ihsän, Mafltüm -fugtiq al-Milkiyya al-Fikriyya wa Dawabitihd ft al- Islam, Jordan 
Jarash, Kulliyyat al- Shari'a, (2001). 
70 Muräd, Dr Barkät Muhammad, Huqüq al-Milkiyya al-Fikriyya ft al-Manzür al-Islami, Riyadh, 
Mu'assasat al-Yamäma, (1423AH/2003) (Fist Edition). Hereinafter: Muräd. 
71 Ibid, p. 21. p119. 
72 Muräd, p. 43. 
73 Ibdi, p. 139 and post. bid'a means disapproval innovation in religion. 
'a Ibid, p. 39 
75 Ibid, p. 45. 
76 Ibid, p. 134. 
" Ibdi. p. 130. For a discussion of the problems associated with this issue, see General Evaluation of 
The Uruguay Round Agreements With Special Reference to The Impact of Trade Related Trade 
Related Investment Measurements (TRIMs) and Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) on Islamic 
countries which is made by ICCI Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, Pakistan; an 
affiliated organ of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Journal of Economic Cooperation 
Among Islamic Countries 16,1-2 (1995), 176-178. 
78 Al-Hupyn, $dlih, hal 1i al-Ta'alif Haqq Mali, an article at www. islamtoday. net dated on 
1/6/1423AH. Hereinafter: Al-llupyn. 
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capitalism environment. Al-Ilusyyn argues, however, that Shari`a must govern 
copyright and considers that this means that the protection should be granted to 
works that do not conflict with Shari `a, provided the author clearly requests 
protection of copyright for his work. According to al-IIusyyn's view, these 
conditions only apply to non-religious works whilst religious books must be 
available freely to all Muslims. In general, he aligns more closely with the 
conclusion reached by Abü Zayd. 
Apart from the condition of the legitimacy of works, the conclusion of al- 
Iiusyyn appears to be arbitrary and unjust. The author considers the error of this 
approach is in its confusion between the basis and source of rights and the discovery 
and regulating of those rights. Copyright is conferred on people from different 
backgrounds. The article by al-IIuýyyn indicates that copyright has not been 
completely recognized or accepted by some religious circles and the argument seems 
to threaten to render copyright redundant. 
It is useful to mention here that al-Ghiryäni issued afatwa permitting only the 
copying of scientific programs or essential computer programs without the consent 
of the company owner, if the latter unlawfully refuses to sell those programs. 
79 The 
distinction of this fatwa is the analogy that was made between the technical 
protection of programs and "hirz". 80 Hirz generally means any measure designed to 
restrict access to or prevent unauthorized reproduction of works such as a password. 
One should bearing in mind here that the destruction of "hirz" in order to steal 
goods is one of the clear conditions applicable in a decision to amputate a thief's 
hand as a "hadd" (punishment). 
In accordance with Abü Zayd's approach, al-Shahräni wrote a dissertation 
entitled "Huqüq al-Ikhtirä ` wa al-Ta'rf fi al-Fiqh al-Islämi '. 81 This dissertation 
79 Al-Ghiryäni, al-Sädiq, Fatäwa wa Tahg7qät ft Masd'il Fiqhiyya Takthur al-ydjatu 'ilayhd, 
Muprata, Där wa Maktabat al-Sha'ab, (2003) (First Edition), p. 166-170. 
8° Hirz means a reasonable place or custody which an owner can keep his property usually according 
to its value and nature. 
81 Al-Shahräni, Ilusayn b, Malawi, Huqüq al-Ikhträ' wa al-Ta'lijf al-Fiqh al-lsldmi, Riyadh, Dar 
al-T a'a li al-Nashar wa al-Tawzi' (1425AH/2004) (First Edition). Hereinafter: Al-Shahräni. 
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surveyed copyright terminology in Islamic and legal studies but this had nothing to 
advance or oppose the establishment of copyright in Shari 'a. The study focused on 
the lexical interpretation of "al-07(authorship) and "al-ikhtird °' (invention). 
After providing a useful survey of the term "right" and definitions of ownership al- 
Shahräni chose what he thought were most appropriate for defining copyright and 
ownership. 
Al-Shahräni tried carefully to deduce Islamic judgments based on different 
ingredients of copyright. The study cannot avoid being drawn into a discussion on 
copyright by assuming that what has been said about copyright is applicable to all 
intellectual property, whereas there is clear distinction between each branch of 
intellectual property. As stated before, the biggest criticism of this approach 
concerns its over-generalization. 
The title of al-Shahräni's work may lead a reader to think that its subject matter 
covers both copyright and intellectual property branches but copyright is considered 
more than any other branch. In this study, also, one might notice that the emphasis is 
on a consideration of copyright as applied to religious writings. The most significant 
element of al-Shahräni's study is the application of "ta `zir "82 to different forms of 
infringement of copyright. 83 
1.7.3 Copyright as applied to figh in legal textbooks 
The picture of the growth of copyright in figh would be incomplete if we did 
not mention those Arabic legal textbooks which have considered this subject. Many 
books have been written on the subject of copyright but none have studied the 
subject in the Shari `a. These textbooks have not provided or mentioned an Islamic 
82 Ta'zTr means "discretionary punishment to be delivered for transgression against God, or against an 
individual for which there is neither fixed punishment nor penance (kara)", see El-Awa, 
Mohamed, Punishment in Islamic Law, Indianapolis, American Trust Publications, (1998/1418H) 
F, 96. See also EI2, Entry: Ta'zir. 
3 Al-Shahräni, p. 527 and post. 
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framework or source for copyright. In fact, these writings are mostly types of 
commentary on secular copyright laws and expressive of civil law and Western 
scholarship. 
The reason for this may be that since the publication of "Qänün Hagq al- 
Mu'allif' (The Author's Right)84 in 1908/1326AH Muslim States have attempted to 
legislate for copyright to align themselves with more internationally acceptable 
practices but have ignored the possibility of deriving copyright from Shari 'a itself. 
The notable absence of contributions regarding copyright in Islamic Law since 
al-Sanhüri 85 is eased somewhat by Kan`än's book "hlagq al-Mwa'1 f'. S6 Yet there 
are some references in these works to copyright in Shari `a, but no sustained 
arguments. Some attention to Islamic Law is indicated. 
In a few pages, Kan`än summarized some of the previous studies, with some 
mistakes such as inaccurate citations and referring to some quotations made by 
fugahä' (jurists) as hadiith. A few pages of Turkey Sagar's book "Himäyt Iluqüq al- 
Mwa'liff, bayn al-Nazariyyti wa a1-Tatbiq" provides another exception, with the 
same mistakes in one and half page. 87 
One might consider here the fact that works of the quality represented by these 
books can be interpreted as evidence of the ignorance and disinterest with which 
Islamic Law is treated in many academic circles. It is not surprising, therefore, to 
find no mention of Shari 'a or its sources in the Arabic Treaty of the Authors' Rights 
Protection. 88 
84 'Izzät, Nizdm, p. 85. 
85 Al-Sanhu-n-, 'Abd al-Razzäq, al-Wasift Sharh al-Qänün al-Madani al-Jadid, Cairo, Dar al-Nahda 
al-'Arbiyya, (1967). vol. 8. 
86 Kan`än, Nawäf, Vaqq al-Mu'alif, al-Namädhj al- Mua'a, ira Ii-Hagq al-Mu'alif wa Wasä'il 
Himäyatihä, (2004) (First Edition) Amman, Dar al-Thaqafa,. p. 23-33. 
87 $agar, Turkey, Himäyt Huqüq al-Mu'alrf, bayn al-Nazariyya wa al-Ta{biq, Damascus, Manshürät 
Itibad al-'Arab (1996). 
88 The 3rd session of the conference of the ministers of culture affairs held in Baghdad 2.11.1981, 
Majallat al-Näshir al-'Arabi, p203,2 "d issue, Feb. 1984, Tripoli, Itehäd al-Näshirin al-'Arab. 
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1.7.4 Copyright applied tofiqh in English works 
As stated in its abstract, the major concerns of Azmi study's are to "evaluate 
the intellectual property laws in Malaysia" according to Islamic law, and "to prove 
that a coherent conceptual framework of ownership of intellectual property can be 
derived from an Islamic perspective", that satisfies international treatises and 
Islam. 89 
These aims are inconsistent with an approach which assumes that "there a 
vacuum exists in authentic sources as to the basis of intellectual property", 90 whereas 
there is good authoritative evidence indicating the flexibility and capability in 
accommodating intellectual property in Islamic jurisprudence. Azmi's work does not 
provide a literature review and relies mainly on al-Dirayni's direction. 
Azmi's study contains some interpretations which has attracted criticism. For 
example, the claim that the Qur'änic verse that praises those who have knowledge 
and the prophetic hadith that allows a person to be selective of the recipient of 
information would support the notion that `ideas' "can become the subject of private 
property" 91 Also, it is difficult to claim that "Muslim scholars argued that the 
duration of copyright is 60 years after the demise of the author". 92 Azmi did not set 
out convincing arguments to support the suggestion that there should be a 
readjustment of an agreed price for an authors' work by a judicial body if the work 
proved to be more successful than the parties thought. Despite these remarks, Azmi 
has provided a valuable source of reference for the English reader. 
Similarly to the approach of Abi! Zayd and al-Husyyn, the Advanced Legal 
Institute93 questioned whether the earlier Muslim jurists would have upheld 
89 Azmi, Ida Madieha Abdul Ghani, Intellectual Property Laws and Islam in Malaysia, a dissertation 
submitted to the Queen Mary &Westfield for the degree of D. Phil. in 1995. p. i and p. 3, hereinafter 
Azmi, Intellectual Property. 
90 [bid, p. 309. 
91 Ibid, p. 79. 
92 Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 87. 
93 Advanced Legal Studies Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
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intellectual property rights as they are understood and implemented today''. 94The 
Institute pointed out that a form closer to Islamic intellectual property rights is the 
Open Publication License, where any material is free without any restrictions whilst 
acknowledging the sources. 95 
The Institute argued that some well-known fugaha' such as al-Suyüti 
(d. 911AH/1505) were transmitting from each other the original work of "al-Ashbdh 
wa al-Nazäi'r" by al-Karkhi (d. 340AH/951/2). 96 However, the rest of this statement 
(with each subsequent author making his own contribution) 97 could be used against 
the argument. Nevertheless, assuming that the transmission as asserted is true, it 
cannot stand as a strong argument in Shari `a for violating copyright. 
Moreover, this approach rests upon the assumption that the Open Publication 
License will help the research and to promote knowledge. In this respect it is likely 
that copyright provides a stronger incentive than the Open Publication License does. 
Jamar tried in an article to apply some of the basic principles of Islamic law to 
general standards of intellectual property protection 98 He compared and tested 
Egyptian law to see how consistent it was with Islamic law as regards many aspects 
of intellectual property. 
Jamar used the principles of Shari `a: "maslaha" (the public interest), the 
sanctity of property and contract and, even Islamic criminal law, as he understood 
these concepts and rules to fashion a framework which provided a rigorous 
protection to intellectual property for foreign clients in Muslim countries. It would 
appear that Jamar subconsciously thinks more of this type of protection than of the 
position of copyright in Shari `a. As result of that, Jamar was unnecessarily drawn 
into a discussion of some areas which requires a fuller exploration. For example, the 
question of whether a Qur'änic provision may be ignored, modified or interpreted to 
94 Available online at: http: //www. nvazee. com/index. html 
95 Ibid. 
96 Available online at: http: //www. nyazee. com/index. html. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Jamar, Steven D., (The Protection of Intellectual Property Under Islamic Law) Capital University 
Law Review, Washington, Howard University School of Law, (1992). vol. 21 1079-1106, hereinafter: 
Jamar. 
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be consistent with maslaha or"`urf' (custom). 
Without accurate investigation or authentic evidence Jamar reached some 
dubious conclusions such as "Royalties are not riba, or interest or usury, and the 
contract is not uncertain so this provision should withstand Shari'a scrutiny". This 
article can be used as a modern example of what Strawson described when he stated: 
"English texts do not present Islamic Law, they construct it". 99 
It is sufficient in the present context to refer very briefly to the Habib page on 
the Internet. Habib approached the subject in a sympathetic way and translated some 
of the above- mentioned works into English. 100 
It should be acknowledged that the European Council for Fatwa and Research 
recently endorsed broadly the same decision as the Fiqh Academy, adding computer 
software programs. 1°' 
1.7.5 Summary 
This literature review sets out the historical development of copyright and its 
religious context. The position of copyright in Shari 'a has many difficulties to be 
resolved. This is because it is a new issue that Shari `a does and has not addressed 
directly. There are, however, some elements of copyright which are treated under 
various headings of frgh and hadith. For example, isnäd and ijdza can be seen as 
supplying roots for the foundations of copyright. 
Although copyright has not been addressed adequately in the same way as other 
similar subjects in frgh, the idea of copyright has developed in the fiqh. In 
contemporary writings on fiqh, there are some serious studies and fatawa on 
copyright, but no single full account of applying the usül al-fiqh to this issue has 
been attempted. 
Many studies treated copyright generally under intellectual property. This 
99 Strawson, John, Islamic Law and English Texts, Law and Critique, vol. 5, PT I, p2I-38. 
ioo I labib, Copyright under Islamic Law. 
101 In its eighth session in Spain in Jumadd a! - Akhira 1422 All/July 2001. available online at: 
http: //www. c-cfr. org/cnglindcx4. shtmi 
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generalization is to be disputed to secure the urgent need for a detailed and specific 
treatment of the subject. The uncertainty of copyright in fiqh should be dealt with by 
a deep and profound study. 
Some studies have not found any clear text in the Qur'än and the Sunna dealing 
with the subject. Other works do not apply some particular constructive rules offiqh 
and usül al-fiqh systematically. Examining these studies in depth goes beyond the 
scope of this section but remarks on each of them indicate that the subject needs 
more analysis and elaboration. Despite the remarks and difference of perspectives, 
the previous studies enrich our understanding of the issue of copyright in Shari`a. 
As we have seen, there are a number of fugahä' who have strongly called for 
the recognition of copyright whilst others seem generally sympathetic to such a call 
without expressly supporting the recognition of copyright and a third group that is 
more cautious about the legitimacy of copyright pointing out, for example, the 
disadvantages and the conflict with other rights and considerations that a recognition 
of copyright would cause. 
This section contains several matters for debate and many differing views that 
will continue to be expressed. What cannot be doubted is that we are seeing the 
concept of copyright infiqh progress and evolve from a point of weakness to a point 
of strength. Fugahä' have not been very favorable to copyright but they have slowly 
strengthened the usage of copyright. This progress arises despite some continuing 
criticism that copyright reduces the widespread dissemination of knowledge. 
Clearly, the question as to whether copyright can have deep-rooted place in 
Islamic Law requires "ýtihäd" (conscientious reasoning). Ijtihäd on copyright 
should be exercised according to the terms, conditions and principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence. One is required, therefore, to discover Islamic solutions necessary for 
the possibility of an effective recognition of copyright. 
Chapter one 
]Yagq and its Classifications in Shari `a 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to cover two main objectives. The first is to give a 
comprehensive review of the definitions of "Hagq" which can loosely be translated 
as "right"; by inspecting its notion, factors and applicability to copyright in general. 
The second is to review the main classifications of hagq used in figh to examine 
whether they can be employed or extended to include copyright. 
`Hagq" is a term which can be observed in every aspect of life. Various legal 
systems locate the notion of right at the centre of their attention. It is one of the most 
important concepts of substantive law. 
The following chapter will provide some structure to the understanding of hagq 
infiqh. Defining the key term hagq is important to the start of researching copyright 
and other new rights in Shari `a within its boundaries. The precise answer to the 
question whether or not copyright can have place under Shari `a depends on the 
analysis of the construction of bagq. A study of copyright under Shari `a must begin 
with what is meant by hagq in order to establish or reject copyright according to the 
Shari `a. Only after this task is undertaken, can copyright begin to be considered on 
conceptual grounds within the classifications of hagq in figh. 
To achieve these objectives, it is necessary to retain familiarity with the 
fundamentals of fiqh and ucül al-fiqh and it is also useful to remind the reader that 
the Islamic law ultimately is product of religion. 
1.2 Meanings of Hagq: 
It is necessary to start with the word meaning in the Arabic language as it is the 
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language of Shari `a. The word hagq (pl. huqüqJ occurs in the Qur'änl and Islamic 
traditions as in the pre-Islamic literature referring to these following meanings: (1)" 
thdbit": real, established, fact, true, truth (2) "wdjib": due to Allah or man obligation, 
duty (3) "mawjüd": exist (4) "sahib": correct, straight, accurate, appropriate, justice, 
legitimate, virtue, suitable, honorably ethical, (5) "mal": wealth, money, property, 
share (6) "khusilma": dispute, claim, litigation (7) the antonym of "bätil' which 
means falsehood, invalid, error or moral wrong. 2 
The word hagq had another meaning after the revelation of the Qur'an, which is 
one of "al Asmä' al-Husnd' (the ninety-nine Divine names of Allah) and one of His 
almighty attributes which reflects its value. After a rigorous scrutiny of the various 
meanings for hagq in Arabic one can conclude that it implies the two essential 
meanings: certainty and obligation. These two meanings are more present and 
highly valued in usage than other meanings which could be regarded as synonyms of 
or substitutes for the first two meanings. It appears that all instances of the word 
employ the'two meanings in different ways and it is only subsequent expansion of 
this word that gives it other additional meaning. 
It is not a vague word but it does cover several meanings. Any actual usage of 
the word hagq will be connected to a specific meaning from this previous spectrum 
of possible meanings. This diversity of meanings can be taken as a sign of fertility 
and perceived in its terminology and not as evidence of ambiguity. Therefore, there 
Hagq is mentioned 283 times in the Qur'än, but it never comes in plural. 
2 Abü al-Husayn Al mad bin Faris, Mujmal al-Lugha, Zuhayr Sultan (ed. ), Beirut, Mua'ssasat al- 
Risäla, (1984) (First Edition), vol. 1, p. 210. herteinafter: Mujmal al-Lugha. Al-Jawhari, lsmä'Y1 bin 
Hamad, Täj al-Lugha wa dish al- Arabiyya, Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghafilr(ed. ), Beirut, Dar al-'Ilm, 
(1987) (Fourth Edition), vol. 4, p. 460., hereinafter: 
Al-Jawhari. AI-Aýfahäni, al-Räghib, al-Mufraddt fi 
Gharib al-Qur'an, Muhammad Kayläni, (ed. ), Beirut, Dar al-Ma'rifa, (N. D) p. 125, hereinafter: al- 
A$fahäni, al-Mufraddt. Al-Zamakhshari, Mahmiid, Asäs al-Baldgha, Muhammad Basil 'Uyün al-Süd 
(ed. ), Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, (1998) (First Edition), vol. 1, p. 203, hereinafter: al- 
Zamakhsharl, Asds al-Balägha. Ibn Man? dr, Muhammad b. Makaram, Lisän al-Arab, Beirut, Dar 
$Adir, (1994) (Third Edition) vol. 10, p. 
49, hereinafter: Ibn Manzür. Al-Zäwi, al-Tahir, Tarfib al- 
Qämüs al-M467/, Tripoli, Dar al-'Arabiyya li al-Kitäb, (1980) (Third Edition), vol. 1, 
p. 679. hereinafter: al-Zäwi, Tartib al-Qämüs. AI-Sharabä$Y, Ahmad, al-Mu jam al-Igtisädi al-Isläml, 
Beirut, Dar al-Jil, (1401 AH/1981), p. 117, hereinafter: al-SharabäýY. 
3 Karnali, Muhammed Hashim, Fundamental Rights of the Individual: An Analysis of Hagq (Right) 
in Islamic Law, available on line at: http: //www. thefigh. org/article., hereinafter: Karnali, 
Fundamental Rights. 
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is no real evidence to claim that the original meaning of the root hagq in Arabic 
4s became obscured, or "that there is no standard meaning of the term hagq. In fact, 
hagq in the context of Shari `a has a wider interpretation than in its legal meaning. 
However, it is commonplace to point to the fact that a translation cannot fully 
transfer the meaning of the Arabic original with all its nuances. 
1.3 Technical Definitions of Haqq: 
Although, the word hagq and its forms appeared ubiquitously in the Qur'an and 
the ahädith, there is no specific technical definition of hagq in these sources. 
Generally, fugahä' used the word hagq to refer to everything that human kind might 
be entitled to do, to have or to claim. 6 This included money, salary, wages, property, 
the legitimate capacity or entitlement such as "hadäna" (right of custody), utility or 
interest and the right of option or ownership. 7 It was also used to refer to the 
contract's obligations, the contract's rights, 8 the right of way or right to air, and 
abstract. 
In fact, the majority of fugahä' were not engaged in the process of defining 
hagq terminology, but they used it very often to refer to all its literal meanings. Thus 
fugahä' use hagq as wide as the Arabic language would support the usage whether 
hagq is for exclusiveness or for common, referring to interest, usufruct, assets or 
profit .9 They are considered to be simply a set of occurrences with different degrees 
of strength. `Iysawi observed that the fugaha' use the word hagq to refer to 
EI2, Entry: "Hakk". 
S Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 102. 
6 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fighiyya, vol. 18, p. 10, Hagq entry. ma means everything that a person entitles to 
have not the entitlement itself. See Karnali, Muhammad Hashim, Freedom of Expression in Islam, 
Cambridge, UK Islamic Texts Society, (1979) (Revised Edition). p. 263, hereinafter: Karnali, 
Freedom of Expression. 
7 AI-Mawsa'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 18, p. 11. 
8 Al-Sanhüri, `Abd al-Razzäq. Masädir al-Hagq fi al-fiqh al-Islämi, Cairo, Arabic States League, 
(1954) (First Edition), p. 9-10., hereinafter: al-Sanhüri, Ma., ddir al-Ilagq. 
Al-Khafif, 'AIY, al-Milkiyya fi al-Shari`a al-Isldmiyya bi'l-Mugdrana bi al-Sharäi' al-Wad'iyya, 
Cairo, Arabic States League, (1966) (First Edition) vol. 1, p. 2, hereinafter: al-Khafif, al-Milkiyya fi al- 
Shari `a. 
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everything relating to interest, property, utility and abstract things. 10 
The reason for this lack of technical definition is the clarity and diversity of its 
various linguistic meanings. Also it might be asserted that fugaha' were not very 
favorable to the notion of defining hagq. Therefore, the technical definition of hagq 
did not exist in the greater part of the early writings such as al-Muwatta'. 
Beside that, there have been a few attempts to define hagq by some earliest 
fugahd'. For example, al-Mirwazi (d. 462AH/1069) defined hagq as the exclusive 
possession of something, which represents the legitimate objects of it. " His 
definition introduced the concept of "ikhtisd$" (the exclusivity) to light for the first 
time. This can be of value not only to the researcher who seeks to define hagq, but 
also to the legal historian. '2 
Choosing one of its meanings, al-Asbahäni (d. 535AIH/1140) defined hagq as 
the actual existence or the inevitable existence in future of any thing. 13 This 
definition brings us to the linguistic meanings without any addition. 
According to al-Qaräfi (d. 684AH/1285), the right of Allah is His commands 
and His prohibitions while the rights of a human are "ma$dlihuh" his interests. 14 This 
is close to a classification rather than a definition, but it draws attention to the 
importance of a "maslaha" (interest) at an early stage. Copyright represents an 
author's interest, while the relevant' commands of Allah should be observed in 
accommodating copyright in Shari 'a. 
Referring to the philosophical debate on the subject of existence, `Ala' al-Din 
al-Bukhäri (d. 736AH/1335) chose to define hagq as any thing that exists entirely 
10 'Isawi, Ahmad, al-Madkhal li'l-Fiqh al-Islams, Cairo, Matba'at al-Ta'ä1if, (1963) (First Edition), 
337, hereinafter: `Isawi. 
Al-`Abbädi, `Abd al-Saläm, al-Milkiyya fi al-Shari'a al-Islamiyya, Amman, Maktabat a1-Aqua, 
(1394AH/1974) (First Edition), footnote p. 96, vol. l. , hereinafter: al-`Abbädi. 12 Al-Nashmi, Majallat Majma', Issue 5, vol. III, p. 2293, footnote No. 4. 
13 Al-Nawawi, Muhyi al-Din b. Sharaf, Sharh Sahih Muslim Muhammad 'Abd al-Bägi, (ed. ), Beirut, 
Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyya, (1421AH/2000) (First Edition), vol. 1, p. 204. hereinafter: al-Nawawi, 
Shark Sahth Muslim. 
14 Al-Qara-ff, Ahmad b. Idris, al-Furiiq, Khalil al-Mangür, (ed. ), Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-7lmiyya, 
(1418 A. H /1988) (First Edition), vol. 1 p. 256, hereinafter: al-Furüq. 
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without doubt about its existence. 15 It is very similar to al-Asbahäni's definition. 
In addition, in his collection of definitions, al-Jurjäni (d. 816AH/1413) defined 
hagq as the corresponding judgment to the reality and which could be used in 
opinions, beliefs and religions. 16 Largely, this definition seems to be designed from 
the point of view of philosophy rather than a legal view. However, copyright had not 
emerged substantially as we know it today but there is no doubt about its existence 
and significance in the present age. 
A wider definition of hagq is suggested by al-Dusügi (d. 1230AH/1814) as a 
general classification consisting of money, "khiyär" (option), "gisds" (legal 
retaliation), guardianship, "wall'"' (patronage or allegiance) and so on. 17 It seems 
to be a descriptive rather than a normative definition. While it presents the familiar 
view prevailing among fugaha', it can be used to include copyright as a group of 
rights, wealth and options. 
From another perspective, the scholars of usül al-fiqh (the principles of 
jurisprudence) debated whether hagq must be unique or whether it could be a 
number of decisions. 18 Here, they considered that hagq refers to "huk n" resulting 
from the process of "ijtihäd" (conscientious reasoning) made by a "mujtahid" (an 
independent jurist) on the basis of evidence found in the sources of the Shari `a. It is 
not surprising that "mujtahidün" (independent jurists) differ in their conclusions, 
when they try to detect or formulate hukm. However, it is not accurate to subsume 
15 Al-Bukhän 'A1ä' al-Din, Kashf al Asrär 'an U, sül Fakhr al-Islam al-Bazdawi, Beirut, Dar al-Kitäb 
al-`Arabi (1974) (First Edition), Vol. 4, p. 134, hereinafter: al-Bazdawi. 
16 Al-Jurjäni, AND al-Hasan All b. Muhammad, al-Ta'rft, Muhammad Basil `Uyiin al-Süd, (ed. ), 
Beirut; Dar al-Kutub al-'llmiyya, (1421AH/2000) (First Edition), p. 94., hereinafter: al-Jurjäni, al- 
Ta'riJt. Al-An$äri, Zakariyya b. Muhammad al-Qädi, al-Hudüd al-Dagiqa wa al-Ta'artýt al-. 4niga, 
Mäzin Mubärak, (ed. ) Beirut, Dar al-Fikr al-Mu'ä$ir, (1991) (First Edition), p. 75. Al-Kafawi, Abü al- 
Bagä' Ayyikb b. Müsä, al-Kulliyyät, `Adnän Darwish and Muhammad al-Mipri, Cairo, (eds), Dar al- 
Kitäb al-Islämi, (1992) (Second Edition), p. 237, vol. 2, hereinafter: al-Kafawi. Abü Jayb, Sa`di, al- 
Qämlis al-Fighi Lughatan wa Islildhan, Damascus, Dar al-Fikr, (1402 AH/ 1982) (First Edition), 
V4. 
Al-Dusügi, Shams al-Din Muhammad 'Arafa, Häshiyat al-Dusüg7 'ala al-Sharp al-Kabir, Beirut, 
Dar al-Film, (1423AH/2003), vol. 4, p. 710., hereinafter: al-Dusügi. 
'ß Al-Ghiryäni, al-Sädiq. Ta{bigät Qawa'id al-fiqh, Sabhä, Matäbi' al-Jamdhiriyya(1422AH) (First 
Edition), p. 73. 
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hagq under the concept of hukm19 or vice versa. Flagq and hukm meet in many 
varieties but each concept has its own scope, applications and meanings. 
In addition, the scholars of ucz l al-fiqh classified "mahkzim fih" (the subject 
matter of judgment) into "huqüq Allah" (rights of Allah), "buqz7q al- `abd" (rights of 
the individual) and "buqz7q Allah wa al- `abd " (rights of Allah and the individual). 
Here hagq can be action, obligation, duty, benefit, claim, privilege or a 
recommendation that is contained in the "hukm ". In this classification, "buqz7q 
Allah" means rights of Allah that include prayer and Allah's penal ordinances, in 
contrast to "buqz7q a! - `abd" which means rights of man such as debts or goods. 
Iluqüq Allah wa al- `abd means rights of Allah and man conjointly such as "gisäs". 
There is generally some difference in determining whether a particular judgment 
manifests a right of Allah, a right of the individual, or a combination of both. 
Reflection on these previous attempts at definition might bring one to the 
conclusion that some contemporary studies are mistaken in claiming that "classical 
jurists have not articulated a juridical definition for hagq, but have relied on the 
lexical meaning of the word" . 
20 Obviously the previous definitions refute this claim 
even, they meet neither consensus of all fugahä' nor widespread among them. Other 
studies have rejected this criticism viewing it as a form of slighting of the Shari'a. 21 
It has been suggested that this reticence does not reflect any intellectual hesitation or 
inability but pertains to the will of wide ranging use of the word hagq. 
Bearing in mind that copyright is a new institution, it is essential to recognize 
the definitions of hagq in modem Islamic jurisprudence. A great intellectual effort 
has been made by some contemporary fugahä' to define hagq terminology. From 
this attempt, four different approaches for defining hagq have been proposed and 
developed gradually. The central difference is between fuqaha' who think that 
"hagq" is based solely on "ikhti$df' (exclusivity), and fugahä' who think that 
"hagq" is "maslaha" (interest). The range of hagq's definitions in modem writings 
19 Karnali, Freedom of Expression, p. 265. Kamali, Fundamental Rights. 
20 Karnali, Freedom of Expression, p. 263, and see Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 104. 21 Tammüm, Muhammad, al-Nagq ft al-Shari a al-Islämiyya, Cairo, al-Maktaba a1-Mahmüdiyya al- 
Tijäriyya, (1398AH/1978) (First Edition), p. 32., hereinafter: Tammüm. 
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is very broad; therefore, this chapter will mention briefly the most outstanding ones. 
1.4 Definitions of Ilagq with reference to "ikhtisds" (exclusivity) 
This approach to define hagq has been adopted by many modern scholars. It 
transfers and limits the meaning of hagq to the meaning of "ikhtisds". One must 
therefore consider the precision of the ikhtisds used in this approach. 
The word "yakhts" (derived from ikhtisds) is mentioned in Qur'an several times 
and has the meaning of "making something exclusive for someone". Some verses 
using this word can be translated as: "But Allah will choose for His special mercy 
whom He will-for". 22 Ikhti$d y can be translated as "exclusive appropriation", 
"exclusive possession" or "exclusive assignment" in order to preclude any thing that 
is for the public generally or with some qualifications or conditions. 
Fugahd' use the word "ikhtisäs" to describe the exclusive relationship between 
the right bearer and the subject matter of his right that gives him sole absolute 
authority to use, dispose or take advantage of the subject matter and which prevents 
others from having any of these privileges without his consent. 
According to this approach, the essence of "hagq" is "ikhtfsds" the 
exclusiveness in favor of the right owner to eliminate what is "ibdha" (at liberty) or 
"idhn" (permission). This view is emphasized by al-Zargä (d. 1420AH/1999), who 
defined hagq as "ikhtisäs". In his statement "hagq is an exclusive assignment 
established by the Shari `a in a form of "sulta" (authority or power) or "taklif 
(command or commission . i23In 
fact, al-Zargä endorsed and renovated the definition 
of "milk" (ownership) proposed by al-Qudsi 4 as the definition of "hagq ". 
This definition was developed by al-Dirayni who added: "... in order to achieve 
22 Qur'dn 2. v. 105 and 3. v. 74. See: The Holy Qur'än English Translation of the Meaning and 
Commentary, Abdullah Yusuf All. 
23 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. Al-Zargä, Nazariyyat al-Iltizam, p. 18. 24 Al-Khafff, al-Milkiyya vol. 1, p. 64. 
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a certain interest "maslaha". 25 However, this addition was made whilst he had 
rejected the notion of defining hagq by maslaha. 26 
Following this doctrine, al-`Abbädi defined hagq with the slight addition "as an 
exclusive assignment established by the Shari 'a in the form of "sulfa" given to man 
over another or "taktif' imposed for the sake of Allah upon people"? ' 
With adherence to the ikhtisds approach, Tammüm attempted to combine 
huqüq of Allah with huqüq al- `abd in one definition. He defined hagq as "a 
legitimate relationship that provides the exclusiveness of "sulta" or "taklt 
imposed on a person accompanied by the compliance of another person whether it is 
compulsorily or voluntarily" 28 However, even with this amendment, the definition 
prescribes a new meaning to hagq. It remains difficult to define right as relationship 
without evidence from Shari `a. Furthermore, it is apparent that the compliance of a 
person with hagq is not an essential element of hagq. 
Finally, the drafters of the Arabic Unified Financial Transactions Bill propose 
that hagq is "ikhtisäs"; "an exclusive assignment established by law to provide a 
person with "sulta" or "taklif ' whether it is financial or not". 29 The drafters of the 
Bill refer to hagq in which the emphasis on ikhtisd$ has been specifically mentioned. 
According to al-Zargä's analysis, hagq is hagq only if it corresponds to 
something allocated to the right-bearer to the exclusion of everyone else. Ilagq must 
entitle its bearer a special advantage exclusively, which is called ikhtisäs. It is a 
relationship existing between the right owner and the subject matter and established 
by "a! - Shari "' (the lawgiver), whether this right personal or financial. 
30 
Hagq is an absolute and special privilege conferred upon a person by a virtue of 
25 Al-Dirayni, Fathi, al-Hagq wa Madä Sultan al-Dawlafi Tagyidihi, Beirut, Mu assasat al-Risala, 
(1400 AH/1981) (First Edition), p. 139. Hereinafter: Al-Dirayni, Fathi, al-Hagq wa Madd Sultan al- 
Dawla. 
26 Al-Bakkä', `Adanän, al-Hukm wa al-Hagq bayn al- Fugahä' wa al-Usüliyyln, Najaf, Matab'at al- 
hari, (1976) (First Edition), p. 155. 
7 Al-'Abbädi, vol. 1, p. 103. 
28 Tammtim, p. 38. 
29 Al-Zargä, Nazariyyat al-Iltizäm, p. 310, article 137 of the Arabic Unified Financial Transactions 
Bill in 1984. 
30 Al-Zargä, Nazariyyat al-lltizdm, p. 20. 
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SharT'a that no one has liberty, permission or license to its subject matter other than 
the right bearer. The association to the right bearer and avoidance of others are both 
essential to the functioning of the hagq. Hagq is exclusive. It is to exclude people 
from using, benefiting and disposing of its subject-matter absolutely without the 
consent of the right bearer. 
The advocates of this approach, from al-Zargä onwards, thought that the 
exclusiveness is necessary for hagq to be distinguished clearly from "ibdha" 
(liberty) or "idhn " (permission), which are established generally for anyone. 
Subsequently, it is necessary to confine the subject matter of hagq entirely in favor 
of the right owner in particular. 
Al-Zargä justified the emphasis on (ikhti$d$) "exclusiveness" that as: (it is 
essentially impossible to recognize hagq unless it provides a privilege exclusively to 
the right owner which is unauthorized for others ... there 
is no hagq without the 
exclusiveness which is the key element of hagq). 31 The basic assumption is that if 
there is no exclusivity, there is no right at all. He is content that hagq is reducible to 
a relation of ikht4d between a person and a thing (ownership) or between two 
persons or more (debt or work). Therefore, ikhtisds is the identity character of hagq 
which distinguishes it from other concepts such as ibdha and idhn. 
In line with this approach, al-Dirayni's agreed that the core concept of hagq is 
the exclusivity stating that "... ikhti. c z. the exclusiveness is necessary for the 
definition because it is the main foundation of hagq as it is the relationship between 
the right owner and the subject matter" 32 
In addition, the principle of exclusiveness is expressed and reflected in many 
ways in copyright. There is a direct link between the notion of exclusiveness of a 
right and exploitation of copyright. The view that right is to be perceived essentially 
as ikhtisd$ is useful in that, copyright must be recognized, protected and reserved 
only to owners. 
31 Al-Zargä, Nazariyyat al-Iltizäm, p. 20. 
32 Al-Dirayni, al-Hagq wa Madd Sultan al-Dawla p. 139. 
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Observing ikhtisäs and other factors al-Bakkä' defined hagq as "the exclusive 
relationship established by Shari 'a in the form of "sulfa" specified in certain limits 
and capable of renouncement". 3 There is some ambiguity as to what constituted 
"specified in certain limits" that leads to an imprecise definition. Another objection 
is that, the capability of renouncement is not a necessary condition or ground to 
establish hagq. 
This definition is similar to that states "Ilagq is a power, whether material or 
spiritual, that the law has granted to a person over another person, over property, or 
over both". 34 In these definitions, sulfa means power granted to the right-bearer over 
an object, property or a person. 
Defining hagq as power is not supported by original Islamic evidence. Equally 
inaccurate is the assertion that hagq means law. 35 A distinction must be drawn 
between hagq and other concepts such as power or law, even if they are closely 
related. Therefore, it cannot be said that hagq has been defined clearly in this 
approach. 
1.5 Some remarks on defining Ilagq with reference to ikhtifaf 
This doctrine of the definition of hagq has been subject to criticism. As we have 
seen, hagq is not defined in the Islamic sources, but it is used ubiquitously to 
indicate all its meanings that are linguistically acceptable. 
In the first place, there is no sound evidence in Islamic sources that supports the 
reduction of the meaning of hagq to exclusiveness only. The principle is that it is 
necessary to provide a proof of Shari'a to establish hagq. The authorization of text 
from Shari `a, directly or indirectly, conferring hagq is the only ground of hagq. 
Hagq can be solely the product of "al-Shari "' (the lawgiver). 
" Al-Bakkä', p. 155. 
34 Kamali, Fundamental Rights. 
35Kamali, Fundamental Rights. 
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This approach does not include meanings other than exclusiveness 36 such as 
ibdha, idhn or maclaha and so on. In contrast, the usage of hagq in the Islamic 
sources extends beyond this limitation. Ilagq is a legitimate entitlement whether it is 
referring to something to be appropriated exclusively permanently or on a temporary 
basis according to an order of priority. 
It is evident in Shari `a that hagq is intrinsically established on recognition by 
the lawgiver. For example, one verse reads: "And Allah by His words doth prove 
and establish hagq ". 37 Also, it indicates that Allah alone who has the right to 
legislate for mankind in general. Correspondingly, the word hagq represents the 
approval which is granted only by al-Shari' to a right bearer to own, do, honor or 
use some thing. 
There is "Umk"' (consensus) among Muslim scholars that only Allah is the 
ultimate lawgiver, the one who decides hagq and its effects including exclusivity or 
commonality. In Shari `a the recognition of what is to be hagq is not left to the 
human judgment whether it is exclusive or common. 
Al-Khafif is certainly correct when he states that" ... the ultimate lawgiver 
approved all legitimate huqüq including ownership, and none of their effects or 
provisions would be affirmed unless the lawgiver appointed that". 38 It is incorrect to 
assume that "ibdha" or "idhn ", which are unrelated to anyone specifically, are not 
hagq because rights are essentially permissions given by the lawgiver. 
Secondly, the approach of exclusivity appears to be arbitrary and uncertain in 
its effect, as the elimination of other meanings of hagq and the difficulty in some 
cases of drawing distinctions between its meanings. In general, what has been said 
about hagq in the form of ikhtisds applies to hagq in the forms of ibäha or idhn. 
There is one related ground on which all these forms still be established and that is 
the approval of the lawgiver. It is only authorization upon a thing, claim, duty or 
concept that makes us recognize its legality. As is clear from the above discussion 
36 Al-'Abbädi, vol. 1, p. 102. 
37 Qur'än, 10 . v. 82. 38 Al-Khafif, al-Milkiyya, vol. 1, p. 18. 
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the approval of Shari `a through its evidence is a prerequisite for the existence of 
copyright. 
Furthermore, a definition is supposed to concentrate on the essence of hagq 
rather than on its effect, attribute or form such as exclusivity or permission. The 
approach has tended to focus on ikhtisäs and less attention has been paid to its 
essence. It is unsatisfactory to define hagq by its effect or form because hagq must 
be defined by its contents. The concern should be with what a hagq is in essence and 
not in what form it is. The essence of hagq is the approval of the lawgiver as there is 
no hagq without it. Hagq bestows standing rather than standing bestows hagq, and 
hagq can manifest in any form. Therefore, hagq is more than an exclusive status or 
worth ascribed to the right-bearer. Ikhtiyds only follows from property or right. 
It must be acknowledged that this approach reveals at least the significance of 
ikhtisäs. The notion of exclusiveness has some evidential support. Most importantly, 
it matches the condition of originality, which is necessary to obtain copyrights. 
9 
There is clearly a very special relationship between the hagq and its bearer, but this 
relationship does not define the right. 
1.6 Definitions of «aqq with reference to "maslaha" (the interest) 
This approach is adopted by some contemporary scholars, for example, al- 
Khafif who argues for the idea that, ultimately, hagq means maslaha. He states that 
"haqq is rightful maslaha that is proven by the Shari `a. " 40The only factor referred 
to in this definition is maclaha. But al-Zargä criticizes this definition convincingly 
because it produces a vicious cycle: hagq is inferred from premises, the rightful 
interest of which cannot be established independently of right. It defines hagq with a 
rightful interest, which in turn must be determined by right. Another doubt is that it 
39 This issue is addressed in Chapter 5p, 213. 
40 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. Al-`Abbädi, vol. 1, p. 97. Al-Dirayni al-Hagq wa Madä Sultan al- 
Dawla p. 188. 
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does not clarify all distinctive characters of hagq. 41 Given these weaknesses, this 
definition does not have a complete and precise legal meaning of hagq. 
Also deserving note is the other definition made by al-Khafif, "hagq is which is 
established in the Shari `a for maslaha the benefit of a human being". 42 It means 
that only a real person (as opposed to a corporate personality) can have a right. The 
definition also, precludes rights that are not necessarily of the right-bearer's interest 
such as "hacldna" (the right of custody). 43 The mother has a right to the custody of 
her child, but if she renounces this right while her child does not accept someone 
other than his mother, the mother is obliged to take custody, because the interest of 
the child comes first 44 This means that a right does not correspond necessarily to the 
interest. 
From a legal but not Shari `a standpoint, al-Sanhüri proposes that hagq is an 
interest, which is protected by law. 5 There is a clear difference between a hagq and 
interest. The protection offered by law is necessary for hagq, but it is not one of its 
elements. 
Agreeing with the view of defining hagq by "maslaha ", Müsä adopts a similar 
definition concluding that "hagq is a maclaha which Shari' the lawgiver has granted 
to the individual, or the community, or both" 46 This definition is questionable, 
because it can be argued that hagq is not equal to maslajia even they are used 
synonymously in many cases. 
1.7 Some remarks on defining Ilagq with reference to mastaha 
The first objection to this way of defining hagq is that there is no authority 
41 Al-Zargä, Nazariyyat al-Iltizäm, footnotes on p. 23. 
42 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. A1-Khafif, `Alf, 'Ahkäm al-Mu'ämalät al-Shar'iyya, Cairo, Matba'at 
al-Ta'dlif, (1944) (Second Edition). From the dates of editions it seems that al-Khafif made this 
definition firstly. 
43 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. 
14 Al-Mawsa'a al-Fighiyya, vol. 17, p. 208, Haq'dna entry. 
45 Al-Sanhüri, Ma. yddir al-Hagq, p. 5. 
46 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. Al-`Abbädi, vol. 1, p. 98. 
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given to support the equation of hagq with maslaha. Despite its scope, the validity of 
any definition is not self-evident. Fuqaha' acknowledge that in the Islamic 
jurisprudential studies using evidence from the Shari 'a sources is necessary. 
This approach concentrates heavily on maclaha, which sometimes is the goal of 
hagq, but is not the essence of hagq itself. 47 Generally, the definition must 
concentrate on the essential attributes of hagq rather than on its ultimate goal such as 
interest. We should identify hagq by its essence and not by its consequences. The 
association between hagq and maclaha in many cases cannot justify defining the 
first by the second. 
This does not necessarily mean that hagq cannot be based on maslaha, but it 
does mean that hagq cannot be identified by maclaha solely. The question is not 
whether maslaha can ground hagq, but whether hagq is maslaha. It is clear that 
maslaha may follow or. coincide from property or hagq, but not as a component of 
one of them. There is nothing contrary to Shari 'a principles in relying on maclaha as 
a factor which may render copyright an evident concept. In addition, as will be 
recalled, there is no doubt that copyright has considerable maslaha for an author and 
the public. 48 
Al-Dirayni states that defining hagq with reference to maslaha, contrary to 
popular believe among contemporary scholars of law and Shari 'a, is quite wrong 
and it is firstly found in law textbooks. 49 However, al-Dirayni, as we have seen, 
made maclaha as part of his definition of hagq. 5° 
This approach also does not include "huqüq Allah" (rights of Allah), which 
belong to the term hagq. Fuqaha' classify hagq into hagq Allah and "hagq al-'abd" 
(right of an individual). 51 As regards to copyright, there are huqüq Allah concerning 
the subject matter. 52 
47 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. 
48 See this thesis p. 175 and post. 
49 A1-Dirayni, al-Hagq wa Madd Sultän al-Dawla, p. 188. 
so See p. 51 here. 
sý For a more detailed discussion on that, see p. 58. 
S2 For more details see p. 210 and post here. 
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It is right to consider on broader basis the balance of merits and demerits of 
these approaches to define hagq. Firstly, the two approaches are not based on strong 
evidence from the Shari `a. According to the general rules of Shari `a the absence of 
ikhtisds or maslaha does not mean the absence of hagq. 
One can wonder whether it is legitimate to compare these approaches with the 
two Western competing theories: the will/choice theory and the interest/benefit 
theory. Some Western scholars think that rights are always the `reflex' of the duty, 
permission or power. Others think that the right has a priority over the duty, 
permission or power. 53 
As we have seen defining hagq is linked or rather shaped by the concepts of 
ikhtisds and maslaha. Ikhtfsd$ is an alternative to the words of choice or power used 
in legal textbooks by choice theory proponents while maslaha means benefit or 
interest and is used by benefit theory proponents. 
Al-Bakkä points out that these attempts may have more relevance to the 
influence of contemporary norms and definitions in law than to the figh. 54 However, 
it is worth noting that, the definitions of hagq that concentrate on ikhti$d$ had 
obtained some precedential reference in al-Mirwazi's definition. In contrast, the 
ma$laha approach could use al-Qaräfi's definition as a reference. 
53 Campbell, Kenneth, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, available online at 
5 
http: //plato. stanford. edu/entries/legal-rights 
Al-Bakkä', footnote on p. 155. 
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1.8 The combination of maslaha and ikhtisäs approaches 
An alternative approach preferred by some fugahä' is a degree of combination 
between the previous directions ikhtisds and maslaha. According to `Isawi, hagq is 
an "Established maslaha in favor of a person in form of exclusivity which the 
lawgiver approved". 55 Another definition made by al-Nashami is to suggest that 
"hagq is legitimate interest that provides its holder with exclusivity or it imposes 
commission on someone". 56 
It seems that these fuqaha' try to characterize hagq by reference to both 
maslaha and ikhtis4 to produce a complete account of hagq. On closer inspection, 
they ultimately are endorsing the "maslaha approach" and adding ikhtisds to 
preclude ibäha or idhn. The same observations on the "maclaha approach" would 
apply to this approach. Even if this approach could be regarded as a possible way of 
combining ikhtisds with maslaha, it defines hagq more narrowly than it can be used 
in figh. Therefore, it differs conceptually from the approach generally followed in 
fiqh, which tends to focus on what the word might convey. It can be concluded from 
what we have seen that the meanings of hagq in Shari `a are more comprehensive 
than in law. 57 
1.9 The "linguistic approach" 
This has been the most preferred approach receiving the support of the majority 
of fugahä' because it is based largely on a close linguistic analysis. 
In general, fuqaha' used this word hagq to indicate to the same meanings 
literally. They are less concerned with technical definitions. They also rely on the 
notion of obviousness of the meaning of hagq. They did not see any compelling 
reason in favor of defining hagq as regards its literal meanings to satisfy its juristic 
55 'Isawi, p. 337. 
$6 A1-NashmT, al-Ijuqüq al-Ma'nawiyya al-Ism al-Tijäri, Majallat aI-Majma, Issue 5, vol. 11I, p. 2294. 57 Al-Khafif, al-Milkiyya, Vol. l. p. 5. 
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usage. 58 They want to use all meanings of hagq which vary from a text to another. 59 
This approach is accepted by fugahä' and is continually used in the fiqh 
manuals as a logical consequence of the Sharl'a being revealed in Arabic. Recently, 
it "has also prevailed in al-Mawszi'a al-Fighiyya". 60 The precise interpretation of 
hagq is based on what it draws its authority from. The determined one of its 
meanings in a particular text, is largely a question of interpretation. The hagq is, 
therefore, defined in very broad terms. 
Following the prevailing view among fugahd"s al-Khafif defines hagq as " that 
which is established and protected by the Shari' lawgiver". 61 With slight addition, 
Abü Sinnah defined it as; "that which is established in the Shari `a (hua ma thdbit fi 
al-Shar ) for a human being, or for Allah, over someone else. s62 
According to Hammäd, hagq is defined as "every privilege or capacity 
established for a person whether it is financial or not. s63 This definition appears to 
exclude rights of Allah from its scope when it refers to" a person". 
These definitions are based on "thubzlt" (establishment) because it is one of the 
key elements of iaqq. Abü Sinnah's definition has been criticized as it reveals the 
subject matter of hagq but not the essence of hagq itself. 64 It can be argued that the 
same comment can be applied to Hammäd's defmition as well. As with many of the 
technical definitions, hagq did not fall outside the linguistic meanings. 
In the light of the survey in this section, it can be concluded that the approach of 
the majority of fugahä' appears to be more precise and less susceptible to error in at 
least three different respects. Firstly, hagq is clearly an abstract idea, which is 
difficult to define as so any axiomatic rule. 65 It might be considered that the 
58 Karnali, Freedom of Expression, p. 263. 
59 Al-Khafif, al-Milkiyya, p. 2 , vol. 1. 60 Karnali, Freedom of Expression. p. 271. footnote No. 5. 
61 Al-Khafif, al-Milkiyya, p. 2 , vol. 1. 62 Kamli, Fundamental Rights. Al-`Abbädi, vol. 1, p. 98. 
63 11ammäd, Nazth, MuYam al-Muslalahat al-Igti$ddiyya, Lughat al-Fugaha', p. 121. referred to in 
Shubir, al-Mu'dmalät al-Maliyya, p. 47. 
64 Al-Dirayni, al-Hagq wa Madd Sullän al-Dawla, p. 190. Al-`Abbäd1, vol. 1'p. 102. 65 Al-Kabbiishi, 'haha, al-Dhimma wa al-Hagq wa al- Ilitzäm wa Ta'aththuruhd bi'l-Mawt f al-Fiqh 
al-Isldmi, Riyadh, Maktabat al-llaramayn, (1989) (First Edition), p. 64. 
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definition can do more to impede than to aid our understanding of hagq. This 
discussion is not meant to imply that hagq is self-evident, if we recall the condition 
of the approval of Shari 'a. It is to describe the use of a word in which it occurs. 
Secondly, it would seem that one of fugahä's aims is to keep all possible 
linguistic meanings of the word hagq without arbitrary exclusion or exception. As 
we have seen, the employment of the word deals with several situations, therefore 
the technical terminology might reduce its usage to one limited form or another. 
Ilagq is a general word even it could be analyzed into duty, permission, power or 
some combination of these whether there are conditions or not. The repetitive and 
various use of the word shows that Shari 'a does not place any restrictions on the 
linguistic meanings of the word hagq. Thus, it is an error to impose subsequent 
qualifications or limitations on hagq, where Shari `a did not clearly indicate such 
limitations. The later terminology cannot manipulate words appeared in the original 
sources of Shari'a. 66 
Thirdly, the issue of definition arises only where a word may have an 
idiosyncratic usage other than linguistic meanings such as in "saläh " (prayer) and 
"zakät" (alms). This is not the case, however, with the word hagq as it serves the 
same usage in Shari'a. There is little if anything for technical terminology to 
contribute. 
One needs to remember that the Shari'a is a divine law which contains 
standards outside those that constitute law in the modem sense. It includes all 
universal and moral principles as well as details of how man should perform all 
aspects of human life. In addition, it is characteristic of Shari `a that the legal 
principles, duties and norms often express themselves in religious terms and are 
intimately connected with moral rules. The legitimacy of the linguistic interpretation 
is established because it adopts the meanings from the language that the Shari' 
(lawgiver) revealed the text in the first place. Therefore, the standard definition that 
66 Al-Nawawi, Sharh SahLh Muslim, vol. 5, p. 63-64. Ibn 11ajar, Alimad, Fath al-Bäri Sharh Sahhh al- 
Bukhän, `Abd al `Aziz Ibn Bäz, (ed. ), Beirut, Där al-Kutub al- Ilmiyya, (1421 AH/2000), vol. 3, p. 318. 
Hereinafter: Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari. 
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fugaha' are interested in is one that applies to all aspects of the word. This 
conception of hagq works very well for accommodating copyright and other new 
rights. 
Al-Shätibi (790AH/1388) points out that the words of the Qur'an and 'ahädith 
must be interpreted linguistically because that is the preferential interpretation of a 
text. 67 He is content that in general any absolute and unquestionable definition is 
beyond reach since conformity with its requirements is not a simple task. 68 It has 
been said that no definition will be -free from criticism and an infallible definition 
has never been reached. 69The assumption that it is safe not to define hagq, can 
explain why al-Shätibi explained what is meant by the right of Allah, 70 without 
defining it. 
The linguistic approach's proponents can justifiably rely upon these 
considerations that give them a certain degree of legitimacy and priority over other 
approaches. This is not to underestimate early or contemporaryfugahd' for adopting 
a definition, because the reason to do so was to produce concept, terms and limits. 
The process of drafting a comprehensive definition usually faces substantial 
obstacles. 
67A1-Shätibi, Ibrähim b. M isa , al-Muwäfagät fi Ucul al-Shari'a, 'Abd Allah Dräz, (ed. ), Beirut, Dar 
al-Kutub al-' Ilmiyya, , (N. D) vol. 2. p. 38., hereinaßer: al-Shätibi, al-Muwafaqat. 68A1-Sh5tibi, al-Muwafaqat, vol. 2. p. 40. 
69 Al-Shätibi, al-Muwäfagdt, vol. 2. p. 40. 
70Tammüm, p. 26 and post. 
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1.10 Classifications of Ilugi q under Shari `a 
Since the notion of copyright is a term related to hagq, it is necessary to achieve 
a thorough understanding of the structure of hagq. We also need to ensure a 
systemic study to deal comprehensively with copyright in Shari'a because the 
clearest way is to examine copyright deeply through the classifications of huqüq in 
Shari `a, even this endeavor is not without difficulties. 
Whilst not wishing to complicate the matter, there are different types of hagq. 
Instead, this will provide us with more explanation of the term hagq and it avoids 
equating the term with right in modern writings. We need to explore the applications 
of the term hagq that are important in implementing it in copyright. 
In figh, there has been a reluctance to define hagq. This is ameliorated to some 
extent by its detailed classification. Fuqaha' are concerned with the classification 
and implementation of huqüq more than the theoretical debate. The suggestion that 
the classification of hagq is more important than the issue of definition is supported 
by the practical attitude in the Shari 'a, where all matters are governed specifically or 
by inclusive texts and general rules. 
This view must be carefully noted, because it has a major practical and 
theoretical impact. Additionally, as we have seen, hagq in Shari 'a means claim, 
permission, duty, authority and so on. That is why Shari `a has its own classifications 
of huqüq which vary greatly from the law textbooks' classifications. Accordingly, 
copyright must have its own moral and legal position within Shari `a. 
In fiqh, there is possibility to classify huqüq in many ways according to the 
chosen consideration of categorization, such as whose they are, what their nature is 
and so on. Recently al-Shanqiti makes a very instructive flow chart of rights with 
such classifications. ' The main concern here is the accurate and objective 
exposition of the categories of huqüq under Shari 'a. 
71 Al-Shangili, vol. 2, p. 698. 
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1.11 The classification of huqüq according to the holder 
According to al-Qaräfi huqüq are grouped into only two broad classifications: 
"hagq Allah is His commands and his prohibitions while the rights of a human are 
"masdlihuhu" (his interests)". 7Z The majority of fugaha', however, hold to the view 
that, hugz7q are classified in three groups; "hagq Allah" (right of Allah), "hagq al- 
'abd" (right of the individual) and "hagq Allah wa hagq 1-`abd" (right of Allah and 
the individual). 73 
It might be said that this general classification had come from the famous hadith 
which reads: "Your Lord has a right on you, your soul has a right on you, your 
family has a right on you; so you should give the right of all those who has a right on 
you.,, 74 
The former refers to rights of Allah, "... which pertains to the general good for 
the world, so it is not to be an exclusive to anyone in particular. The attribution to 
Allah here is to honor what has great significance, very benefit and common good 
which all people make use of it... ". 75 These rights are representative of certain high 
religious values and concern the public interest. Their nobility stems from these 
considerations. 
This category of hugrlq Allah includes belief, compulsory worship and all 
prohibitions against disbelief, homicide, fornication and so on. It includes also any 
right, which does not belong to a particular right-bearer, such as a "wagf" 
(endowment) for a charitable purpose. 76 Some fugaha' of the Hanafi school sub- 
72 Al-Furüq, vol. 1 p. 256. 
73 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. Al-Zuhayli, Wahbah, al-Fiqh al-Isläml wa adillatuhu, Damascus, 
Dar al-Fikr (1418AH/1997) (Fourth Edition), vol. 4, p. 2843. Hereinafter: al-Zuhayli. 74 A1-Bukhäri, Abü `Abd Allah Muhammad b. Ismä`ft, Sahib al-Bukhäri, translated by Dr. 
Muhammad Muhsin Khan, The Translation of the Meaning of . Sahib al-Bukhari, Beirut , Dar al- `Arabiyya, (N. D) vol. 3, p. 108, Hadith No. 189, hereinafter: al-Bukhäri, tr. 75 Al-Bazdawi, vol. 4, p. 134. 
76 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. Täj al-Shart'a, `Ubayd Allah b. Mas`Gd, al-Tawdih fi Iialli 
Ghawämic/ al-Tanq7h, Beirut, Dar al-Kitäb al-`Arabi, (N. D), vol. 2, p. 151. 
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divided huqüq Allah into several sections, 77 but this is highly controversial. 78 
However, there is no a practical need for that sub-division in the subject currently 
under discussion. 
The second category refers to "hagq al-'abd" (rights of the individual) which 
bestow a claim by, duty or benefit to individuals. For example, obligations regarding 
the payment of money; debts, prices and maintenance which individuals have to 
honor. This constitutes an open-ended category that "covers claims of private 
individuals in their dealings with each other". 79 
The third category is "hagq Allah wa 1-`abd" which concerns the rights of Allah 
and human together. These are also known as the shared rights. For example, 
"qis s" (legal retaliation) which is a punishment fixed by Shari 'a, but at the same 
time, victims or their relatives have the right to waive gis4 with or without financial 
consideration. This category exists even though a hagq of Allah or hagq of an 
individual prevails over the other in some cases. Some fuqaha' split this category 
into two divisions according to who has priority. 80 
The special status of hugz q Allah is recognized in their treatment in many 
aspects, because they have much greater significance. Firstly, the most important 
difference is that, huqüq Allah are non-negotiable. They cannot be compromised or 
waived. The hagq al-'abd is generally negotiable and subject to waive or 
compromise 81 There are, however, some exceptions regarding the extent to which 
an individual can abandon or forego his rights. The distinction between the two 
kinds remains the fact that the main purpose of huqüq al-`abd is wealth, while the 
main purpose of huqüq Allah is obedience. 82 
Secondly, "huqüq Allah are not subject to inheritance, but hugriq al-'abd can, in 
77 Täj al-Sharii`a, vol. 2, p. 151. Hoexter, Miriam, Huqüq Allah and tluqüq Al- ibäd as reflected in the 
Wagf institution, Jerusalem Studies In Arabic And Islam, 1995, vol. 19, p 134. Hereinafter: Hoexter. 
78 Sha`bän, Zakiyy al-Din, Usül al-figh al-Islämi, Benghazi, University of Gäryünus Publications, 
(1989) (Fifth Edition), p. 268, hereinafter: Sha'ban. 
79 Hoexter, p 134. 
so mid. Al-Qaräfi, vol. 1, p. 256. 
8' Al-Qaräfi, vol. 1, p. 256. 
82 Al-Bazdawi, vol. 4, p. 237. 
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general, be inherited. Thirdly, the enforcement of rights of Allah is a duty of the 
state, which needs to implement them directly or through a request of an individual 
"hisba ". 83 In contrast, the state generally has no direct concern to enforce 
individuals' rights unless the state is required to do so. 84 
There is generally some difference in determining whether a particular case 
manifests chiefly as a right of Allah or a right of the individual. Some rights do not 
fit easily into any of these groups. For example, "qadhf "(slander). 85 
It is worth noting that the distinction has no effect on the jurisdiction of a judge 
to hear any case brought before the court, whether it concerns huqüq Allah or huqüq 
al-`abd. 86 
Despite this classification, buqz7q Allah and buqz7q al-'abd should not be 
considered as two unrelated categories of huqüq. They are closely related to each 
other. There is a correspondence between huqüq al-'abd and buqz7q Allah. More 
precisely, huqüq al-'abd are generally protected and traceable to huqüq Allah. 
Huqüq al-'abd are protected by huqüq Allah, i. e. the duty on everyone to respect 
others' rights. Al-'Izz (d. 660AH/1262) states that every hagq belonging to an 
individual, which can be waived with consent, contains a hagq of Allah. 87 Similarly, 
al-Qaräfi states that: "there is no human right in total isolation of Allah's right". 
88 
This means that huqüq al-'abd must be respected as a duty of obedience to Allah. 
This view imposes a duty upon everyone to respect others' rights, which invests 
rights of the individual, such as copyright with religious status in addition to the 
legal protection. 
Having applied this classification, copyright contains three kinds of rights: hagq 
Allah, hagq al-'abd and hagq Allah wa 1-`abd and this is the case, whether they are 
83 Al-Hisba means enjoining good and preventing evil voluntarily within the community. 
ß° Karnali, Fundamental Rights. 
85 Al-Qaräfi, vol. 4, p. 173. See Al-Qurtubi, al-Jämi, vol. 12, p. 177. 
86 Ibn Rushd, Biddyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II. p. 555. 
87 Ibn 'Abd al-Saläm, al-'Izz, Qawä'id al-'Ahkdm fi Islah al-Andm, Dr Nazih I1ammäd and Dr 
'Uthmän Dumayriyya, (eds), Damascus, Dar al-Qalam, (2000/1421 AH) (First Edition), vol. 1, p. 238. 
, hereinafter: al-'Izz. 88 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. 
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economic or moral rights. The rights of an author on attribution and integrity rights 
of the work and economic rights can be classified under hagq al-'abd. 
The right of publication of the work and the right of revocation are mostly of 
hagq al-'abd, unless the work is necessary to the public interest in which case they 
are huqüq Allah. And the fair use of works for the public interest such as review, 
research or educational purposes is huqüq Allah. 
1.12 The classification of huqüq according to their subjects 
Some of the Planau school classify hagq in this respect to "huqüq mujarrada" 
(abstract rights) in contrast to "huqüq mutagarrira" (concrete rights). The 
classification suggests a difference between rights from the perspective of their 
consequences. The distinction between the two rights is actually concerned with 
deducing and applying rulings more than the theoretical aspect, even though at first 
sight it may have been seen differently. 
Accordingly, the term "huqüq mujarrada" refers merely to a hagq that does not 
have a conceived subject. In such case there are no consequences if the right bearer 
renounces the right. For example, "hagq al-shuf `a "89 will not have effect if "shaft' 
"(the beneficiary) of this hagq decides not to use it, because the ownership remains 
with the purchaser of the property as it was before. 90 In other words, the hagq 
mujarrad has effect only if it has been used and not if it has been waived. 
On the other hand, the "hagq mutaqarrir" (concrete right) refers to what has a 
conceived subject so there is a consequence if the right bearer waives the hagq. For 
example, in the case of the right of gisäs, if the relatives of the victim waive their 
right of gisac, the life of the murderer becomes protected. 91 
89 Shuf a the right of pre-emption is a right of priority to purchase a property which is a subject to 
sale, given to (shaft') the neighbour, co-sharer or partner in the real property. 
90 Al-Zoayli, vol. 4, p. 2852. 
91 A1-Mawsü'a al-Fighiyya, vol. 18, p. 40-41. 
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Although this way of classifying rights is not completely satisfactory even 
among the Ilanajl school, it is a classification with a purpose. 92 The significance of 
this classification according to the fugaha' who make it appears in a number of 
consequences. Huqüq mujarrada cannot be subject to sale, reimbursement, gift, 
donation or exchange and there is no compensation if these rights have been 
damaged. In contrast, huqüq mutaqarrira can be exchanged, reconciled, or 
compromised. 93 The renouncement of a right can be conditional or unconditional. 
The classification is open to some objections. Firstly, it is difficult, even 
artificial, to distinguish between what forms hagq mutaqarr and what forms hagq 
mujarrad in the strict sense. And any classification should not be arbitrary. 
Secondly, in fact, Shari'a recognizes hagq mujarrad and approves the transfer of 
some rights to others for some monetary considerations such as the right of gisds. 
The rights of an author on publication, revocation of the work and economic 
rights can be classified under huqüq mutaqarrira. While the attribution, paternity 
and integrity rights can be classified under huqüq mujarrada. Arguably, some 
modern fuqaha' apply this classification to intellectual property and think that such 
huqüq can be categorized within huqüq mujarrada. 94 
1.13 The classification of huqüq according to their financial conditions 
This classification explores huqüq from their financial claims. Some fugahä' 
classify hagq in this way into six categories 95 Huqüq vary greatly in their financial 
conditions. 
The first group of huqüq refers to financial huqüq, which are substantially 
92 Dr. Madhkür Muhammad, al-Madkhal 117-figh al-Islämi, p. 430.431, cited in al-Kabbäshi, p. 77. 
Footnote No. 1. 
93 Al-KiisänT, 'A1ä' al-Din Abü-Baler b. Mas'üd, Badä'i' al-Sanä'i' J Tartib al-Sharä'i', Beirut, Dar 
al-Kitäb al-'Arabi, (1982) (Second Edition), vol. 6, p. 189-190, hereinafter: al-Käsäni. Ibn `Abdin, 
Muhammad Amin, Radd al-Muhtär 'ald al-Durr al-Mukhtär, Damascus, Dar al-Fikr, (1979), vol. 4, 
518, hereinafter: Ibn 'Abdin. Al-Zuhayli, vol. 4, p. 2853. ýA 
Tuhmäz, `Abd al-Hamid, Vaqq al-Ta'tf wa al-Nashar wa al-Tarjama, in al-Dirayni, Hagq al- 
Ibtikdr, p. 179. 
95 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 18, p. 40-41. Al-Zuhayli, vol. 4, p. 2849. 
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money and they can be exchanged by money such as zakat, debts, or prices. The 
rights of an author on publication, and revocation of the work and other economic 
rights can be classified under this group. 
The second refers to financial huqüq, which are not in consideration of money 
such as "mahr" (dower) and "nafaqa" (maintenance) given by a husband to his 
wife. 
The third refers to non-financial huqüq, which pertain to money, although they 
cannot be subject to compensation such as shuf`a. 
The fourth refers to non-financial huqüq, which do not pertain to money but 
they can be subject to reimbursement such as gisäs and "khul "" 96 
The fifth refers to non-financial huqüq, which do not pertain to money but they 
cannot be subject to reimbursement such as "nasab" (lineage), "gadhf' (slander) or 
"hudüd" (punishments). The author's rights of attribution and paternity can be 
classified under this subdivision. 
The sixth which is very controversial refers to "manäfi "' (utilities). They are 
considered as money by all schools except the hlanafi school. 7 
This classification is made to clarify which huqüq can be affirmed by oath and 
huqüq which cannot be affirmed by oath in proceedings before a court. It is 
obligatory for a judge to decide dispute on its own sufficient evidence. The test 
relates to the reliability of an oath in proceedings before a judge, which he can 
decide accordingly. 
The standard of proof in cases of financial huqüq's cases is normally that 
parties can prove their claims or defenses by oath, while the oath has limited role in 
non-fmancial rights. This is the case whether some huqüq are inheritable or not and 
whether they are negotiable or not. 98 Each hagq has to be identified as to whether it 
96 Khul' : an agreement between husband and wife terminating the contract of marriage. 
97 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 18, p. 40-41. 
98 Ibn Qudäma, Muwaffaq al-Din, al -Mughni, Beirut, Dar al-Kitäb al-'Arabi, (N. D) vol. 12, p. 127, 
hereinafter: al-Mugni. Al-Nawawi, Muhyi al-Din b. Sharaf, al-Majmü' Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, 
Beirut, Dar Ihyä' al-Turäth al-'Arabi, (1995/1415AH), vol. 23, p. 144, and vol. 12, p. 182. Hereinafter: 
al-Majmü'. Al-l. lusayni, Taqiyy al-Din Abu Bakr, Kifyat al Akhyar ft Valli Ghayat al-Ikhtisdr, 
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is capable of financial exchange or not. Clearly, that has the potential to create a 
good deal of dispute. 
1.14 The classification of huqüq according to their ranks 
Not all rights are of the same strength. They range from a high status to a 
lower one. Accordingly, some fugahä' divided hagq into three divisions: "al-hagq 
al-mubäh " (the permissive right), "al-hagq al-thäbit" (the imperfect right) and "al- 
hagq al-mzVakkad" (the perfect right). 
The threshold of rights is al-mubdh. It is a term to denote those actions, which 
fall within the domain of the indifference and legal neutrality. This means that every 
person who possesses legal capacity is entitled to act or not to act. Shari 'a in general 
leaves every person at liberty within its margins to make bargains or to dispose of 
his own property as he chooses. 
The next grade of rights is known as "al-hagq al-thdbit" (the imperfect right). It 
means that a person can exercise his unilateral will. For example, if a person has 
received an offer to have an object with or without consideration he has an imperfect 
right. If he decides to own that object, he acquires the perfect right, which is at the 
pinnacle of this classification. 
The most important is "al-hagq al-mü'akkad" (perfect right). It has much 
greater significance in terms of inheritance, claim, exchange, enforcement and 
protection, while other rights have limited range of theses privileges or even none of 
them 99 In other words, al-hagq al-mubäh has weak competence as compared to 
other rights. Within al-hagq al-mü'akkad group, their strength also varies with the 
grounds of each hagq. 
There is debate among schools of fiqh as to what balance should be taken 
Beirut, Mr al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, (N. D), vol. 2, p. 280. Hereinafter: K yat al-Akhyär. 
99 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. Al-Mawsa a al-Fighiyya, vol. 18, p. 41. 
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between these rights if they exist collectively or in conflict in a particular case? loo 
The schools of figh differ in balancing the order of priority of huqüq Allah and 
huqüq al-'abd. For example, if the deceased did not pay "zakät" (alms) or "kaffa-ra" 
(expiation) or he did not perform "hajj" (pilgrimage), is the heir obliged to honor 
these duties despite the deceased not having made a "wasiyya" (bequest) for 
them? lo' The answer varies from one school to another. 
Al-Shäfi`i school believes that huqüq Allah must have a categorical priority in 
weight over any of huqüq al-'abd. In contrast, al-Mäliki school states that huqüq al- 
`abd should surpass hugi q Allah because huqüq al-'abd are always on competitive 
bases and subject to conflict while iuqüq Allah are easier to be forgiven. 102 It should 
be noted, however, all schools agree that if huqüq Allah result in "hudz d" 
(punishments) then hugziq Allah must prevail over huqüq al-`abd. 103 
The moderate view is that copyright is "hagq mü'akkad" a (perfect right) if it 
can be asserted in Shari `a. This means that copyrights can be subject to inheritance, 
claim, exchange, enforcement and protection. 
1.15 The classification of huqüq according to their enforceability 
One of the meanings of hagq is a judgment. '°4 The classification deals with the 
question of the truthfulness of a judgment, since a judge may apply rules and decide 
according to evidence, but the judgment does not achieve justice in reality. 
It is helpful here to refer to the famous hadith which is reported by Umm 
Salama (d. 61AI-U681) in which he said in the meaning: (I am only human being, and 
too Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 18, p. 22-23, lfagq entry. 
101 Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujiahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 409. 
102 Al-Qäranshäwi, `Abd al-Jai 1, Dirdsät ft al-Shari'a al-Islämiyya, Benghazi, University of 
Gärytinus Publications, (1989) (Second Edition), p. 25,26, hereinafter: al-Qäranshäwi. 
103 Sahnün, Abik Said 'Abd al-Sa1äm, al-Mudawwana al-Kubra, Ahmad 'Abd al-Saläm, (ed. ), Beirut, 
Där al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, (1994/1415AH) (First Edition), vol. 4 p. 549, hereinafter: A1-Mudawwana. 
104 See here, p. 46. 
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you people (litigants)105 come to me with your cases; and it may be that one of you 
can present his case eloquently in a more convincing way than the other, and I give 
my verdict according to what I hear. So if ever I judge (by error) and give the right 
of a brother to his other (brother), he should not take it, for I am giving him only a 
piece of Fire). 106 
Corresponding almost exactly to the above hadith and to the general dispute 
about whether a judge's decision can permit the prohibited and prohibit the lawful or 
not, 107 three variants have been proposed to subdivide hagq. Firstly, that hagq is 
"wdjib diydnatan" (religious obligation). Secondly, that hagq is "wäjib gaciä'an" 
(juridical order). Thirdly, that hagq is "wäjib diyänatan wa gadä'an" (religious 
obligation and juridical order). 
The wajib diyänatan is a right authorized by Shar 7 ruling or contractual 
obligation, but there is insufficient evidence. For example, a court cannot enforce a 
judgment confirming "taläq" (divorce), if a wife cannot establish the evidence by 
witnesses or a proper document. Also, a judge cannot enforce many of the huqüq 
Allah such as "hajj " (pilgrimage) and "nadhr" a (vow) and so on. 
The "wäjib gacid "' arises if a case can be proven and enforced by a court, but it 
does not correspond to the truth. For example, if someone divorces his wife for a 
third time, the marriage is terminated "diyänatan" (religiously), but if the wife 
cannot prove this divorce by witnesses or by document the marriage is valid before a 
court. This means that it is open to the husband, but sinful to return to his wife. 
"Similarly, if a debtor denies a creditor's right to repayment and the creditor is 
unable to prove his/her case in court, the court cannot enforce the creditor's right". 108 
"Wäjib diydnatan wa gacid'an" is a right authorized by a ruling of Shari'a or a 
contractual obligation and can be proven and enforced by a court. 109 
This can be used as evidence that legal rights are separated from religious rights 
. os The original translation is opponents. 
1 °6 AI-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 9, p. 212. No. 281. 
107 Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 555. 
108 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. 
109 Al-Mawsa'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 18, p. 41-46, cf. Karnali, Fundamental Rights. 
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in Shari`a. 110 The former can be adjudicated by a judge and many of the latter 
cannot be adjudicated by a judge. " For example, those stated in the hadith: (The 
rights of Muslim on the Muslims are five; To return the greeting, to visit the sick, to 
follow the funeral processions, to accept invitation and reply the sneezed). ' 12 
The With illustrates that the distinction between the religiously commendable 
and the legally enforceable has been clearly made in fiqh, because of Shari`a's 
comprehensive nature and its practical method. Since Shari `a does not have an exact 
equivalent in modem terms we should elaborated its meaning by looking at its terms, 
norms and principles. 
This is supported by the fact that Shari 'a contains many rights which cannot be 
enforced. If they are violated, no action can be taken to impose a penalty or seek a 
remedy. In contrast, there are rights, which should be treated not only as morally 
fundamental but also as legally enforced. 
It follows that if copyright has been established in the Shari`a it becomes 
"wäjib diyänatan wa gaciä'an". Copyright should be legally enforced to protect an 
author's economic and moral rights and the public interest. In addition, if copyright 
cannot be protected by the state or the judicial authority for any reason, a Muslim is 
required to honor copyright, because it is wajib dayäanta. Understood in this way, 
the approach adopted by some fugahd', which limits copyright to the meaning of 
recommendation, removes its obligatory nature and impact. This approach weakens 
the position of copyright. 113 
1.16 The classification of huqüq according to inheritability 
According to this standard, hugq can be divided into two groups. Inheritable 
huqüq which are heirs inherit from deceased relatives. For example, a pledge, right 
110 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. 
111 Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 571. 
112 Al-Bukhärl, tr., vol. 2, p. 187,188. 
113 See here p. 25 and post. 
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of water or right of way. 
Non-inheritable huqüq which heirs cannot inherit from deceased relatives' 
include the rights of divorce or custody. The reason for non-inheritability is that they 
are essentially attributed to an individual and which begin during their lives, end at 
death and are linked only to a specific person. 114 Therefore, they are purely personal 
rights which do not form part of the estate. 
There are some huqüq which may fall into the first or second category. 
115 This 
includes "khiyär al-shart" 116 "khiydr al-ru'ya"117 "khiyär al-majlis" 
118 and gisäs. 
The majority offuqaha' argue that in general, rights are inherited in the same way as 
other wealth by virtue of the absence of any rule to the contrary and because they are 
subject to reimbursement. The Hanafi school considers that these rights cannot be 
subject to inheritance because they pertain to the deceased person. 
119 It can be 
argued in such a case that author's economic rights are inheritable, while author's 
moral rights are not inheritable. 
According to Ibn Rajab (d. 795AH/1393), there is a classification of huqüq into 
five categories. 120 Iluqüq can be divided into "hagq al-milk" (the right of 
ownership), "hagq al-tamlluk" (the right of a father to appropriate his son's 
property), "hagq al-intia "' (the right of utilization) such as the right of neighbor to 
put a stick on the wall of his neighbor's wall, "hagq al-ikhtisäs" (the right to 
exclusive appropriation of the subject matter of his right) which prevents others from 
sharing the subject matter with the hagq holder. This hagq is not subject to 
exchange, such as the right to sit in a mosque. Finally, "hagq al-ta'aluq list/' a! - 
114 AI-Mawsü'a al-Fighiyya, vol. 18, p. 37 and after. Al-Zuhayli, vol. 4, p. 2848. 
115 Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 253. Al-Zuhayli, vol. 4, p. 2849. A1-Majmü' 
vol. 11, p. 393. Ibn Rajab, 'Abd al-Rahman, al-IIanbali, aI-Qawä'id 
f 
al-Fiqh, Taha Sa'd, (ed. ), (First 
Edition) (1972), p. 341, Hereinafter: Ibn Rajab, al-Qawa'id. 
16 The right of both parties of a contract to withdraw from the contract during a specific period if that 
party stipulated that. See The Mejelle, Article 300, p. 44. 
117 The right of the buyer to rescind or ratify a sale contract upon visual inspection. See The Mejelle, 
Article 320, p. 46. 
118 The right of both parties in a business transaction to withdraw as long as they have not separated. 
Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 205. 
119 Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 253. Al-Qäranshäwi, p. 20,21. 
120 Ihn Rajab, al-Qawä'id, p. 188. 
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hagq" (the right to execute or to enforce a right). 
This classification is not more widely acknowledged or applied than other 
classifications. However, the author's economic rights fall under the categories both 
of hagq al-milk and of hagq al-ikhtisds while the public right to have access to 
useful works for research or education fall under the category of hagq al-intifä `. The 
right of attribution and acknowledgment fall under hagq al-ta`aluq li-istr' al- 
hagq. 
In contemporary writings on fiqh, Usmani provides his account of 
classifications of huqüq in Shari `a in some detail. 12' The overarching goal of his 
classifications is to distinguish which rights can be subject to financial exchange. He 
divides huqüq into two main categories; "huqüq Shar'iyya" (legal rights) and 
"huqüq 'urfyya" (customary rights). The first division of "huqüq Shar`iyya" are 
rights affirmed by direct or indirect text from "al-Shari "' (the lawgiver). The second 
division of "huqüq `urffiyya" are established by custom and then approved by 
Shari `a. 
The group of hugziq Shar `iyya is sub-divided into two kinds of huqüq. Firstly, 
those huqüq which are conferred by the Shari' upon the owner to a remedy for some 
forms of damage, such as "shufa'a" and "haddna". This kind of hagq is not subject 
to financial exchange by way of transaction. The second sub-division refers to rights 
that are conferred to the owner other than as a remedy such as "gisds" or the right of 
inheritance. A sale, gift, or inheritance cannot transfer those huqüq, but they can be 
the subject of compromise or reconciliation. 
Carrying this classification further, huqüq 'u>fyya can be sub-divided into 
three categories. Firstly, "manäfi "' (utilities) such as the right of way or right to air. 
Secondly, a right arising from a contract such as a tenant's right to remain on waqf 
land during the term of his tenancy. Thirdly, the right of priority being a right to 
prevent anyone other than the priority holder such as (land, water or animals) from 
121 Usmani, Buhüth ft Qa4äya Fiqhiyya Mu astra, p. 78-85. 
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claiming ownership of that thing. '22 Usmani concluded that the rights of manäfi ` are 
generally allowed to be sold, while other rights are not saleable but can be settled. 
According to this classification, copyright is one of the huqüq `urffiyya. 123 
There are two problems with Usmani's conclusion on copyright. First of all, 
copyright can stand with the direct texts of Shari`a124 and there is no reason to 
believe that copyright is not "manta `a" (a Utility) . 
125 Secondly, if the copyright 
owner decides to exchange his work for an amount of money the difference between 
sale and settlement is of theoretical not practical consequences. 
1.17 Summary 
The " tqh" (Islamic jurisprudence) has its own concept of hagq and its own 
approach although there are many commonalities between Shari `a and other legal 
systems. The precise understanding of hagq in Shari `a is important for researching 
of copyright regardless of which definition of hagq is more accurate. 
The word hagq has many senses in Arabic and in Islamic literature including 
the meanings: real, truth, adherence to fact, duty, correct judgment, accurate, justice, 
legitimate, money, claim and litigation. 
There is no a particular technical definition of hagq in the Qur'an, the 'ahddith 
or other Shari `a sources. Most fugahd' give it all its linguistic meanings, but some 
definitions had been articulated early than others. However, there is a difference in 
defining hagq depending on whether it is an ikhtisdc, ma laha of an individual or a 
combination of both or whether the word should be left as it means. 
It is suggested that the absence of a single definition of hagq in the original 
sources of Shari 'a and the difference in defining of hagq is much less of a problem 
for the purpose of recognizing copyright. It is not necessary to invent a definition of 
122 Usmani, Buhüth fi Qac/äyä Fiqhiyya Mu'ä. ira, p78-85. 
123 Ibid. 
124 See this thesis p. 115 and post. 
125 See this thesis, p. 99. 
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hagq because its linguistic meanings are valid in Shari 'a. Hagq needs not 
necessarily be a clear-cut construct. Nor can it be understood in a vacuum detached 
from the language or the conceptual structure of Shari 'a. The two basic elements of 
hagq in Shari `a are: the state or the ability of "thdbüt" (existence) in the future and 
the approval of Shari'a. 126 The second factor determines its grounds. This shifts the 
definitional problem onto the approval of Shari'a. Ilagq is more heavily dependent 
on the approval of Shari 'a than any other consideration. Hence, there is a practical 
consensus regarding these elements where theoretical agreement on a single 
definition is lacking. lVagq is entirely made by the Shdri' who chooses which form is 
used and on which form an adequate security is given. 
This chapter presents that to be hagq it must be approved by evidence of 
Shari'a whether the hagq is of Allah or human or both, ruling or contractual 
obligation, financial or non-financial, inheritable or non-inheritable, welfare or 
option, claim or liberty, abstract or concrete, unilateral or bilateral, in rem or in 
personam, mandatory or discretionary. 
Flowing from this, copyright requires the approval of Shari'a to be a recognized 
hagq. This approval will be researched and discussed in more detail in subsequent 
chapters. It would appear to be possible to detect copyright's foundations within the 
concept of hagq. This is the case whether a definition is needed or not and regardless 
of which particular definition of hagq applies or is valid. Copyright can be found 
within the broader framework of hagq. 
The lack of definition of hagq in the original sources has been redeemed 
somewhat by an intensive "Utihdd " (conscientious reasoning) to clarify hagq. This 
is evident when the figh has produced objectively many classifications of huqüq, 
which give more precise and detailed statements of them. Ilugr7q in their 
manifestations are extensively discussed and recognized by fugahd' noting that there 
is a good deal of overlap between these various categories. Fugahd' have provided a 
rich literature of various rules and conditions, enabling rights to be ranked in general 
126 Karnali added, without enough evidence, the right-bearer (sahib al-hagq) as an element of hagq. 
Kamali, Fundamental Rights. 
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and within each category. 127 Iluqüq under Shari `a can be classified according to the 
holder, their subjects, their financial conditions, their ranks, their enforceability and 
to their inheritability. A review of the various ways in which huqüq are classified is 
useful for researching copyright in Shari `a and in determining which of these 
classifications is applicable to copyright. Generally then, these broad categories can 
be applied to copyright. 
The assertion in this chapter is that this typology of rights made by fugaha' can 
be employed and extended to include copyright. It can be argued that Shari `a 
deploys the basic concept of hagq from which copyright in the modern sense, can be 
deduced and framed. The application of the framework has shown that copyright is a 
"bundle" of various huqüq. 
Shari 'a approves the transfer of several intangible rights to others for some 
monetary considerations. It is legitimate to question whether this judgment might 
apply to copyright. This might grant the author the full option of a waiver, whether 
conditional or unconditional. It may accordingly consider the general approach of 
rights when deciding if copyright is inheritable. 
These classifications of hagq reveal the general Islamic attitude; the precision, 
and empiricism at the expense of theoretical considerations. As we have seen, huqüq 
have existed and been recognized in a piecemeal manner but which can be presented 
in a reasonably coherent body of identifiable and complete rights. Some 
contemporary scholars concluded that "[t]his distinction between rights, made by 
Muslim jurists at an early stage, had no parallel in Roman law"128 nor common law. 
This provides a counter to some conclusions that Islamic law "does not present a 
notion of the rights of the individual". 129 In contrast, it is possible to infer that 
127 Al-'Izz. vol. 1 p. 217-258. Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 18, p. 20 and after. 
128 Karnali, Fundamental Rights. compare with Piscatori J. P. "Human Rights in Islamic Political 
Cultures, " in: The Moral Imperatives of Human Rights (Washington, American University Press, 
1980), p. 142 and post. 
129 Piscatori J. P. "Human Rights in Islamic Political Cultures, " in: The Moral Imperatives of Human 
Rights (Washington, American University Press, 1980), p. 144. Urfan Khaliq, "Beyond the Yeil?: An 
Analysis of the Provisions of the Women's Convention and the Law as Stipulated in Shari'ah", 
Buffalo Journal of International Law. 1995 VOL 20T2 p. 1-47. 
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copyright could have a proper position in the Shari'a's system of huquq. 
After achieving the clarification of hagq and its classifications, copyright would 
profit from research on other terms relating to hagq in Shari `a and the nature of 
intellectual works. 
Chapter Two 
The Related Terms to Hagq 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the primary interest is in testing copyright in Shari `a, it is necessary to 
build a comprehensive and appropriate analytical framework of copyright to 
highlight the related terms to "hagq" (right). This chapter is devoted to the study of 
the definitions of "milkiyya" (ownership), "mdl " (wealth) and "manfa `a" (utility). In 
addition, we will describe the relationship between copyright and these terms and 
briefly review the basic features of intellectual works. 
Two preliminary points must be made. Firstly, these terms are conceptually 
pivotal to copyright because copyright can be traceable to them. An understanding 
of these terms is required for a correct decision on the Shari `a position regarding 
copyright. Different approaches to determining these terms and their applications 
have a direct impact on copyright. Secondly, copyright can be more soundly 
elaborated in Shari `a, if terms related to hagq are understood and fully connected. 
Needless to say a translation cannot ever fully capture the sense of the term in 
its Arabic original form. 
2.2 "Milkiyya" (Ownership) 
In Shari `a hagq encompasses what is approved whether as to "ikhtisds" the 
(exclusiveness) of its owner, or as the "idhn" (permission) for some people with 
certain qualifications or as to "ibäha" (liberty) for everyone. Therefore, hagq is 
more comprehensive than "milkiyya or milk" (ownership) because the latter is one of 
sub-divisions of the former. ' 
Rooted in the Islamic creed is the belief that only Allah has the attribute of 
1 Al-Khafif, al-Milkiyya, vol. 1, p. 1. Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikär. p. 88, footnote No. 1. 
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complete, ultimate and absolute ownership. A Muslim must believe that the heaven 
and the earth, which includes all individuals and their properties, are essentially and 
ultimately in Allah's ownership and that what is divided and held by humankind as a 
trust 2 There are many verses of the Qur'än and numerous "ahddith" (the prophetic 
traditions) which establish this aspect of the creed. This belief is held with an 
emphasis and plainness that Allah has a right to delineate the general rules of how 
people hold, use and dispose of property. 
What follows from this is that the nature and role of private and public 
ownership in Islamic law must be understood within this context. This has led to the 
conclusion that authors and their works belongs to Allah, and that the ownership of 
copyright will be granted and controlled by Shari `a 4 
2.2.1 Meanings of "Milkiyya" or "Milk" 
Milkiyya or milk literally means ownership, property, possession, control and 
action as referred to in the Quränic verses . 's It means an exclusive right to 
keep, use 
or dispose of a property. 6 "It is derived from a root [milk] that implies the idea of 
possession and acquisition of objects". 7 Milkiyya is the exact modem equivalent to 
milk. Early fugahd' used milk while the contemporaryfugaha' use milkiyya. 8 
2 Al-Arabi, M. A., Private Property and its limits in Islam, Al Azhr, Academy of Islamic Research, 
Cairo, The First Conference of Academy of Islamic Research, March 1964, p. 106. Al-Migri, Dr Rafiq 
Yünus, Usül al-Igtisdd al-Islami, Damascus, Dar al-Qalam, (1999) (Third Edition), p. 35. 
3 Qur'an, 2. v. 284,3 v. 189, and 57 v. 7. 
4 See this thesis, p. 206. 
5 Mujmal al-lugha, vol. 3, p. 840. Al-Zamakhsharl, Asäs al-Balägha, vol. 2, p. 227. Ibn Manz0r, vol. 
10, p. 491. Al-Sharab5ý1, p. 441. 
6 Al-Sayis, M. A., Ownership of Land and its Benefits in Islam, Al Azhr, Academy of Islamic 
Research, Cairo, The First Conference of Academy of Islamic Research, March 1964, 
V129., hereinafter: al-Sayis, Ownership of Land and its Benefits in Islam. 
El Khafeef, Aly, Individual Property and its limits in Islam, Al Azhr, Academy of Islamic Research, 
Cairo, The First Conference of Academy of Islamic Research, March 1964, p. 79. 
8 Al-Khafif, al-Milkiyya vol. 1, p. 64, footnote 1. Al-Mawsü `a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 3 1, Milk entry. 
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2.2.2 Technical Definitions of "milk" (Ownership) 
When we are considering "milk "(ownership), there is debate amongst fugahä' 
as to how it should be defined. It is not controversial to say that the majority of 
fuqaha' recognize that it is essentially difficult to identify "milk" reliably. 9 This 
might lead some contemporary fugahd' to conclude that there had been no precise 
definition of milk in figh. lo 
However, there are some definitions of "milk" which are closely related to the 
lexical interpretation, but the focus will be on technical clarification. 
Some fuqaha' considered that ownership could be analyzed in terms of 
legitimate judgment, capability or relationship being granted by the lawgiver to an 
owner. " They justified that on the basis that ownership is entirely the creature of the 
lawgiver and Allah provides the owner an adequate authority over the owned thing. 
A coherent statement of this opinion was made by al-Qaräfi and al-Subki who 
defined "milk" as "a "hukm shay T' (legitimate judgment) that has been proposed in 
a thing or "manfa `a " (utility) conferring on its owner an authority to take advantage 
of or exchange it". 12 Ownership is essentially a "hukm shar ä' (legitimate judgment) 
because it is based on " shar i' (legitimate) grounds. Al-Jurjäni defines it as a" 
"ittisäl shay `i "a legal relationship between "insän " (a person) and "shay"' (a thing) 
which allows that person to dispose of it to the exclusion of everyone else" . 
13 In 
fact, al-Jurjäni mentioned in specific the word "tasarruf', which can loosely be 
translated as authority or control. 
Following this logic, al-Sayis (d. 1396AH/1976) defines it as "the relative 
relationship between the owner and the thing owned, through which the owner is 
exclusively entitled to control the thing owned, except in case of inexpediency or 
Al-Furüq, vol. 3 p. 364. 
10 Al-Khaftf, al-Milkiyya, vol. 1, p. 59. 
11 Ibid. vol. 1, p. 66 
12 Al-FurzZq, vol. 3 p. 364. Al-Suyt4i, Jaläl al-Din, al-Ashbdh wa al-Nazd'ir, Muhammad Hasan al- 
Shäfi'Y (ed. ), Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-'Jlmiyya, (1419AH/1998) (First Edition), vol. 2, p. 155, 
hereinafter: al-Suyüti, al-Ashbäh. 
13 EI2, Entry: "Milk'. Al-Jurjäni, al-T'arila-t, p. 226. 
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any other legal hindrance pertaining to public or private interest. " l' 
A new definition proposes that "milkiyya" is 'ittisäl shar'i ' (a legal 
relationship) between a person and a "shay' mamlük" (an owned thing) which 
initially provides the owner "int jä ` (utilization) of and "tasarruf' (authority or 
control) unless a constraint operates. 15 The fundamental characteristic of ownership 
which affects its existence and which is vitally important to consider, is that "shay 7" 
(legitimate) approval. Whilst this is true, other factors need to be considered, 
because focusing on a relationship or judgment will not explain ownership. 
Accordingly, ownership of copyright creates a legal relationship or an authority 
between an author and his work. Conversely, there is no a legitimate relationship or 
an authority between an imitator and copied works. 
Another group offuqaha' favored the view that, ownership is to be analyzed as 
the notion of authority, with the addition of other criteria. The analysis rests upon a 
supposition that ownership means a legitimate authority to dispose. 
In presenting this view, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728 AH/1328) described "milk" as 
"al-Qudrat al-Shar `iyya" (the legitimate ability) to "tacarruf' (control). This ability 
is similar to the physical ability. 16 Likewise, Ibn al-Humäm (d. 861AH/1457) defined 
it as the legitimate control to dispose essentially established by Shari`a. "Al- 
Zarkashi (d. 794AH/1391) insisted that the essence of "milk" is the ability to do any 
action with property in which there is no liability or sin arising in the course of 
exercising this authority. 18 
It should be noted that ownership means more than the legitimate authority. In 
fact, ownership bestows legitimate authority but it is not ownership itself. 19 An 
14 Al-Sayis, Ownership of Land and its Benefits in Islam, p. 131. 
15 Al-Mu$lih, `Abd Allah, Quyüd al-Milkiyya al-Khdssa, Riyadh, Dar al-Mu'ayyad, (1415AH/I995) 
(Second Edition), p. 39, hereinafter: al-Mu$lih. 
16 Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad, b. `Abd al-Halim, Majmü' Fatäwä Shaykh al-Islam, Riyadh, `Abd al- 
Rahmän Qäsim (eds. ), vol. 29. p. 178. Hereinafter: Ibn Taymiyya Fatäwä. 
17 Ibn al-Humäm, Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wähid, Sharh Fath al-Qadir, Beirut, Dar Ihyä' al-Turäth al- 
'ArabY, (N. D) vol. 5, p. 456. 
18 Al-Zarkashi, Badr al-Din, Muhammad b. Bahädir, al-Manthiir fi al-Qaw'id, Kuwait, the Ministry 
of Awgäf and Islamic Affairs, (N. D), vol. 3, p. 224, hereinafter: al-Zarkashi, al-Manthür. 19 Al-Furüq, vol. 3 p. 364. 
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individual may possess property even though he has no control over its disposal and 
vice versa. There are some cases where there is no liability or sin arising in 
disposing of a property and there is no ownership. Therefore, it is clear that the 
definition is uncertain and the legitimate authority is only an indicator as regards 
ownership. 
However, the presentation of legitimacy in these definitions prevents unlawful 
ownership of copyright and ownership of unlawful works. 
In order to give exhaustively an exact definition, Ibn `Arafa (d. 803AH/1400) 
suggested that "milk" is "istingäq" (the entitlement) of "tasarruf' to dispose or use 
of an owned thing with any lawful act without need of another person's authority. 20 
The definition shows that "istingäq" (entitlement) is the very essence of the concept 
of ownership. This "istingdq" can only be established by Shari `a. 
The terminology regarding ownership has shifted with the term entitlement. The 
emphasis on entitlement is consistent with the general rules of Shari'a. The reason is 
that, the existence of ownership is conditional upon the approval of Shari'a and 
provides the direct and absolute ability to execute any lawful act on a property. 
Therefore, the approval of Shari 'a must be acknowledged, because it provides 
authority to the owner. 
Although, ownership can in part be explained by reference to such a concept but 
not fully, however, the entitlement of attribution, change, exploitation and 
reproduction of works are reserved only to authors. 
Some scholars add to the definition some points such as (unless a constraint 
operates), and (subject to any restrictions on the owner's right imposed by Shari 'a) 
or similar wording added to their chosen definitions because, for example, incapable 
person can own property but not have capacity freely to sell or dispose of it. 2' 
It seems that these conditions are necessary for any right or concept to be in 
accordance with other considerations and conditions stipulated by Shari 'a. 
20 AI-Rq$ä', Abü 'Abd Allah Muhammad, Sharh Hudüd Ibn 'Arafa, Muhammad AbU al-Ajran and 
al-Tahir al-Ma'müri, (eds. ), (1993) (First Edition), vol. 2, p. 605. 
21 Al-Kafawi, p. 853. Al-Muýlih, p. 39. 
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From a different viewpoint, Majallat al-'Ahkäm a! -'Aadliyya defines ownership 
by stating; "it is a thing of which man has become the owner, "22 whether it is 
corporeal thing or utility. 23 It is explained briefly in Majallat al-'Ahkäm, that 
ownership is anything that can be owned by a human which provides for exclusivity 
in the transaction. 24 
Obviously, there is a close connection between ownership and the thing owned, 
but they do not share the same identity, which a definition should address. Similarly, 
copyright is different from works. 
Even with mention of exclusiveness in the explanation, it is still inaccurate to 
define ownership by its subject matter. The definition has to go to the essence of the 
milkiyya itself. There is no a simple equivalence between the concept and its 
applications. 
According to al-Zargä, "milkiyya" (ownership) is a legitimate and an exclusive 
assignment "ikhti d shar `an" that provides an owner with authority to make any 
transaction unless a constraint operates. 25 He said that he created this definition by 
extracting it from several definitions, describing it as the most comprehensive and 
concise definition. 26 In fact, al-Zargä developed the definition of al-Quds7i who 
stated "al-milk ikhtisäs häjiz". 27 
Ikhtisds means an exclusive relationship between an owner and an owned thing 
that gives him absolute authority to use, dispose or take advantage solely and 
prevents others from having any of these privileges without his consent. This 
definition depends on his definition of hagq, which is "(ikhtisäs) exclusivity 
22 The Mejelle, p. 18, Article No. 125. 
23 Haydar `Ali, Durr al-Hukkäm Shari Majallat al-Abkam, Translated into Arabic by Fahmi al- 
HusaynY, Riyadh, Där `Alain al-Kutub, (2003/1423AH) (Special Edition), vol. l. p. 115, Article No. 
125. Hereinafter: Haydar. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Al-Zargä, Mustafa, al-Madkhal al-Fighl a! -'. 4m, Damascus, Dar al-Qalam, (1418AH/1998) (First 
Edition), vol. l, p. 333., hereinafter: al-Zargä, al-Madkhal. Many contemporary scholars such as 
Muhammad Abü Zahra favour this definition or try to improve it. See al-`Abbädl, vol. 1 p. 103. Al- 
Nashmi, al-Huqüq al-Ma'naüyya Ii al-Bardmy wa'Ahkam Naskhiha, p. 199. 
26 Al-Zargä, al-Madkhal vol. 1, p. 333. 
27 Al-Khaftf, al-Milkiyya, vol. 1, p. 66 
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established by the Shari 'a in the form of authority (sulfa) or commission (takliy). i28 
The logic of both definitions is the same. 
Applied to copyrights, "ikhtisds" retains extensive scope for application in two 
areas of copyright. First, ownership is an exclusive assignment, which prohibits 
other than the owner to using or dealing with property without the owner's consent. 
Second, it bears a strong relation to the condition of originality to obtain copyright. 
Here, ownership has been viewed in terms of exclusiveness. Even al-Zargä 
stipulates a condition that it must be "shar i" (legitimate). It is suggested that this 
definition is applicable to ownership, rights and physical objects. It is claimed that 
the exclusiveness is detrimental to the ownership, but without reference to the 
approval of Shari 'a. 
From the point of view of the majority offuqaha', this approach is criticized as 
the definition is applicable to temporary and permanent types of ikhtisäs. For 
example, the ownership of a borrower falls short of exclusiveness, even though the 
ownership is established. 29 Ikhtfsäs is different from ownership because ikhtisds 
gives a limited right of "tasarruf" over a "manfa `a" (utility) only but milkiyya gives 
an absolute right on a property or manfa `a. 3o 
However, it would be irrational to deny or underestimate the exclusiveness 
relying on the literal nature of the definition. On other hand, exclusivity should not 
be thought of as being ownership itself but as a part of the very essence of the 
concept of ownership. 
In the light of the previous discussion, it is beneficial to apply the definitions of 
ownership and their interpretation to copyright. There are some conclusions, which 
provide some basis for copyright in Shari `a. 
Firstly, evidence from Shari `a is necessary to establish ownership on anything, 
which would otherwise be unidentified. Shari `a recognizes that individuals have 
rights to particular property which they have obtained legally and grants them rights 
28 Kamali, Fundamental Rights. Al-Zargä, Nazariyyat al-Iltizdm, p. 18. 
29 Al-Zargä, Nazariyyat al-Iltizdm, vol. 1, p17,18. 
30 Al-Nashmi, al-Huqüq al-Ma `nawiyya li al-Barämij wa 'Ahkdm Naskhihä, p. 205. 
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of free use, possession, and disposition within Shari `a's limits. Ownership is entirely 
and solely the creature of Shari `a which provides a legal relationship between an 
owner and a thing. 
This implies that ownership, because it is, in essence, created by Shari `a, should 
be protected by it. As ownership is created by Shari `a, it is accordingly, ceased by 
Shari `a. The majority of fuqaha' agree that the abandonment of property by the 
owner does not terminate its ownership. 31 Therefore, authors do not lose their 
copyright, if they do not use or exploit it over time. 
Secondly, "shay... mamhik (the owned thing) has been generalized in its 
applications to include wealth, utility and right. This area of ownership can also be 
expanded to encompass intellectual property including copyright. With the analogy 
of material things, it is not hard to see the terminology of ownership extending to 
immaterial things. 
The only condition related to an owned thing is to be permitted interest and it 
does not belong to another person. 2 Thus, it can be argued that ownership applies to 
large extent to copyright. Copyright represents ownership of a work that cannot be 
legally copied and published by someone else other than the author. It might be held 
that ownership in the sense of Shari `a is wide because it does not stipulate that the 
subject matter must be a material thing. 33 The subject matter of property can be 
anything beneficial and approved by Shari 'a whether tangible, intangible, movable 
or immovable. Physical substantiality or control is not an essential element for 
ownership of something or its financial value. 
Thirdly, the baseline rule of Shari `a is that, the modes of acquisition of 
ownership must be acceptable by Shari `a. Ownership should be viewed as a 
legitimate authority established by Shad a if it corresponds to its conditions and 
modes of acquisition of it. Any means of an illegal possession such as theft, piracy 
or usurpation does not render ownership valid nor acquire an advantage in Shari `a, 
31 Al-`Izz, vol. 2, p. 326. Al-Khafif, al-Milkiyya, vol. 1, p. 77. 
32 Al-Furaq, vol. 3 p. 383. 
33 AI `Abbädi, vol. l, p. 198. 
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even though they are widespread. The same is true for copyrights. 
Fourthly, ownership means that an owner is the only person given total control 
over a thing originally, whether the owner exercises control directly or indirectly. It 
also means the exclusion of everyone other than the owner to use, possess or dispose 
of property without the owner's permission. The ownership rights are total and fully 
enforceable by the owner against others within the boundaries of Shari `a. Ownership 
and wealth is sacred to the extent, a person who is killed while protecting his 
property is a martyr. 34 The exceptions to the owner's rights are that the owners must 
not use their property to harm others or the community by "ihtikär" (hoarding) 
because these practices are forbidden. 35 
Ownership and the authority to dispose are not necessarily identical. This is 
equally applicable to the relationship between ownership and possession. Therefore, 
if the owners cannot take advantage of their property or to use their authority, 
because of lack of legal capacity for example, a minor or mentally incapable person 
or because of "ghasb" (usurpation) or theft, their ownership is not affected. 
Ownership by an author implies that the owner is at liberty to exchange, use or 
dispose of his property directly or indirectly, whether in consideration of a sum 
money or not, within the boundaries of Shari 'a. It also means that the author has the 
right to use his work and the right to dispose of it directly or indirectly, whether in 
consideration of a sum money or not. 
Shari `a evokes that each person is required to respect the property that other 
people have. Accordingly, Shari `a protects private ownership by imposing 
punishments and civil penalties on any intentional violating or taking of other's 
property without permission or lawful cause. Any kind of intentional taking, using of 
other's property or interference with the owner's property without his consent is 
prohibited. Article 96 of the Mejelle states that" The dealing by one person with the 
34 Al-Bukhari, tr., vol. 3, p. 397, Hadith No. 660. 
35 See this thesis, p. 219. 
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property of another, without his leave, is not lawful" 36 
Al-Dirayni thought that al-Qaräfi disapproved of the financial value of 
"Utihäddt" (opinions) and being subject to inheritance. 7 In fact, the position of al- 
Qaräfi on this point is difficult to ascertain, because it is not one he addressed 
directly. Abn Zaid stated rightfully that al-Dirayni misinterpreted al-Qaräfi's 
statement. 8 It is clear that a work consists of the expression of the thoughts and the 
thoughts "Utihädät " underlying it. When al-Qaräfi's statement is looked at closely, it 
is seen that he meant rightly that there is no property in the ideas. 39 
2.2.3 Classifications of Ownership 
Infiqh, ownership can be categorized into two ways: absolute ownership and or 
imperfect ownership. 40 The first is when the owner has full authority over an owned 
thing and use of it. The second is when the owner only has some authority or use of 
an owned thing. For example, in a lease contract, the tenant cannot sell the home or 
the car, but he can use it and the owner cannot use it during the contract. 1 It can be 
argued that authors have an absolute ownership over their works, but their heirs have 
imperfect ownership, as the heirs cannot change the inherited works. 
From another perspective, ownership is also of two kinds, public ownership and 
private ownership. The former refers to what the public owns so that it is not to be 
exclusive to someone in particular. For example, the sea, rivers and mountains are 
publicly owned. In contrast, private ownership means what an individual owns. 2 
The same classification might be applied to copyright. Similarly, ideas are free for 
everyone, but once they are captured in some particular form that form becomes a 
36 The Mejelle, p. 15. 
37 Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikär. p. 55,59. 
38 Abil Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawäzil, vol. 2 p. 91. 
39 Ibid. vol. 2 p. 91. 
ao Al-Sayis, Ownership of Land and its Benefits in Islam, p. 131. 
41 Al-Khafif, al-Milkiyya, vol. 1, p. 53. Al-Mawsa'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 39, p. 33 and post. Al-Nashmi, al- 
Huqüq al-Ma'nawiyya li al-Barämy wa 'Abkam Naskhiha, p. 200. 
42 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 39, p. 37 
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private property. 
2.3 Mal 
Milkiyya is more comprehensive than "mal" (wealth) because every portion of 
mal is a portion of milkiyya, but not the other way round. 43 "[M]äl is naturally the 
subject matter of ownership; "44There is mutual dependence of these concepts upon 
each other. It is important to ascertain whether copyright is kind of mal or not to 
determine the standpoint taken by Shari 'a about copyright. 
2.3.1 Meanings of "Mal" 
The word "mal pl. amwdl " means camels, cattle, sheep, land, clothes gold and 
silver or "all things one might own" 45 In the Qur'an the word mal refers to a gift. 46 
As pointed out in some ahädith, food, clothes, property and gold are mä1.47 The 
second caliph `Umar Ibn al-Khattäb (d. 23AH/643) described land as mä1.48 Wealth, 
property and wealth carry joint and comparable meanings referring to what is 
considered capital, estate or valuable goods and services in exchange. "Ibn al-Athzr 
says that the original meaning of the word mal referred to owned gold and silver but 
then it became generalized to include all material things that are obtained and 
43 Al-Kafawi, p. 835. 
44 Islam, Muhammad Wohidul, Al-Mal: the Concept of Property in Islamic Legal Thought, Arab Law 
Quarterly, Issue: Vol. 14, Number 4, p. 361. 
45 lbn Manzür, vol. 11, p. 635. Al-Asfahäni, al-Mufradät, p. 478. Al-Jawhari, vol. 5, p. 125, al-Zäwi, 
Tarfib al-Qämüs vol. 4, p. 298. Al-Zabidi, Muhammad Murtada, Taj al-'Aras, Benghazi, (ND), vol. 8, 
p. 121, hereinafter: al-Zabidi. Al-Sharabäýi, p. 448-451. 
46 Qur'an, 27. v35.36. 
47 Al-Bäz, 'Abbas Ahmad, 'Ahkäm al-Mal al-Hardm, ), Amman, Dar a1-Naf 'is, (1424AH/2004) 
(Second Edition), p. 26. hereinafter: al-Bäz, 'Ahkdm al-Mal al-Hardm. Al-Nawawi, Sharh Sai' h 
Muslim, Hadith No: 2958, vol. 18, p. 74. 
as Al-Bäz, 'Ahkäm al-Mai al-Ifaräm, p. 27. AI-Nawawi, Shari $ahih Muslim, Hadith No: 1632, vol. 
11, p. 72. 
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owned", 49 even though Arab Bedouins used to measure wealth with reference to 
camel. 50 This is what is meant by saying that someone has wealth, but "in any case 
to concrete things' sl 
2.3.2 Technical Definitions of "Mal" 
In line with the general approach to the sources of Shari `a, there is no specific 
technical definition of mal in the Qur'an nor the Iladith. 52 Moreover, the leading 
books on figh in general or on property in particular such as Kitäb al-Amwäl53 or 
Kitäb al-Kharäj54 had never worked out a definition of mal. Therefore, there is no 
unanimity on what is a proper definition of mdl, which places limits on the extent of 
its application. 
As to the practical importance, fugahd' have discussed the issue of definition of 
mal in order to explain what is allowed to be a subject matter of a contract of sale, 
dividing inheritance55 and for the purpose of interpreting and applying zakat. 56 Also, 
fuqaha' have described mal when dealing with the question of what should be 
regarded as the breach of an oath, if a person took an oath that he does not have 
mal. 57 The answers of fugahd' to this question reflect their views on mal. It is an 
objective test. 
In deciding what is mal, the majority of fugahä' have said that, any kind of 
wealth such as coin, furniture, estate, animal or debt is mal. They have frequently 
49 AI-Qardwi, Dr. Yusuf, Fiqh Az-Zakat , translated by Dr. Kahf, Monzer, London, Dar Al-Taqwa, (I 999), p. 66-67, hereinafter: al-Qardawi, Fiqh Az-Zakat. 
so EI2, Entry: "Mal". 
si Ibid. 
52 Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikdr, p. 128. 
53 Ibn Salläm, Abü `Ubayd al-Qäsim, Kitdb al-Amwdl, translated by Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, 
Readin U. K, Grane Publisingt, (2002) (First Edition)., hereinafter: Ibn Salläm. 
sa Qadi Abu Uusaf, Kitab ul-Kharaj, English Translation, by Ali, Dr. Abid Ahmad, Lahore, Islamic 
Book Centre, (1979) , (First Edition). ss EI2, Entry: "Mal". 
56 Al-Qardawi, Fiqh Az-Zakat. p. 66. 
57 Al-Mudawwana, vol. 1 p. 608. 
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used the term mal in the looser sense of the word. The most accepted view is that 
whatever can be converted to mal is like mal. 58 
The Flanafi school suggested that mdl exists only where zakdt is applicable, 
which means that debts are not ma1.59 It is not surprising that there are many rights 
of financial value, but they are not money essentially. On the same bases, zakdt is 
not payable on other valuable things, such as land, furniture and work tools unless 
they are traded. 60 
According to the Seventh Seminar on Contemporary zakät Issues, 61 the owner 
of copyright is not obliged to pay zakat on them automatically, but only on their 
profits if they comply with other requirements of zakc t. This indicates that copyright 
are not mal. It is consistent with the Fiqh Academy's decision that copyright is a 
legitimate right, which has financial value. 62 
Determining the estate of a deceased person might be the most crucial indicator 
of the attitudes of schools of fqh to define mal, because it obliges fugahä' to decide 
what thing is ultimately to be mal in order to distribute the estate among the 
beneficiaries. As stated before, the author's economic rights can be inherited like 
any kind of wealth and the author's moral rights cannot be accounted for the estate, 
because they are like personal rights. 63 
2.3.3 The View of the Majority of fugaha' 64 
There are serious attempts to grasp with the problem of defining mal from the 
practical view and the absence of any provision to the contrary. 
58 ZarNq, Ahmad Ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Risdla, Beirut, Där al-Fikr, (1982), vol. 2, P. 281. In 
English at: http: //ourworld. compuserve. com/homepage/ABewley/RisShahat. html 
59 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 32. Al-Mughni, vol. 10, p. 53. 
60 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 23, p. 193. 
61 Bayt al-Zakät Seminar, p. 593 and post. A1-Qaradäghi, p. 393 and post. 
62 Majallat al-Majma', issue5, vol. III, p. 2579, Resolution No. 43. 
63 See this thesis, p. 74. 
64 The three schools of figh other than the Hanafi. 
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The position in the Malik! school is that there are three factors, which render an 
object mal: desirability, usefulness and legality. In trying to explain what has a 
value, so that the amputation might be applicable to a person who steals wealth, Ibn 
al-`Arabi al-Mälild (d. 543AH/1148) defined mal as what is worthy of desire, and 
can be useful normally and lawfully. 65 Also, al-Shätibi defined mal as everything 
which can be owned if the owner acquires it legally and where the owner has 
exclusive control over it 66 
It is a similar to the linguistic meaning with the addition of being legal acquired, 
which is necessary to avoid recognizing illegal possession such as theft or 
usurpation. The first general rule of ownership in Shari `a is that unlawful things 
cannot be mal and cannot be considered among ownership. 67 Consequently, wine 
and pork are not mal for a Muslim, 68 because they are not permissible in Shari 'a. 69 
In addition, it means that illegal possession of a lawful thing will not validate its 
ownership. It seems that there is no difficulty in considering intellectual works as 
mal, because they are desirable and useful, provided they are acquired legally. 
Al-Shäfi`i states that the word "mal" is designated only for what has a value on 
sale, and the person who causes damage to it or loses it is obliged to pay 
compensation 70 This foundational concept can be applicable to intellectual works 
because they have financial value and if one causes damage to them, he is liable to 
compensate the owner. 
Following the founder of the al-Shäfi`i school, al-Zarkashi defined mal in a 
general statement as every useful thing. 1 Also al-Suyüti confirmed the definition of 
al-Shafi`i when he defined it as what people never get rid of it even it is small in 
65 Ibn al-'Arabi, Abü-Baler, Muhammad, 'Abd Allah, 'Ahkäm a/-Qur'än, 'Ali al-Bijäwi, (ed. ) Beirut, 
Dar al-Ma'rifa, (N. D), vol. 2, p. 607. hereinafter: Ibn al-'Arabi, 
66 A1-Shatibi, al-Muwafagat, Vol. 2. p. 14. 
67 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jämi', vol. 2 p. 328. Al-Bäz, 'Ahkäm al- Mal al-Haram, p. 40 and post. 
68 Wine is mdl for Christian and Jews. See Al-Mudawwana, vol. 
4 
p. 189. Ibn SallAm, Kftäb al-Amwäl, 
112. 
Al-Mawsa'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 34. 
70 Al-Suyuxi, al-Ashbah, vol. 2, p. 171. 
71 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 32. 
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value. 72 Authors never get rid of their works even it is small piece of work or has 
been subject to criticism. 
However, it is necessary to ascertain whether people agree to ascribing value to 
something or not. The value of any article is socially determined and may change 
largely, but its usability must be permissible. Al-Suyüti points to the fact that "'urf" 
(custom) has been a source. of value, 73 especially in the field of commerce. It is true 
that the value of anything is changed when custom or its usability changes. Many 
commodities or services rarely sold in the past are now traded for a great deal of 
money, because their acceptability of exchange and usability has changed. 74 These 
justifications are found in intellectual works. Al-Khafif stated rightly that according 
to the majority of fuqaha', intellectual property is mal because `urf recognizes it as 
mal although intellectual property is not a material thing. 75 
Some fugahd' of the FIanbali school define mdl as everything which is allowed 
to be used indefinitely. 76 This includes money, commodities, utilities and services if 
they have a permitted benefit and are traded for exchange. Accordingly, wealth is 
what can be utilized and recognized in Shari `a. This is what connects mal to the 
permissible usability. 77 It is consistent with their definition of contract of sale: "A 
sale is the exchange of property or utility for property or utility". 78 This definition 
constitutes an open-ended category, which contains intellectual works simply. 
There is an appeal in these definitions because they are rational, based on 
practical usage and not idealistic in approach. In concluding this view, Anderson 
said that mal is "those corporeal, usufructuary and other rights of any kind the 
exchange of which is customary are to be regarded as property mal of commercial 
72 A1-Suyuti, al-Ashbäh, vol. 2, p. 171. 
73 Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikär. p. 24. 
74 Ibid. p. 27,28. 
75 Al-Khalif, al-Milkiyya, vol. 1, p. 16. 
76 Al-Bahuri, Manýiür, Sharh Muntaha al-Iräddt, Riyadh, Iddrat al-Buhüth al-'Ilmiyya, (N. D), vol. 2, 
142. Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtkär. p. 25,26. 
Ibid. p. 26. 
78 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 9, p7, Bay' entry. 
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value". 79 Perhaps the addition of the condition of legality is another essential 
element, which has been made in the most modem and comprehensive definition in 
whatever contains a legitimate interest for a human being. 80 
2.3.4 The Hanafis' View 
Adhering to the Hanafi school, Ibn Nujaym (d. 970 AH/1562) states that, mal is 
what can be obtained and saved to be used at the time of need. 81 As well as, Ibn 
`Abidin (d. 1252AH/1836) who said that "mä1 is a thing which is naturally desired by 
man and can be stored for times of necessity" 82 whether it is movable or not. 83 
On the same line of thought with some amendments, al-Zargä defines mal as 
every corporeal thing that has financial value in the public point of view. 84 The 
definition is explained by stating that the financial quality of anything is established 
through the usage of people, the evaluation of goods against it and the legality of its 
use. 85 Anything that is not desired by anyone has no value on the market. 
Therefore, the sole source of value of everything comes from the practice but its 
permissibly depends on Shari `a. Apart from the assertion that mal "can be stored" 
these definitions are not the subject of any dispute. 
Al-Khafif explained the view of the Ilanafi school by stating that "mä1 is 
something capable of being possessed, physically acquired, where normal enjoyment 
is possible in ordinary times". 86 The definition of the Ilanafi school implies that mal 
79 Anderson, J. Norman D., International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Property and Trust, 
Islamic Law, vol. VI, Frederick H. Lawson, (ed. ) (Tubigen: Mohr, 1976), p. 103,104. Azmi, Intellectual 
Property. p. 61. 
8° Al-Bäz, 'Abkam al- Mal al-Haräm, p. 37. 
81 Al-Qardawi, Fiqh Az-Zakat. p. 66. 
82 The Mejelle, p. 18, Article No. 126. 
83 Ibn`Abidin, vol. 4, p. 510, vol. 5, p. 50. The same definition is used in Article 126 of Majallat al- 
Abkam, see Haydar vol. l. p. 115. 
84 Al-Zargä, al-Madkhal, p. 127. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 63. Here, al-Khafif did not define mal. 
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must be a material thing, because non-material things cannot be obtained' . 
87 The 
precondition for its being saved is materiality. 88 
This approach appears to narrow the conception of mal. Therefore, manfa `a is 
not mal, because it cannot be saved. 89 Also, al-Khafif concluded correctly that 
according to the Flanafi school, intellectual property can not be regarded as mäl. 
90 
From a textual standpoint, there is no sound proof from the Shari`a to support 
these conditions that mal must be a material thing and capable of being saved 91 On 
the contrary, there is evidence in Shari `a to sanction incorporeal or dependent things 
such as manfa `a within the broad meaning of wealth. In addition, some critics argue 
that the definition precludes perishable goods because they cannot be saved, while 
they are valuable and tradable. 92 It would be difficult to justify such a result. 
Acknowledging the undoubted link between the wealth and the financial value, 
the drafters of the Arabic Unified Financial Transactions Bill define mal as 
everything, utility or right that has a financial value on transaction. 3 This wording 
shows a reasonable degree of flexibility by attempting to include manfa `a and 
intellectual property. 
A more modem version proposes that mdl is everything that has financial value 
approved in Shari `a and capable of exchange. 4 This view is to keep the essential 
features of what constitutes mdl. Accordingly, no goods or tokens are money unless 
it can satisfy all three criteria. The application of this test results in asserting 
intellectual property mal. 
We can extract two basic grounds, which are necessary to the existence of mal 
according to the majority of fugahä': the usefulness and the approval of Shari `a. 
87 Al-Qardawi, Fiqh Az-Zakat, p. 66. A1-Zu4ay1Y, Wahbah, Majallat al-Majma' issue5, vol. III, p. 2575. 
ea Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikär. p. 97. 
s9 Ibid. 
90 Al-Khaßf, aI-Milkiyya, footnote on vol. 1, p. 9. Cf. Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 60. 
91 Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikdr. p. 31. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Al-Zargä, Mustafa, al-Madkhal ilä Nazariyyat, p. 309. Article 130 of the Arabic Unified Financial 
Transactions Bill in 1984. 
94 Al-Miff, Muhammad Tawfiq, al-Buyü' al-Shd'1 a, Damascus, Dar al-Fikr, (1998) (First Edition), 
p. 203., hereinafter: AI-Büli, Tawfiq, al-Buyü'. 
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While according to the Ilanafi school the grounds are value of something because of 
its financial quality, and "physical or corporeal goods which can be possessed, 
acquired and stored. i95 
On balance, the two versions coincide in the first condition of usefulness and 
the value. The conception is expressed in different ways. These versions differ as to 
the second condition as regards the approval of Shari `a and its materiality. In 
general, conformity with Shari`a should be seen as part of every concept, to be 
rooted and protected by Shari `a. 
This is not meant to imply that according to the Hanafi school mal may not 
comply with the requirement of legality. Rather, the hianafi school shares the 
general idea of legality but adopts a special classification for unlawful mal. The 
condition of the legitimacy is supported by the general rule that no one should 
benefit from his own wrong and that unlawful mdl will not be considered as part of 
his property. 96 
The approach of the majority of fugahd' is capable of adapting itself to all other 
forms of property, including intellectual works. It leads to a broader generalization 
that copyright can be sold, exchanged or assigned. This understanding provides 
some basis for the correct treatment of copyright in Shari 'a. 
2.3.5 Classifications of Mal 
Mal can be categorized in different ways. The most important division is 
between "mal mithli" (fungible or standard property) and "mdl giyml" (non- 
fungible or remediable property). "Mäl mithli" refers to "objects that have an equal 
value on the market without there being any disputable differences". 97 "... [T]hings 
that are measured, weighed or counted, as each individual item is no different in 
95 Cf. - Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikdr, p. 96. Islam, Wohidul, Al-Mal, p. 365. Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 63. 
96 Al-Qurlubi, al-Jämi', vol. 2 p. 328. 
97 El-Sawy, Dr. Salah, Financial Contracts I, Translator Inas Farid, Falls Church, The American Open 
University, (2002) p. 74-75. Hereinafter: El-Sawy. See The Mejelle, Article No. 145, p. 19. Ilaydar, 
vol. l. p. 121, Article No. 145. Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 36. 
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value from the other, such as cereals, eggs,... etc. "98 "Mdl giymi" refers to "objects 
that have no equivalent in the market"99 or they have equivalent but with a huge 
difference in value, such as animals, buildings and hand-made works. 1°° This 
classification belongs more properly to that of compensation. When someone has 
caused loss or damage to another's property, if it as regards fungible property that 
the tortfeasor is liable to provide similar property, but if it is non-fungible property, 
the tortfeasor is liable to provide its value. '0' 
An intellectual work should be considered as an abstract form of mal giym! 
because it has usually a personal print. But when it takes some material form such as 
a book or CD, it becomes mal mithli. 
According to the Flanafi school, mal is divided into "mä1 mutaqüm " where its 
usability is permissible under Shari 'a and "mal ghayr mutaqüm" where its usability 
is not permissible, such as pork or wine. 102 The majority of fugahä' do not consider 
unlawful item as mal in essence. 103 Therefore, works contain unlawful materials are 
mal ghayr mutaqüm. 
Further, property can be classified into two kinds: "`agdr" (immovable) and 
"mal manqül " (movable). Movable property includes everything that can be moved 
from one place to another such as coins, animals and commodities. Immovable 
property consists of land and buildings. '04 
2.4 The question of "Manfa `a" 
It is suggested that the discrepancy of considering "manfa `a " as kind of "mäl " 
98 El-Sawy, p. 75. 
99 Ibid. The Mejelle, Article No. 146, p. 19. 
'°° AI-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 36. 
101 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 36. 
102 llaydar , vol. l. p. 116, Article No. 127. los Al-Mawsü'a al-Fighiyya, vol. 36, p. 34. 
104 The Mejelle, Article No. 128 and 129, p. 18. liaydar, vol. l. p. 116,117 for the same articles. Al- 
Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 36. 
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is a problem for the recognition of`copyright. 105 The discussion regarding manfa `a is 
fruitful to conclude the position of copyright in Shari `a about. The disagreement 
regarding the definition of mal is analytically and closely connected to the question 
of whether manfa `a is to be considered as mal or not. 
The popularity and importance of analyzing manfa `a stem from the possibility 
that it may establish copyright within its definition. However, many contemporary 
scholars incline to the view that copyright is simply an extension of the concept of 
manfa `a. It may be that the correct way of understanding copyright is to draw a 
distinction between manfa `a and copyright. Copyright contains a great deal of 
manfa `a, but is essentially a right. 
It would be inaccurate to suppose that mal in the Arabic language includes 
manafa. Otherwise there is no reason for dispute between the majority of fugahä' 
and the Hanafi school. 106 Manaf'a is not mal in the way the word is used. 
Manfa'a (p1. manäfi') in the terminology of the fugahd' means any kind of 
utility, service, or enjoyment obtained from any thing, right (for example authorship) 
or permission. 107 In general, it is an antonym of hurt, harm, injury etc. 108 Habitation 
in a home, riding a horse, usage of a car and reading a book are kinds of manfa'a 109 
It is defined as "a temporary benefit that is a derived from an object through use of it 
". 110 In other words, it "refers to the collateral of tangible property and hence treated 
as incidentals to physical property". 111 The usual correlation between objects and 
theirs usability might support al-Qaräfi when he said that objects which have no 
manfa `a cannot be owned. ' 12 
It may not be an easy task to determine the question posed by al-Zarkashi, 
105 Majallat al-Majma', issues, vol. III, p. 2267-2579. 
106 Islam, Wohidul, Al-Mal, p. 361. 
107 AI-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 32, mal entry, and vol. 39. p. 102, manfa'a entry. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Yanagihash, Hiroyuki, A History of The Early Islamic Law of Property, Brill, Leiden, (2004), 
p. 45. 
11 Azmi, Intellectual Property p. 61. 
112 Al-Furüq, vol. 3, p. 384. 
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whether manfa `a can be called as mä1 or not, because of its nature. After presenting 
some examples of the application of the word, he stated that the word essentially 
refers to tangible things and then only to manfa `a as a metaphor and as a 
supplementary issue. ' 13 
To answer this question, the majority of fugahä' consider manfa'a as wealth, 
while the Hanaft school stated that manfa'a is not mal unless it becomes the subject 
matter of a contract. "4 A related and more controversial points is whether manfa'a 
like any kind of wealth, can be inherited, guaranteed or be the subject of 
compensation. l"5 
In fact, the difference does not refer to two concepts of wealth. It stems from 
the different attitude towards dealing with "ghacb " (usurpation) whether a person 
usurps someone's property and uses it is liable for the use, even he does not 
consume that property or cause damage to it while it is in his illegal possession but 
usurps its manfa `a only. The majority of fugahä' said that a person is liable for any 
illegal usurpation, while the Flanaf school incline to the view that he is not liable. 1lb 
The ffanafi scholars think that mal must be corporeal, independent and 
acquirable. Right and manfa'a should not be deemed as mal, because they are 
abstract, dependent and it is not possible to capture them. Manfa'a and rights might 
be in consideration of a sum of money in a contract such as hire or "qi ä" (legal 
retaliation), but they cannot be mä1 in themselves. 117 Considering manfa'a as mal in 
a contract is presented by the late Ilanaf scholars as a link between the early Hanafi 
school and the majority offugahd'. 
The Ilanafi school have argued that the duty of the payment of zakät cannot be 
fulfilled by giving a poor person any thing of value such as a right (inhabiting a 
113 Al-Zarkashi, al-Manthür, vol. 3, p. 189. 
114 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 36, p. 32, mal entry, and vol. 39. p. 102, manfa'a entry. 115 Ibid. 
116 Al-Mawsa'a al-Fighiyya, vol. 39, p. 103. Al-Sayis, Ownership of Land and its Benefits in Islam, 
130. 
1'ý For more details on this difference see these books; Abii Zahra, Muhammad, Nazariyyat al-'Aqd 
wa al-Milkiyya fi al-Shari'a al-Islämiyya, Cairo, Dar al-Fikr al-'Arbi, (N. D), p. 52. Al-Dirayni, al- 
Ibtikdr. p. 20 and after, al-Nashmi, al-Hugaq al-Ma'nawiyya if al-Bardmij wa 'Ahkdm 
Naskhihä, p. 137 and post, p. 181 and post. Al-Buli, Tawfiq, al-Buyü', p. 202,203. 
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house), service (traveling by car) or utility (reading a book). Similar support can be 
drawn from the fact that the duty of the payment of zaküt cannot be imposed on 
those possessing rights, services or utilities. 
The majority of fugahä' observe that mal includes commodities, goods and 
manfa `a. There is a good deal of overlap between manfa `a and mä1. This means that 
according to the majority of fugahä' mdl includes more than that as defined by the 
Ilanafi. What is of special interest here is that fugahd' made these definitions not 
regarding them as infallible. 
There are some arguments in defense of the idea of regarding manfa `a as 
wealth. Firstly, the leading argument is that there is no evidence in Shari `a that mä1 
does not include manfa `a. "Islamic Law does not strictly define the object of 
property as a tangible thing". 118 Therefore, the criteria for what constitutes mal 
should not be prescriptive or stringent. 
Secondly, teaching the Qur'än is acceptable as a "mahr" (dower) which is an 
essential condition for a marriage contract to be valid. 119 Specifically, it means that 
teaching the Qur'än is equivalent to a sum of money provided by the husband to his 
wife as a mahr. 
This has been generalized in its application by an analogy being drawn between 
teaching Qur'än which is manfa'a and any permissible manfa `a. In exchange for 
manfa'a, the demand for a certain profit is generally accepted. However, manfa'a 
must be legal to be approved as mal, because the legality is an absolute condition. 
Thirdly, with the more reasonable approach that mal is what has use or utility, 
the recognition of manfa'a as wealth. is obviously justified. Valuable things, whether 
tangible or not, are those which everyone would accept as wealth. Manfa `a has 
purchasing power, as does any commodity because it is permissible and everyone 
agrees that it is valuable. The worth of manfa `a can hardly be denied. 
Advocates of this view claim that, "'urf" (custom) which is one of the 
118 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford UK, p. 134. 
119 This argument is further discussed in p. 170 of this thesis. 
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authoritative references in Shari'a, considers manfa'a as wealth. '2° 'Urf 
internationally recognizes that wealth refers to tangible property such as houses, 
automobiles, books, and clothing as well as intangible property such as rights, 
benefits, privileges and concessions. 
Therefore, extending mal to include manfa'a is justified because manfa'a is a 
significant purpose of mal, and is often in higher demand than other categories of 
mdI. 121 Specifically, the association between manfa'a and mal is evident. Highly 
relevant is the notion that mal is related to utilitarian conditions. 
There is a sound argument in al-Shätibi's statement that all scholars agreed that 
Allah alone is the ultimate proprietor of all things but that the purpose of human 
ownership is the obtaining of their utility or advantages. Things such as a piece of 
land or some clothes have no value in themselves, but have value because they 
contain their related utilities and advantages. 122 If these utilities and advantages are 
diminished or reduced, they lose or lessen their values respectively. 
From an economic perspective, al-Zanjäni (d. 656 AH/1258) from the al-Shäfi`i 
school disputed the Ilanafi's opinion saying on the contrary that manfa `a deserves to 
be called mal more than anything else because something must have a value to be 
wealth. 123 Utilitarianism is the most obvious standard for an examination of the 
value of anything. The waiving of manfa `a from the definition of mdl is legally 
destructive even if logically possible. The Ilanafi school position on manfa `a might 
figure as elements in an academic argument rather than as practical justifications. 
But, Shari `a rulings essentially concern a practical life more than take abstract 
matters. 124 
Recently, al-Qaradäwi concludes correctly that "the definition of the Hanafi 
school seems to be closer to the lexical meaning given in the dictionaries and more 
120 I will bring up further discussion about 'Urf later, see p. 185 and post. 
t21 Al-'Izz, vol. l . p. 269. c. 
f with Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 62. 
122 Al-Shälibi, al-Muwafagät, vol. 3, p. 125. 
123 Al-Zanjäni, Mahmüd b. Al; ºamd, Takhrij al-Furü' 'alä al-Ucül, Muhammad $älih (ed. ), Beirut, 
Mu'assasat al-Risäla, (1982) (Fourth Edition). p. 225,226. 
124 Al-Zanjäni, Takhr j al-Fural' 'ala al-Usül, p. 225,226. 
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sensible with regard to the application of the texts on zaküt, since it is material assets 
and not services that zakat must be paid on". 125 
The viewpoint of the majority of fugahä's view has been more widely adopted 
and accepted than the Ilanafi's opinion, even within the. Hanafi school itself. The 
utility derived from a commodity is measured by units of money and compared with 
another utility or commodity. Any permissible commodity, utility or service that has 
value in exchange is wealth whether corporeal or not. Manfa `a and rights need not to 
be conceived as two unrelated categories of mä1 even if some of them are removed 
from exchangeable property for some reason. Money is not an empty container but, 
instead must carry some amount of permitted utility. 
There is nothing in al-Dirayni`s book appears to support the suggestion that 
"there is a critical conceptual gap between the understanding of the concept of 
manfa `a in classical works and al-Dirayni `s view". 126 In fact, al-Dirayni argues to 
support the majority of fuqaha's view refuting the arguments made by the Ilanafi 
school to exclude manfa `a from being a kind of mal. 
2.4.1 Are Intellectual works mal under Shari'a? 
Understanding what mal means under Shari `a will yield only one answer to this 
question. The logic leads to the view that copyright is simply a form of ownership 
which has a value that can be assessed and recognized even it is an intangible. 
According to the majority offugahä's view of mal, intellectual property in general is 
considered as a kind of mdl, provided that manäfai ` contained in them are 
permitted. 127 
The criteria of what constitutes mdl, which includes manfa `a, is more effective 
125 Al-Qardawi, Fiqh Az-Zakat, p. 66. 
126 Azmi, Intellectual Property. p. 61. 
127 Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikär, p. 20. 
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in copyright. 128 Pieces of information, knowledge, entertainment or experience 
represent manfa `a. A supporting argument can be found in the legal maxim which 
states: "A judgment is in accordance with what the object of an act may be". 129 A 
judgment on a thing depends very much on the purpose of that thing. There is 
certainly connection between the value of any thing and its manfa `a. Therefore, if 
manfa `a is the essence of mal and manfa `a is included in intellectual works, 
considering copyright as mal under Shari `a is approved. 
It follows from all these that authors have ownership over their work, which 
permits them to exchange or dispose of their work as they see suitable. In addition, it 
means that any act which might have the effect of causing the damage or destruction 
to this kind of wealth or disturbing the exercise of it must be prohibited. Today 
copyrights are vital business asset. This kind of wealth can be the subject matter of a 
transaction or an acquisition. 
There is no valid argument in Shari 'a to preclude intellectual works from being 
a form of ownership or property if the legal requirements are met. In principle, 
everything that is not expressly forbidden to possess or use in Shari 'a is permitted to 
be mal. Using this principle as a structure, one can acknowledge that intellectual 
works are mal and authors own the products of their mental and labor. The onus 
should be upon those who deny copyright to be a kind of property, to make their 
case. 
If, as is customarily argued, property was once limited to material things and 
only gradually expanded to include manfa'a then it is only logical and really quite 
progressive to keep expanding the circle to include intellectual property. 
Finally, Ibn Rushd, the first divided objects into what cannot be owned and 
what can be owned. What cannot be owned cannot be sold such as wine etc. What 
can be owned is subdivided into two kinds; the first is what cannot be sold because 
Shari'a prohibits its sale for one reason or another such as sale of "wagf" 
128 Ibid, p. 33.. I29 Tyser C. R, The Mejelle, Lahore, Law Publishing Company, (N. D. ) Article 1. p. 3, hereinafter: The 
Mejelle. 
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(endowment) or the sale of astray camel which cannot be delivered. The second is 
what Shari `a permits for trade unless it is carried out in unlawful way. 130 If we 
apply this classification to copyright, we will find that the author's economic rights 
can be owned and sold. 
The majority of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of India is from the Ilanafi school, 
but they decided that in accordance with contemporary practices, copyright 
constitutes a commodity that is subject to sale provided that the copyrighted work 
does not have any conflict with the Shari `a. 131 
In this respect, it might be possible to draw an analogy with the calls that were 
made for the consideration of the banknotes as mal for the application of zakdt, 
where for many commentators mal is not an inflexible concept and the Shari`a 
principles are not unsuited to the changes of life. In fact, some scholars are reluctant 
to use the principles in a sufficiently broad manner. 132 
2.5 The Nature of Copyrights 
After reviewing the classification of rights, we should identify the basic and 
general characteristics of copyright. This is because the uncertainty about copyright 
infiqh originates partly from the fact that intellectual property is essentially different 
from physical property. 
Also, it is an established principle of Shari `a that a ruling on any case should 
not be issued unless all relevant information, circumstances and evidence of the case 
in question are available before those who issue the ruling. Therefore, a coherent and 
justified Islamic treatment of copyright depends on an accurate understanding of the 
nature of intellectual property. Otherwise the researcher might reach an incorrect 
130 Ibn Rushd the first, Abü al-Walid Muhammad b. Ahmad d. 520AH/1126), al-Mugaddimät al- 
Mumahhidät, Sa'Id A'räb, (ed. ), Beirut, Dir al-Gharb al-Islämi, (1408A}111988), 
vol. 2, p. 62., hereinfter: Ibn Rushd al-Mugaddimdt. 
13' Decision No. 11, in third session in iyli Bangalore, India, in 13th -16 th Dhi al-Qa'da 1410 AH/8t' - 
11th June 1990, htta: //ifa-india. org/english/decision Sale of Rights. html 
132 See al-Qardawi, Fiqh Az-Zakat, p. 172. 
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conclusion on copyright in Shari `a. 
There is nothing contrary in Sharia in recognizing of the precise nature of 
intellectual property through legal textbooks that explain the important features of 
intellectual works. The researcher should benefit from the perspectives made by 
legal textbooks, which are common in all legal systems. In addition, Shari`a 
contains many rights which are by their nature abstract, intangible and of personal 
attribute comparable to copyright. 
It is agreed that intellectual property is significantly different from physical 
property or other rights in terms of being defined, used and protected. More 
precisely, copyright is distinguished by certain characteristics, which have allowed it 
to face difficulty and differences on treatment. Therefore, this section is devoted to 
addressing the most important aspects of the nature of copyright to facilitate our 
researching of copyright in Shari `a. 
2.5.1 Intangible nature 
Property is classified into tangible and intangible property. Intangible property 
means something which has no physical substance. 133 
The first significant distinction between copyright and physical property is that, 
copyright is an intangible right resulting from intellectual effort. The material forms, 
that is, book or CD, which conveys an idea is separate property and can be sold 
without concern over copyright. 134 The most perceptive truth about copyright lies in 
intellectual its creation embodied in a work. 135 It generally refers to imaginary 
creations such as a book, poem or picture. Copyright subsists within rather than 
exists as part of a work, because it is an intangible property. 
The material form is necessary to establish the theoretical works that contain the 
133 See Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, p. 16. 
134 Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 89. 
135 Ibid, p. 85. 
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ideas or information because there must be certainty as to what those immaterial 
things are and make them accessible. 136 For example, an author owns a certain work 
giving rise to the copyright. 
Unlike tangible property, absolute determination of intellectual works is not a 
simple task achievable to everyone. An intellectual work can be understood in the 
ideational configuration of which they it is part. 
2.5.2 Property Applicability 
Although, copyright has its distinctive role in our life but in terms of ownership 
it is a more controversial than other rights because of its nature. For various reasons 
the concept of ownership in the property sense is somewhat weak in intellectual 
works. Some scholars have viewed copyright as an artificial man-made law property 
and because of its nature. 137 
The intangible nature of intellectual works should not be perceived as an 
obstacle to their ownership, but it can change the course of application of traditional 
property rules so as they related to copyright. In general, intellectual products are 
less capable of being protected because of a lack of physical possession or control. 
It should be noted that property rights can be applied to different types of 
subjects. The details of property rights vary from subject matter to another. For 
example, there are many different rules relating to property rights in land as opposed 
to movable objects. Further, many rights fall short of either exchange or possession. 
For example, debt falls short of possession, but the creditor still has a right. 138 The 
same is true for intellectual property, which also falls short of possession because of 
its nature. This kind of property does not provide unconditional possession of its 
136 Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, p. 17. Cornish, W. R., Intellectual Property, London, 
Sweet& Maxwell, (1999). p. 399., hereinafter: Cornish, Intellectual Property. 
137 Al-l; lu$ayn. 
138 Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikär. p. 53. 
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subject matter because of its special nature. 
Tangible possession is only a pointer to ownership it is not the right itself. 
Ownership does not necessarily correspond to possession. Once authors publish their 
works they no have longer an exclusive possession of them. However, it is not 
justified to deny property ownership to intellectual works simply because there is no 
physical possession. The ownership of copyright is similar to a bill of lading, deeds 
to a debt or shares in company stock because of the intangible character in each of 
these cases. Moreover, electronic trade is based mostly on documentary intangibles. 
From another standpoint, if the buyer has no physical control over goods the 
contract of sale becomes void. 139 However, fuqaha' do not regard the selling of the 
airspace above property as void140 because the handover must be compatible with 
the goods. This means that rights, obligations and terms must be processed 
according to the nature and particularities of the specific subject-matter. 
It might be argued that the non-exclusive nature of intellectual works conflicts 
with absolute ownership. The purpose and indication of ownership of physical 
objects, their seizure, while it is the presentation and broadcast in the case of 
intellectual works according to their nature. There are some fuqaha' who consider 
that ownership does not subsist in materials in any way, but in their "manäfai "' 
(utilities). 141 However, it is not fair to assume that the nature of intellectual works 
will lead authors being prevented from exercising every potential aspect of property 
rights. 
A major equivalence between intellectual and physical property is that they 
have the financial worth, so that they. can be bought, exchanged or disposed of like 
any tangible property. Property in intellectual works is similar to the financial value 
of tangible objects. Indeed, on many occasions intellectual works can sometimes 
outweigh other property. The need for recognition of private property in intellectual 
139 Ibn Rushd, Biddyat Al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 206. 
140 Al-Dusügi, vol. 3, p. 21. Al-Ghiryani, al-Sadiq, Mudawwanat al-Fiqh al-Mäliki. Tripoli, 
Tashärukiyyt al-Magari, (2005) (First edition), vo1.3, p. 257, hereinafter: al-Ghiryäni, Mudawwanat. 
141 Al-Diraynr, al-Ibtikär. p. 54. 
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works rights is as important for tangible objects. In addition, infringement of 
copyright reveals the situation where an "abstract object is taken". "2 
The application of traditional ownership of intellectual works is controversial 
because of their nature. Therefore, it may be wise to recognize and apply potential 
aspects of property right only. Copyright means, relatively, some rules of ownership 
but not a complete set of comprehensive rules as in the case of physical objects. An 
investigation into the nature of copyright might offer more guidance regarding 
which aspect of copyright should be regarded as property and which not. Not all 
copyright is of the same nature. Some copyright is of a commercial nature, whilst 
others are only moral right. Copyright gives the owner the right to prevent others 
from claiming authorship of the work, or of copying all or substantial parts of it or 
exploiting it without permission. 143 
2.5.3 Personal Characteristic 
One of the distinctive features of authorship is that it is attached to its author as 
an extension of the personality. Authors try to create a body of work behind that is 
unique to them and that personifies them as individuals, works that speak of 
something about what that person was or did. And generally a work gives a personal 
profile of its author. '44 
Intellectual works have a strong personal attribute. Intellectual ability and 
creation is the most significant features of human being. Clearly, it is true on many 
occasions that intellectual works, or some of them, outweigh other property in 
importance. They express human identity. They can sometimes be justifiably 
outweighed even by considerations of personal preference. Similarly, intellectual 
works may prevail based on considerations of the general interest. 
142 Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, p. 154. 
143 Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 92. 
144 Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, p. 79. 
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It is evident that ideas occupy a significant position in both private individual 
life and public life. They are abstract in nature similar to personal rights. 
It is very difficult to distinguish one person's intellectual contribution from 
another's. Copyright can be based on ideas that attach to the author personally. A 
work is sometimes called the author's "brainchild". The paternity relationship 
between an author and his work provides that an author shall have responsibility and 
control over the authorship of his work. An author deserves the results of his work in 
the world and the hereafter, whether they are good or evil. '45 
The effects of many works and words subsist in the world for a long time often 
after the death of their creators. The fundamental significance of words was widely 
acknowledged in the Qur'an. As one verse reads: "Not a word does he utter but there 
is a vigilant guardian. i146 It is also reported that the Prophet pointed out to the 
importance of a word by saying: "A slave (of Allah) may utter a word which pleases 
Allah without giving it much importance, and because of that Allah will raise him to 
degrees (of reward); a slave (of Allah) may utter a word (carelessly) which 
displeases Allah without thinking of its gravity, and because of that he will be 
thrown into the Hell Fire". '47 
Copyright are of fundamental importance to intelligent people since they 
constitute the basis of their spiritual, cultural and social identity and because they are 
an economic source. It would only be fair to treat ideas, thoughts and words at least 
as equally as the treatment of other materials. 
Any work appears to reflect the author's personality, since it customarily lends 
itself to giving free reign to one's assets, knowledge, expertise and creative 
imagination. Authors usually protest strongly regarding any kind of distortion or 
derogatory treatment of their works. The reason is that their privilege and reputation 
are built on their works. 
145 Al-Bat-1, Qaddyä Fiqhiyya Mu'dsira, p. 82. 
146 Qur'an, 50. v 18. 
147 Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 8, p. 223. Hadith No. 9485. 
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2.5.4 Exclusivity and Usability 
The concept of exclusiveness in the property sense is almost problematic to 
apply to intellectual works. Unlike physical property intellectual works are normally 
intended for public use. Intellectual products are incompatible with physical 
exclusivity because they will only successful if they spread out. According to their 
nature, intellectual works depend on circulation, dissemination and use. Intellectual 
works have been created to disseminate thoughts and knowledge. The dissemination 
of works gives them their life. Obviously, intellectual works have no existence 
without the necessary spread by which people are able to recognize and use them. 
The property of authors of their works is limited by their nature, which needs to 
provide access to the public. Intellectual products are less capable of being protected 
because of a lack of physical possession or control. Once authors publish their 
works, they can no longer have exclusive possession of them. 
This description should not necessarily involve disadvantage to the intellectual 
works. This aspect of nature should not conflict with the exclusive rights of authors 
to their works. It is not justified to deny property on intellectual works because there 
is no physical possession or exclusiveness. The nature of openness of intellectual 
works is the source of weaknesses in the concept of their property. The property of 
authors of their works has limited applications. Authors cannot prevent others from 
using information ideas or facts, provided in their works but at the same time, 
authors have exclusive rights to prevent others from copying or selling their works. 
Copyright are relatively exclusionary for the purposes of presentation and 
commerce. 
Another consequence comes from the fact that intellectual works cannot be 
exhausted or diminished by use, intellectual works can be used everywhere at the 
same time without fear of consumption or termination. Although usage of property 
is obviously one of the most important of its consequences, it is not applicable to 
intellectual property. 
The unique characteristic of intellectual products needs to have a powerful 
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moral perception besides the law. The ethical treatment with regard to copyright has 
to be considered under Shari `a. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has been devoted to present an overview of the terms related to 
hagq in order to clarify all possible foundations of copyright in Shari `a. There is a 
strong relationship between hagq, milkiyya, mal and manfa `a, which has an effect on 
the legal assessment of copyright. These definitions are important resources that 
enhance the background in considering copyright. Different understandings of these 
definitions will yield different answers to the question of copyrights in fiqh. Once 
the research has addressed these terms, one might think thatfiqh is ready to move on 
to find evidence for a new form of hagq, milkiyya, mal and manfa `a. 
As the case with hagq, there are no technical definitions in the sources of 
Shari'a. Therefore, most fugahä' resort to lexical meanings to keep all of the 
meanings a word. Some scholars, however, attempt to give precise definitions. 
Although the majority of fugahii' recognize the difficulty of defining 
"milkiyya" (ownership), there is no justification to claim that there has been no 
precise definition of ownership infiqh. Fugahä' differ as to whether milkiyya should 
be analyzed in terms "hukm char i" (legitimate judgment), "al-Qudrat al- 
Shar `iyyat " (ability), "ittisdl shay T' (relationship) "istingdq " (the entitlement), or 
"tasarruf' (control or authority) granted by the lawgiver to the owner. Other fugahä' 
say that ownership is "ikhtisds shar'an" (legitimate exclusive assignment) which is 
crucial to its existence. The definitions of ownership have been criticized for relying 
more on some factors than others. 
From this chapter it appears that the Ilanafi school stipulates that the materiality 
of anything is a condition of it being "mdl" (wealth), while the majority of fugahä' 
think that its usefulness and the approval of Shari 'a are their only conditions. In 
considering several subjects such as the distribution of inherited estate, fugahd' 
have discussed the definition of mal. 
The majority of fugahd' consider "manfa `a" (utility) as mal, while the Ilanafi 
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school states that manfa'a is not mal except in rare cases. There is no evidence in 
Shari'a to exclude manfa'a from the broad meaning of mal. Manfa'a in copyright is 
an intangible interest whether it represents a piece of information, knowledge, 
entertainment or experience. 
It can be argued that since Shari 'a says nothing about copyright, there can be 
no conflict in recognizing it as wealth and property. Copyright ought to be 
recognized as those things which contain manfa'a. Intellectual works provide some 
kind of manf'a which must be within the boundaries of Shari 'a to obtain copyright 
on it. 
However, there is consensus among the fuqaha' is that the legitimacy of the 
contents of property or wealth is an essential condition. The approval of Shari 'a has 
always been an essential part of every concept. The discussion of terminology 
reveals some interesting results including the possibility of recognizing copyright as 
milkiyya, manfa'a and mal. According to Shari'a any lawful thing which is 
beneficial and is undertaken by a person can be owned and considered as moil. Parts 
of copyright are mere rights and other parts can be seen as wealth. 
The arguments set out in this chapter clarify that copyright is simply a form of 
ownership and mal in Shari 'a because Shari-'a does not stipulate that the subject 
matter of ownership or mal must be a material thing or under physical control. There 
is no reason to impose limitations or conditions on these terms that Shari 'a has not 
expressed clearly. 
As the owner is at liberty to exchange, use, or dispose his property within the 
boundaries of Shari'a, the author has the same rights over his work, whether in 
consideration of a sum money or not. 
Although the debate on the recognition of copyright in Shari'a continues, 
certain features are common to all legal systems. Addressing the precise nature of 
copyright is necessary to facilitate our understanding of it and to give the correct 
judgment in establishing of copyrights on Shari a. Copyright is an intangible and 
abstract property, exclusionary and of personal attribute. 
Chapter Three 
Evidence from the Original Sources 
3.1 Introduction 
As shown in the previous chapters, clarification has been achieved in the 
underlying components of copyright. This chapter will explore the possibility of 
copyright evidence from the original sources of Shari `a. It starts with introducing 
evidence from Qur'an that supports copyright. In the subsequent section, other 
evidence from the Sunna will be presented. 
As the following hadith indicates, the process of finding a ruling on something 
in Shari 'a is by approaching its sources sequentially. It is reported that "When the 
Apostle of Allah intended to send Mu`ädh Ibn Jabal (d. 18 AH/639) to the Yemen, he 
asked: How will you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises? He replied: 
I shall judge in accordance with Allah's Book (Qur'än). He asked: (What will you 
do) if you do not find any guidance in Allah's Book (Qur'än)? He replied: (I shall 
act) in accordance with the Sunna of the Apostle of Allah. He asked: (What will you 
do) if you do not find any guidance in the Sunna of the Apostle of Allah and in 
Allah's Book? He replied: I shall do my best to form ijtihdd an opinion and I shall 
spare no effort. The Apostle of Allah then patted him on the chest and said: praise be 
to Allah Who has helped the messenger of the Apostle of Allah to find something 
which pleases the Apostle of Allah". 1 
Few Qur'änic verses and 'ahddith deal with issues in comprehensive wording 
which is termed by scholars of usül al-figh and exegesis as " "tlmm" (general). 2 The 
fugaha' have stated that those texts provide general principles which can go beyond 
particular cases. 
Sunan Aba Dawüd, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/024. html , Book 24, Number 3585. 
2 `Ämm means a word that applies to unlimited things. See Karnali, Principles of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, p. 104. 
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To facilitate the study, the judgment of copyright can also be inferred from the 
general texts and principles laid down by the original sources if there are no specific 
texts dealing directly with the topic. In fact, there will be a privilege if a general text 
of copyright is available. 
Accordingly, it is not necessary that the research should aim to find only a 
specific text of copyright in the original sources. It is not correct to assume that the 
ruling on a case requires that materials be essentially "khäss "3 (specific). 
The prescribed steps in the hadith of Mu`ädh will be followed in researching 
copyright in this study. The proper starting point for establishing a correct judgment 
of copyright is the reference to the Qur'än, the first source of Shari `a. Therefore, this 
chapter will collect and examine a number of arguments for copyright derived from 
the Qur'an and Sunna. 
3.2 Evidence of copyright from the Qur'an 
According to the Shari `a every matter has its own ruling, whether the ruling is 
"wdjib " (an obligation), "mandüb " (recommended), "mubäh " (indifferent), 
"makrüh " (reprehensible) or "hardm " (forbidden). Qur'an says that, "the command 
is for none but Allah. ", ° "Whatever it be wherein Ye differ, the decision therefore is 
with Allah. "5 and "If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and 
. Therefore, the 
difference of opinion about copyright is to be his Messenger" 6 
resolved by reference to Shari`a. 
Moreover, the verse: "... To thee the Book explaining all things, a guide a 
mercy ... "ý and the verse: "This day have I perfected your religion for you, 
3Khdýs means a word that applies to limited things. See Karnali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 
105. 
°p Qur'an, 12. v 40. 
S Qur'an, 42. v 10. 
6 Qur'än, 4. v 59. 
7 Qur'än, 16. v 89. 
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completed my favor upon you, and have chosen for Islam as your way religion"8 
indicate the perfection of the Shari a. The entire law is to be derived from Shari `a 
whether a case is regulated directly by a "khä " (specific) text or in comprehensive 
wording " `ämm ". 
In Qur'an, certain rulings such as inheritance shares or family affairs are stated 
in "khä " (specific) texts, while most rulings are normally provided in "`ämm" 
(general) texts. 9 Therefore, a ruling can be inferred from " `dmm " (general) texts and 
supported by other evidence, indications and references. These supporting materials 
lead to the discovery of what a ruling might be on a case of question. This enables 
the fuqaha' to promote the law through the process of "Utihäd" (conscientious 
reasoning) when they face a new situation. 10 This was also meant to provide a fertile 
field of discourse for constructive readings. When the fugahä' apply a general verse 
to cover a new situation it is normally thought of as implementing the verse. 
The researcher will firstly resort to the main source of Shari `a, that is, Qur'an 
and its commentaries to find any guidance on a new issue such as copyright. There 
are sketchy references and citations relating to the issue of copyright in Qur'an and 
Qur'änic commentaries. Each verse represents a distinctive cluster of values and 
attitudes capable of directing juristic approach to new cases. 
3.2.1 The First Evidence 
Since copyright has been located within the Islamic broader framework of right, 
ownership and wealth, as stated before, there can be no conflict in recognizing 
copyright as trust. Shari `a pointed out through many unequivocal statements to the 
importance of "amäna" (honesty or trust) and "`adl" (justice). The reference to 
these principles appears as a regular theme in the Qurä'n and the Sunna. From the 
8 Qur'än, 5. v 3. 
9 Sha'bän, p. 48. Al-Zargä, al-Madkhal, vol. 1, p. 74. 
10 Sha`bän, p. 48. Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 366 and post. 
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Qurä'n, the main verse is "Allah doth command that you to render back trusts to 
those to whom they are due And when ye judge between man and man, that ye judge 
with justice... ". " 
It is important to review the interpretations placed on this verse by the highly 
acknowledged Qur'änic commentators. Al-Tabari (d. 310AH/922) stated that the 
verse was revealed, when the Prophet took the keys of the "Ka `ba X12 from its 
custodian `Uthmän Ibn Tallha (d. 41AH/661), 13 so the verse commanded him to 
return the keys. Therefore, the Prophet did. '4 
Although, the verse came in response to the issue of keys of the Ka `ba, but the 
actual wording is "'ämm " (general). The famous rule in usül al-figh is that a text 
should be interpreted and determined by its comprehensive wording not by its own 
"asbdb al-nuzül " (the occasions of its revelations). 15A1-Räzi is correct in confirming 
that the occasion of the revelation of this verse should not restrict its applications, 
Allah instructs believers to honor all their responsibilities, whatever they would be, 
religious or worldly. '6 
This generalization is supported by the "ßmä "' that, the command is to return 
the trusts to their owners whether they are righteous or sinful. " The ßmä ; which is 
one of the main sources of Shari'a removes any doubt about the broad interpretation 
of the verse or its continuous applicability. 
The word "amäna ", mentioned in the verse, means trust, honesty, 
responsibility, probity all the duties which Allah has ordained upon humans whether 
11 Qur'än, 3. v 58. 
12 The Holy Ka'ba is the cub building in the al-Masjid Al-IIaräm at Makkah. 
13 Al-Dhahabi, Muhammad bin Ahmad, Siyar A'läm al-Nubald , Beirut Mu'assasat al-Risala, 
(1419AH/1998) (Eleventh Edition), vol. 3, p. 12, hereinafter: al-Dhahabi. 
14 Al-Tabari, Abü Ja'far Muhammad Ibn Jarir, Tafsir al-Tabari, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 
(1999) (Third Edition), vol. 4, p148, hereinafter: al-Tabari. Al-Mubarkpuri, Shaykh Saftur-Ruhman et. 
al, Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Abridged), Riyadh, Darussalam, (2000) (First edition), vol. 2p., 493,494, 
hereinafter: Ibn Kathir. 
15 Al-Tabari, vol. 4, p 148. Karnali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 111. 
16 Al-Räzi, Fakhr al-Din b. 'Umar, al-Tafsir al-Kabir (Also known as Mafttih al-Ghayb), Beirut, Dar 
al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, (AH 1421/2000) (First Edition), vol. 10, p. 111. Hereinafter: al-Räzi. 
" Ibid. Al-Zamakhshari, Malmtid, al-Kashshdf, Bierut, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, (1995) (First 
Edition), vol. 1, p. 512, Hereinafter: al-Zamakhshari, al-Kashshaf Ibn al-Mundhir, Abü Bakr, al- 
Ijmä , Dr Fu'äd 'Abd al-Mun'im (ed. )Alexandria, (AH1402) (Third Edition), p. 102. 
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they be commands or prohibitions, their trusts or their covenants. This amdna is a 
general obligation binding a person to deal with every right, property, duty or such 
which he has a connection with justly and in good faith. "Trust embraces all the 
responsibilities which are imparted to someone because he is trusted... It might also 
consist of personal or collective property... ". 18 
According to many Qur'änic commentaries, the verse imposes honesty upon 
every person in all the circumstances. Everyone is required to act honestly in any 
matter in which they are involved. This includes rulers, judges, scholars and every 
person who is in position of trust to carry out his duty, whether the trust is connected 
to world affairs or the hereafter. 19 
The command of trust is worded in such a way that trust is identified as the key 
essence of every matter and individuals are obliged and expected to act honestly in 
their life. This deep-seated principle of honesty means no activity or aspect of life 
can escape its reach. 
This verse is the most comprehensive statement that imposes the obligation to 
deal honestly and justly with everyone on everything. 20There is nothing in the words 
used in the verse, which restricts its application. There is no express provision in 
Qur'an or Sunna which restricts honesty to tangible objects only. 
Moreover, the principle of honesty occupies a significant position in Shari `a 
and it is reflected in many verses of Qur'an and numerous ahddith. For example, one 
verse praises the Prophet Moses by saying "truly, the best of men for thee to employ 
is the man who is strong, the trusty. ", 21in another verse Allah praises the Angel of 
Revelation by saying "With authority there, and faithful to his trusts22 and a third 
verse praises believers who are "Those who faithfully observe their trusts and their 
18 Ansari, Zafar Ishaq, Towards Understanding the Qur'än, English Version of Tafhim al-Qur'än by 
Sayyid Abul A'1ä Mawdüdi, Leicester, The Islamic Foundation, (1994), vol. III, p. 148. 
19 Al-Tabari, vol. 4, p149. 
20 Al-Qurtubi, a1-Jämi', vol. 5, p. 165 and post. 
21. Qur'än, 28. v. 26. 
22 Qur'än, 81. v. 21. 
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covenants". 23 More traces of the principle of trust are to be found in the hadith. For 
example, it is reported that the Prophet said: "Return the trust to those who entrusted 
you, and do not betray those who betrayed you". 24 The command of amäna can 
provide a solid foundation for copyright. 
This evidence supports the meaning that honesty is compulsory and it has a 
significant reach over everything. 25 These texts are not abrogated or unequivocal. 
Therefore, the list of trusts can always be open and updated and every individual is 
within the terms of each trust in which he is involved. Contemporary fugaha' have, 
so far as possible, applied these verses to new norms and needs with similar effect. 
The principle of honesty constitutes an integral part of the Islamic education 
system. In this context, Muhammad `Abduh (d. 1905) stated that the general 
command of trust means the recognition of any right whether it is related to a 
tangible or intangible object. He stated that trust means a thing entrusted to the care 
of a person on the behalf of another, such as money or knowledge whether there is 
verbal or special agreement or not. Then he extended the notion of honesty to cover 
a scholar, who must return `ilm" (knowledge) to people, to a trustee who must 
return money to its owner, pointing out that there is an actual agreement to achieve 
that. Without this agreement between scholar and student, no sound knowledge can 
take place. In his understanding, the fulfillment of the obligation of "scientific trust 
or honesty" depends on disclosing the methods which lead to the discovery of 
knowledge. 26 
Scientific honesty is a particular application of honesty, because the concept of 
trust in Shari `a is not confined to tangible objects only. Accordingly, many 
contemporaryfugahä'27 approve the concept of "scientific trust". 
The main goals of scholars and researchers are discovery, teaching and 
23 Qur'än, 23. v. 8. 
24 Muslim b. al-Hajjäj, $ahih Muslim, translated by $addigi, Abdul Hamid, Lahore, Sh. Muhammad 
Ashraf, (1990), vol. I. A, p. 48., hereinafter: Muslim, tr. $addigi. 
ZS Al-Qurlubi, al-Jämi, vol. 5, p. 165. 
26 Ridä, Muhammad Rashid, Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Hakim (also known as Tafsir al-Mandr, Beirut, Dar 
al-Ma'rifa, (1993), vol. 5p. 170. Hereinafter: al-Mandr. 
27 Abi! Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawdzil, vol. 2, p. 98. 
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dissemination of scientific truth and honestly. The principle of honesty is connected 
to the concern of "isndd" (the chain of the narrators) 28 The obligation of honesty 
requires the reader to attribute a quotation to its true author. Quoting the references 
and documenting the texts are important duties of scientific honesty. 
Establishing copyright under the broad umbrella of honesty is justified by the 
flexibility and breadth of the definition of honesty. The concept of honesty is vast in 
scope inasmuch as it covers every deed. It is, however, particularly useful in 
copyright, because copyright is covered by the command of honesty and may 
advance its effectiveness. 
The outcome is that copyright is one of trusts that must be observed. This broad 
interpretation of the verse and the ijmd ` on its generalization can connect copyrights 
to the general principle of honesty. Accordingly, it can be argued from these agreed 
foundations that copyright must be protected and attributed to its owners. 
The term trust is here used in a wide sense. All rights, obligations and duties 
towards Allah or people are simply based on trust. Honesty is the basic moral 
principle without which a healthy society is not possible. We can then use these 
arguments to demonstrate that, copyright are trusts that must be acknowledged and 
returned to the author, not least because a copyright has financial value. 
Moreover, the possible application of the verse to copyright can be supported 
by other pieces of evidence which prohibit mistrust. One verse reads "For Allah 
loveth not the treacherous". 29 Another verse confirms that: "o ye that believe Betray 
not the trust Of Allah and the Messenger, Nor misappropriate knowingly Things 
entrusted to you". 30 These verses adopt the same meaning as the first verse by 
prohibiting the opposite conduct, that is, dishonesty. 
Not only has Qur'än condemned dishonesty, but the Prophet condemned also 
dishonesty when he said: "The signs of a hypocrite are three... if you trust him, he 
28 For more details on that, see p. 148 and post. 
29 Qur'an, 8. v. 58. 
30 Qur'an, 8. v. 27. 
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proves to be dishonest". 1 This understanding is supported by other 'ahdd th such as 
"... Anyone who cheats us is not one of us. 02 This hadith rejects a fraudster's 
inclusion as a member of society. Shari `a castigates mistrust and dishonesty for 
destroying society, their harmful consequences and regards them as one of the most 
serious crimes. 3 It is also, reported that the Prophet said "... your properties are 
sacred to each other, and for every betrayer there will be a flag to expose him on the 
Day of Resurrection. 2)34 A flag is a defamatory sign of betrayal. 
This is a further indication in that not only is the prohibition of all forms of 
dishonesty established but also the prohibition of any action leading to dishonesty, 
mistrust or fraudulence in general and this is a central rule in the Shari `a. As regards 
to our present subject, violation of copyright is contrary to honesty. The recognition 
and exploitation of works contrary to the command of honesty would be unethical 
and illegal. 
There is no obstacle in Qur'an, in the Sunna or in the figh to extending the 
prohibition of dishonesty to intangible objects. If a person uses others' writing 
without sufficient acknowledgment and attribution, and even passes them off as his, 
he is committing a kind of dishonesty. He does not return back the trust, which is the 
writing to the real owner. 
In addition, the reproduction of work without its owner's consent destroys 
public trust. It is repugnant that this kind of mistrust leads to profitable results, 
awards and fame attained at the real author's expense. He betrays the author's rights 
and betrays people when he dishonestly obtains moral and economic advantages that 
he does not deserve. 
The obligation of honesty is a legitimate and has a wide variety of applications 
that can provide sound foundations for recognition and protection of copyright. Al- 
Shäfi`i will perhaps regard infringement and violation of copyright as a kinds of 
31 Al-Bukhärl, tr., vol. 1, p. 31, Iiadith No. 32,33. 
32 Muslim, tr. Saddigi, vol. I. A, p. 67. 
33 Al-Mawardi, Abu al-Hasan `Ali, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, trans. Dr Asadullah Yate, London, Ta- 
Ha Publisher, (1416/1996), p. 355., hereinafter: al-Mawardi. 
34 AI-Bukhäri, tr., Vol 9, p. 79. liadith No. 96. 
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"khiydna" (mistrust or breach of confidence) because he defines it as taking 
another's property unlawfully. 35 According to al-Jaý$d$ (d. 370AH/980-1), from the 
Ilanafi school, "khiyäna" means reduction of someone else's right in an undisclosed 
manner. 36 
Thus, it is a kind of "khiyäna" and "ghish" (deception) to take an existing work 
and to claim its copyright. Khiyäna occurs if a person makes a false claim of 
authorship over another's work because he pretends to be a scholar or righteous 37 
Also when a publisher reproduces works without the consent of their authors or 
exceeds the copies of a work over the agreed number with the author, he makes 
khiydna. Article 34 of the (Qäntin IIagq al-Mu'allif) prescribed the punishment of 
mistrust on such publishers. 38 
Moreover, khiyäna includes the editing and breaking up of one transcript of a 
book into several books without scientific purpose and is a form of 
misrepresentation and deception. The changing of titles of books written by 
outstanding scholars and pretending that they are different books is another form of 
khiyäna. Also the preference of commercial profit in editing or publishing works at 
the expense of scientific and ethical considerations is a kind of khiydna. Indeed it is 
impossible to enumerate all the forms in which dishonesty can appear. 
An associated argument is the clarification of other related terms to benefit our 
discussion of this issue. "Ta `addi " (transgression) is defined as "benefiting from the 
property of another person without entitlement and without the intention to acquire 
ownership of its substance, or by destroying it or part of it without the intention to 
acquire ownership [of its substance]'. '. 9 Similarly, "ghasb" (usurpation) is defined 
thus "the willful seizure and appropriation of another's property without the use of 
35 Al-Shäfi`Y, Abü 'Abd Allah Mubammad b. Idris, al-Umm, Beirut, Dar al-Ma'rifa, 
(13 93AH/1 973)(Second Edition), vol. 5, p. 105. 
36 Al-Ja ä, Abü3-Bakr Abmad b. `Ali al-Räzi, 'Ahkäm a1-Qur'än, Muhammad al-Sädiq Qamhäwi 
(ed. ), Beirut, Dar Ilya' al-Turäth al-'Arabi, (1405AH) vol. 1, p. 282. 
37 Al-Nafaräwi, Abamad b. Ghunaym, al-Fawäkih al-Dawäni, Beirut, Dar al-Fikr, (1415AH), 
vol. 2, p. 284. 
38 'Izzät, Nizäm. p. 88. 
39 Al-Dusag7, vol. 3, p. 683. Al-Mughn7, vol. 5, p. 238. Yanagihash, A History of The Early Islamic Law 
of Property, p. 40. 
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arms" 40 Al-Mäwardi (d. 450AH/1058) defined ghacb as the prevention of a person 
from ownership and using the property without a right cause. 410ne almost 
comprehensive definition by al-Nawawi (d. 676AH/1278) reads: "ghasb" is the 
appropriation of one's right without a right cause". 42 
These definitions of usurpation can apply to a person appropriating a work or 
part of it and claiming authorship. However, both definitions can be applied to the 
case where a publisher benefits from a work beyond the number specified in the 
contract, which gives the publisher the right to distribute. 
When considering these prohibited actions, as to how they should be analyzed, 
some are essentially a kind of "khiyäna" (mistrust or breach of confidence) "ghish" 
(deception), and so on, whilst other actions are basically "zulm " (oppression), 
"ghasb" (usurpation) or "ta'addz"' (transgression). The negative consequences of a 
wide spread uptake of these prohibited actions need not to be demonstrated. It leaves 
rights with no special status in practical life and can lead to great injustice and 
wrongful enrichment. 
The second strand of the same verse is justice43 and the verse reads: "And when 
ye judge between man and man, that ye judge with justice". 44 The commandment 
requiring justice appears in many verses such as: "0 ye who believe! stand out 
firmly for justice as witnesses to Allah even as against yourselves or your parents or 
your kin and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both. 
Follow not the lusts (of your hearts) lest ye swerve and if ye distort (justice) or 
decline to do justice verily Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do. "45 "And 
whenever ye speak, speak justly, s46, "... Be just: that is next to piety"47 and "Allah 
ao Al-Dusügi, vol. 3, p. 683. F. H. Ruxton, Maliki Law, a Summary from French Translation of the 
Mukhtapr of Sidi Khalil, p. 217. 
al A1-Majmü', vol. 14, p. 341. 
42 Al-Majmü', vol. 14, p. 338. The Mejelle, p. 137. 
" Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikdr. p. 105. 
as Qur'än, 3. v 58. 
05 Qur'än, 4. v 135 and, 5. v 8. 
46 Qur'an, 6. v 152. 
47 Qur'an, 5. v 8. 
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commands justice, " 48 
From the IIadith, it is reported that the Prophet praised "... those who do justice 
in their rules, in matters relating to their families and in all that they undertake to 
do" 49 
Conversely, it is strictly prohibited for someone to commit any form of injustice 
whether it is obvious or obscure and regardless of the subject or how much of 
something there is. It is reported that the Prophet said: "Allah, the Exalted and 
Glorious, said: My servants, I have made oppression unlawful for Me and unlawful 
for you, so do not commit oppression against one another". 50 Warning in his last 
sermon, the Prophet said: "Verily your blood, your property are as sacred and 
inviolable as the sacredness of this day of yours, in this month of yours, in this town 
of yours. s51 It is also reported that he said: `Be on your guard against committing 
oppression, for oppression is a darkness on the Day of Resurrection, ". 52 There are 
severe punishments prescribed for oppression in this world and the hereafter. 
Therefore, the rule is that a Muslim must achieve justice and avoid oppression 
in every matter he undertakes. Al-Qurtubi (d. 671AH/1273) stated that as the case 
with honesty, it is an obligation upon everyone including rulers, judges and scholars 
to strive to achieve justice in all aspects of life. 3 
Recognizing copyright is one basis of achieving practical justice. An author is 
like a laborer who is entitled to appropriate and exploit the fruits of his work. Justice 
can only be achieved in response to the reality of authors creating their works and 
society and individuals recognizing copyright. In fact, authors are the only people 
who deserve to exploit their works. The denial of copyright leads to great injustice. 
48 Qur'än, 16. v 90. 
49 Sahih Muslim, Book 020, Number 4493, available online at: http: //www. muslimaccess. com/ 
Bunn ah/hadeeth/musl im/020. html,. 
so Sahih Muslim, Book 032, Number 6246, available online at: http: //www. muslimaccess. com/ 
sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/032. html . sl Sahih Muslim, Book 07, Number 2803, available online at: http: //www. muslimaccess. com/ 
sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/020. html . 52 Sahih Muslim, Book 032, Number 6248, available online at: http: //www. muslimaccess. com/ 
sunnah/hadeeth/musl im/03 2. html,. 
53 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jdmi, vol. 5p. 258. 
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There is no need to elaborate on the widespread injustice to authors if copyright is 
not restricted to them. 
This principle is seen in all the teachings of the Shari `a, with an emphasis and a 
clarity applied to every case. The concepts of honesty and justice are universal and 
they can be located in every case. Within the broad meaning of these principles, 
copyright can be accommodated within Shari `a. Another observation is that "hagq 
[right] is inextricably linked with justice and benevolence (a `dl wa ihsdn)". 54 
A deeper understanding of these principles needs to be implemented and 
developed in response to changing factors such as time and society and so on. In our 
time, observing copyright is consistent with honesty and justice. The ethical use of 
intellectual works, respect and protection of the economic interests of authors are 
covered by the general rules of justice and honesty. 55 Otherwise, the principles of 
trust and justice are at risk. 
By applying the general principles of justice and honesty it is possible to build 
Umiä ` to recognize and protect copyright especially where administrative and 
technical measurements fail. This is not only an ethical approach because the 
implementation of the Shari `a means that matters not in accordance with honesty are 
sinful as well as illegal. More precisely, infringement or violation of copyright can 
be punishable under the Islamic institution of ta'zir because in the Shari 'a the state 
is vested with discretionary powers to discipline those who neglect the religious 
principles. 56 
3.2.2 The Second Evidence 
In Qur'an, the second authority for copyright is the verses: "... nor withhold 
from the people the things that are their due... "57 and: "And withhold not things 
s' Karnali, Freedom ofExpression. p. 263. 
55 Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawazil, vol. 2, p. 103. 
56 Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawdzil, vol. 2, p. 103. E1-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 114. See also Ell, 
Entry: Ta'ztr. 
57 Qur'5n, 7. v. 85. and 1 l. v. 85. 
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justly due to men, ". 8 
These verses prohibit, through the Prophet Shu'ayb's words to his people, the 
diminution of peoples' things in transactions. This occurred when giving short 
weight, measure, qualifications, considerations or otherwise 59 But the word 
"peoples' things" should be taken as unlimited in that covers properties, wealth, 
rights and anything of value, whether tangible or intangible. 60 And the principle is 
that, property is protected, no matter how much it is worth. 
There is consensus that it is not allowed for anyone to take another's property, 
without permission. There is no doubt that anyone who contradicts this principle 
commits a "haräm " (forbidden) deed and he is a sinner. 61 
Therefore, this universal principle is applicable to copyright because copyright 
is just another intangible form of property. 62 Copyright is property belonging to 
those who create something and are the only ones who can exchange or dispose of 
them. A diminution of copyright can take many forms. There is the diminishing of 
an author's rights where violation or infringement of copyright arises. The 
deprivation of a person's copyright can be considered as a form of theft, 63 
diminution and oppression. 4 In this respect, piracy and plagiarism amount to 
diminution of copyright. Further, a publisher is not allowed to exploit the author or 
to publish his work more than the parties agree. Such a practice is a form of 
diminution of peoples' things and economic rights. 
There are many verses concerning the prohibition of taking another's property 
such as; "Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanitiesi65 and "Eat not up 
your property among yourselves in vanities: but let there be amongst you traffic and 
58 Qur'än, 26. v. 183. 
59 Al-Räz1 vol. 14, p. 142. 
60 Al-Mandr vol. 8, p. 255. 
61 Al-Qurlubi, AI-Jämi, vol. 2, p. 227. 
62 Al-DiraynT, Vaqq al-Ibtikar, p. 147. For more details, see also Chapter 2 here. 
63 Ibn Qayyim, al-Jawziyya, Muhammad b. Abi-Bakr, l'/äm al-Muwagqi 7n, 'haha Sa'd, (ed. ), Beirut, 
Där al-Jil, (1973), vol. 3, p. 332, hereinafter: I'ldm al-Muwagqi in. It is cited by Abü Zayd, Fiqh al- 
Nawdzil, vol. 2, p. 100. Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikdr, p. 147. 
64 Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikär, p. 147. 
65 Qur'än, 2. v. 188. 
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trade by mutual good-will"66 and "but if ye shall have your capital sums deal not 
unjustly and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly". 67 
These verses were followed by the report that the Prophet said: "A Muslim's 
mal (wealth) is forbidden for others to use without his permission... 9768 and "it is not 
lawful for a person to take his brother's stick except with his good will". 
69 
Al-Qurlubi pointed out that "Things included in this judgment are gambling, 
fraud, usurpation, denying someone's just right and anything the owner is not happy 
about or things which the Shari `a forbids, even if the owner is happy with them, 
such as money from prostitution, fees for [producing a slanderous poem] and money 
from wine and pigs and others. "70 "Whoever obtains someone else's property in a 
manner other than permitted by the Shari 'a has consumed it by false means" 71 
This line of authorities confirms a general ruling that applies to all situations. It 
is prohibited to take another's things irrespective of their value, whether the property 
is physical or intellectual. Principles of honesty and justice do not permit a 
compromise in this respect. 
On a wide interpretation violation or infringement of copyright is a kind of 
personal, educational and economic oppression. There is no doubt that an author will 
be unhappy when someone infringes his copyright. 
Therefore, violation or infringement of copyright are forms of diminution and 
can be grounds of legal liability and under "ta `zir" punishment, which is left to the 
66 Qur'an, 4. v. 29. 
67 Qur'iin, 2. v. 279. 
68 Al-Hakim, Muhammad Ibn `Abd Allah, AI-Mustadrak 'ala al-Sahihayn, Mustafa 'Alä, (ed). Beirut, 
Dar al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, (1411AH/1990) (First Edition), Iiadith No. 318, vol. l, p. 171, hereinafter: al- 
Mustadrak. Al-Shawkäni, Muhammad Ibn 'All, Nayl al-Awlar, Cairo, Dar al-Hadith (N. D), Hadith 
No: 2425. vol. 5, p. 378. Hereinafter: Nayl al-Awtär. Al-Albani, Näsir al-Din,. ahih al Jami'al-, Saghir, 
Beirut al-Maktab al-Islämi, (1988/1408AH) (Third Edition), vol. 2, p. 1268, Hadith 
No. 7662, hereinafter: al-Albäni, al-Jämi' al-$aghir. The translation is taken from: Al Jumah 
Magazine, Madison, Contemporary Fatawa, vol. 11, issue 2 1420, p. 11. The Permanent Committee for 
If9tä', in Saudi Arabia, FatwaNo. 18452, dated on 12/1/1417AH. 
Ibn Hajar, Al-Hafiz Al-Asqalani, Bulugh al-Maram, Dar-us-Salam tr. Riyadh, Dar-us-Salam, 
(1996/1416AH) (First Edition), p. 307. Hereinafter: Bulugh al-Maram. 
70 Bewley, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, I, p. 485. 
71 Ibid. 
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state's discretionary power. 72 
3.2.3 The Third Evidence 
A further verse which has not received due attention from previous writings of 
copyright, 73states: "Think not that those Who exult in what they Have brought about, 
and love To be praised for what They have not done, Think not that they can escape 
the Chastisement. For them is a Chastisement is Grievous indeed. " 74 
In order to give further background, al-Bukhäri (d. 256AH/869) reported that the 
occasion of the revelation of this verse was that "it was only that the Prophet called 
the Jews and asked them about some thing, and they concealed the truth and told 
him something else and seemed to deserve praise for the favor of telling him the 
answer to his question, and they became happy with what they had concealed". 75 
They tried to increase their reputation for work they had not done or knowledge they 
did not posses. 
The verse is introduced by another verse which states: "And remember Allah 
took a covenant from the people of the Book to make it known and clear to mankind. 
And not to hide it. But they threw it behind their backs, and purchased with it some 
miserable gain and vile was the bargain they made"76 
Commenting on this main verse (188), al-Shawkäni (d. 1250AH/1834) stated 
that one can, so far as is possible, interpret the verse as applicable to everyone who 
wants to be praised for what he has not done. 77 It condemns anyone who 
masquerades as something he is not, particularly in a given character or position that 
has serious consequences such as those of scholars or authors. The false claim might 
have a significant effect on the professional field to which he belongs and the whole 
72 Al-Shahräni, p. 527 and post. 
73 See p. 25 and post. 
74 Qur'an, 3 v. 188. 
75 Al-Bukhdri, tr., vol. 6, p. 74, I Iadith No. 91. 
76 Qur'än, 3 v. 187. 
" Al-Shawkäni, Muhammad Ibn `Ali, Fat. al-Qadir, Ahmad `Abd al-Saläm, (ed. ), Beirut, Dar al- 
Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, (ND), vol. 1, p. 515. hereinafter: al-Shawkäni, Fath al-Qadir. 
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of society. 
The verse can be taken as rejection of false appearance in general but it 
particularly condemns the willingness of being considered as scholars whilst they 
are not scholars. 8 Usually, if the Qurä'n warns people to avoid doing some action 
with the direst punishment in the hereafter (as with this case), it implies that the 
exercising of that action is prohibited79 and it arguably would itself be a crime or a 
civil wrong. 
Consequently, this implies that only real knowledge deserves honor, awards and 
wealth. If we move from materials to ideas, the verse imposes that only the author 
should deserve praise, honor and profit from authoring a work or creating 
something. 
It is therefore quite in conformity with the purpose of this verse to reject all 
false claims to authorship. It can be argued that the verse condemns scientific 
cheating. It confirms that those who hold knowledge are obliged to explain their 
knowledge to the public. It is the duty of the scholars to make the Shari `a clear to all 
people. Equally, the duty of scholars is to disseminate any piece of knowledge which 
is useful to humankind. The duty of dissemination of knowledge is approved and 
supported by the related duty of the preventing false claims to knowledge or 
authorship. 
3.2.4 The Fourth Evidence 
One verse provides a basic standard of prohibition of false claims. In the 
conversation between Allah and the Prophet Jesus, the verse reads: "Never I could 
say what I had no right (to say)". 80 In other words, he could never make a claim to 
what does not justly belong to him. 
78 Al-Jawzi, Abü al-Faraj Jamal al-Din, Zäd al-Masir fi 'Ilm al-Tafsir, (1407 AH/1987), Beirut, al- 
Maktab al-Islämi, vol. 1, p. 523. 
79 Sha'ban, p. 52. 
ß° Qur'an, 5. v. 116 
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Al-Shawkäni commenting on this verse said that it means "I must not claim for 
myself what I am not entitled to". 81 The text's message is simple, universal and 
general that a person is prohibited from making a false claim to anything. A person 
is duty bound by Shari `a to tell the truth. 
It has to be read together with the verse: "and shun the word that is false". 82 
The verse prohibits literally saying "zür" which means falsity, laying and similar 
meanings. It prohibits not only false testimony but also any sort of false speech, 
whether written or heard. Similarly, Ibn al-`Arabi stated that (zür) means a lie and 
the difference between the degrees of a lie appears in what the lie is about. 83 
These verses are particularly relevant to copyright. The general meaning of 
these texts can be applied without qualification. Truthfulness is part of the basic 
religious and legal duties of a Muslim. It is a requisite and coherent statement, 
presented in any form told, written down or recorded: 
Therefore, many forms of violation of copyright can be seen as making a false 
claim. For example, if one copies a work claiming that he is the author, he makes a 
false statement about his knowledge or intellectual assets and, therefore, the verse 
applies to his actions. In addition, if one copies a work and exploits it without proper 
consent, he appropriates what is not his own. It is accordingly necessary to consider 
that what is worth claiming is worth protecting. Therefore, the verse is certainly 
applicable to copyright. 
It is to be noted that the correct way of understanding this verse is to combine it 
with the previous verses. The rule as so stated applies to the case in question: 
copyright as well as other branches of intellectual property. Therefore, it provides 
that only an author shall have the right to be identified as the creator of his work. 
According to Ibn al-`Arabi, there are different kinds of lies and each of them 
should be treated with its own need of prohibition at different levels. Because 
knowledge and authorship are highly valued in Shari `a and of great influence on 
81 A1-Shawkäni, Falb al-Qadir, vol.!!, p. 95. 
82 Qur'än, 22. v 30. 
83 Ibn al-'Arabi, vol. 3, p. 287. 
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life, the lies in relationship to authorship and copyright will be heavily criticized and 
condemned. It can be argued that false attribution of copyright, which can take many 
forms, is prohibited under this verse. These conclusions are based on the direct 
meaning of these verses. 
3.2.5 The Fifth Evidence 
The verse "Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind. Enjoining what is 
right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah, "84 gives general evidence 
for copyright. The overarching goal of the Muslim society is to establish and 
maintain moral standards and to prevent the outbreak of corruption and oppression. 
Moreover, it is narrated that the Prophet said: "The religion is nasiha sincerity 
(or advice) and well wishing. Upon this we said: For whom? He replied: For Allah, 
His Book, His Messenger and for the leaders and the general Muslims". 85 
This hadith assigns to everyone in the community the duty to advise others 
sincerely for enjoining good and forbidding evil. For its wider interpretation and 
applications, al-Nawawi described this hadith as a central Islamic principle that has 
a great significance. 86 
Sincerity can be considered here a wide conception. It is imposed as a common 
positive religious practice to achieve the individual and public good and to reduce 
the level of evil and dishonesty in the community in general. The applications that 
follow from the principle of sincerity are not necessarily exhausted by any existing 
set of duties, 87 but new duties can be created as circumstances appear or change. 
Carrying this verse further, it can be argued that respect for copyright is one of 
the right deeds which should be enjoined and any infringement of copyright is 
84 Qur'an, 3. v. 110. 
85 Muslim, tr. Saddigi, vol. I. A, p. 45. Also available online at http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/ 
hadeeth/muslim/013. html. Book 001, Number 0098. 
86 Al-Nawawi, Shari Sahib Muslim, Hadith No: 55, vol. 2, p. 32. 
97 Ibid. 
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wrong and should be forbidden. It is clear that the duty of sincerity harmonizes with 
the respect of copyright. On the other hand, the violation or infringement of 
copyright can be seen as against the principle of sincerity. 
This understanding supports copyright. As al-Nawawi stated: "it is a matter of 
sincerity to attribute the admired quotation to who originates it, and it is the manner 
which people of knowledge and nobility still follow". 88 Therefore, there is a valid 
claim on society to protect copyright and to prevent infringement on them. This task 
can be achieved by enforcing suitable laws and by education. 
3.3 Evidence of Copyright from the Iladith 
The Sunna is the second principal source of Shari 'a after Qur'än. It is defined 
as the Prophet's sayings, actions and his tacit approvals of the sayings and actions of 
others. 89 The Sunna is of divine authority. Its authority is established by many verses 
such as: "whatsoever the messenger ordains you should accept and whatsoever he 
forbids you should abstain from"90, "But nay, by your Lord, they will not believe 
until they make you the judge of what is in dispute between them, then they shall 
find in themselves no dislike of that which you have decreed, and submit in full 
submission. " 91"he who obeys the messenger obeys Allah"92 and "... And We have 
sent down Unto thee also the Message; That thou mayest explain clearly To men 
what is sent For them, and that they May give thought. ". 93 
Additionally, the Sunna is considered to be a commentary on Qur'an and 
supplementary to its rulings. 4 Therefore, the Sunna can provide special decisions 
which were not mentioned in Qur'an. The order of research for ruling on any case is 
88 Al-Nawawi, Muhyi al-Din b. Sharaf, Bustän al- Ärifin, Beirut, Där al-Kitab al-`Arabi, (1985)(First 
Edition), p. 15. 
89 Karnali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 44. 
90 Qur'an, 59. v. 7. 
91 Qur'an, 4. v. 65 
92 Qur'an, 4. v. 80. 
93 Qur'an, 16. v. 44. 
94 Karnali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 44. 
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reported in the hadith of Mu`ädh cited above when he stated that he would judge in 
accordance with the Sunna if he did not find any guidance in Allah's Book 
(Qur'än). 95 
Following the logic of usül al-figh, we can start to move forward to the next 
stage of research. There are some materials calling for approval of copyright. 
Admittedly, we will find that 'ahädith are more specific than the Qur'änic verses. 
3.3.1 The First Evidence 
The status of "`ilm" (knowledge), scholars and students in Shari 'a is very high 
to the extent that teaching and learning are forms of worship and obedience to Allah. 
Many scholars devoted a chapter96 or even a book to refer to this high position. 97 
The significance of `ilm is rooted in many verses and ahddith. There are many 
Qur'änic verses that praise the status of knowledge and scholars. These include: 
"Say: My Lord! Increase me in knowledge", 98 "Say: "Are those equal, those who 
know and those who do not know? "99 and "Allah will Raise up, to (suitable) ranks 
(And degrees), those of you who believe, and those who have been granted 
knowledge"loo 
It is reported that the Prophet said: "If anyone travels on a road in search of 
knowledge, Allah will cause him to travel on one of the roads of Paradise. The 
angels will lower their wings in their great pleasure with one who seeks knowledge, 
the inhabitants of the heavens and the Earth and the fish in the deep waters will ask 
forgiveness for the learned man. The superiority of the learned man over the devout 
95 Sunan Abü Dawüd, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/024. html , Book 24, 
Number 3585. 
96 See for example; Malik in al-Muwat a', al-Bukhäri, Muslim, in their collections, al-Nawawi in 
Riydd al-$dlihin and many others. 
97 Ibn `Abd al-Barr, Abü `Umar Yüsuf b. `Abd Allah, Jdmi ` Bayän a! -'Ilm wa Fadlih, Damascus, Dar 
al-Fikr, (N. D). 
98 Qur'an, 20v. 114. 
"Qur'an, 39v. 9. 
100 Qur'an, 58v. 11. 
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is like that of the moon, on the night when it is full, over the rest of the stars. The 
learned are the heirs of the Prophets... ". '°' It is also reported that the Prophet said: 
".., and he who treads the path in search of knowledge, Allah would make that path 
easy, leading to Paradise for him ..: '. 
102 Consequently, knowledge and scholars 
'o3 occupy the highest religious and social status. 
71m does not only apply to religious knowledge or a specific field, but it 
includes all beneficial studies for human being. There is no indication that 
knowledge is limited to religious studies, but it generally includes any field of 
beneficial knowledge, science and technology. 104 
It is reported that the Prophet said: "When a man dies, his acts come to an end, 
but three, recurring charity, or knowledge (by which people) benefit, or a pious son 
who prays for him (for the deceased)". 105 It means that "knowledge is recognized by 
Islam as being of continuous benefit that outlives the author, even after death and the 
cessation of the property right" . 
'o6 
Al-Nawawi interpreted this hadith that after death the good deeds of the 
deceased person will terminate, and the hereafter rewards will not continue except 
for those three kinds of actions. One of these unceasing actions is knowledge that 
can beneficial to others. This is because the deceased person is the producer of these 
results of beneficial knowledge or a righteous descendant. Beneficial knowledge 
includes teaching others and authorship. 107 Being beneficial provides knowledge 
with continuity after death but it is not a condition of ownership of any work. Also, 
being beneficial can be for the public, the author or both. 
The previous hadth provides ample evidence for copyright. Firstly, the 
101 Sunan Abü Dawiid, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/025. html, Book 25. 
Number: 3634. 
102 Sahih Muslim, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/035. html, Book 035, 
Number 6518. 
103 Shalaby, p. 127 and p. 162. 
104 Shalaby, p. 53. Quraishi, Mansoor, Some Aspects of Muslim Education, Lahore, Universal Books, 
(I983), p. 8 and p. 36. Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. 
'05 Muslim, tr. $addigi. vol. III/A, p. 83. Sahih Muslim, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/ 
muslim/013. html, Book 013, Number 4005. 
106 Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. 
107 Al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahib Muslim, I3adith No: 1631, vol. 11. p. 71. 
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paternity right was enshrined for the first time in this hadith. It can be argued that 
the paternity right, which was mentioned in previous hadith, is directly linked 
between the creator of the work and the work. The author has the right to have a 
work which belongs to him, to be attributed to him. 
The author gives his name to his work and his descendants on the grounds that 
he has made the assertion of his paternity of both. The parents of righteous offspring 
and the holder of beneficial knowledge are similar in this respect because, it is not an 
easy task to achieve the criterion of being righteous or beneficial. In the same way 
that people bring up their children, authors also develop their ideas. This attribution 
to the author applies to works in a similar way as attribution of upbringing is to 
descendants. An author might be honored by his beneficial work, which is similar to 
honoring a parent for bringing up righteous offspring. In this respect, the hadith may 
be supported by another hadith; "... your sons are part of your labor". 108 On a broad 
interpretation of gain, offspring fall within gain, because under Shari 'a, children are 
obliged to maintain their poor parents. 109 This understanding of these 'ahddith can 
find further support in the previous classification of rights made by Ibn Rajab, which 
gives a parent a right to appropriate his son's property. 
The above hadith (When a man dies) means that as a general rule; after death a 
person no longer receives credit for good deeds. There are only three good deeds 
which remain capable of providing credit for the deceased person after death. One of 
them is knowledge, which is used by and benefits people. For example, where an 
author writes a beneficial and informative book its rewards remain after his death. 
Secondly, the hadith considers knowledge as a type of work and which gives 
its holder the entitlement to both rewards in this world and the hereafter. "o There is 
nothing in Shari `a that prohibits the combination of the work for rewards for 
business and the hereafter. 
108 Cited at Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. In Arabic, see al-Tirmidhi, Abu Ed Muhammad, 
Sunan al-Tirmidhi, Mahmüd Muhammad NaUär, (ed. ), Beirut, Dir al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, (First 
Edition), (1421AIV2000). Hadith No: 1358, Vol. 2, p. 347. Hereinafter: al-Tirmidhi. 
109 Al-Ghiryani, Mudawwanat, vol. 3, p. 131. 
110 Al-Dirayni, hlagq al-Ibtikär, p. 14, p. 73. 
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Also, there is nothing contrary to the principles of Shari `a in recognizing financial 
rewards and rewards in the hereafter for the same work. All kinds of deeds can be 
subject to continuity or termination according to their usefulness. 
Habitual daily actions such as eating, sleeping, exercise and so on are 
"mubdhdt" (neutral whether done or not). But these actions may be considered as 
kind of worship, if the believer does them with the correct intention and this includes 
even those actions done for the sake of the self. The intention of a person is decisive 
in the acquisition of the reward. The actions with good intention become sound and 
deserve reward in the hereafter, whether they are exchangeable in this world or 
not. 11' 
3.3.2 The Second Evidence 
It is reported that the Prophet said: "If anyone reaches (ma) whatever has not 
been approached before by any Muslim, it belongs to him". 112 As to its authenticity, 
Abiz Däwüd (d. 275AH/888), al-Mundhiri (d. 656AH/1258), 113al-Magdisi 
(d. 643AH/1245), 114 Ibn IIajarl15(d. 852AH/1448) and al-Suyüti 116 reported the same 
hadith. While other fugahd' 117 have pointed out that there are a number of 'ahädith 
that support this hafiith. 
111 AI-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 1, p. 47, Hadith No:. 52. 
112 Available online at: http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/013. html Book 19, 
Number 3065. In Arabic see Abü . 
Däwiid, Sulaymän b. al-Ash'ath, Sunan Aba Däwad , 'Izzat al- Da'äs and 'Adil al-Sayyld, (eds. ), Beirut, Dar al-Hadith, (1971), I3adTth No: 3071, Vol. 3, p. 452, 
hereinafter: Abü Däwüd. 
113 Al-Mundhin, Abü Muhammad 'Abd al-'Azaim Ibn 'Abd al-Qawi, Mukhtavar Sunan Abt Ddwüd, 
Alunad Shäkir and Mul}ammad al-Faqi, (eds. ) Beirut, Dar al- Ma'rifa, (1980), Hadith 
No: 2947, vol. 4, p. 264. 
114 Al-Magdisi, Muhammad b 'Abd al-Wähid, al-'Ahädith al-Mukhtdra, 'Abd al-Malik Dahash, (ed. ), 
Makka al-Mukarrama, Maktabat al-Nahda al-Haditha, (1991/1411AH) (First Edition), vol. 4, p. 227,228. 
115 Ibn Hajar, Alimad, Talkh7$ al-Habir ft Takhry 'Aha ith al-Räfi'i al-Kabir, Häshim al- 
Yamäni, (ed. ), Beirut, Dar al- Ma'rifa, (1384AH), vol. 3, p. 63. 
116 Al-Manäwi, 'Abd al-Ra'üf, Fay/ al-Qadir Sharh al-Jami' al-Saghir lil-Suyüf, Beirut, Dar al- 
Ma'rifa , vol. 7, p. 148. 117 Al-'Ajlüni, Ismä'il, Kashf al-Khan, Al mad, al-Qallash (ed. ), Beirut, Mu'assasat al-Rishla, (1408 
AH/1988) (Fifth Edition), vol. 2, p. 330. Al-Mullä 'All Qäri, al-Asrdr al-Marfü'a ft a1 Akhbar al- 
Mawdü'a, Muhammad al-Said, (ed. ), Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al- Ilmiyya, (N. D), p. 232. 
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These fuqaha' mention the following 'ahddith: "He who cultivates land that 
does not belong to anybody is more rightful (to own it)i118, "If anyone brings barren 
land into cultivation, it belongs to him, and the unjust vein has no right", 119 and in 
more detailed narration "the land is the land of Allah, and the servants are the 
servants of Allah. If anyone brings barren land into cultivation, he has more right to 
it 
. 99120 
The first hadith uses the word "ma" which means whatever, anything and 
everything. Under the broad meaning of this word "maw', this conception is 
expressed in a general and knowable way equally applicable to material and 
immaterial things. The validity of the priority right is supported by these 'ahddith 
together with the first hadith to the effect that who first comes to anything is most 
entitled to it. These 'ahddith sanction ownership to the first acquirer in a broader 
generalization of priority. And the priority right demonstrates the religious factor to 
protect rights. 
Moreover, people are equal and at liberty to own free and lawful things, but 
whoever is the first to appropriate any of them is entitled to own them. Al-Bayhagi 
(d. 458AH/1066) and Ibn Hajar confirmed that right of priority or priority right is an 
established principle in Shari `a. 121 This priority right bears a strong relation to the 
principles of justice and the stability and security of rights, because the priority gives 
the first holder of something, which has not been previously owned a certain ground 
of ownership over competing claimers. According to Shari `a principles; priority is 
decisive as to the question of ownership if there is no other evidence of ownership. 
18 AI-Bukhär7, tr., vol. 3, p. 306, Hadith No:. 528. 
19 Available online at: http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/013. html Book 19, 
Number 3067. In Arabic see: Sunan Abü Däwüd , iiadith No: 3073, Vol. 3, p. 453. Al-Zargäni, 
Muhammad, Sharh Muwatfa' al-Imam Malik, Beirut, Där al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, (1990) (First 
Edition), IIadith No: 1495, Vol. 4, p. 37, hereinafter: al-Zargäni, Sharh Muwatta'. Al-Tirmidhi, 
Hadith No: 1378, Vol. 2, p. 364. Ibn Iianbal, Ahmad, Musnad al-Imäm Ahmad, Muhammad Salim, 
(ed. ), Beirut, Där al-Maktb al-Islami, (1993)(First Edition), vol. 3, p. 382 and post. hereinafter: 
Musnad Ahmad. 
120 Available online at: http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/013. html Book 19, 
Number 3070. 
'Z' Al-Bayhagl, Abü Bakar, al-Sunan al-Kubrä, Beirut, Där al-Ma'rifa, (1992), vol. 10, p. 139. Ibn 
liajar, Fats al-Bart, vol. l, p. 74, liadith No: 6270. 
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Priority right is one of the lawful ways to acquire ownership. The general principles 
of Shari `a make clear certainties about the authenticity and the generality of the first 
hadtth. 
Therefore, these 'ahädith along with other arguments create the result of 
acquiring ownership based on priority. These 'ahddith and principles can be used to 
extend the right of priority to include intellectual and scientific priority. '22 In like 
manner, authors are to be treated as the first acquirer of previously un-owned things 
and so are entitled to ownership provided by the first hadith directly and in express 
terms. This hadith thus resolves the problem of priority which is the essences of 
copyright. '23 
3.3.3 The Third Evidence 
Islam attaches honor and praise to `aml" (labor). There are many verses 
demonstrate its elevated position. 124 A particularly important prophetic tradition is: 
"Nobody has ever eaten a better meal than that which he has earned by working with 
his own hands... s125 and "The best of what you would eat is that derived through 
your labor... " 126 
These 'ahddith indicate clearly that the labor is the best factor which has the 
highest weight in Shari`a in acquiring ownership of something. This principle can be 
applied to copyright because "the author combined with his physical and mental 
work and time spent, all place the author in the rank of an artisan who has the right 
to enjoy the ownership of the rights for his work". '27 
122 Fatäwa al-Lajna al-dä'ima, vol. 3, p. 188, Fatwa No. 18453, dated on 12/l/1417AH, Fatwa 
No. 18845, dated on 30/5/1417AH. Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. 
123 See p. 214 here. 
124 Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 112 and post. 
its Al-Bukhdr, tr., vol. 3, p. 162, Iladith No:. 286. 
126 Cited at Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. In Arabic al-Tirmidhi, Hadith No: 1358, Vol. 2, 
347. 
127 Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. 
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Al-Nawawi stated that the labor by hands is the best way of earnings on which 
to live and the best kind of work is agriculture because it implies the complete 
reliance on Allah, and because it carries benefit to humans and animals. It can be 128 
argued that authorship of useful things which, also has these benefits, is among the 
best ways of earnings. 
Labor need not be restricted to where tangible products are obtained. The broad 
understanding of texts extends the concept of labor to authorship. The entitlement of 
rewards in the hereafter based on authorship of valuable things does not conflict 
with financial reward in this life. 
This supports the principle that whoever applies mental labor in order to invent 
something or who has written a book, is the exclusive owner of the fruits of his 
labor. 129 One's work represents the fruits of a great deal of labor. A work can be 
characterized as the flesh and blood of an author who carried out the work to realize 
it. 
Intellectual property can be justified and established on this theory of `aml " 
(labor) which applies to mental and physical endeavor. 130 It is obvious that 
intellectual creations are, at the very least, similar to other products. The 
combination of mental and physical labor found in these works should not diminish 
the recognition and the protection they deserve. 131 
The legitimacy and preference of the appropriation of things on the basis of 
one's labor as provided for by Shari `a is similar to Locke's132 theory, which is used 
to justify the ownership of intellectual property. 133 According to this theory, each 
individual has an exclusive right to his own body and its actions. By mixing his 
labor with other actions one has legitimate grounds for appropriating things as his 
128 Ibn IIajar, Fath al-B&, vol. 4. p. 381. 
129 Usmani, Muhammad, http: //www. albalagh. net. 
130 Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 113 and post. 
13' Al-Dirayni, Uaqq al-Ibtikar. p. '105. Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 125. 
132 See Al-Dirayni, Nagq al-Iblikär. p. 149-159. Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 95. 
133 Bently, and Sherman, Intellectual Property, p. 34. Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 
p. 41 and post. 
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own personal property. 134 The same principle was extended by scholars to apply to 
intellectual works in the Western writings. 
This ownership implies that only the author has the right to exchange, use, or 
dispose of his property in a similar way to the owner of material products. The 
author can dispose of his rights directly or indirectly, in consideration of a sum 
money or not, and conditional or unconditional within the bounds of Shari-a. 
3.3.4 The Fourth Evidence 
Where the Shari `a applies, it is not only prohibited to claim ownership of 
something, if it is not true, but it is also prohibited to pretend to be an owner of 
something. 
"Narrated Asmä'(d. 73AH/692): Some lady said: 0 Allah's Apostle My husband 
has another wife, so is it sinful of me to claim that he has given me what he has not 
(in order to tease her)? Allah's Apostle said: The one who pretends that he has been 
given what he has not, is just like the (false) one who wears two garment of 
falsehood". 135 The hadith condemns giving false impression in social affairs, but 
many scholars said it is generally applicable to everyone who makes a false 
impression or statement of having or owning anything which in fact he has not". 136 
In order to achieve practical justice, the haäith prohibits `unjust appearance' 
even where there is no harm or injury caused to others. The hadIth has been held to 
apply to cases where the false statement is an attempt to acquire social gain among 
peers. 
Shari `a also condemns both unjust enrichment and unjust appearance where the 
134 Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, Adler, Mortimer J. (ed), London, Britannica, Great 
Books of The Western World, (1991), vol. 33. Chapter, v, p. 30 and post. 
135 Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 7, p. 109, Hadith No: 146. Muslim, tr. $addigi, vol. IIl/B., p. 420. Sahih Muslim 
available online at: http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/013. html. Book 024, 
Number 5311,5312. 
136 Al-Nawawi, Shark Sail i Muslim vol. 14. p. 93, Hadith No: 2129. Ibn IIajar, Fat, al-Bart, vol. 9. 
P. 397, Hadith No: 5219. 
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truthfulness is not perceived. People are incapable of drawing a distinction between 
real and false enrichment. One can make a. false claim to having wealth, knowledge, 
honor or piety for different reasons. In some cases, the external appearance of people 
and things has a great importance as well as the reality. It is therefore in conformity 
with the purpose of SharT `a to reject all false claims. 
This creates an environment in which honesty is fostered, perceived and 
rewarded, and dishonesty and falsity is castigated and eradicated. Authors and 
scientists who make false claims, deny the rights of the real authors and researchers 
and unfairly gain the reputation of the works they have not created and these actions 
fall within the meaning of this hadith. 
In its plain terms, the text broadly prohibits the giving of false appearance or 
making false statements. This applies to any claims made in order to obtain some 
benefit such as reputation, wealth, awards, and fame. In every field, there are a 
number of people, who appear to be qualified but who are not, trying to use such 
appearances for their purposes. 
It is a juristic task to apply the general text's holding to all new cases. 
According the direct meaning of this hadith, it is prohibited to plagiarize a work 
because it gives a false impression that someone other than the real writer created 
the work, and to claim its rewards. It is prohibited to claim authorship of something 
and pass it off as one's own work, when, in fact, belongs to someone else. 
It becomes a deception (a legally constructed term) that applies even if the only 
thing "taken" is fame of knowledge. If a person usurps someone's copyright and 
attributes the work to him, he makes a false statement and allegation of doing some 
work and claiming that he is the scholar or author while he does not deserve that 
reputation. An analogy is made between, on the one hand, someone who makes a 
false allegation or statement of having or owning anything and, on the other hand, 
false witness. This is because in both cases they wrong themselves, the real owners 
and the public. 137 
137 Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, vol. 9. P. 397, Iiadith No: 5219. Al-Hakim, Muhammad Ibn `Abd Allah, 
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In reality, it is worse than giving a false impression to violate or infringe an 
author's copyright. The damage of false allegation as regards copyright, or in 
science or knowledge generally is more devastatingly harmful than in many other 
aspects of life. Indeed, a person can obtain many advantages by violation or 
infringement of someone's copyright when he commits deception to the public. 
This understanding is supported by the hadith: "... he who made a claim of 
anything, which (in fact) did not belong to him, is not amongst us... s138 and ".. he 
who made a false claim in order to increase (his wealth), Allah would make no 
addition but that of paucity, and he who perjured would earn the wrath of God. "139 
Therefore, whoever claims copyright without being entitled to falls within the terms 
of this hadith. 
For these reasons, the fugaha' condemn the practice of "tadCs" describing it as 
" the brother of mendacity". 140 "Tadlis" means fraud or deception, but in the terms 
of "`ilm mus; alai al-hadith" it is to change or modify hadith so as to prevent the 
recognition of its true chain of narrators. 141 In the case of "hadith mudallas", a 
person narrates from his contemporary and does not meet him, or met him but he did 
not listen to him, as if he said : (an anonymous person said... '42 The scholars of the 
discipline of hadith were acting as protectors or detectives to restrain cheating and 
eliminate dishonest narrators, describing them as charlatans and frauds. 143 There are 
special books which collected and exposed the names of people who were "accused 
or suspected of tadlis ". 'aa 
There are many reasons why someone might commit tadlis. It can be to impress 
Ma'rifat 'Ulum al-Kadith, Mu`zm Husin, (ed). Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, (I397AH/1977) 
(Second Edition), p. 103., hereinafter: Ma'rifat 'Ulüm al-Hadith. 
138 Muslim, tr. $addigi, vol. I/A, p. 49. Sahih Muslim http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/ 
muslim/013. html, Book 01, Number 0118. 
139 Muslim, tr. $addigT, vol. I/A, p. 72. Sahih Muslim http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/ 
muslim/013. html, Book 01, Number 0202. 
140 EI2, Entry: tadlis. 
14! Al-Tahhän, Tays7r, p. 83. Ma'arifat 'Ulüm al-Hafiith, p. 107. 
142 Al-Tahhän, Tays7r, p. 80. Ma`arifat 'Ulüm al-Hadith, p. 108,109. 
103 Ma'rifat Ulüm al-Hadith, p. 103. 
144 EI2, Entry: tadts. 
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one's peers by presenting himself in a series of chain of narrators. '45 However, 
equally it can be argued that many forms of infringement of copyright are tadlis. 
3.3.5 The Fifth Evidence 
The concept of copyright has met huge support for ethical reasons. There are 
'ahädith which clearly prohibit making a proposal of sale if one's brother has 
already made a proposal regarding the same thing. '46 
The first is "Narrated Ibn `Umar (d. 74AH/693): the Prophet decreed that one 
should not try to cancel a bargain already agreed upon some other persons (by 
offering a bigger price). "147 Another hadith is that, "Abü Huraira (d. 57AH/676) 
reported Allah's Messenger as saying: A Muslim should not purchase (in 
opposition) to his brother. "148 
Moreover, Abü Huraira reported that the Prophet said: "Don't nurse grudge and 
don't bid him out for raising the price and don't nurse aversion or enmity and don't 
enter into a transaction when the others have entered into that transaction and be as 
fellow-brothers and servants of Allah. A Muslim is the brother of a Muslim. He 
neither oppresses him nor humiliates him nor looks down upon him... All things of a 
Muslim are inviolable for his brother in faith: his noble blood, his wealth and his 
honor". 149 
The prohibition of these actions is justified by the mere fact that they provoke 
injustice, enmity and hatred in the community, and they deny the right of priority. 
These negative consequences can be induced by the infringement or violation of 
copyright. By analogy, it is prohibited to perform any act that would amount to an 
las Al-Tahhän, Taysir. p. 83. Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 74. 
146 Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 198. 
147 Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 7, p. 56, Hadith No:. 73 
148 Sahih Muslim hgp: //www. mustimaccess. com/surinah/hadeeth/muslim/013. htmi, 010, 
Number 3619. 
149 Sahih Muslim httD: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/013. html Book 032, 
Number 6219. 
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infringement or violation of copyright such as the reproduction or the use of a work 
or a substantial part of a work for the commercial purposes by other than its real 
owner without his consent. 
What follows from the above discussion is that, it is forbidden claim or use 
copyright, which one does not own. This means that copyright should be treated not 
only as morally fundamental, but also as legally enforceable. Shari `a attaches 
importance to the moral aspect as well as to the legal aspect. 
3.3.6 The Sixth Evidence 
By using evidence from Shari`a and its principles such as honesty, the 
discipline of hadith has been well established over time. The discipline of hadith has 
two parts; "main" (the text) and "isndd" (the chain of the narrators). 150 The concern 
of isndd is one of the religious duties and noble characters of Islamic civilization. ' 51 
As we have seen, the concern of isnäd is an application of the obligation of 
honesty. 152 
The approval of an hadith is dependent upon the analysis of the validity of both 
its isndd and main. There is a particular established order of rules according to 
which 'ahddith should be dealt with to examine their authenticity. The scholars of 
hadith developed a list of factors which need to be considered when deciding 
whether an hadith is authentic or not. The rules regarding the discipline of hadith 
enable scholars to check how an hadith has come down to them by providing a 
series of the names of the narrators and the transfer of the onus of responsibility of 
their references. 
The concern and need for scientific honesty started very early in Islamic 
civilization. Sufayän al-Thawri (d. 161AH/778) said that "attribution of a useful 
150 EI2, Entry: Isnäd. 
'51 Ma'rifat 'Ulüm al-Hadith, p. 6. Nag, al-$iddiq Bashir, Dawäbit al-Riwaya 'ind al-Muhaddithin, 
Tripoli, Manshürät, Kulliyyat al-Da'wa, (1412AH/1992) (First Edition), p. 59. Hereinafter: Dawdbil 
al-Riwcya. 
152 See p. 122 and post. 
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quotation to its originator is an aspect of honesty and gratitude for knowledge, while 
ignorance of this attribution is kind of dishonesty and ingratitude". '53 
Al-Shäfi`i explained that "He who seeks learning without references[Isnäd] is 
like him who gathers firewood by night, he may carry a bundle of firewood in which 
there is a snake that will bite him without his being aware that is there". '54 "Ibn al- 
Mubärak (d. 18 1 AH/797) said: "isndd is a part of the faith, without it, anyone might 
say whatever he wished". 155 
Ibn Hazm (d. 456AH/1064) confirmed that "the knowledge of hadith is an 
Islamic established science exclusive to Muslims regarding the Prophet's traditions 
which has no counterpart in other civilizations, and it is not possible for a sinner to 
add any alteration ". 156 
Islamic civilization is famous for being the first to adopt measurements for 
recording in scientific methods. One of the most notable achievements in the history 
of Islamic civilization have been that the knowledge of hadith and `flm mustalah al- 
hadith, which were compiled in the collections. A wide variety of experimental 
techniques plus a working knowledge of 'ahddith are crucial tools in establishing the 
authenticity of any hadith. Techniques were developed to pursue and ensure the 
hadith material as regards their attribution to the Prophet. 157 
Therefore, isndd can be seen as the root of what is known as author's right of 
attribution and paternity. 158 As we have seen, isnäd was used to combat false 
attribution. Similarly, this objective (combat of false attribution) is required 
throughout contemporary copyright. 
There are rules developed by scholars that govern reception, narration, 
153 Al-Hattäb, Muhammad b. Muhammad, Mawahib al-Jarl ft Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, Damascus, 
Dar al-Film , (N. D), vol, I, p. 4, 
hereinafter: al-Hattäb. 
154 Zafar, Abdul Rauf, Transmission of Iladth and Biography, Islamic Quarterly, Vol. xxxv. No. 2, 
London, The Islamic Culture Centre, AH 1411/ 1991. p. 119. 
iss Ibdi, p. 118. Ma'rifat 'Ulüm al-Hadlth, p. 6. Al-Tahhan, Tayslr, p. 181. 
156 Ibn IIazm, Abii Muhammad `All, al-Fill bayn al-Ahwä' wa al-Nihal, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al- 
'Ilmiyya, (1996) (First Edition), vol. 1, p. 336. 
157 Al-Tahhän, Taysir. p. 15. 
158 Al-Najjar, p. 6. 
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attribution and documentation of hadith. 159 One of these rules is that "Every student, 
before utilizing any verbal or written material, had to obtain it through the proper 
channel otherwise it is considered to be a forgery or theft of material. 7460 
There are eight ways of "tahmmul al- `ilm "161 by which one can receive or 
narrate ahädith. 162 Students must follow special conduct and rules to gain the right to 
convey or narrate ahädith. Ijäza is one of these ways to obtain the license of 
narration. 163 
Ijäza lexically means permission, license, authorization or endorsement. In 
terminological terms it means a diploma, certificate or accreditation awarded by a 
scholar to his student to narrate books (whether they are his works or which he has 
the authority to narrate). 164 The certificate that records this permission is called 
Jdza 165 
Ijäza is a system of narration, handing down hadith and knowledge from any 
book through permission. If someone wishes to obtain a hadith, book of 'ahädIth or 
any book one learns from a scholar, who already had the chain of authorities to 
transmit a book from each person in that chain backdated to its original author. Ijäza 
contains details of the places, dates and the attendance of class devoted to a 
particular book. 166 There is a comprehensive analysis of these issues to minimize the 
level of uncertainty as regards the narration of hadth. 
The methodology of isndd is not only for "the texts of hadith, of figh or of 
"tafsir" (commentary on Qur'än), but also theological, mystical, historical and 
philological works, and even literary collections, of both prose and poetry"' 67 This 
rigorous system is designed to ensure the scientific honesty and to be exhaustively 
159 Azmi Hadith Literature, p. 183 and post. 
160 Ibid, p. 204. `Abd al-Mannän, I; Iassän, al-Sarigät al-'Ilmiyya, Beirut, Där Ibn Ham, (1996) (First 
Edition), p. 53, hereinafter: Al-Sarigät al-'Ilmiyya. 
161 Azmi Hadith Literature, p. 183 and post. 
162 Al-Tahhän, Taysir, p. 158. 
163 EI2, Entry: Ijaza. Al-Mawsü'a a! -Fiqhiyya, vol. 1, p. 303, Yaw entry. $ä1i1, al-Ijäza, p. 99 and post. 
Al-Tahhan, p. 156 and post. 
'64 Al-TaI b n, Taysir, p. 160. EI2, Entry: Ijaza. 
165 Shalaby, p. 147. 
166 E12, Entry: "Ijäza" 
167 Ibid. Shalaby, p. 149. 
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precise. 
In case of conducting oneself outside of or contrary to this system, the 
punishment is harsh. The label of dishonesty is widely disseminated in public and in 
academic circles. The punishment was defamation in derogatory terms such as 
infringer, cheater, rapist, thief and pretender etc. 168 Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751AH/1350) 
described them as thieves who are using their pens and using their appearance. 169 
This widespread and popular usage of the term of defamation indicates a generally 
held belief that these rules are obligatory, well established and common. 
It is reported that the Prophet said: " May Allah brighten a man who hears a 
tradition from us, gets it by heart and passes it to others as he hears it". 170 In another 
hadith the Prophet taught one of his Companions a special prayer before sleep. The 
Prophet asked him to repeat it to be sure that he learned it well. The Companion 
changed a word by a synonym. The Prophet enunciated it to him again with the 
original word. 171 Commenting on this hadith Ibn Hajar stated that the accuracy can 
be achieved if the narrator preserves the exact wording as heard the first time 
especially when there is uncertainty in the expression by using alternative words. 172 
There is an emphasis on keeping the same wording as heard the first time 
accurately. There is an interesting difference regarding the permissibility or 
otherwise of narrating a hadith by using synonyms. A narrator can, arguably, 
express it in similar words provided he has full knowledge of the Arabic language to 
enable him to do so. However, no one is allowed to amend or correct any written 
material with his own words. If he cannot remember the word exactly, he can use 
similar words, but with a precise indication that a quotation is to the best of his 
knowledge. 173 Usually a reader finds variant narrations or readings of one hadith in 
168 Abe Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawäzil., p. 103. Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. A1-Sarigdt al-'Ilmiyya, 
41 and post. 
169 See Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawazil, vol. 2, p. 100. 
170 Nayl al-Awlär, Hadith No: 1. voll, p. 13. 
'" Ibn Ilajar, Fath al-Bari, vol. 11. p. 135. IIadith No: 6311. A1-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 8, p. 217, Hadith No: 
323. 
172 Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari , vol. I 1. p. 135. Hadith No: 631 I. Dawäbil al-Riwäya. p. 152 and post. 173 A1-Tahhän, Taysir, p. 172. 
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the collections of hadith. 
Also, as part of this methodology there are detailed rules to correct errors or 
misspellings, if they appear in the hadith itself. 174 The scholars set out clearly their 
bibliographies in the beginnings or the endings of their books. 175 They are concerned 
with clarity and credibility, when they use quotations or when they move between 
each quotation and their own words. 176 
All these rules from `ilm mustalah al-hadith are intended to protect scientific 
honesty, precision and an author's moral rights. These rules can be applied to 
contemporary situations and refined in order to provide a strong basis for the 
recognition of copyright. 
3.3.7 The Seventh Evidence 
There is a widespread and deep conviction in Shari `a that responsibility of 
actions should accompany benefits. The true connection of these two concepts aims 
at confirming justice. 
It is reported that the Prophet said: "al-khardju bil-cdamän". 177 Kharäju means 
income, return, profit, gain178 and /amän means liability, responsibility, charge. 179 it 
means that the gaining of profits from any property is in consideration of assuming 
the risk of its damage, loss or liability. This hadith became a leading legal 
maxim. 180This ruling is important because, the owner of an object is entitled to all 
174 Azmi liadith Literature, p. 196. 
175 Ibid, p. 205. Al-Halwäji `Abd al-Sattär, Diräsät ft al-Kutub wa al-Maktabdt, Jeddah, Maktabat 
Miýbäh, (1988) (First Edition), p. 33. HärÜn, `Abd al-Saläm, Qup7f Adabiyya, Cairo, Maktabat al- 
Sunna, (1988) (First Edition), p. 22, hereinafter: Härün. 
176 Azmi Hadith Literature, p. 203. Al-IIalwäji, Diräsät fi al-Kutub wa al-Maktabät, p. 33.136. 
Härün, `Abd al-Saläm, Tahgiq al-Nus ;s wa Nashruhd, Cairo, Maktabat al-Sunna, (AH1410) 
(Fifth Edition), p. 47. 
117 Ibn Hajar, Bulugh al-Maram, p. 286. It is also available online at: http: //www. muslimaccess. com/ 
sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/023. html, Had! th No: 3501. 
178 EI2, Entry: Kharaju. Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 19, p. 36. kharäj entry. 
179 EI2, Entry: ciamän. Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 28, p. 191. clamdn entry. 
180 The Mejelle, p. 14, Article No. 85. IIaydar, vol.!, p. 88, article No. 85 article No. 87, and article 
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profits arising from it as well simultaneously assuming liability for all risks related 
to it. 
For example, if a buyer returns a commodity to the seller for any reason, the 
seller cannot claim profits from the buyer during the period from the sale up to the 
time of return. The reason is that during this period, only the buyer is liable for all 
risks related to the goods. According to this rule, the owner has a right to retain the 
fruits of his property, corresponding to the fact that he becomes the loser if the 
property is subject to any damage or loss. 
On balance, besides the advantage of being an owner of something, including 
the entitlement of its fruits, he must bear its risks. It is clearly right that an author 
assumes complete religious and legal responsibility for all injury or liability arising 
from his work. 181 This hadith and maxim can be used to similar effect in that a 
copyright represent economic value that should be given only to authors. 
3.4 Summary 
Shari `a principles are not inherently unsuited to the recognition and protection 
of copyright. In fact, researchers are recruited to use and develop these principles in 
a sufficient and systemic manner to reveal whether there is room for copyright in 
Shari `a or not. 
Following the order of research reported in the hadith of Mu'ddh, Qur'an is the 
standard starting-point, the principal source of Shari 'a, for a researcher pursuing and 
examining guidance on copyright. After the consultation with the Qur'än, one moves 
on to the Sunna. 
There is not a single agreed text that argues directly and specifically for 
copyright but there is a whole range of evidence each piece of which argues for 
copyright in a different way. In establishing a correct judgment regarding copyright, 
research can rely on the actual wording of a verse rather its historical occasion 
No. 88. 
181 Al-Büli, Qa/äyä Fiqhiyya Mu'äsira, p. 82. Shubir, al-Muämalät al-Mäliyya, p. 49. 
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without there being any arbitrariness or uncertainty. The first part of this chapter 
introduced pieces of five pieces of evidence from Qur'an. 
Firstly, the principles of "amäna " (honesty, trust) and `adl " (justice) occupy 
significant positions in Shari `a. The Qurä'n requires honest and just dealing with 
everyone on everything. The word amäna means trust, which is a general obligation 
binding a person to deal with every right and property justly. This principle 
embraces copyright and reserves for authors praise, honor and profit from 
authorship. 
If a person uses another's writing without sufficient acknowledgment and 
attribution, and even, passes off that work as his, he commits a kind of "khiydna" 
(mistrust), ' ghish " (deception), "ta `addi " (transgression) and "ghasb " (usurpation). 
It can be argued that copyrights are trusts that must be acknowledged and returned to 
the authors and violation of copyright is against honesty and justice. 
Secondly, according to Qur'an, one is not allowed to diminish copyright which 
is just an intangible form of property. There is no doubting that piracy and 
plagiarism amount to diminution of copyright. It can be argued that a violation of 
copyright is a kind of educational and economic oppression, which is prohibited. 
Thirdly, another Qur'änic verse condemns obtaining reputation from work or 
knowledge a person has not done. Fourthly, a Qur'änic verse referred to condemn 
and prohibit making false claims, expressing a general ruling that applies to all 
situations, even if the only thing claimed is knowledge or authorship. This supports 
the notion of copyright in that only an author shall have the right to claim authorship 
of the work. Fifthly, a Qur'änic verse states a general ruling that commands 
enjoining right deeds and forbidding wrong actions in all situations including the 
approach to dealing with copyright. The violation or infringement of copyright is 
clearly against this central principle from which the religion is based, namely, on 
sincerity and advice. The outcome is that the interpretation of these verses provides a 
basic standard of recognition of copyright. 
After presenting the significant status of knowledge and scholars in Shari 'a the 
second part of this chapter introduced some materials from hadith and `ilm mustalah 
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al-hadth calling for approval of copyright. This position is not confined only to a 
religious knowledge but it includes every branch of knowledge which is beneficial 
for human beings. 
The first hadith provides that the author has the right to have his work attributed 
to him and regards knowledge as a type of ongoing work which gives its owner 
rewards in the hereafter. This does not conflict with financial return in this life. The 
second hadith establishes the general rule of acquiring ownership by priority right 
and, therefore, the principle of the right of priority can be applied directly to 
copyright. 
The third hadith prohibits giving a false impression and this is applicable to 
untruthful claims of authorship of another's work. "Unjust appearance" is prohibited 
even where there is no apparent harm or injury caused to others. Therefore, it is 
more so if it leads to "unjust enrichment". Scholars of the discipline of hadith in 
particular condemn the practice of tadlis in which hadith is changed or modified to 
misrepresent who is in the chain of narrators. 
The fourth hadith stated that labor which one's own hand is the best way of 
earning a living and this can be applied to copyright because author applies his 
physical and mental labor to create a work. Fifthly, there is a group of 'ahädith 
prohibiting the making of a proposal of any contract if another brother has already 
made a proposal for the same thing. This is to prevent injustice, enmity and hatred 
among community. 
Sixthly, the knowledge of `film mus; alah al-hadith, provides a set of rules and 
techniques according to which 'ahädith should be received, narrated and how to 
correct errors or misspellings if those errors appear. These rules are used to examine 
and pursue the authenticity of 'ahddith and their attribution to the Prophet. In this 
discipline, there is Udza in which a scholar gives permission to his student to narrate 
hadith. This principle was applied to all knowledge, materials and branches to 
ensure clarity and credibility of any person or book. 
Finally, the hadith and leading legal maxim "al-khardju bil-4amän" (the 
gaining of profits from any property is in consideration of assuming the risk of its 
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damage, loss or liability)can be applied to include copyright, because copyright 
represents economic value that should be given to authors who also assume all 
responsibilities arising from their works. The common thread running through these 
pieces of evidence from Qur'än and the hadith supports the idea of copyright. 
Chapter Four 
Evidence of Copyright from the Secondary Sources 
4.1 Introduction 
Having explored the original sources, the work presented in this chapter is 
devoted to the investigation of copyright in the secondary sources of Shari `a, 
namely; giyäs, maslaha and `urf. 
These sources are justified, because Qur'an and Sunna obviously do not contain 
a full or ready draft of rulings for all new cases and norms of life. Therefore, 
scholars exercise their own search and judgment on new cases when evidence is not 
found in the original sources directly. 
This chapter will start first by applying the method of giyds using several cases 
found in Shari `a. Subsequently, maslaha and `urf will be used as evidence for 
supporting copyright. The chapter will conclude by employing some al- Qawä `id al- 
Fiqhiyya "legal maxims" to our subject matter. 
4.2 Evidence of Copyright from Qiyds 
According to the majority of fugahä', giyds is the fourth standard basis on 
which Islamic Law is built. The literal meaning of giyäs is measuring and 
comparison. "Technically, giyäs is the extension of a Shari'ah value from an 
original case, or asl to a new case, because the latter has the same effective cause as 
the former. It is by virtue of the commonality of the effective cause, or `illah, 
between the original case and the new case that the application of giyäs is 
justified. "1 
1 Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 197. EI2, Entry: giyäs, also see Izz Dien, Islamic Law, 
p. 52-63. 
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As a general rule, there is overwhelming evidence from Qur'än and Sunna 
which instruct people to think, consider and reflect on things and praise those who 
think and reflect. 
For example, verses state: "... are signs for a people that are wise"2 "He granteth 
wisdom to whom pleaseth; and who he to whom wisdom is granted receivth indeed a 
benefit overflowing; but non will receive admonition but men of understanding"3 
and "Verily in this is a Message for any that has a heart and understanding or who 
gives ear and earnestly witnesses (the truth)"4. Therefore, the authority for qiyas is 
derived from these verses because it is a kind of reflection and reasoning. 
In the textbooks of until al-fiqh it is also widely recognized that the common 
authority for giyäs is the verse: ", take warning, then, 0 ye with eyes (to see) ". 5 All 
these verses use the application of the meanings of the text being examined and 
apply those meanings to other situations, that is, by giyds. It is a necessary juristic 
tool to understand and promote Qur'än's message. 
From the Sunna, there is the well known prophetic tradition of Mu`ädh stating: 
"I shall do my best to form ijtihdd an opinion and I shall spare no effort. s6 Fugahd' 
consider that Utihäd includes giyäs, al-Shäfi`i stated that ijtihäd and giyds refer to 
the same substantive source of law. 7 
Also, it is related that " `Umar Ibn al-Khattäb said to the Prophet: I have done a 
big deed; I kissed while I was fasting. He said: What do you think if you rinse your 
mouth with water while you are fasting, I said to him: There is no harm in it. He 
said: Then what? 8 The Prophet made giyäs between rinsing the mouth with water 
while fasting and kissing while fasting. Some fugaha' regard the answering of the 
2 Qur'än. 2. v. 165. 
3 Qur'an . 2. v. 269. Qur'an . 3. v. 7. 
Qur'an. 50. v. 37. 
S Qur'an . 59. v. 2. 6 Sunan Aba Dawad, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/024. html , Book 24, Number 3585. 
7 Al-Shäfi`T, Muhammad Ibn Idris, al-Risäla, translated by Majid Khadduri, Cambridge, UK, The 
Islamic Texts Books Society, (I987)(Second Edition) p. 288. 
8 Sunan Abü Dawcld, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/013. html, Book 13, 
Number 2379. 
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question in this way carries in its formulation guidance on the usage of giyäs. 9 
It might be said that the clearest support for the legitimacy of giyäs comes from 
the practice of the Companions of the Prophet who applied it in many cases. 10 By 
giyäs a jurist adopts the meanings of texts which had the authority to create a ruling 
in the first place. It suggests that the Islamic Law is capable of being developed to 
meet new circumstances by giyäs. It creates the possibility of a knowable 
interpretation of text, and which can be applied in a non-arbitrary fashion to new 
cases. 
It can happen that a statement applied in its special context may also have been 
meant to be taken as general statement. The process of giyäs can produce many 
equally valid applications which, avoids the imperfection and narrowness that would 
follow if only one interpretation was meant. To some extent, the reliance on giyäs is 
similar to the reliance on precedents in common law, where a court creates a legal 
principle that applies to subsequent cases with similar issues. Fugahä' start with 
decided cases as their source, using them as general statements of principle and work 
out the law from there. 
The majority of fugahd' use giyäs as a means of applying the law to new cases 
which are not yef available. Only a minority of fugahä' point to the invalidity of 
using giyäs. 11 
Fugah5' held to the fact that the sources of Shari 'a are definite in their quantity, 
while the events of life are indefinite. In other words, the texts of Shari 'a are final, 
while people's cases are limitless. The limited texts which are revealed to guide 
humankind cannot cover every particular case in a detailed manner. Thus, for the 
determination of rulings on new cases, we require the applicability of the principles 
of Shari 'a to new cases in an analogous way. 
Qiyas has four essential factors; "asl " (the original case) recorded in the text, 
9 Al-Zargäni, Sharh Muwatta', Hadith No: 654, Vol. 2, p. bb. Sha`bän, p. 120. 
10 Sha'bän, p. 126. 
AI-Zarkashi, Badr al-Din, Muhammad b. Bahädir, al-Bahr al-Muhit ft Usül al-Fiqh, Dr `Abd al- 
Sttär Abü Ghudda, (ed. ) Kuwait, the Ministry of Awgäf and Islamic Affairs, (1413A1-i/1992) 
(Second Edition) vol. 1, p. 16. Sha`bän, p. 117. Al-Zargä, al-Madkhal, vol. 1. p. 79. 
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'! far' " (a new case such as copyright), "`illa" (the effective cause) of the ruling, 
which exists exactly in the original and the new case and "hukm" (the ruling) given 
to the original case in the text and considered to be applicable to the new case. 12 (Ilia 
is similar to the Latin legal phrase " ratio decidendi", which means "the reason for 
the decision". 13 
The conditions required to apply giyäs correctly can be summarized as follows. 
The original case "asl " must be found in Qur'an and Sunna. There is disagreement 
between fuqaha' if it is found in ßmä' or giyds. The original case must not be 
extraordinary as giyäs cannot be drawn on exceptional rulings or considerations. 
Qiyäs is dependent upon substantial equality between "asl " (the original case) and 
`far"' (the new case). 14 The "`illa" of the "hukm" of the original case must be 
accessible to human rationale. It is necessary to discover the exact reason for the 
ruling. The effective causes of ritual performances such as the number and times of 
prayers cannot be identified. ls 
As for sound analogy, we must appeal to texts according to the extent to which 
we recognize their effective causes to be able to ascertain a known and previous 
ruling to a new case which has not any particular ruling. Qiyas must be based on a 
form based on where it drew its authority from: Qur'an, Sunna and ijmä `. The use of 
the source of giyäs is regulative and constructive; therefore, the task of legislation 
can never be brought to termination. By this method of representing law, Shari `a 
adapts itself to changed conditions or in response to new factors. 
In addition, copyright needs consideration not only by the technical method of 
giyäs in those cases, but also through Utihäd as regards the sources of Shari `a. It has 
been sometimes impossible to achieve exhaustively exact uniformity between every 
two cases where giyds is applied. For example, the two cases which came for giyäs 
in the hadith of `Umar regarding fasting were not exactly alike. Rinsing water in 
mouth does not equal a kiss but there is some similarity in that both are considered 
12 Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 200. EI2, Entry: giyäs. 
13 Martin, Oxford Dictionary of Law, p. 381. 
14 Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 206. EI2, Entry: giyds. 
15 Ibid, p. 203. 
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to be the sign of the beginning of something breaking the fast; sexual intercourse. 
There are many rulings cases in which giyäs can be employed in extracting and 
determining the judgment of copyright. For the purposes of exposition, each case is 
examined separately but it may well be that a combination of all of them proves to 
the legitimacy of copyright. 
4.2.1 The case of cultivation of barren land 
Given the high position of "`am! ' (labor), it is reasonable to grant ownership 
rights to those who cultivate waste land. 16 There are 'ai äd th dealing with the issue 
of acquiring ownership of barren land which can be used by the process of giyäs. It 
is reported that the Prophet said: "If anyone brings barren land into cultivation, it 
belongs to him, and the unjust vein has no right". "" He who cultivates land that 
does not belong to anybody is more rightful (to own it)" 18 and "If anyone brings 
barren land into cultivation, it belongs to him,.. ". 19 
These 'ahädith support each other and establish clearly that cultivation of 
barren land is a rightful method of acquiring ownership. The person who revived a 
piece of waste land was lawfully the person who owned it. 20 The texts use the word 
"ahya" which means give life to or restore to life. Fuqaha' use the term 'ihiyd' al- 
mawät", which means the' revival of the dead. 2' 
The effective cause of this entitlement and ownership is bringing life, survival 
and productivity to the dead land. This gives to the first person who brings anything 
to life a high degree of priority of it, over others. Shari`a clearly explains that 
16 See this thesis, p. 139. 
17 http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/013. html Book 19, Number 3067: In 
Arabic see Sunan Aba Dawüd, I; Iadith No: 3073, vol. 3, p. 453. Al-Zargäni, Shari Muwa/ta', Iiadith 
No: 1495, vol. 4, p. 37. Al-Tirmidhi, Iiadith No: 1378, vol. 2, p. 364. 
18 AI-BukhdrY, tr., vol. 3, p. 306, Hadith No: 528. http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/ 
muslim/013. html Book 19, Number 3070: 
19 Musnad Ahmad, vol. 3, p. 382 and post. 
20 Ibn Salläm, p. 279 and post. 
21 EI2, Entry: mawdt. The Mejelle. p. 207. 
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ownership of barren land is based on ihiyä' (because it makes the land useful and 
productive) and an analogy can be drawn with intellectual works which have a 
similar effective cause. "Thus, the creative act of making something useful is 
recognized as a means of acquiring ownership even of real property. "22 The analogy 
is supported by the general principle of right priority, which is affirmed by many 
sources of Shari 'a. 
The criterion of what constitutes ownership in barren land can be found in 
copyright. The concept of "ihiyä "' can be found in authorship. Intellectual works 
actually breathe new life into a society. There are remarkable similarities between 
physical revival and intellectual revival. The spreading of knowledge is an obvious 
revival undertaking in a society. New scientific discoveries change the world and 
people's views. 
Similarly, any new study or work, which has not yet been identified as such 
before, deserves recognition and should also belong to its real owner. Both of these 
initiators introduce into the existence a new work, which is available to the public by 
interactive means. Renaissance of the arts and sciences results in activating 
intellectual life in general and generates advancements. 
The similarity is that both of them by their effort brought previously un-owned 
and unused things into use. It is common knowledge that ideas will move about in 
the mind, unless and until those ideas have been captured and produced by someone. 
As a result of this similarity, the judgment appears to be the same. These concepts 
are a broad interpretation and application of the principle. 
A single work of valuable knowledge may be recollected for decades. Many 
successful works brought a life of knowledge to those who learned about it. A 
farmer, who plants a tree that provides shade and beauty for people, is similar to an 
author who writes a book which provides knowledge or enjoyment. One may 
consider here the difference between abstract and practical meaning. However, the 
difference must not conceal the correct application of giyäs. It is clear that, apart 
22 Jamar, p. 1083. 
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from difference in physical embodiment there is no essential difference in principle. 
As part of the correct application of giyds the criterion is not exceptional, but it 
is applicable to new cases. It appears that the grant of ownership rights is based on a 
well-defined, common, visible and rigid criterion. That is, the living, survival of 
land. It is not difficult to subject this measure to examination. 
The principle of being the rejuvenator of land, work or study who acquires 
ownership through such rejuvenation, is established in order to achieve a degree of 
widespread justice and certainty in transactions and this is of great importance for 
Shari 'a. This principle encourages and respects one's labor. The rationale of living, 
survival and renaissance can be extended to include the editing and publication of 
manuscripts and is not confined only to the revival of land. 
The 'ahddith do not seem to indicate that bringing to life, survival or revival 
should only be applied to cases involving land. The objective of legislation in 
conferring ownership on barren land by its revival is the public interest and to 
encourage individual and economic efficiency. This supports the possibility of 
application of ihiyä' to intellectual works. 
An analogy can be drawn between rejuvenation of barren and uncultivated 
land and rejuvenation of some idea as it adopts the rationale of the text. The 
rediscovery and presentation of ancient writings that have lain dormant for hundreds 
of years and in some cases unknown work is a kind of revival. 
It might be argued that giyäs between the revival of barren land and the revival 
of an idea is "giyds ma' al färiq ", 23 which is not valid according to usül al-fiqh. 
Because there is no equivalence between the two cases. The very foundation of this 
mode of ownership which can be applied to copyright is this, namely, that the owner 
is the one who gives life to property. 
It seems that giyäs between the revival of a barren land and an idea is rather 
giyäs al-awld. 24 "71la ", which is giving life to dead thing, is present in authorship 
23 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence. p. 206. 
24 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence. p. 214 and 215. 
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more than in cultivation of barren land. The cases share not only a common cause 
(the giving of life to something whether physical or immaterial) but commercial 
value. 
As the first legal maxim suggests "A judgment is in accordance with what the 
object of an act may be". 25. Copyright is justified because it is the means of making 
a livelihood similar to cultivating land. Shari `a always gives significance to intrinsic 
meanings more than forms or words. 
In terms of property, copyright seems more subject to controversy than other 
forms. In general, there is a preference for physical property over intellectual 
property, because it is more present and it is often more highly valued than 
intellectual property. Moreover, the first hadith prohibits any kind of intentional 
interfering, taking or using of such property without permission. The prohibited 
activity is, literally, oppression. It is a persuasive example as far as newer classes of 
property, such as copyright, is concerned. The hadith shows the sanctity of 
ownership. And giyäs establishes ownership of a copyright. Infringement, therefore, 
of copyright should be viewed as an illegitimate action. 
4.2.2 The case of prohibition of listening without permission 
According to Shari `a what should be taken as property or a right is that which 
has been obtained lawfully. As a general rule, Shari `a requires lawful means for 
producing property, legal status, situation or evidence. It is a dominant position that, 
the means as well as the ends must be legitimate. 
There is plenty of evidence in Shari 'a which affirms this principle. Shari`a 
imposes restrictions that bar people from using any right or property without 
permission from its owner. For example, there is a Qur'änic verse addressed to the 
believers not to eavesdrop. 26 
Moreover, it is reported that the Prophet said: "..., If anyone listened to the talk 
25 The Mejelle, p. 3, Article 1. 
26 Qur'an . 49. v. 12. 
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of some people, when they do not like him (to listen) or they run away from him, 
then molten lead will be poured into his ears on the Day of Resurrection". 7 
The meaning of this hadith is that, a person, who secretly listens to the private 
conversations of others, where they would not like him to listen, is committing sin. It 
is punishable on the Day of Resurrection by the pouring of molten lead into his ears. 
This hadith impresses upon the seriousness of eavesdropping; the considerable 
respect for privacy and that the acquisition of information and ideas must be lawful. 
The penalty in this world for that is not prescribed in the hadith. It is punishable, 
therefore, under discretionary powers under the wide category of to `zir. 
In addition, the Prophet said: "Meetings are confidential except in three 
instances: those for the purpose of shedding blood unlawfully, or committing 
fornication, or acquiring property unjustly. "28 
The hadith imposes restrictions that bar the people involved in meeting from 
disclosing that meeting unless it relates to crimes such as homicide, fornication or 
usurpation of other people's property. In a similar manner, this right provided in this 
hadith may be extended to copyright in that authors have not given permission to 
hackers or unauthorized publishers to narrate, use, produce or copy their works for 
the public. 
This hadith provides authors privacy right and control over their works and this 
is part of copyright. It also, provides them, generally with a right to authorize, select 
or prohibit the audience and the distribution of their works . 
29 Therefore, an author is 
entitled to determine his works' course. This implies that authors have right over the 
disposition of their works. The hacker of copyright can be seen as unauthorized 
person who secretly copies or records works of authors in cases where they do not 
wish him to do that. Publication of copies of a work over and above the agreed 
number can be regarded as an unlawful action because the author did not intend for 
27 Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 9, p. 134, Hadith No: 165. 
28 Sunan Aba Dawüd, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/041. htmi Book 41, 
Number 4851. In Arabic see Sunan Abü Dawüd, IIadith No: 4869, vol. 3, p. 268 
Z9 See Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 76 and post. 
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those additional copies. 
This conforms to Qur'anic verses which command the seeking of permission 
before entering another's house 30 The Prophet stated the reason: " Asking for 
permission to enter has been enjoined so that one may not look unlawfully" 31 It is 
also reported that the Prophet said: "He who sees a kitäb of his brother without his 
permission, sees Hell-fire". 2 In Arabic, "kitäb" means a book or a letter. Some 
scholars have stated that the principle which this hadith laid down is general, so that 
nobody has any right to read a book or letter without its owner's permission. 33 
Similarly, this reason is applied to copyright, because it is kind of property. The 
one who views intellectual works without permission can be considered as an 
unlawful intruder. In many cases, the mere sight by an expert of a work is sufficient 
to copy and exploit it or appropriate a substantial part of it. Also, some works lose 
their privacy or inspiration once they are shown. 
Further, it is beyond any doubt that permission is needed for publishing a book 
even more than reading it. Qiyds here is a kind of "giyäs al-musäwi' 34 
According to these verses, following the general "magäsid" (objectives) of 
Shari `a and combining these ahädith, it can be argued that no one should use, enjoy 
or benefit from an intellectual work without the lawful permission of its owner. 
This generalization is illustrated in the fatwa of Abmad (d. 241AH/855), when 
he was asked whether a person, who found a paper, containing a group of ahädith, 
can copy then return it 35 The answer is that, he should take permission then copy it. 
Al-Ghazäli explained the fatwa, there are doubts about whether the owner of that 
paper gives his permission or not, and therefore it becomes prohibited. 6 The giyäs 
30 Qur'an . 24. v. 28 and v. 58. 31 Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 9, p. 31, Hadith No: 38. 
32 Sunan Abü Dawüd, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/041. html, Book 8, 
Number 1480. 
33 'Abädi, Muhammad Shams al-Hagq, 'Awn al-Ma'büd, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, (1415 
A. H), vol. 4, p. 
250. 
34 Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 215. 
35 Al-Ghazäli, Abu Hamid Muhammad, . 16yä' 'Ulüm al-Din, Beirut, Där al-Ji1, (1412AH/1992) (First 
Edition), vol. 11, p. 168, cited in al-Bfti, Qadäyd Fighiyya Mu'asira, p. 89. 
36 Al-Ghazali, Ihyd' 'Ulüm al-Din, vol. II, p. 168. 
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supports the author's moral rights. 
4.2.3 The case of receiving money for reciting and teaching Qur'än 
The legality of the author's economic rights can be justified on giyäs with two 
accepted rulings: the approval of obtaining pecuniary rewards for reciting Qur'an 
and for teaching it. 
In this respect, there is narration of some of the Companions of the Prophet who 
treated a patient by reciting "Surat-al-Fdtiha" over him in exchange for financial 
consideration. The patient was cured and his tribe gave the companions a flock of 
sheep. The Companions were different on the legality of getting money for reciting 
Qur'an but the Prophet approved this transaction. 7 In another hafiith; the Prophet 
said: " You are most entitled to take wages for doing a Ruqya38 with Allah's Book" 
39 
The majority of fugahä' approved the validity of the payment for teaching 
Qur'an and hadzth. 4° Malik (d. 179AH/796) confirmed that it is not forbidden to hire 
someone to teach children Qur'än, 41 saying that he had not known of a case where 
the fuquha' rejected it. 42 From the Mäliki school al-Qurlubi said that "... [M]ost 
scholars permit accepting a wage for teaching, based on the words of the Prophet in 
the hadith of Ibn `Abbas (d. 68AH/687/688) who stated "you are most entitled to 
take a wage for the book of Allah". Following the rule that is: (It is not permitted for 
lawyers to strive to arrive at the meaning of a point of law or religion, where there is 
a decisive text)43, the hadith is evidence of legality of receiving money in such 
circumstances. This hadith is an evidential criterion which removes any dispute and 
"Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 7, p. 424, Hadith No: 632. 
38 Ruqya is Qur'änic recitation and making supplications to Allah for seeking a cure for any illness. 
39 Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 7, p. 425, I; Iadith No: 633. It is better to be translated as "You are most entitled 
to take wages for the Book of Allah". 
40 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jdmi', voll p. 229. Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 268. 
41 Al-Mudawwana, vol. 3 p. 432. 
42 Ibn Abi Zayd, Abü Muhammad al-Qayrawäni. al-Nawddir wa al-Ziyädät 'ala ma ft al- 
Mudawwana, Muhammad al-Dabbägh, (ed. ), Beirut, Dar al-Gharb, (1999) (First Edition). vol. 7 p. 58. 
43 The Mejelle. Article: 14, p. 4. 
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can be relied upon. '°aa 
Al-Nawawi from the Shäf `i school stated that, the hadith makes a clear 
statement about the validity of getting a wage for Qur'änic healing and teaching 
Qur'än. 45 
From the ffanbah- school, Ibn Qudäma (d. 620AH/1223) stated that any work 
that is not exceptionally regarded as a form of worship can be hired and priced, such 
as teaching literacy and numeracy, the construction of houses, mosques and bridges, 
cultivation of trees and also teaching Qur'än and hadith because all these acts can be 
done either religiously or non-religiously. 46 
The early fugahd' of the Hanafi school and some of the other schools forbade 
the receipt of money for teaching Qur'an, because they "hated the notioni47 
regarding it, as an issue of unethical use of Qur'an. However, "the normal 
procedurei48 and the later prevailing opinion of the Ilanafi school is to approve of 
the hiring of people for the purpose of teaching Qur'an andfiqh, " imadma" (leading 
prayer) and "adhän " (raising the call to prayer). 49 
In the same way, there is approval for hiring a specialist scholar in traditions" 
to narrate hadith in exchange for payment. Ibn al-Sa1äh (d. 643 AH/1245) pointed out 
that some scholars were moderate towards this issue comparing it with hiring for 
teaching Qur'än. However, he held to the opinion that hiring is traditionally regarded 
as contrary to noble characteristics, and might draw suspicion, unless the scholar 
devotes his time to narrating and studying hadith and has no actual wealth to support 
himself and his family. -51 In biographical literature, however, there are many reports 
about a number of scholars were used to demand wages for narrating hadith or 
44 Bewley, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, I, p. 228. " 
45 Al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahih Muslim. Hadith No: 2201, Vol. 14, p. 157. 
46 Al-Mughnl, vol. 5, p. 325. 
47 Shalaby, p. 131. 
48 lbid, p. 133. 
49 Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 294. A1-Zayla'i, Zayn Ibn Ibrahim, al-Bahr al-Ra'iq, 
Beirut, Dar al-Ma'rifa, (N. D) vol. 3, p. 168. 
5o It is called muhaddith. See Al-Tabban, Tays? r, p. 17. 
s' Al-'Iraq'i, Abü al-Fadl Zayn al-Din `Abd al-Rahim, Fath al-Mughlth bi-Shari 'Alflyyat al-Iiadith, 
Mahmüd Raba` (ed. ), Cairo, al-Dar al-Salafiyya li al-Nashar, (1410AH), p. 167. Hereinafter: a! - 
'Iraq 7, Fath al-Mughlth. 
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teaching Qur'an and other subjects. 52 
Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728 AH/1328) issued a fatwa in response to a 
question concerning a scholar who refused to teach others unless he was paid. He 
concluded that according to some direction in the Hanbar school, it is allowed only 
for the poor and in cases of necessity and this is similar to position of a guardian of 
an orphan53. The reference was made to the verse "... If the Guardian is well-off, let 
him claim no remuneration, but if he is poor, let him have for himself what is just 
and reasonable" 54 
A strong argument for copyright can be derived from the above discussion by 
giyäs. The reason behind the entitlement to a return for reciting or teaching Qurä'n is 
applied to authorship. It is difficult to find any essential difference between hiring 
for the purpose of teaching Qur'än, Hadith or other branches of the knowledge of 
Shari `a. Qiyäs can be drawn between receiving money for reciting and teaching 
Qurä'n and the author's economic rights . 
55 
Some fugaha' have argued that there are three main reasons why the hiring of a 
teacher of Qur'än, Iladith and other sciences has been permitted: firstly, although 
these actions are categorized as religious, they are not individual obligations, such as 
prayer or fasting during the month of Ramdan. Therefore, an author is not obliged 
under religion personally to write or teach. 
Teaching Qur'an is similar to works that pertain to the public interest, and the 
dissemination of knowledge. It cannot be considered an individual act such as 
personal prayer or reciting Qur'an. Second, teaching Qurä'n need not necessarily be 
done exclusively for charitable purposes. This kind of action can be done for the 
purpose of profit as well, because it is not compulsory worship. Leading the prayer, 
calling to prayer and teaching the Qurä'n are categorized as purely religious duties. 
Lastly, a scholar who devotes his time to teaching cannot support himself and 
52 Azmi Hadith Literature, p. 198. Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawazil, vol. 2, p. 110. Al-Dhahabi, vol. 11 
426, vol. 12, p. 322, vol. 16. p. 327, vol. 17, p. 619 and vol. 18, p. 372. 
5 Ibn Taymiyya, Fatmvd, vol. 30 . p. 204,205. 54 Qur'an . 4. v. 6. 55 Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. 
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his family, while he is required to maintain himself and people under his care. He 
should receive the same compensation that a lay person would receive, if he 
commits his life to serving the people. Such people are attending to the spiritual, 
moral, and educational needs of the community. The shortage of "hafizah" (people 
who memorize the Qurä'n) is to be expected if there is no sufficient recompense set 
for them. 
The same "`ilal" (effective causes) is not confined only to teaching the Qurä'n, 
but it can be applied to copyright. In an analogous way, an author like a teacher is 
not obliged religiously to write. Therefore, he is allowed to receive compensation for 
authorship. Scholars can earn from their knowledge through teaching or authorship. 
Authors like teachers must be paid for the cost of their authorship, regardless of the 
method of payment. There is no conflict between the financial consideration for 
authorship and rewards in the hereafter. 
It can be argued that this might be applicable to teachers and authors of Islamic 
studies but not to others such as authors of fiction. It would be rational to give the 
same ruling to teaching of sciences as to teaching the Qurä'n because the labor and 
effort of teaching in both cases is similar. 
The similarity between teaching and authorship is that, both of them lead to 
teaching, explaining or conveying some knowledge art or experience to others. 
Authorship can be seen as a form of teaching. Because of this parallel between them 
they should be equal in judgment. 
However, we must be careful not to confuse the entitlement of an author to 
financial consideration with the legality of ingredients of authorship, which should 
be examined separately. The issue here is to present the legitimacy of entitlement to 
financial profit separate from authorship as general rule. The evidence which 
approves copyright also recognizes the potential for exploiting it. Once authorship 
has been accepted in Shari 'a, its subsequent economic rights are acknowledged. 
Authorship pertains to the public interest, and the dissemination of knowledge. 
It is not an individualistic compulsory worship. It can be done for charitable 
purpose, the profit motive or both. In addition, a scholar who devotes his time to 
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authorship cannot support himself and his family. The explicit validity of hiring 
someone to teach Qur'an, which is more exclusive and closer to the ritual nature, is 
sufficiently strong to justify the validity of hiring someone to teach other sciences in 
a variety of forms. Similarly, the validity of hiring someone to teach other sciences 
can be established by giyäs. 
Teaching can be achieved in any format such as authorship or distance learning. 
It does not require another ruling, when methods of teaching change from time to 
time, in accordance to changed circumstances, needs or other factors. 
4.2.4 The case of getting money for sale and hiring a copy of Qur'an 
Fugahä' assert that there is no prohibition in Qur'än or Sunna as regards the 
sale, purchase, rental, lease, or lending of copies of Qur'an to the public. 56 Ibn 
`Abbas issued a fatwa that, there is no harm in selling copies of Qur'an, because 
copiers deserve compensation for their labor. 57 Ibn `Abbas explained that, the 
effective cause of this ruling is the copier's labor. 
Another point is that, the majority of fugaha' have agreed that amputation of the 
hand of a thief can be inflicted for stealing any book or a copy of Qur'an. This 
judgment is based on valid reasons because the copy has a marketable value, it can 
be a subject matter of a contract of sale and its owner has property rights over it. 58 
It can be argued that these rulings regarding the approval of the sale and hire of 
a copy of Qur'an and the amputation of the hand of a thief of a copy of Qur'an, are 
established although Qur'an is the word of Allah, and the owner of copy has not 
created it. Indeed, the authorship of a book has considerably more influence and 
financial value than a copy of a book or CD. Like any commodity, intellectual works 
56 Al-Mudawwana, vol. 3 p. 429. 
57 A! -Majma', vol. 9, p. 302. 58 Al-Mudawwana, vol. 4 p. 536. Ibn Rushd, Biddyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. 11, p. 542. Al- 
Mughn7, vol. 10, p. 249. Ibn Ham, Abü Muhammad 'All Ibn Ahamad, al-Muhalla, Beirut, Dar al- 
'Afq al-Jadida (N. D) vol. 11, p. 337, hereinafter: al-Muhalla. 
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are distinct in value terms. 
Therefore, authors have ownership rights over the products of their mental and 
labor works which entail them to exchange or dispose them as they see suitable. It 
might be possible to draw an analogy between the ownership and financial value in 
both cases. 
Although Ibn al-Qayyim pointed that there are some thieves who are using their 
pens and their appearance, 59 and some contemporary writers would argue that 
violation of copyright can be criminally prosecutable, 60 the foregoing discussion is 
only to realize that the authorship of any work has financial value which is separated 
from its container, i. e. book, CD, etc. Therefore, authorship and its financial value 
must be ascertained to their owner. In addition, the deprivation of person's copyright 
could be conceived as a form of theft, although it is an unconventional kind of 
property, or the amputation cannot be applicable. 
Further support can be found in many fatawa pointing that documents have 
different legal values are moved to financial considerations. For example, it is lawful 
to sell a document that gives its holder a quotation of food or money. 61 According to 
Ibn Taymiyya, it is allowed to sell a document, issued from "sultan" (the ruler) that 
exempts its holder from paying tax. 62 The fatwa pointed to that the value of 
document belongs to its function (the official order) not to the paper. This is 
expressed in the ruling, which endorses that a person is liable for destroying a 
document proves a claim that cannot be proved otherwise, whether this destruction 
intentionally or not. 63 This would end up with the conclusion that financial value and 
exchange of copyright are accepted in Shari `a. 
59 See Abo Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawäzil, vol. 2, p. 100. 
60 Al-Shahräni, p. 527 and post. Jamar, p. 1086. 
61 AI-Nawawi, Sharh Sahib Muslim, vol. 10, p. 146. Al-Majma vol. 9, p. 322. 
62 Ibn Taymiyya Fatäwä, vol. 29, p. 230,231. 
63 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 28, p. 305. 
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4.2.5 The case of approving teaching Qur'an as dowry 
Approval of economic rights of authors can be held as the approval of financial 
value of teaching Qur'an. The general rule in Shari 'a is that the contract of marriage 
imposes "mahr" (a dowry) given by the husband to the wife as a necessary 
condition. The mahr can be an amount of money, land, property or any valuable 
things. 
The majority of fugahd' recognize the validity of teaching Qur'än as a mahr, 64 
which the husband, in such a case, is required to pay to the wife upon the contract of 
marriage. This is based on the hadith; "... the Prophet said I have married her to you 
for what you know of Qur'äni65 The Prophet, in this case, agreed to marry one of 
his Companions to a woman and made teaching her Qur'än as her mahr. 
The approval of teaching Qur'än as a mahr implies that teaching Qur'än has a 
financial value, which can be exchanged in any contract. 66 In other words, teaching 
Qur'än cannot be mahr unless it can be money. Therefore, it is evident that there is a 
commercial value of that knowledge. 
This point of view is best illustrated and supported by one of the rules of figh, 
which says that: an appointed alternative thing can stand as the conventional one, 
carrying its position and its rulings. 67 Therefore, teaching Qur'an can be the subject 
matter of any contract, although Shari 'a gives emphasis to the significance of 
Qur'än over anything else. 
There is no difficulty in comparing the work of a teacher and that of an author, 
which refers to both labor, and the economic rights, which are created by them, and 
therefore that financial reimbursement is legitimate. Authorship and writing is 
simply a method and means of recording what people teach. This ruling is not 
confined to teaching Qur'an, but is shared with the teaching of other sciences. For 
64 Ibn llajar, Fath al-Bari, vol. 9, p. 256, p. 265 IIadith No: 5149. 
65 Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 7, p. 39, Hadith No:. 54,58,63 and 66. 
66 Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikär. p. 104. 
67 Ibn Rajab, al-Qawä'id, p. 188. Al-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Mabsa(, Beirut, Dar al- 
Ma`rifa, (1406A1-1/1986), vol. 21, p. 93. Ibn Tayiniyya, Majmü' Fatäwa, vol. 35. p. 345. 
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example, al-Shäfi`is stated that teaching a poem can be "mahr". 68 
Having agreed upon this assertion, the same may be said for teaching other 
subjects whether teaching is oral, the writing of books, recording tapes or other 
means. The financial value in copyright is evident as in teaching, and it is clear in 
education or entertainment as in teaching Qur'an. As has been argued, the legitimacy 
of economic rights of authorship can be seen as part of the legitimacy of economic 
return for education. 
Copyright can be treated as teaching Qur'an, therefore the author is entitled to 
determine the course of his work. To facilitate this giyas, measuring the economic 
return of copyright by the number of copies which have already been practiced 
seems to be the only logical step to take. And there is an equivalent in the number of 
students in a class. 69 
4.2.6 The case of selling or waiving some rights for money 
There are many practical needs which Sharia considers in dealing with different 
rights. These needs may subject to rights of sale, renouncement, reimbursement, 
exchange, or compromise whether conditional or unconditional. 70 The legal validity 
for the waiver of some rights for financial exchange is derived from Qurä'n as these 
rights are conferred by Shari `a on the owners of those rights. 
It may be helpful to mention the materials used in order to illustrate this validity 
by these examples. Firstly, the verse regarding "khul "' gives this meaning: ".., if ye 
judges do indeed Fear that they would be unable to keep the limits ordained by 
Allah, There is no blame on either of them if she give something for her freedom"71 
According to Shari `a, "khul"' is an agreement between a husband and wife 
68 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 26, p. 91. 
69 al-BütY, Qaclayä Fiqhiyya Mu'äsira, p. 86. 
70 See this thesis, p. 64 and post. 
71 Qur'än. 2. v. 239. 
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terminating the contract of marriage. Wife initiates khul' when she fears that she will 
not be able to observe her duties toward her husband, while he is fulfilling his duties 
toward her. The wife may return the mahr or some of her property in exchange for 
this divorce, but the husband is at liberty whether to accept anything back from 
her. 72 Also, a wife can obtain khul ` by renouncing her right of "haddna" custody of 
children or "nafaqa " maintenance. 73 
Ibn `Abbas narrated that the wife of Thäbit Ibn Qays came to the Prophet to ask 
him a solution for her problem with her husband. The Prophet ordered her to return 
back the mahr to her husband, which in this case was a garden, and ordered him to 
divorce her. 74 The husband has the unilateral right of divorce, but by khul' he may 
waive this right by settlement. The husband's right of divorce is purely a personal 
right, but it can be subject to waiver and reimbursement. 
Secondly, "shuf `a" (pre-emption) is defined as the right of a co-owner in 
immovable property to redeem that part of property which has been sold to a 
stranger by another of the co-owners, with the same agreed consideration. The 
reason behind the right of "shufa" is the expectation of conflict or inconvenience 
with a new co-owner. There is a discussion as to whether a co-owner is allowed to 
waive his right of shufa in consideration of money. According to the Mäliki school 
shufa can be subject to inheritance or sale. 75 
It is similar to the waiver of "gisds" (the right of retaliation) by the next of kin 
of a murdered person in consideration of a sum of money. The next of kin, who has 
the right to demand retaliation, may waive it by settlement with the murder for 
"diya" (the blood-money). It is another personal right, which is prescribed by the 
verse; "And for him who is forgiven somewhat by his (injured) brother, prosecution 
according to usage and payment unto him in kindness. , 76 
72 Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 79. 
73 Al-Ghiryäni, Mudawwanat, vol. 2, p. 689. 
74 Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 7, p. 150, IIadith No: 197. In Arabic see: Ibn IIajar, Fath al-Bari, lIadith No: 
5273, Vol. 9, II, p. 494. Abü Dawüd, IIadith No: 2227, vol. 3, p. 677. 
75 Ibn Rushd, Biddyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 315. 
76 Qur'an. 2. v. 178. 
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Moreover, fugahä' allowed selling the airspace above a property which is only 
a right and the buyer has no physical control over the subject matter of the 
contract. " 
Another rationalist and a recognized principle in Shari 'a is "sulk" (settlement 
or mediation). It is reported that the Prophet said: " Conciliation between Muslims is 
permissible, except the conciliation which makes lawful unlawful and unlawful 
lawful. "78 Therefore, the majority of fugahd' agreed on the validity of sulh. 79 It 
consists of concluding a dispute between parties by agreement. It is made usually by 
the giving of a sum of money or concession to a right or claim. 0 Only "hagq al- 
`abd" (rights of an individual) are in general negotiable and subject to settlement, 
waive or compromise. 81 A person can offer a sum of money or property or waive his 
right to something to avoid appearance in court or being involved in a dispute. 82 
Also, an heir is allowed to make a settlement with other heirs by which they pay a 
sum of money or give property in consideration of his provision in the estate. 83 
It is possible to use the principle of sulk to recognize the contract between an 
author and a publisher, where the author waives his right to publish works in favor 
of the publisher in exchange of money. 
These examples are indications that the waiver of some rights for financial 
exchange is, in essence, legal. The conclusion derives from the above rulings is that 
Shari `a contains many rights which are in their nature exchangeable in that, when 
they are waived, compensation can be taken. Many fugahd' share the general idea of 
the exchange of rights even though they differ in the exchange of some rights. This 
can be understood when read with the rule that it is a case of sale if anything has 
77 AI-Dusi qi, vol. 3, p. 21. A1-Ghiryäni, Mudawwanat, vol. 3, p. 257. 
78 Sunan Abü Dawüd: hn: //Www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/041. htmi, Book 24, 
Number 3587. 
79 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 353. The Mejelle, p. 254. Al-Ghiryäni, 
Mudawwanat, vol. 3, p. 706. llaydar, vol. 4, p. 7 and post. 
80 Al-Ghiryäni, Mudawwanat, vol. 3, p. 706. 
81 Al-Zuhayli, vol. 6, p. 4351. 
82 Ibid, vol. 6, p. 4334. Al-Ghiryäni, Mudawwanat, vol. 3, p. 713. 
83 Al-ZuhaylT, vol. 6, p. 4368. AI-Ghiryäni, Mudawwanat, vol. 3, p. 716. 
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been exchanged for payment. 84 
The concept of approval of the waiver of some rights is particularly functional 
in copyright, because it supports the notion of the transfer of the economic rights, 
which subsist in the work. Approval of waiving of economic rights of authors is 
even greater than the approval of waiving of these rights. 
This provide some basis for copyright in Shari 'a, although the "'flal " (effective 
causes) behind these various rulings are different. The technique of giyäs is not 
confined to cases where there is exact equity between a known injunction and a new 
injunction. There is a realization that the waiver of rights is possible and instituted 
especially in the context of the economy. In comparison, it seems that the economic 
bearing attends in copyright more closely than the rights of khul ; gisäs and shuf `a. 
The principle of the waiver and reimbursement can be applied to copyright. Not 
all copyright will reach the same position. If the right of the attribution of works is 
not assignable, however, the right of publishing, production or performance of a 
work can be transferred. Authors can waive or sell their rights subsisting in their 
works for a monetary gain. This giyds proves the recognition of authors' economic 
rights, which is an important part of copyright. 
Another endorsement for this conclusion drawn from giyds can be found in 
"istihsän". In Arabic, "istihsän" means "to approve or to deem something good". 85 
Technically, istihsän involves choosing "the stronger of two indications". 86 Some 
fuqaha' consider istihsdn as a kind of qiyas asserting that the difference is that 
" 711a" in giyäs is apparent but not so in istihsdn. 87 
It is juristic preference for one of possible rulings on a new case. It is not a 
personal choice as the precision of the word might indicate. It is, however, based on 
special text, giyds or other evidence. This usually occurs when a case has several 
equally valid rulings, and the jurist supports a single ruling, because it adopts the 
84 Ibn `Abd al-Barr, Abü `Umar Yüsuf b. `Abd Allah, al-Kaff f Fiqh al-Madina, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub 
al-'Ilmiyya, (N. D), p. 304. 
as Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 246. 
86Ibid, p. 249. 
87 Ibid, p. 259. EI2, Entry: Istihsän. 
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ultimate principles of Shari`a. 88 Istihsän is a kind of exceptional knowledge in 
Shari' which applies its principles on theoretical and practical reasoning not as 
rigidly as given in authoritative texts in every case. The point which needs to be 
emphasized here is thatfiqh requires consideration not only of the technical method 
of giyäs in a given case, but also of the objectives of Shari `a. Istihsdn can be based 
on that which is beneficial and it is not opposed to principle or text. Istihsan is an 
additional instrument for the administration of justice. 
If there are doubts remain about applying giyäs in copyright or if there is any 
giyäs or evidence that can lead to the contrary conclusion in the recognition of 
copyright, as some contemporary fugahä' suggested, istihsän gives certainty to 
copyright. Istihsän supports copyright because of numerous citations and evidence 
that prove that Shari `a aims at confirming rights and properties. Moreover, there are 
neither practical difficulties nor scientific grounds which preclude the possibility of 
recognition of copyright under Shari 'a or the exchange of the author's economic 
rights. 
4.3 Evidence of Copyright from "Maslaha" (the Public Interest) 
Copyright are recognized, not only because they are backed by the authority of 
many strong texts directly and indirectly but also as it will be explained copyright 
are justified on maclaha grounds. 
Maslaha (pl. masälih) means benefit, interest and its synonyms. Technically, 
"maclaha mursalah is defined as a consideration which is proper and harmonious 
... with the objectives of the 
Lawgiver; it secures a benefit or prevents a harm; and 
the Shari `a provides no indication as to its validity or otherwise". 9 
Qur'än and Sunna indicate that the concept of maslaha can be a ground for 
legislation, although scholars are divided as to whether maslaha is a form of "giyds" 
88 Sha'ban, p. 174. 
89 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 267. 
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(analogy), a part of "istihsän " (juristic preference) or independent source. 90 The role 
of maslaha in the realm of Ytihäd is supplementary, designed to relieve the 
limitation of texts leading the public closer to good and further away from evil as 
much as possible. 
Shari `a aims to maximize utility in this world and the hereafter, and lessens 
harm at large. 91 Al-Ghazal! (d. 505AH/l 111) stated that maslaha in a broad sense is 
the ultimate purpose of the Shari `a. 92 Legislation according to maslaha is simply a 
reflection and an application of the fundamental principles of Shari `a. 
The aim of Shari `a is to enable humans to live under its sovereignty without 
harm by protecting the five principles "magäsid ". These are religion, life, intellect, 
lineage and property. Al-'Izz presented a similar viewpoint stating that the 
comprehensive examination of the vast majority of cases in Shari `a illustrates that 
the underlying premise of Shari `a is the preservation of the maslaha 93 He stressed 
the conclusion that Shari `a is always "masdlih" (interests) and it is to protect against 
corruptions and to provide interests. 4 
Shari 'a is enacted to promote masälih and to combat "maftsid" (corruption 
acts) as much as possible on behalf of the public. In principle, "Any measure which 
secure these values falls within the scope of maslaha, and anything that violates 
them is mafsadah('evil'), and preventing the latter is also maslaha". 95 Understanding 
Shari `a leads to this conclusion. 96 
There are many rulings derived from the source of maslaha, for example, 
Qur'än was not collected in the format of "musahf '(one book) during the life of the 
Prophet, but because of maslaha the Companions agreed on collecting Qur'än 
despite the fact that there was no text or analogy on that. Similarly, under the 
90 Izzi Dien, Mawil, MASLAIIA in Islamic Law: A Source or Concept? Studies In Honour of Clifford 
Edmund Bosworth, Munter of the East Arabic and Islamic Studies (2000), vol. 1, p. 348. 
91 Al-'Izz, vol. 1, p. 39. Al-Shätibi, al-Muwäfagät, vol. 2. p. 4,42. 
92 EI2, Entry: maslaha. AI-Zargä, al-Madkhal, vol. l. p. 99 and post. 
93 Al-'Izz. vol. 2, p. 314. 
94 Ibid. vol. 1, p. 14. 
9s Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 267. 
96 Al-`Izz. vol. 2, p. 314. 
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maslaha the companions added a second "adhdn" on the day of "Jumu `a" (Friday) 
and established "diywän" (an official register) etc 97 
According to the majority of fugahä', in order to secure the public interest, the 
government can impose taxes, if the state needs, prescribe the minimum wages for 
employees and regulate the prices of necessary commodities, if traders raise them 
unjustifiably. 98 
The role of the legislator is to secure the five principles and to prevent anything 
that is against them. This authorizes fugahd' to issue relevant rulings for the purpose 
of promoting the five principles. Things which ought to be so protected are those 
which concern the magd$id of Shari 'a. 
The reliance on maslaha as a subsidiary source of legislation is agreed by the 
majority of fugaha' for producing rulings that help in increasing beneficial 
opportunities and reducing harmful opportunities. Moreover, if there are gradations 
of evils or a conflict between benefits it is an obligation to choose "the lesser of two 
evils" and "the greater of two benefits" 99 The measure of the degree to which any 
thing, act or concept is "Shan `i " (legitimate) is the degree to which it adheres to 
these principles of Shari a. 
Maslaha varies from one social context to another and from time to time within 
the scope of Shari `a. Through maslaha fugaha' are granted more flexibility and a 
wider discretion to meet the needs and the challenges of the modem age. 
The principle of maslaha is flexible because it is constantly subject to 
reassessment on the basis of cultural norms, new needs and scientific knowledge. 
Maslaha is now claimed for a wider range of judgments than ever before. 10° In 
principle, everything that was not expressly forbidden or leading to forbidden can be 
maslaha. 
This generalization is not to suggest that all interests can be considered 
97 Sha`bän, p. 165. 
98 Ibid, p. 170. 
" Al-'Izz vol. I. p. 9. Ibn Taymiyya, Fatäwä, vol. 20. p. 48. 
loo EIZ, Entry: maslaha. EI , Entry: istisläh. 
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maslaha. According to usisl al-figh, the test relates to its compatibility with the main 
magdsid of Shari `a, i°t it does not conflict with other "nass " (text), jmd ` or giyäs 
that deals in specific with a case in question102 and jurists have to weigh maslaha 
against other maslaha that might override it or any harm that might be caused. 103 
These five-fold conditions must be carefully observed. Maslaha is recognized, not 
because benefits will be expected if a law is issued accordingly but because it is 
backed by these stated conditions. 
Fuqaha' work out these conditions from Shari `a to avoid the uncertainty and 
arbitrariness that would follow were maslaha to be used for providing rulings 
without qualification. Without these conditions it is possible to draw up rulings in 
accordance with desires rather than Shari`a. Instead, Shari `a condemns the 
following of cravings and vain desire in many verses and ahädith. For example, 
"... Nor follow thou the lust (of thy heart), for it will mislead thee from the Path of 
Allah [Shari `a]. "104 Otherwise, the general maclaha in trust, stability, certainty, and 
security of rights would be at risk. 
The maslaha and its conditions as so stated apply to copyright. The approval of 
copyright serves the magäsid of Shari `a in religion, intellect and property. Copyright 
are justified by many fundamental considerations as working to serve the maslaha in 
several ways. There are several pieces of evidence from maslaha which provide a 
strong basis for approval of copyright in Shari `a. 
First of all, the protection of religion, which is the first "magäsid" principle of 
Shari'a, can be assisted by upholding copyright. The violation or ignorance of 
copyright would allow pseudo scholars to hold a high status by virtue of their 
alleged knowledge of Shari-a. Usually, a society rewards a person who writes a 
work by addressing them by the title of author or a scholar or by offering them a 
position. There are many negative consequences, if usurpation and appropriation of 
101 Al-Bull, Muhammad, Qawdbil al-Macla, a ft al-Shari'a al-Islamiyya, Beirut, Mu'assasat al- 
Risala, (1986) (Fifth Edition), p. 1 19. hereinafter : al-BUtT, Qawabil al-Ma. claha 
102 lbid, p. 129, p. 161 and p. 246. 
103 Al-Bah, Dawäbit al-Ma. laha, p. 248. 
104 Qur'än. 38. v. 26. 
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an authors' rights are applied to works regarding the knowledge of Shari `a. 
The pseudo scholar causes "fitna" (confusion or disturbance) for people about 
religion and misleads them. He misleads the people into the belief that he is a 
scholar. 
Religious leadership is a very important issue. According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the 
injury of an ignorant muft'05 is greater than the injury of an ignorant physician. 106 
This leads to serious results for the religion and the community. It is demoralizing, if 
those who preach or issue fatwa are unqualified. They betray a trust and cause 
mischief. In SharT`a, an unqualified person is most definitely not allowed to give 
fatwa. Therefore, the stability, certainty and improvement of the body of knowledge 
regarding Shari `a is achieved by recognizing copyright. 
Secondly, in terms of the principle of protection of property in Shari `a, the 
property of authors, who have sacrificed their time and effort would become 
meaningless or at least at risk, if others could appropriate their intellectual works. 
It is of the magdsid of Shari'a that the precise beneficiary of a right must be 
readily determined so as, to prevent risks of conflict within a society. 107 Authors can 
achieve their economic rights arising from writings only through the recognition of 
copyright and this is based on maslaha. 
The call for the appropriation of copyright for creators of works would seem to 
fit with the magd id of Shari 'a regarding the protection of rights. Copyright should 
be conceived as protection of the public interest and the rights of ownership of 
authors. 
Practically, the question of whether or not copyright, especially its economic 
orientation, can be ascribed correctly to its rightful owner under Shari `a has much 
greater significance because of the exploitation of their works is ongoing. Protection 
of rights is an essential maslaha and fuqaha' have utilized it in order to provide 
105 One who givesfatwa. 
'061'! äm al-Muwaqqi in, vol. 3, p. 78 and vol. 4 p. 229. 
107 Ibn `Ashur, Muhammad al-Tähir, Magdcid al-Shari'a al-Islämiyya, Muhammad al-Tahir al- 
MYsäwi (ed. ), Amman, Dar al-Nara'is (1421AIV2001) (Second Edition), p. 421. 
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resolutions for new rights and issues. The special status held by copyright is 
essential to its establishment as a right and to its unique role that it performs in our 
life. The state has to foster creative intellectuals by protecting their rights. 
Thirdly, it can be argued that copyright should be approved for the sake of 
scientific advancement and humanity's future both of, which are of the magdsid of 
Shari`a. The importance of copyright stems from the fact that it may steer a new 
course for the scientific life of society. For the sake of scientific development and 
humanity's future, copyright must be supported, not merely by the justice system 
that has been instituted, but also by the accepted priorities that inspired them. It is a 
religious obligation upon a Muslim nation to strive to improve its efficiency and 
capabilities in all aspects of life. This cannot be done without the encouragement of 
scientific life, which in turn depends on the recognition of copyright. 
It seems that the protection of science, that is, the principle of intellect, as one 
of the magdsid of Shari `a, can only be achieved by protection of copyright. The 
bodies of knowledge in the arts and sciences in any forms of presentation is 
maslaha. 
On reflection, there is an association between copyright and scientific progress. 
The recognition of copyright respects rights and encourages scientific efficiency. 
Thus, it strengthens the objectives of Shari `a by promoting knowledge and 
rewarding scholars. Therefore, the recognition of copyright serves the magdsid 
(principles) of Shari `a. 
Fiqh can recognize and protect copyright, without necessarily relying on a 
particular text. That is something which would act as a positive reason in favor of 
maslaha. Recognition of copyright is a very efficient way of benefiting the whole of 
society and encouraging beneficial intellectual works. A society should facilitate the 
good of an author for the purposes, overall, of the magäsid. Asserting copyright is 
the primary mode by which society can achieve development and prosperity, which 
are part of the magäsid of Shari `a. 
It is obvious that educational and scientific developments within society have a 
close bearing upon an authors' ability to benefit from his works. The evidence for 
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this promotion is so overwhelming that it is now considered an established fact and 
not merely a theory. 
Copyright is based on the interest that the protection of copyright encourages 
the scientists to publish their works and that these works develop and enlighten 
society. 108 Copyright is needed in order to stimulate individuals to create new 
literature and useful knowledge. Copyright is necessary as an incentive for the 
promotion of intellectual works, which are, in turn, necessary for advancing the 
public interest. Copyright can be seen as compensation for the expected risk of 
failure of publishing works, since the author does not know whether his work will 
succeed. 
The endorsement of copyright does not conflict with other nass, ijmä ` or giyds 
dealing with it. In stead, as we have seen, the recognition of copyright is consistent 
with the original sources of Shari `a. Copyright does not conflict with other maslaha 
or cause illegitimate harm to others. Copyright cannot be seen as causing damage to 
any other general interest. 
By ignorance of copyright, anyone can acquire scholarship, social and 
economic advantages, under the guise of authorship. Generally, in every branch of 
knowledge and technology, usurpation of copyright can be seen to have damaging 
effects. 
An endorsement can also be raised from the fact that, the protection of property 
(one of the magäsid of Shari `a) can be harmed by the violation on economic rights 
of authors. If the objectives of Shari 'a are to maximize the public interest, it seems 
that the recognition and protection of copyright is required as of necessity. 
It would be a mistake to suppose that approval of copyright will lead to the 
erosion of the bonds of public interest. In fact, failing to uphold copyright would 
subject such bonds to usurpation and appropriation by infringers and hijackers. 
The infringement of copyright leads to misleading the public about the 
scientific authority of knowledge the prevention of rightful authors from achieving 
118 Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. 
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the posts that they deserve and the exploiting of their works by unauthorized 
production. The conclusion of upholding copyright is that no one shall usurp it, 
pretend to be an author or a scholar or acquire undeserved advantage. 
It is advisable for a mujtahid to do a search and review the sequences and 
effects of a particular ruling, he wants to issue, with a careful consideration before 
confirming that ruling-109 This will ensure the quality of a ruling. The more precise a 
consideration of the general direction of Shari `a is, the better a ruling it will produce 
that is relevant to a particular case. For example, the following questions should be 
asked; does this ruling advance the magdqid of Shari `a? Do the results of this ruling 
conform to those principles? These questions are made objectively to secure the 
balance in the treatment of any subject. Shari `a does not require dealing with new 
cases just in terms of principles, but also with practical observation. 
This provides a mechanism whereby scholars evaluate the appropriateness of a 
particular ruling and decide whether it should be applied to the case in question. 
These considerations provide strong grounds on which to think that it would be 
legitimate to approve or deny copyright. 
The justifications for copyright are also derivative from the principle of "sadd 
al-dhardi `" (blocking the means of evil). It is one of the main functions of SharT`a 
to block the sources of causing harm, damage or breach to the interests or rights of 
people! 10 This principle supports the preventive policy by the lawful means. 
The denial or absence of copyright would have many negative consequences. for 
both authors and scholars and the society. The rapid development of new technology 
should support the eradication of plagiarism and piracy because it prevents the real 
owners from enjoying the fruits of their works. Those who infringe copyright, 
exploit technologies in order to maximize the opportunities of having the proceeds 
of their unauthorized production of works without the copyright owners' consent. 
Authors, scientists and publishers complain constantly regarding a selfish group of 
pretenders exploiting the fruits of their labor. 
109 Al-Shätibi, al-Muwafagat, vol. 4. p. 140. 
110 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 310. 
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The infringement of copyright by academics results in unlimited damage to 
scientific life and reputation. In addition, the fraud could remain undiscovered for 
some time. Absence of copyright can create the real risk of preventing future 
authorship. The greatest challenge in intellectual and scientific circles is piracy in 
authorship and publishing. This means that copyright should be protected by law to 
prevent such harmful consequences. 
The waiving of copyright would be destructive to individuals and deprive a 
community of legitimate principles and needs and indeed of means of survival and 
development. Chaos would follow from failing to recognize and protect the works of 
creative and scientific individuals. 
The absence of copyright would lead to deprivation and would discourage 
genuine researchers and authors in the pursuit of their legitimate goals. This would 
be contrary to the public interest. "' Scholars would lose a great deal of motivation, 
researchers would become hopeless and rightful works may prove unprofitable. 
Science, literature, art and other useful works would, thus, diminish or disappear 
over time. 
Denial of copyright would be catastrophic for both authors and scholars who 
strive hard to develop their society as well as themselves. A society can achieve 
development by approval of copyright and indeed its absence would deprive a 
community of one of the means of improvement. 
It is against the maslaha, for someone to infringe, appropriate and exploit a 
piece of work, whilst the rightful author is deprived of his work completely or in 
part. 
Authors have a valid claim that society recognizes and protects their works and 
this allows them to reciprocate by giving a commitment to devote their lives to 
research, study, and authorship and assist in community projects generally. They 
will be encouraged and rewarded to give to society their knowledge and intellect as 
much as their rights are recognized and protected. 
111 Al-Dirayni, ffagq al-lbtikär. p. 137. 
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Copyright helps scholars to operate and disseminate knowledge without fearing 
that their useful works will be stolen and that they will not be able to recover the 
cost of funding the research to produce it. 
Copyright is based not on the maslaha or the need of the copyright holder but 
on the worth of what there is an interest or need for. Reciprocity can be observed 
between the recognition of copyright and encouragement of development in 
sciences, arts and so on. The fact is that, in general, if authors are unable to reap 
economic rewards from authorship in the market place they will be unwilling to 
produce works. As a practical result, they will have no incentive to start or continue 
their works because of the lack of recognition and protection of their rights. 
No doubt, the security of authors' rights over their works would support the 
progress of knowledge and science. The expected problem is that without the 
protection of copyright not enough works will be produced. 
There has been a maslaha in protecting national works by copyright from 
misappropriation by international companies. There is relationship between 
copyright and national growth, if the state is to use a. modem instrument such as 
intellectual property law and international agreements to protect and benefit 
intellectual products. 
Finally, the notion that authorship is in the public interest can be demonstrated 
in recognizing and protecting copyright. Given that caveat, copyright is located 
successfully within the framework of maslaha. 
4.4 Evidence of Copyright from `Urf 
It is agreed that, "`Urf literally means that which is known" 412 about the 
common usage in speech or in action in a particular country or society. It results 
from a consistent practice of the public. Technically, 'urf means that "recurring 
112 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 283. Al-Zargä, al-Madkhal, vol. 1. p. 141 and post. 
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practices which are acceptable to people of sound nature". 113 According to the 
discipline of usül al-figh, fugaha' are concerned with the perception of `urf for 
changing rulings or deciding cases where there is a correspondence between a ruling 
and `urf 114 
Its authority originated essentially from the primary sources of Shari `a. That is 
Qur'an and Sunna. The word 'urf is mentioned in the Qur'änic verse "..., and 
command what is right `urf.. "I's Many Qur'änic commentators interpret `urf as 
righteousness 116 and the observance of good characters and morals. "? 
The second endorsement of this source is found in Sunna. It is reported that 
"what the Muslims deem to be good is good in the sight of Allah". 118 It means that if 
the Muslim community considers something acceptable is indication that Allah 
approves it. This rule is to nullify any practice if it shocks or offends the conscience 
of the Muslim community. 
Shari `a clearly specifies that one should return many matters to `urf. For 
example, commanding the good, 119 living well with one's wife120 and "mut `a" (the 
gift of consolation). 121 It is this `urf that allows a judge to take into account standard 
to determine the cost of living and maintenance level, to define words and signs of 
defamation and other similar matters. 
The reliance on `urf is articulated in many acceptable and well established legal 
maxims such as, "What is proven by `urf is like that which is proven by a shay i 
proof' 122 and "What is proven by `urf is like that which is proven by an agreed 
113 Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 283. 
114 Ibdi. p. 293. 
115 Qur'an. 7. v. 199. 
161bn Kathir, vol. 4, p. 241. 
117 For a more detailed discussion on its authoritativeness, see Karnali, Principle of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, p. 292. 
1s Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 292. Al-Mustadrak. Hadith No: 4466, vol. I1I, p. 84. 
MusnadAhmad, vol. 1, p. 379. 
119 Qur'än. 7. v. 199. 
120 Qur'än. 4. v. 19. 
121 Qur'än. 2. v. 236 and 2. v. 241. 
122 Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 284. 
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condition". 123 Both maxims provide custom with the rank of a binding stipulation 
imposed by Shari 'a or by an explicit agreement. Other maxims say: "Custom is of 
forces124 "The use of men is evidence according to which it is necessary to act" 
125 indicates that a judge or jurist can use custom as a source for rulings in the 
absence of other sources or an applicable contractual provision. These maxims are 
indications of the significance of 'urf. This binds people to follow `urf and which 
provides decisive and authoritative rulings. 
Fuqaha' use 'urf to endorse the validity of many commercial contracts such as 
"istisnd "' (contract of manufacture), "al-bay' bi! -ta'aF" (sale or exchange of 
commodities by code gestures without positive proposal), "mudäraba" (contract of 
partnership) which used to happen. 126 It is 'urf that shows the flexibility of Shari `a 
and its capability of adapting itself to new circumstances unless it conflicts with 
other rules in Shari 'a. 
Obviously, not all customs can be accepted and there are the qualifications that 
connect the `urf to Shari `a. According to usül al-fiqh, what gives weight to `urf is its 
complying with three conditions. 127 Firstly, it must be something common to popular 
practice not a personal choice. Secondly, it has continued to exist continuously. 
Thirdly, it must not conflict with Shari `a. '28 In the view of Shari `a, `urf is an 
obligatory law only in these conditions. Demands for approving any case of `urf can 
be met and satisfied by the examination of these conditions. 
'Urf constitutes a binding source of law if no contradiction exists between 'urf 
and Qur`än and Sunna. Any action or practice which is prohibited by Shari `a cannot 
be recognized on the basis of the custom `urf whether it has a local or worldwide 
usage. Instead, `urf rules which are inconsistent with Shari `a must be ignored. 
The role of `urf in the realm of copyright is substantial and this has lead to a 
123 Ibn Rushd al-Mugaddimät, vol. 2, p. 466. 
u4 The Mejelle, Article 36, p. 7. 
125 Ibid, Article 37, p. 8. 
126 Ibn Rushd, Biddyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. 2,284. EI2, Entry: mudäraba. 
127 Al-Mawsü'a al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 30, p. 42, 'Urf entry. 
128 Karnali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 286 and post. 
Foundations and Conditions of Copyright in Islamic Law 187 
number of scholars having argued for the applicability of `urf to copyright . 
129 For 
example, the Fiqh Academy's decision pointed to the `urf dimension in recognizing 
copyright130 and Usmani concluded that copyright is huqüq `urffyya. '31 
`Urf and its conditions retain large scope for application to copyright. Copyright 
is based partly on `urf. As to the first condition, the existence of customary 
international law with regard to copyright is undeniable. Copyright is entrenched in 
laws, constitutions and international agreements. This `urf regarding copyright is 
internationally accepted, well established and reciprocally enforced. In `urf 
copyright has developed considerably in both depth and specificity. 
Though Shari `a is an independent system, it intersects with useful customary 
and international laws and norms in various ways. There are many international 
copyright conventions, but the most widely accepted is the Berne Convention of 
1886 as most nations have joined it. The agreement has been revised several times 
since 1886 to set the duration of copyright, expand the scope of the Convention to 
include newer technologies, prohibit formalities as a prerequisite of copyright 
protection and recognize the moral rights of authors and artists, giving them the right 
to object to modifications or to the destruction of a work in a way that might 
prejudice or decrease the artists' reputations. 
Also, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which is part of the 
UN system, was established in 1967 to promote the protection of intellectual 
property throughout the world and sponsor the various agreements dealing with 
intellectual property such as TRIPS, which has a very great impact on international 
trade law. Muslim states participate in the binding international agreements to 
protect copyright. 
Secondly, the practice of recognizing and protecting copyright has a universal 
and continued usage. `Urf approves that authors have rights over their, works which 
129 Al-Nähi, IIagq al-Mu'allif. Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikär. p. 83. 
130 In its fifth session in Kuwait in 10th -15"' December 1988, see Majallat al-Majma', issue5, Vol. 
III 
131 Usmani, Buhüth f Qa4dyd Fighiyya Mu'äsira, p78-85. 
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enables them to exchange or dispose of them as they see them suitable. One might 
say that copyright is a contract between society as a whole and an author and is 
supported by `urf. 
For the third condition, the `urf of respect for copyright has not been in conflict 
with the injunctions and the principles of Shari `a magdsid. Copyright has clear 
reasons for approval, in that it represents honesty and justice that should be 
respected by human beings. Nothing in Shari 'a prevents the public from respecting 
copyright if people consider it appropriate to the public interest. Copyright is in 
accordance with Shari `a precepts in recognizing and protecting authors' rights. 
There is a realization that copyright is a just institution. 
The core of copyright can be found in the institution of Yäza, which is well- 
established in Islamic `urf. The legitimacy of governing the circulation of knowledge 
by ijdza and the principles of justice and honesty became a conclusive `urf. It was an 
integral part of the academic life, which was protected from any kind of criticism. 
In the literature on `ilm al-hadith, there is a debate amongst scholars as to how 
al-hadith should be received and transmitted. 132 As it has been indicated before, 
there is a detailed and determinate set of rules governing the correction, editing and 
narration of al-hadith. 133 There is certain `urf in the Muslim academic community 
that governs transmission of knowledge. The recent of copyright is a kind of revival, 
expansion and development of the old institution of iUdza which is rightful `urf. It is 
the historical groundings for modern copyright in `urf. 
In addition, the 'urf that the sources of writings should be acknowledged for the 
purposes of public benefit is demonstrated in the extensive Islamic 
literature. 134 Therefore, 'urf condemns piracy and plagiarism and regards them as 
serious offences against authors and public interest. 'Urf points to the stigma of 
violation and infringement of copyright. The violation of this 'urf leads to 
condemnation and to exclusion from academic life. According to `urf, the hacker is 
132 Azmi ifadith Literature, p. 182 and post. 
133 See p. 147 and post. 
134 Härün, p. 22. 
Foundations and Conditions of Copyright in Islamic Law 189 
called as a thief, dishonest and a fraud even if the only thing "taken" is a piece of 
knowledge or art. 135 
The development of modem `urf considers copyright as a kind of wealth that 
can be subject to exchange even if the work is abstract in nature. `Urf has expanded 
the area of property to encompass subjects that have never previously fallen to be 
considered by fugahä' . 
The acceptance of copyright based on `urf is not meant to imply that all works 
must be accepted without qualification. A special chapter will present the necessary 
conditions for works to be protected in Shari `a. 136 
4.5 Evidence of Copyright from al-Qawd `id al-Fiqhiyya (Legal 
Maxims) 
Aimed at researching copyright systemically, this section devotes itself to 
applying al-Qawä `id al-Fiqhiyya to copyright. "The maxims of figh refer to a body 
of abstract rules which are derived from the detailed study of the figh itself. They 
consist of theoretical guidelines in the different areas of fiqh such as evidence, 
transactions, matrimonial law, and so on and they are an integral part of figh. The 
name "a! -Qawä `id a1-Fiqhiyya" may resemble the expression usül al-frgh, but the 
former is not a part of the latter and the two are totally different from one 
another". 137 Some of these rules are essentially 'ai dith but they are recognized and 
used by fugahd' as a set of rules. They are described as a body of rules, governing 
the study of figh and facilitating the process of Ytihäd. Fiqh rules were used to not 
1351'1äm al-Muwagqi in, vol. 3, p. 332, cited by Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawdzil, vol. 2, p. 100. 
136 See this thesis p. 206 and post. 
137 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence. p. 5. Al-Zargä, al-Madkhal, vol. 2. p. 965 and post. 
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only to explain the relations between the settled rulings but also to reach rulings to 
new cases. 
It is important that the researcher should be not only familiar with thefiqh rules, 
but also be able to apply them to new cases with the requirements of Utihäd. 
Fugaha' can start with elegant statements of rules and work out the rulings from 
them, and develop solutions in response to demonstrated new problems. While 
recognizing the advantages of these rules, our focus here is on how they might need 
to be applied, to provide support for copyright. 
4.5.1 The rule: "wad' al-yad" the appropriation of permitted things 
In Shari `a there are certain rules and conditions laid down as to how to acquire 
ownership. One of the approved modes for the acquisition of ownership is the prior 
occupation of "al-mubdhät" (permitted things) amounts to its ownership. For 
example, the capture of fish or wild animals is sufficient to acquire its ownership. It 
is known in figh as the rule of "hiaydaa" or "wad ` al yad", which means literally 
"put hand". Priority is one of the ways that establishes ownership. It gives who finds 
something its ownership. The priority right provides that a first acquirer of 
something is entitled to its ownership. 138 
There are many items in nature, which are available to everyone without 
restrictions such as air, water, fire or grass. According to Shari-a, it is called "al- 
mubdh pl. al-mubdbdt" which is any lawful thing that is not owned by anyone else. 
In principle, everything that was not expressly forbidden was permitted. It is an 
underlying principle of Shari `a that if an object is not already possessed or taken 
then it may be owned. Therefore, a person acquires property rights in anything that 
is not formerly owned. 
Allah created everything on the earth for human beings and its ownership is 
"a See this thesis p. 137 and post. 
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vested in common among all members of humanity equally. 139 Allah ordained that, 
if an individual appropriates an object then it belongs to him140 and the owner is 
provided with an adequate authority over the owned thing. The right of priority is 
based on direct texts of Shari `a141 although, Usmani made it under hugitq `urfyya 
which are based on acceptable `urf, in his classification of rights. 142 
In its articles 1248 and 1249 Majallat al-'Ahkdm establishes the acceptable 
modes of ownership. These articles state that appropriation of any "mubäh" 
(permitted thing) which is not owned by anyone else gives the right to its 
ownership. 143 The acquisition of ownership of something can be by the physical 
control over it directly or it can be deemed in such a way by any act, which is 
appropriate to the nature or condition of that thing. An example given in the 
explanation of these articles is the water seller who collects water from a river. The 
river and the water are mubäh for everyone. The container belongs to the collector. 
Therefore, the water collector should be given property rights over the water because 
of this lawful appropriation. '44 
The possession of something is a decisive to its ownership, such as taking water 
from a river using container. Al-Büti considered a book, CD or tape as a container, 
which captures an idea, information or interest. 145 The property can then be passed 
to others in lawful ways such as a sale, gift, and inheritance and so on. 
Human kind is at liberty to own whatever is not prohibited. This means that 
legal possession of anything will validate its ownership. The argument is that the 
expressions presented in a work are like previously un-owned things and that the 
author appropriated them. Authorship is legal possession of thoughts in some form, 
which then validates its ownership. 
139 Ibn al-'Arabi, Abü-Baler, Äriclat al-Ahwadhi Sharh . 'ahih al-Tirmidhi, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al- 
'Ilmiyya, (1418AH/1997) (First Edition), vol. 6, p. 117 
14° Ibid 
141 See this thesis p. 137. 
142 Usmani, Buhüth f Qacläyd Fiqhiyya Mu'dsira, p78-85. 
143 Haydar, vol. 3 p. 257,258. The Mejelle, p. 203. 
144 Haydar, vol. 3 p. 259. 
145 Al-Büti, Qadäya Fighiyya Mu'dsira, p. 84. 
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The recognition of copyright is justified on the grounds that only the author 
should deserve, praise, honor and profit from authoring the work because he is the 
first one to capture of the creative work. 
Shari `a recognizes that individuals are entitled to particular items based on the 
appropriation by which they acquired the ownership granting them the right of use 
and disposal of owned things. 
Under this rule, therefore, it is possible to be the owner of an idea that takes a 
material form, fixed in writing or otherwise, provided that it has not been previously 
appropriated. 
When we are applying this rule of ownership to copyright, ideas are mubähdt 
and are available for everyone. The author is similar to a hunter or collector of these 
mubdhdt, and a book or computer program is similar to a container or net in which 
these mubähät can be preserved or captured. 
The appropriation of an idea is the right to which all people have equal access. 
Authors, however, are the only ones who are entitled to this right. The reason is that 
authors capture ideas and convert them into readable or noticeable forms according 
to their own choice. 
Unless and until the idea takes some material form, its ownership cannot be 
ascertained for anyone. The possession of anything is determined according to its 
nature and condition. Therefore, possession can be actual or in law. It is not 
necessary for there to be physical control over something that is not possessed or 
owned by anyone to acquire ownership of it. 
An individual may own property even though there is no actual control over its 
possession. For example, the airspace above a property can be sold even the owner 
has no physical control over it. Also, as we have seen physical possession is neither 
property itself nor its inevitable condition. This type of ownership necessarily 
corresponds to the legal position which gives the owner exclusive rights of use and 
disposal of that which is possessed and owned. 
The principle, however, has the same application in relation to ideas, 
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information, sciences and arts with some qualifications. '46 It seems there is no 
reason why copyright in a work should not be recognized by Shari `a, if it satisfies 
the conditions of ownership subsisting in it. 
The works of authors, once established, cannot be equated with mubdbat, 
because they have been possessed and owned despite the fact they are produced of 
ideas which were essentially and originally free in their nature. 147 
It is consistent with the public interest, to accept the International Standard 
Book Number (ISBN) to manage and secure the priority. 149 Interestingly some 
current writers have compared the (ISBN) system with an old traditional system of 
"takhlid' (to be an eternal) where authors send their works to the official library of 
Baghdad to be preserved forever. 149 It can be argued that these systems are similar to 
"diywc n" (the official register) which was established in the public interest. '50 
This rule is simple and profound and argues that the first possessor of a thing, 
which currently has no owner, becomes the owner of that thing. As it is a reflection 
of the universal value of justice, this principle is known by the Roman law concept 
of Res Nullius and in European thought as the Locke's theory of property. 
4.5.2 The rule relating to a necessary condition for the fulfillment of an 
obligation 
This rule is one of the famous and common rules of both the maxims of figh al- 
Qawd'id al-Fiqhiyya" and the principles of jurisprudence up 7l al-figh. The rule is 
known and debated in the textbooks of usiil al-figh under the heading of 
"mugaddimat al-wäjib" (a prerequisite for command). lsl There is "ßmä"' 
146 See p. 214 and post here. 
147 Habib, Copyright under Islamic Law. 
148 Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikdr. p. 93. 
149 Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawdzil, vol. 2, p. 102. 
150 See this thesis p. 175. 
151 Al-Amidi, Sayf al-Din `Ali b. Abi `Ali( d. 630AH/1232), al-Ihkdm fi Usal al-Abkam, (1402AH), 
Beirut, al-Maktab al-Islämi, (Second Edition), vol. 1, p. 111. Al-Zarkashi, Badr al-Din, Muhammad b. 
Bahädir, al-Bahr al-Muhi/J Usül al-Fiqh, Shaykh `Abd al-Qädir al-'Ani, (ed. ) Kuwait, the Ministry 
of Awgäf and Islamic Affairs, (1413AH/1992) (Second Edition), vol. 1, p. 223 and post. Ibn 
Foundations and Conditions of Copyright in Islamic Law 194 
(consensus) that it is an obligation to provide what is regarded as a preliminary 
condition for the fulfillment of religious duties. 152 
The rule means that what is deemed essential to the obligations sanctioned by 
Shari `a must be achieved and that whatever promotes these obligations has the same 
mandatory rank as the obligations themselves. 
For example, "wudü' " (ritual ablution) is necessary for prayer, walking to the 
mosque is necessary for Friday congregational prayer, travel to Mecca is necessary 
for performing pilgrimage, and so on. Therefore, ablution, walking to the mosque 
and travel to Mecca are commands. The common rule is that humans are required 
and are responsible to prepare and provide only what they are capable of doing. A 
preliminary condition required in order to obey a command or follow a 
recommendation, then, carries the same weight as the command or recommendation 
itself. 
Al-Amidi (d. 631AH/1233) stated that the scholars of all schools had reached to 
a consensus to the effect that all necessary qualifications and conditions for 
establishing a command must be fulfilled. 
153 The physical, mental and Shar `iyya 
legal requirements and conditions that are necessary to achieve something 
commanded by Shari `a have the same position as the command itself. 
The means that are devised to achieve objectives of Shari `a acquire the same 
status as the objectives themselves. Therefore, the tool of the best objectives is the 
best tool and the tool of the lowest objectives is the lowest tool. There is a parallel 
relationship between the objectives and the tools. Therefore the tools are classified 
according to the classification of the objectives. '54 
It is useful to apply "al-'ahkäm al-khamsa" (the quintuple classification) 
carefully to means. This implies that means can be "wäjib" or `fard "(obligatory), 
"mandüb " (recommended), "mubäh " (indifferent), "makrüh" (reprehensible) or 
Taymiyya, Fatäwa, vol. 20, p. 161. 
152 Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam f Usiil al-Abkam, vol. 1, p. 111. 
'53 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 111. 
154 Al-'Izz, vol. 1, p. 74. 
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"hardm" (forbidden). 
Al-Qaräfi, whilst endorsing this view in general, stated that the means can be 
legalized or prohibited to suit the objectives of Shari `a. 1s5Tools which are necessary 
to achieve the objectives of Shari `a are fared or wäjib. At the opposite, tools, which 
are against these objectives, are haräm. There is. a genuine connection between 
objectives and tools. 
The notion of muqaddimat al-wdjib can be used when defining copyright 
because copyright is necessary for development and this is "wdjib" (an obligation). 
Copyright, therefore, is a straightforward wdjib. 156 
The account of necessary conditions is particularly appropriate in dealing with 
copyright. The recognition of copyright is wäjib, because of its significant role in 
that it functions in educational and industrial life. It is not possible for a society to 
achieve or maintain the public good in development without the approval of scholars 
and authors' rights. Copyright must be so recognized and protected because it is 
deeply concerned with the development of arts, science and technology, and is 
therefore fundamentals to human wellbeing. Copyright is made necessary because of 
interests of society pushing towards improvement. 
On the other hand, the harmful consequences of the violation or infringement of 
copyright are already evident from the earlier discussion! 57 The disapproval of 
copyright creates long-term developmental problems such as the weakness of 
educational institutions, declining researching standards and lack of scientific 
progress. These factors have contributed to or aggravated the problem of 
development in many countries. 
The gap that has existed between the ideal standard of development and the 
actual practice in many Muslim countries can be partly resolved and ratified by the 
recognition of copyright in accordance with the precepts of Shari `a. 
In general, this rule requires that an Islamic state should enact the laws that 
Iss AI-Furiiq, vol. 2 p. 62. Izzi Dien, MA$LAHA in Islamic Law, vol. 1, p. 352. 
156 Abil Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawäzil, vol. 2, p. 136. 
157 See this thesis p. 182 qnd post. 
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achieve the public interest and protect society against the sources of harm or 
unlawful practices. According to this rule, enacting copyright laws is one of the 
primary conditions for a society to achieve their legitimate goals of development. 
4.5.3 The rule relating to public or private "häja" (need) being treated as 
"clarika" (a necessity)158 
The rule is expressed in the article 32 of the Majallat al-Ahkäm, and is 
translated as: "whether a want be general, or whether it be special, it is reduced to the 
degree of necessity". 159 In case of emergency, unlawful food can be eaten to save 
one's life, 160but according to this rule, scholars consider that "häja" (need) can have 
the same legal consequence as "clarüra" (a necessity). 
Häja can be translated as a need, want or requirement. The scholars of usül al- 
figh use häja to refer to suffering by people from the absence of something despite 
the fact that they can live without it. 161 In general, any act or thing that might cause 
difficulties to people must be prohibited, and any act or thing that might lead to 
facilitating the life of people must be permitted. A need means a lack of or an 
insufficient amount of something and which creates difficulties for human beings. 
There is a Qur'änic verse that states: "Allah intends every facility for you: He 
does not want to put you to difficulties . 1462 Another verse contains the same 
direction "and [he] has imposed no difficulties on you in religion". 163 Along with 
other evidence these verses lay down clearly a general attitude of Shari `a, which is 
the consideration of human needs or requirements. Shari`a upholds the human 
needs, interests and necessities and facilitates life so that it meets new circumstances 
of every age in an empirical way. Rulings can be legalized under certain conditions 
in answer to some need or to remove difficulty or hardship. 
158 Ilaydar, vol. l p. 42. 
159 The Mejelle, p. 7. 
160 Qur'än 2. v. 173. 
161 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence. p. 398 
162 Qur'an 2. v. 185. 
163 Qur'an 22. v. 78. 
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There are some commonalities exist between this rule and the concept of 
maslaha. 164 Anything that can be compatible with "al-magdsid al-khamsa" the five 
principles of Shart'a of religion, life, intellect, lineage or property can be legalized. 
Measures are required to remove any difficulty. 
With a view to fulfilling the public need, many fugahä' chose this rule to issue 
rulings in respect of new needs. For example, the state can acquire land owned by 
someone for the purpose of widening a public road or extending a mosque, with a 
fair compensation being paid to the owner. Also the legitimacy of contracts of 
"yära" (lease or hire) "salam" (advance sale) and "istisnd "' (the manufacturture of 
goods) is established the basis of public need. 165 Moreover, a patient can expose the 
private parts of his or her body to a doctor for treatment. 166 
To emphasize the profundity of this rule infiqh, al-'Izz went on to say that an 
individual necessity is similar to a public interest. 167 Thus, the rule provides the 
government with wide powers to impose regulations in order to respond to the 
needs. 
The theoretical position is that Shari `a is not a static law or one which brings 
harshness to human beings. Therefore, it is a duty upon fugahä' to explore existing 
needs and suggest whether a public or individual need should be viewed, as a 
permitted, forbidden or obligatory. 
Within the scope of Shari `a, many systems such as copyright can be established 
for the sake of the public interest. This rule provides economic efficiency for authors 
and aims to fulfill the public need. There is a great public need for recognition of 
copyright. It is needed in order to reassure authors that their works are protected and 
profitable. 
Obviously, authors need to exploit their works to live on otherwise the life of 
the science research and authorship would be meaningless for them and they would 
164 See this thesis p. 175 and post. 
165 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 340. 
166 Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bäri, vol. 10. p. 341. 
167 Al-'Izz, vol. 2, p. 314 
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have to strive to find other ways of earning money. The recognition of copyright is 
based on the fact that without it, authors would face difficulties in their lives and 
society would see a shortage of authors. The economic rights flowing from 
authorship should be protected for authors' needs and this is part of the public need 
and interest. Copyright is justified on the grounds that authors need profits from 
authoring and researching, which they devote their lives to. Therefore, society 
should support them for the attainment of public need. 
Copyright is based not only on the interest or the need of the copyright holder 
but also on the worth of what is in it. The crucial public need of stimulating research 
and development leads to the recognition of copyright. Arising from public and 
private needs, we can equally correctly say that copyrights can be ordained by 
Shari `a. 
On the other hand, the recognition of copyright would serve both the public 
need in general and a private need of authors. What the rule amounts to is that lawful 
public or private needs should be fulfilled as far as possible to minimize its negative 
consequences. 
The public interest of intellectual capital and life is only achieved when its 
resources namely, authors, are secured. The failure of the fulfillment of this need is 
likely to increase the number of scientists and academics emigrating and this would 
have a large impact on society. The widespread degeneration in many countries is an 
indicator that there is a vital need for that society to recognize and protect the rights 
of scholars and authors. 
It is likely that the recognition of copyright will augment research and 
development and help most developing countries in education and technology. The 
rule focuses on both the public need and authors' need for legislative recognition of 
copyright. It seems that copyrights can be introduced purely for perceived public and 
private need without recourse to other juristic arguments. Shari `a fosters rather than 
disrupts copyright for both authors and the public good. 
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4.5.4 The rule of removing of harm 
Shari `a aims at achieving the mercy and the interest of all humanity. It is 
confirmed by the verse: "We have not sent down Qur'an to thee to be (an occasion) 
for thy distress". 168 This rule is consistent with the principle that Shari `a seeks 
"maslaha" (the public interest) by attaining advantages as much as possible and 
diminishing evils as much as possible. 
It is reported that the Prophet said: "la Barar wa-la clirdr "There is no injury 
nor return of injury. i169 According to the rules of usül al-fiqh, the prohibition of 
Barar is general, because the actual wording is general. It can be applied to every 
case where there is injury without permission. The exemption to this general rule can 
only be found in judicial orders or cases of self-defense. Generally, it means that an 
injury is not justified and must not be initiated nor can it be accepted in return for 
another injury. This hadith prohibits any kind of intentional injury of others whether 
it is launched or it is merely reactionary. 170 It is to prohibit any harm caused to an 
individual or caused to the public. Therefore, any act might which have the effect of 
injury of anyone is prohibited in Shari `a. 
There are several rules driven from the main hadiith and rule, such as the rule 
that Barar cannot be prevented by its like 171 and Barar "is repelled as far as 
possiblei172 and so on. 
It is impossible to give an exhaustive account of the kinds of "ciarar" (injury or 
harm). This is why Abü Däüd and al-Nawawi stressed that this hadith is one of the 
168 Qur'än. 20. v. 2. 
169 Anas, Malik, al-Muwafla', translated by Professor Ahmad Hasan. http: //www. muslimaccess. com/ 
sunnah/hadeeth/muwatta/036. html. Book 36, Number 36.26.31. The Mejelle, p. 6, Article No. 19. In 
Arabic: Al-Zarqani, Share Muwalla', Hadith No: 1500, vol. 4, p. 40. Ibn `Abd al-Barr, Abü `Umar 
Yüsuf b. `Abd Allah, al-Istidhkär, `Abd Al-Mu`li Qal`aji, (ed. ), Damascus, Dar Ibn Qutayba, (1993) 
(First Edition), vol. 22, p. 221. Hereinafter: Ibn `Abd al-Barr, al-Istidhkär. Haydar, vol. ] p. 36, Article 
No. 19. See The Mejelle Article: 19, p. 6. Haydar, vol. 1 p. 36. 
170 Al-Zargäni, Shares al-Muwalla', vol. 4, p. 40. 
171 The Mejelle, Article: 25, p. 6. 
172 Ibid, Article: 31, p. 7. 
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most important 'ahddith that religion and fiqh in particular rely on. 173 Ibn `Abd al- 
Barr said that this hadith and rule in particular has an unlimited scope in 
applications. 174 Fugahä' use this rule heavily and effectively to prohibit new 
products or actions such as drugs and cigarettes which cause injury where there is no 
text dealing with them directly or indirectly. 
This hadith is highly efficient on both sides, for being absolute and sound 
hadith which can be used as independent evidence and for being a central rule that 
copyright can be grounded on. If copyright fall for consideration under this rule, it is 
evident that the denial of copyright has tended to lead to individuals and public 
injury and unjust results. 
The consideration relates to the practical effects of the denial of copyright to 
authors and the public. There is "ciarar" (harm) to authors when their works have 
been misappropriated or exploited without proper consent which also injuriously 
affects the interests of the community. It prevents genuine scientists and authors 
from benefiting from their works and leading the intellectual life in society. As a 
consequence research and the authorship decline because they are unauthentic, 
unpromising and unprofitable. Consequently, it diminishes the incentive of research 
or authorship. 
The harm reaches beyond the violated work in question and causes the concept 
of ownership and responsibility to become obscure. It contributes to the diseased 
condition of society in many ways. It encourages unjust enrichment, if the person 
who violated or infringed copyright benefits from that. It is likely to cause academic 
dishonesty to spread and discourage people from striving for promising 
developments and prosperity. This precludes scholars from contributing to the task 
of nation building. It creates an environment in which research, education and 
authorship are corrupted. 
173 Ibn Rajab, 'Abd al-Rahman, Jdmi' al-'Ulüm wa al-Ifikam, Shu'ayb al-Arnä'üt and Ibrahim 
Bäkhüs, (eds. ) Beirut, Mu'assasat al-Risäla, (1999/1419AH) (Eighth Edition), vol. 2, p. 211. Al- 
Albani, NA$ir al-Din, , Sahib Sunan Ibn Mäjah, Beirut, al-Maktab al-Islämi, (1988/1408AH) (Third 
Edition), vol. 2, p. 39, Iiadith No: 1895. 
174 Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Istidhkdr, vol. 22, p. 223. 
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This will in turn, for example, encourage more scholars to migrate from 
developing countries. This threatens intellectual and human capital, which are the 
principal resources of development. All these lead to deterioration, backwardness, 
poverty and their destructive effects, which can be categorized under the rule of 
removing c arar. 
Therefore, copyright should be established to remove the definite harm. On the 
contrary, recognition and protection of copyright has a tremendous influence on the 
scientific community and consequently on the public. 
4.5.5 The rule that: "A person, who is owner of a thing, is owner also of things 
which are indispensable for that thing". 175 
This rule is set out in article 49 of Majallat al Ahkc m. 176 The right of a property 
has no application without the necessary rights and easements by which one could 
use the subject matter of the property. Another baseline rule of Islamic law is that to 
own property is to have the right to own everything, which is necessary to that main 
property. 
The rationale is that not possessing such necessarily related things to that 
property would mean that the owner would be practically incapable of using of his 
property. The property has no sense in the absence of necessarily related things to 
the subject matter of the property. The object of this rule is to ensure and enable 
owners to use their property. 
For example, the owner of land owns consequentially all necessary rights 
appertaining to it, such as the right of way. The right to a property has no application 
without the necessary arrangements by which one could use the subject matter of the 
property. When Shari `a recognizes someone's right to, it imposes a corresponding 
175 The Mejelle, p. 9. I3aydar, vol. 1 p. 53. 
176 It has been translated also as: " A person, who is owner of a thing is owner also of things which are 
indispensable for that thing. " The Mejelle, p. 9. 
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duty on others to respect this right within its borders. 177 
Shari `a does not aim at achieving futility or anarchy but at securing its 
principles "al-magäsid al-khamsa" in religion, life, intellect, lineage and property by 
using the relevant legal and religious machinery. Recognizing copyright is an 
important instrument for protecting these principles of Shari `a. 
As stated previously, Shari `a does not stipulate that the subject matter of 
ownership must be a material thing. 178 It allows a broader definition on which 
ownership can be claimed. Therefore, the rule is applicable to copyright. 
Likewise, it would be necessary to grant certain exclusive rights (copyright) to 
authors. The recognition of copyright requires the recognition of all complementary 
rights, which are related to them for ensuring their existence. Owners have a 
legitimate claim and interest to ensure that their works cannot be assigned to others. 
This rule leads to the approval of all the author's rights such as the right of 
paternity, the right of integrity, the right of economic exploitation, the right of 
disclosure of a work to the public and the right of withdrawal from the distribution. 
These rights are the ingredients of the ownership of copyright. 
The recognition of copyright without them is insufficient to ensure the 
attainment of the purpose of copyright, and thus copyright would become 
meaningless. If authors cannot exercise control over their copyright, it is 
inappropriate to think of their possessing copyright. It cannot be said that copyright 
exists if anyone can share in or prevent authors from using these rights. 
Alternatively, copyright is granted to authors only in name, not in fact. This rule has 
been used only to ensure the ownership of copyright. 
4.6 Summary 
A recourse to the second sources is warranted by Qur'an, the Sunna and ßmä' 
to find rulings for new cases. Qiyas has been established to apply the meanings of 
177 '! saw!, p. 338. 
l7e AI-`Abbädi, al-Milkiyyai, vol. 1, p. 198. 
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the texts in other places provided that the conditions of qiyas and "7116" (the 
effective cause) can be fulfilled. Therefore, there are many decided cases in Shari `a 
which giyäs can provide a strong basis for copyright. 
The case of acquiring ownership of barren land by its cultivation can be used by 
the process of giyäs, because ownership which is based on survival and productivity 
can be extended to intellectual works. The spreading of knowledge is an obviously 
reviving process in society and generates future advancements because in Shari 'a 
intrinsic meanings are more present and more highly valued than forms or words. 
Shari `a requires lawful access to property, legal status, situations or evidence 
and prohibits using any thing, right or property without permission from its owner. 
It is reported that the Prophet prohibited listening to the talk of people, who do 
not want people to listen. This is combined with another hadith which imposes 
restrictions that bar people involved in a meeting from disclosing that meeting. It can 
be argued that these `ahadi-th are applicable to a hacker or unlawful publisher who 
produces or copies a work for the public without permission. These two cases prove 
ownership of copyright especially moral rights. 
An analogy was drawn between, on the one hand, the teaching and reciting of 
Qurä'n and Sunna or "rugya" which entitling the one who does this task to a reward 
with, on the other hand, authorship which entitles the author to a reward. Similarly, 
hiring people to teach Qur'an, hadith and figh, leading prayer and raising the call to 
prayer is approved. This can be applied to copyright because an author, like a 
teacher, is allowed to receive compensation for authorship regardless of the subject 
of authorship, the method of payment and the rewards in the hereafter. 
It can be argued that if it is rational to give a sufficient return not only to the one 
who copies Qur'an, which is word of Allah, but also to the copier who has no role 
other than writing it, then similarly, authors who create works are entitled to sell 
them. 
Teaching Qur'an can be a dowry, which implies that teaching Qur'an has a 
financial value. This approves of a commercial value for knowledge and this 
includes the economic rights of authors. 
Foundations and Conditions of Copyright in Islamic Law 204 
There are many rights conferred by Shari 'a to the owners of rights which can 
be the subject to sale, waiver, reimbursement, exchange, or "sulh " (settlement, 
compromise) whether conditional or unconditional. For example, "gisäs ", 'khul"', 
"shuf a", "haddna"; "nafaqa" and the sale the airspace above property. There is no 
difficulty in treating copyright in the same way as these rights for financial 
exchange, therefore, generally, the waiver and reimbursement of copyright is valid. 
These three cases prove the author's economic rights. "Maslaha" (the public 
interest) which is used by the majority of fugahä' for protecting the five principles 
"magäsid ' of Shari `a is applicable to copyright. 
It can be argued that copyright should be recognized in order to promote 
scientific advance and humanity's future and to encourage scientific efficiency and 
serve the property of authors and scholars who are working for the maslaha. These 
objectives are derive from the principle of Shari `a "magäsid of intellect. 
Additionally, it is possible to apply some legal maxims to copyright. First, the 
principle that the prior occupation of "mubdhät " (permitted things) amounts to 
ownership provides that copyright is justified in Shari`a. The reason is that 
authorship is a kind of legal possession of thoughts which are mubähät in any form. 
Secondly, by applying the rule of the necessary condition for the fulfillment of 
an obligation of copyright this can be seen as a preliminary condition for the 
development of arts, science and technology and are therefore fundamentals to the 
public interest. Thirdly, the use of the rule that a public or private "häja" (need) 
must be treated as "darüra " (necessity) is to remove difficulty and hardship. This 
rule helps to support copyright in order to protect a perceived public need for 
stimulating research and development and the private needs of scholars and authors. 
Fourthly, the rule that "if someone owns something, its ownership implies the 
ownership of anything that is necessary for it" leads to a recognition of copyright 
and all related rights. Finally, by employing the rule of removing a harm copyright 
can be established in that the denial of copyright has tended to lead to individual and 
public injury. Moreover, the approval of copyright can be established infiqh through 
istihsän using the general principles of Shari'a. 
Chapter Five 
The Conditions of Copyright 
5.1 Introduction 
Modem legal systems in general recognize some conditions on copyright with 
many variations. Unlike modem laws, in Shari 'a there is no ready-made set of terms 
and conditions for the existence, extent or exercise of copyrights. Likewise, in many 
legal systems, conditions of copyrights can be erected by Shari `a. Therefore, the 
objective of this chapter is to present conditions and qualifications for copyright in 
Shari'a, which can give rise to some difficulties in their applications. 
It is observed that as a general rule, all rights must be originated, used and 
aimed within the boarders of Shari'a. l The boundaries and qualifications of 
copyright are analogous to a large extent to those attached to other rights. Therefore, 
copyrights are limited and based on conditions of Shari'a. Copyright must not be 
treated as absolutely inviolable in all possible circumstances, but it is a kind of 
conditional rights. 
Broadly speaking, there are certain restrictions which Shari 'a places upon 
copyright to make it in harmony with other rights and considerations. The 
considerations qualifying copyright are instantiations of other rights of Allah, others' 
rights and the public interest. As is the case with many rights in Shari 'a, copyright 
can be justifiably given less weight or even defeated by other considerations of the 
general interest. 
One reason for the conditions is that thought is principally being given to the 
harmonization of "hagq Allah" pertaining to the public interest and the author's 
rights "hagq al-'abd ". Moreover, copyrights in Shari a cannot be against its 
principles since they are themselves derived from the same source. 
' See this thesis p. 78. 
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These conditions are determined and justified by Shari `a for the purpose of 
protecting other rights, upholding public order, morality and the public interest. 
They are necessary to prevent contravention upon other more important rights or 
considerations. For example, conditions on a work serve to maintain a balance 
between the interests of copyright owners and the public. This is to place limits on 
the extent to which copyrights can be manipulated for the sake of the public interest. 
Copyrights are to be exercised under certain rather restrictive conditions to be 
approved in Shari `a. Therefore, copyrights cannot be used to injure the society, to 
undermine the course of morality, or to challenge the public interest. 
Shari'a establishes conditions that must be satisfied in order to possess or 
exercise of copyright of a work. Therefore, if a work fails to comply with these 
conditions, copyright cannot thereafter be asserted. 
This does not mean that for each work, conditions need to be scrutinized by 
inspectors, but works have to be weighed and balanced against these standards to be 
copyrighted under Shari `a. In contrast, works are premised not on prohibition, but 
from the general Islamic approach that what is not prohibited is allowed. 
The conditions here concern the essence, use and scope of copyright. The 
account of conditions takes the relevant factors particularly the nature of copyrights, 
the importance of the purpose of that condition and its extent. 
5.2 Legality 
Copyright reflects in a particular legal system its standards, values and 
objectives. The legitimate merit of any work is one of the determining factors in 
finding whether or not copyright subsists. Since Shari `a recognizes copyright, there 
must be certainty that the subject matter of copyright is lawful. 
In terms of justification, when fuqaha' laid down conditions and terms of 
contract of sale, they agreed that what cannot be owned, because it is prohibited, 
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cannot be the subject matter or a consideration of any contract. 2 There is no dispute 
among fuqaha' that legality is an important factor which may render a contract, 
action or property invalid. As it has been stated before, the reason for not owning or 
dealing in some goods is that they are prohibited, regardless of whether they have 
fmancial value on market or not. 3 
This is consistent with many 'ahddith such as "The Prophet forbade the use of 
the price of a dog, the money charged of a soothsayer and the earnings of a 
prostitute. " 4, "the Prophet ... proclaimed the trade of alcohol as illegal. " 
5" and He, 
who has forbidden its drinking, has forbidden its sale also'. 6 Therefore, fugaha' such 
al-Qaräfi said generally that objects, which have "manfa `a muharma" (unlawful 
utility) such as wine, cannot be owned. 7 The assertion of legality as a condition is 
justified also on the grounds that injustice enrichment would follow if an author can 
make profit on unlawful works. 
This rule can be applied with similar results, thus works, which contain 
unlawful materials, support or lead to unlawful actions, cannot be owned. The 
subject matter of a work can be approved or rejected by all that which is indicative 
of it. The acceptance by the Shari`a's a work is based on its contents and the social 
context in which the work will be published. Therefore, if the idea underlying a 
work is in conflict with SharT`a, the work cannot seek copyright in Shari 'a. 
Another reason is that Shari 'a fixes responsibility on a speaker of any sin or 
harm caused by his words. This finds clear support from the verse: "Not a word does 
he utter but there is a vigilant guardian". 8 This warns people to choose their words 
carefully. 
A further verse which clearly prohibits making a mockery of religion and 
2 Ibn Rushd, Bidnyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 156. 
3 See chapter 3. 
4 AI-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 7, p. 197, Iladith No: 258. 
S Ibid, vol. 3, p. 168, Iiadith No:. 297 
6 Sahih Muslim available online at: 
htt: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/010. html, Book 010, Number 3836. 
7 AI-Furüq, vol. 3, p. 384. 
8 Qur'än, 50. v 18. 
Foundations and Conditions of Copyright in Islamic Law 208 
refuses an apology for it, reads: "Say: "Was it at Allah, and His Signs, and His 
Messenger that ye were mocking... Make ye no excuses: ye have rejected Faith after 
ye had accepted it. "9 
To set a barrier on any sort of false statement or speech another verse reads: 
"and shun the word that is false". 10 This is to indicate that words have a greater 
significance than people might think and to limit the abusive exercise of talk or 
writing. 
A special Qur'änic verse reads "Those who love (to see) scandal published 
broadcast among the Believers, will have a grievous Penalty in this life and in the 
Hereafter: Allah knows, and ye know not. s11 The verse prohibits promotion and 
advertising adultery or scandal which might deprave and corrupt a Muslim society. 
Following these verses, it is reported that "the Prophet said a slave (of Allah) 
may utter a word which pleases Allah without giving it much importance, and 
because of that Allah will raise him to degrees (of reward); a slave (of Allah) may 
utter a word (carelessly) which displeases Allah without thinking of its gravity, and 
because of that he will be thrown into the hell fire". 
'Z It is established that a word, 
written or heard, has a great impact on a person's life whether good or evil. 
Therefore, writing or publication of works containing scandals, blasphemy or 
features of similar category is prohibited according to Sharia. As we have seen, the 
right of Allah is confirmed throughout the prohibitions in Shari 'a. 
13 An author is 
bound and expected not to write a work that is against the commands and conditions 
prevalent in Shari 'a. A work lacking legality is invalid. Copyright cannot be granted 
for prohibited, abusive or fraudulent ends. 
This is necessary in ensuring that the recognition accorded to the work does not 
conflict with Shari 'a. Shari-'a recognizes that no one has the right to pursue activities 
which aim at the destruction of any of the commands and the principles enshrined in 
9 Qur'an, 9. v 65 and 66. 
10 Qur'an, 22. v 30. 
11 Qur'an, 24. v 19. 
12 AI-Bukhdri, tr., vol. 8, p. 322, liadith No. 485. 
13 See this thesis p. 65 and post. 
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it. 
Broadly speaking, what is worth recognizing and protecting by Shari `a is what 
cannot be opposing to its principles. The author's right is not worthy of recognition 
if it is in conflict with the rulings of Shari `a. 
It is unreliable to obtain legal status, take advantage of, or to derive from the 
Shari `a a right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at challenging any 
of the principles set forth in Shari `a. Otherwise, the sovereignty of Shari `a and the 
public interest in stability would be at risk. 
This principle is illustrated by the Companions during the reign of the Caliph of 
`Uthmän when the Qur`änic version became an issue of the highest concern to the 
Companions. The contents of the Qur'än must be uniform because when people are 
in dispute about something they will refer to the Qur'än to resolve their differences. 
The use of different Qur'änic copies will lead to a marked difference, which is 
haräm, 14despite the common origin. 
Therefore, the caliph appointed a committee to write the Authorized Version, a 
copy of which was to be sent to every Muslim country, and ordered to bum all other 
copies of the Qur'än, which had been written in fragmentary manuscripts of other 
versions. is 
This case can be seen as evidence since the decision to destroy copies of the 
Qur'an was made after discussion, consultation and ßmä' among the Companions of 
the Prophet. Relying on that Mälik stated that the ruler should prevent anyone from 
selling or reciting the Qur'an according to the manuscript which was written by Ibn 
Mas`üd. 16 This gives guidance that in the case of works that might lead to a clash 
within a nation or where legality might be an issue, the prevention and destruction of 
these works are considered under Shari `a. 
14 Ibn Ilajar, Falb al-Bari, vol. 9, p. 13, IIadith No:. 4987. Al-Zarkashi, Badr al-Din, Muhammad b. 
Bahädir, al-Burhdn ft 'Ulüm al-Qur'än, Muhammad AN al-Fadl Ibrähim, (ed. ) Beirut, Dar al- 
Ma'rifa, (N. D), vol. 1, p. 235. 
15 Al-Bukhdri, tr., vol. 6, p. 479, Hadith No:. 510. 
16 Ibn Rushd the first, Abo al-Walid Muhammad b. Alnmd, al-Bayän wa al-Tahsil, Dr Ahmad al- 
Habäbi and others (eds. ), Beirut, Dar al-Gharb al-IslämT, (1405AH/1985). vol. 9, p. 374. 
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Shari'a prohibits any transaction on what can be used for the purpose of 
promoting crimes. For example, the sale of weapons to rebels or thieves or during 
civil war or the rent of place to be used as a brothel is prohibited. '? 
The rule is common that whatever promotes the prohibitions of Shari'a must be 
banned even where a work meets the condition of originality. And the state must 
support and protect the Islamic principles and standards. 
Further support can be found in the agreement of jurists on the permissibility of 
destroying of wine bottles, its special vessels and gambling instruments as penalty 
for offenders and to prevent others from getting access to them. Such a ruling might 
have provided the basis for destruction of works that are against Shari-a. 
There are many authorities which identify explicitly unlawful works as a 
corrupting cultural influence and a harmful force for their readers' minds. The 
destruction of the materials or instruments used only in crimes or wrongdoings is 
legally recognized. 
Ahmad issued fatwa that one can demolish a borrowed book, if he finds bad 
things in it. 18 The idea behind thisfatwa is that illegal works are not an appropriate 
subject-matter for property or right. Illegal materials are excluded from the security 
of ownership and rights. This might give guidance to the observer in cases where 
legality might be an issue. 
Al-Mäwardi stated that it is one of the qualified muhtasib's19 duties to prevent a 
person engaged in knowledge from contradicting the consensus or textual evidence, 
narrating 'ahädith of abhorrent meaning or giving incorrect interpretations. 
20 Also, 
al-Nawawi stated that it is not allowed to sell books of atheism, blasphemy, black 
magic, reading future or philosophy. 2' 
Ibn al-Qayyim stated that books that oppose Qur'än and Sunna must be 
17 Al-Mughni, vol. 4, p. 284. 
18 Al-Magdisi, Abü 'Abd Allah Muhammad Ibn Muflib, al-Adab al-Shar'iyya wa al-Minh a! - 
Mar'iyya, Beirut, 'Alain al-Kutub, (N. 
D. ), vol. 1, p. 210. 
19 Muhtasib is a religious person who enjoins people what is right and forbids them what is wrong. 
20 Al-Mawardi, p. 349. 
21 Al-Majmü' vol. 9, p. 303. 
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demolished, because there is no greater harm to the community than from these 
books, such that their destruction is of greater necessity than those utensils 
associated with alcohol consumption. 22 In his reasoning, the harm that is caused by 
these books is more serious than the harm caused by other things. In addition, there 
is no threat of civil or criminal liability for damage or loss for the person who 
destroys the object that is used in the prohibited actions. 23 Numerous fatäwa have 
been issued on the same direction to secure legality within a particular culture. 24 
According to the Shari 'a there are clearly negative consequences for a society, 
if works are allowed that propagate "zanadiqah " (heresy), challenge the meanings of 
the Qur'an and hadith, preach distorted interpretations of them, spread corruption, 
promote obscenity, or incite rebellion against the lawful authority. 
It might be argued that circulation of materials encouraging people to do evil is 
worse than actually doing it, as the second case involves one person's sin and it is 
limited to him; while circulation of such material is an act of evil which affects all 
people who use it or become subject to it. It brings down the high standards of 
society. 
To consider what is meant by `lawful' in the light of Shari `a; a work should be 
considered to be lawful if it does not form part of the state of "haräm " (the 
forbidden). The state of haräm is held to comprise everything established as 
prohibited or which leads to those prohibitions. The recognition and exploitation of 
illegal works are contrary to Shari `a. 
The question of whether or not the work is lawful must be answered in the 
affirmative and this is also the case for originality. Moral judgment regarding a work 
and its intended purpose have importance in determining whether it is approved. 
There is no copyright on a work which offends people, because it should be 
22 Ibn Qayyim, al-Jawziyya, Muhammad b. Abi Bakr, al-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, Beirut Dar al-Kutub al- 
`Ilmiyya, (1415AH/1995) (First edition), p. 214 and post., hereinafter: al-Jawziyya, al-Turuq al- 
Hukmiyya. 
23 lbdi. 
24 Al-Shawkäni, Muhammad Ibn `Ali, al-Fath al-Rabbäni Min Fatdwa al-Imäm al-Shawkäni, Sana'a, 
The Publications of The High College of Justice, (1994) (First Edition) p. 202. Ibn Bäz, `Abd al-'Ziz, 
Majmü' Fatäwa wa al-Magdldt, Jeddah, Maktabat al-Ma'ärif, (1992) (Second Edition) vol. 4, p. 206. 
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prohibited. 
According to Shari `a, works which preach apostasy, criticize Islam, justify 
adultery, encourage indignity or racial hatred, or incite people to commit any 
criminal offence, are religiously aggravated offences. These works are especially 
dangerous because they oppose moral fundamentals, public order, and community 
cohesion and very often stir up hatred and violence. 
Al-Qaräfi stated that it is necessary to warn the public and, in particular, 
vulnerable people about dangerous writings but to do so without exaggeration or 
false accusation. 25 There is the potential for a disastrous impact on relations between 
various religious communities. There are many instances where this has happened 
under the title of freedom of expression. In addition, the distinction between a 
believer and their beliefs, and between genuine scientific research and hatred 
disguised as science, is generally uncertain. 
The view that the approval of Shari 'a is of a permanent nature, necessary and 
common, implies that no rights or protection should be granted to works opposing 
Shari `a. To have copyright, a work must not contradict the rules of Shari `a 
regarding the prevention of defamation or indecency. 
Finally, there is the question of has a work which pirates another work or 
contains material contrary to Shari `a, copyright at all? According to many Qurä'nic 
verses such as: ".., and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong 
and depart from justice. Be justs26 and hadith: "... you should give the right of all 
those who has a right on you. s27, copyright subsists only in lawful material that 
originates from the author of infringed works. Furthermore, copyright cannot exist in 
those parts of a work which are opposed to the principles of Shari `a. 
25 Al-Furüq, vol. 4, p. 359. 
26 Qur'än, 5. v 8. 
27 Al-Bukhäri, tr., vol. 3, p108, lIadith No. 189. 
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5.3 Originality 
All legal systems require some level of originality for a work to gain full 
recognition. Originality is regarded as a matter of principle. This condition works 
well for copyright. The purpose of such a requirement is to provide all valuable 
types of works their due recognition and protection. Having recognized this 
principle, these legal systems differ in terms of how they should apply it. 
In spite of the apparent silence of Shari `a, originality of a work can be seen as a 
necessary condition for receiving recognition and there are many justifications for 
this. The first argument for the requirement of originality is that priority is the 
essence of ownership and copyright is, thus, logically dependent on the originality. 
In terms of usül al-fiqh, "`ilia" (the effective cause) of the priority right which 
provides ownership is originality. 28 
In fact, the requirement for a work to be original is a specific prerequisite of that 
work because it gives an author the priority right. As stated before, the prior 
possession of a thing amounts to its ownership. 29 Originality is essential for the 
purpose of applying the rule of ownership to the work in question. Entitlement is 
based on originality. There is no priority if the work lacks originality. The notion of 
imaginative originality is at the core of priority. 
Originality can be seen as a ground for ownership of a work. For a work to be 
recognized as the author's rights, it must be an original form of his or her creation. 
Therefore, the issue of originality precedes recognition of copyright. 
Moreover, the concept of originality is a necessary safeguard of the public 
interest. Without this safeguard, copyright, which has some degree of monopoly, 
can be granted for what is already in the public domain. This standard provides 
copyright only for original works of authorship. 
Al-Dirayni defined original intellectual production as those intellectual forms 
that result from the individual author's ingenuity, which have not been created 
28 See p. 154 here. 
29 See p. 137 here. 
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before. 0 Originality is a purely rational state, which leads the mind from the known 
to the unknown. It can be captured accidentally or systematically. 
In the international custom and the practical life, it is a well-established 
principle that in authorship some degree of originality is necessary for a work to 
obtain acknowledgement. Arabic literature provides that a poem shall be considered 
to be original if it has never seen in currently pre-existing works in any way 
before. 1The priority right and prevailing ethos place great value on creativity and 
originality. 
Moreover, as we have seen, Shari `a adopts the principle that no one should 
benefit from his own wrong, that is, violation or infringement of another's copyright. 
In Shari 'a, no valid property or rights relating to property can be based on illegal 
possession of some thing. 32 If there is no condition of originality, there would be 
many inconveniences and many doubtful questions of right. It prevents someone 
from claiming authorship and obtaining advantage for something that is owned 
already. It can be argued rightly that denial of the criterion of originality provides 
support to violation of legitimate copyright. There cannot be said to be copyright of 
a work that has been copied or otherwise infringed. 
Originality can be absolute, in which case the works are novel and unique, or it 
can be relative, acquiring only a minimum degree of creativity of collection 
arrangement or selection. 3 This means at the very least, a work should be 
individually identifiable by its own features. Originality embodies some aspect of 
being the "mark of the author's personality". 
Originality requires that: a work must owe its origin to the author and not be 
copied from another pre-existing work. Artistic merit or beauty is not necessary but 
the work must not be imitated or otherwise infringed. 
The copying of the whole or a substantial part of a work is regarded as 
30 Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtiknr. p. 9. 
31 Al-Qayrawäni, Abu `All Ibn Rashiq, al-'Umda f Mahäsin al-Shi'r, Dr. Muhammad Qargzän, (ed. ), 
Beirut, Dar al-Ma'rifa, (1988) (First Edition), vol.! p. 448. 
32 See p. 101 here. 
33 A1-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikär, p. 10. Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 82. 
Foundations and Conditions of Copyright in Islamic Law 215 
infringement of copyright and renders the new work as unoriginal. Otherwise, it 
would be a reproduction of previous works clothed in quotation, without real 
contribution or originality. As al-Shätibi pointed out what is permitted in part 
becomes prohibited when done excessively. In other words, the over-indulgence on 
mubdhät becomes hardm 34 
A second order debate has emerged about the best way to define originality. 
Much of this debate has focused on the themes of flexibility or certainty towards 
originality. The question of originality should be decided objectively, if necessary, 
on a case-by-case basis and by competent experts according to the field of work. 
This debate is undoubtedly important, but the key question is about the position of 
originality in ascertaining copyright in Sharif `a. 
The condition of originality is of a general application. Therefore, in a broader 
generalization, whether a work is novel and unique or merely a compilation of facts 
in any order, copyright must be given to the earlier work. 
A work is not recognized as original if it does not involve some additional 
contribution. A work can incorporate materials from other sources and still be 
considered original even if it has only minimal creativity in the selection, 
coordination, or arrangement of known facts. 
The practical test in determining originality and recognition is whether the work 
is worth copying or using and is prima facie worth recognizing the author and 
protecting his rights over that work. 
There is debate in every field of knowledge as to how originality should be 
evaluated. In most instances, an author starts from previous works and moves 
forward adding his or her own contributions. 
Further, there is nothing contrary to the principles of Shari `a in establishing that 
copyright does not subsist in a work unless and until that work is an original and 
takes some material form. One must ensure that the essence of copyright to be 
acquired enjoys the status of originality and takes some material form. 
34 Al-Shalibi, al-Muwafagat, vol. 1. p. 92,93. 
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There is no reason to reject that when an author who has an idea he must put it 
in some material form in order to give the work tangible existence. Taking some 
material form or fixed state is necessary in order to prove the existence of the work, 
its rightful owner, and what the work consists of. Otherwise many people can share 
many ideas but an author is who seizes these ideas in material forms. 
Extending priority rights means that copyright over work is confined only to 
truly new forms (expressions) contributed by the author in which ideas and concepts 
are presented. Usually ownership of aesthetic works relates to non-material objects 
on a spiritual or sensory basis. 
5.4 The protection of ma$laha (the Public Interest) 
There is an important consideration of "maslaha" leading copyright on two 
levels: introduction and control of them. This condition is a countervailing force 
acting to ameliorate every individual's rights "huqüq al- `abd" for the sake of the 
public interest. 
Copyright contains both rights of Allah and rights of authors conjointly. It has 
been indicated in order to secure and signify its importance "maslaha" (the public 
interest) is labeled as "hagq Allah" (Allah's right) 35 As al-Qaräfi pointed out, every 
individual's right has an associated right of Allah. 36 
In Shari `a, a balance between the individual right and the public good is 
attainable. Shari `a recognizes that stimulating research and development by 
providing recognition and protection of copyright serves the public interest. 
Copyright concern the authors as well as the public. Shari `a strikes a balance 
between the public interest (the right of Allah) and the individual's rights. 
Another justification is that most intellectual works are not wholly the products 
of authors. There exists a continuous transfer of knowledge and culture from the 
preceding generation to the current one. An intellectual production is, therefore, a 
35 See this thesis p. 65. 
36 See this thesis p. 67. 
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collaborative, rather than an individual endeavor and it is most often mixed with a 
series of works through the generations and between nations. Authors rely on 
predecessors when producing their works. Of course, a work can be built on 
previous work. Authors can produce their works only through cooperation with 
previous contributors and towards a common good. Therefore, humanity has its own 
contribution in every individual work. 
Therefore, copyright does not cover ideas and concepts which must be available 
to the public. Copyright does not give rise to ownership over information ideas or 
facts otherwise it would prevent anyone from dealing with any subject whatsoever. 
And this would cause great harm to the public interest. 
Yet, the ideal work is one in which an author and community can benefit 
harmoniously. People can use all previous works created to advance education and 
intellectual thought provided they respect copyright. Directed toward achieving 
balance between different rights, copyright should work for authors, publishers and 
users to benefit the public at large. 
According to Shari`a, individual rights are of less importance in comparison 
with the public interest. The tendency is to place greater emphasis on public interest 
than on individual rights, especially in a case where there is a conflict between them. 
The public interest prevails over an author's rights to the extent that it might deny 
their validity and applicability. 
Authors are required to exercise copyright in a just and honest manner. 
However, copyright might clash with the common good. An author cannot prevent 
the public from educational fair use of his works 37There is "isti `mal al-hagq lil- 
Idrdr" an (abuse of right), when the exercise and exploitation of an author's rights 
injuriously affects the public interest. 38 
A simple example of an argument against absolute copyright is the case where 
37 Al-Dirayni, Haqq al-Ibtikar. p. l 19. 
38 The Mejelle, Articles No. 1192 and 1197, p. 194, and Articles No. 25 and post, p. 6. IIaydar, 
vol. I. p. 40 for the same artcles and 29. Haydar, vol. 3. p. 201,211, Articles No. 1192 andl 197. Al- 
Mawsü'a al-Fighiyya, vol. 28, p. 159. 
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an author owns a book which society needs but he refuses to publish it or demands 
an unjustifiably high price for it. 
This approach is supported by the legal maxims of choosing the lesser of two 
evils. These are: " A damage cannot be put an end to by its like", "To repel a public 
damage, a private damage is preferred" and "Sever damage is made to disappear by 
a lighter damage": 39 This gives the judiciary the authority to require the publication 
of useful works, that are needed for the public even if authors or publishers refuse to 
do so. 4° 
Protection against perceived abuse of copyright is also provided by the 
prohibition against hoarding. With a view to protecting the public interest, the 
Prophet is reported to have said: "He who hoards is a sinner"41 and "There is neither 
injury nor return of injury. " 42 Hoarding of wealth without recognizing the rights of 
the poor is threatened with the direst punishment in the hereafter and is declared to 
be one of the main causes of the decay of societies in this world. 
Not only is hoarding food prohibited but, additionally, fugahä' extended the 
applications of its prohibition by preventing a person from hoarding any material of 
need or necessity. Malik stated that hoarding can be applied to everything that 
disturbs the market. 43 
The reasoning behind this prohibition (causing harm to the public) makes this 
hadith applicable not only to food but also to anything that is needed by the public. 44 
There are situations where the harm that is caused by the hoarding of some materials 
is equal or more serious than the harm caused by the hoarding of food. 
Similarly, hoarding knowledge, research or information without recognizing the 
39 The Mejelle, p. 6. Haydar, vol. I. p. 40 Article No. 25,26,27,28 and 29. 
40 Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawdzil, vol. 2, p. 126. 
41 Sahih Muslim, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/013. html. Book 010. 
Number 3910 
42 http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muwatta/036. html. Book 36, Number 36.26.31. In 
Arabic see al-Zargäni, Shari Muwatla', Iladith No: 1500, vol. 4, p. 40. Ibn `Abd al-Barr, Al-Istidhkär, 
vol. 22, p. 221. AI-Muhalla, vol. 9. p. 78. 
43 AI-Mudawwana, vol. 3, p. 313. 
44 Ibid. AI-Baydn wa al-Tahs11, Vol. 9, p. 352. Al-Hattäb, vol. 4, p. 227. 
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public interest contains a similar outcome and it is detrimental to society. The 
prohibition against hoarding can be applied to hoarding of helpful intellectual works 
made by authors or publishers. No one is allowed to deprive humanity of the basic 
right to fully benefit from its own creativity. This extension is to protect of the 
public interest and is in accordance with the hadith. There is no general limitation 
clause on the extent of hoarding applications. An individual cannot hoard any 
necessity or need of society. 
Fugahd' have agreed that the state can enforce hoarders to sell to the public 
what they hold at a fair value. The state can force hoarders to sell hoarded property 
at `the market rate'. 45 The state should have no hesitation in using legal means to 
force authors and publishers to publish useful works to the fullest extent needed for 
the public interest. 
Similarly, if traders increase unreasonably the price of essential commodities, 
the state is empowered to regulate prices in order to protect the public interest. The 
state should legislate so as to prevent authors from misusing of their rights. It is not 
justifiable to infringe or violate copyright, but it is all the more unjustifiable for the 
authors to hoard useful works. 
Where a work is useful to the public interest, the state can compel the 
reproduction of the work without the copyright owner's consent if the owner refuses 
to do so. 
If there is an imbalance between copyright and public interest, then this is prima 
facie evidence that there is something wrong with the state's accountancy. A society 
should sacrifice the right or good of an author for the overall public right or good. 
The state is vested with discretionary powers to protect the public interest. 
This debate has become polarized between the need for copyright to be 
strengthened to promote creativity and the protection of the public need to know. 
However, this condition has no way at all weakened the legitimacy of copyright 
in the same way as any other private property. There is another rule, which says: 
45 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmü' Fatäwä, vol. 28, p. 82. Al-Jawziyya, al-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, p. 289. 
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"constraints do not destroy the rights of another". 6 Therefore, the public need must 
not abrogate the authors' rights. In the case where the state needs to acquire work 
owned by authors it must pay just compensation to that author and must represent 
the work with dignity. 
The abolition of copyright is not a rational resolution of this issue. The 
compulsory fair licensing and pricing can mediate between public and private 
interests. At the same time, it must be emphasized that the public interest will not 
justify the reproduction of a work for commercial purpose without the copyright 
owner's consent. 7 If one were to hold otherwise, many inconveniences and many 
doubtful questions of justice might arise. 
From the perspective of `ilm Mustalah al-Hadith, a student can narrate a hadith 
and attribute it to its narrator although the narrator refuses to give his consent to the 
student to narrate this hadith, unless the refusal was because there is an error in the 
hadith or doubts about it. 48 Fugahd' think that narrating hadith to people is a 
religious duty even when a scholar from whom the hadth comes refuses to 
permission to narrate it. Therefore, an author cannot use copyrights to prevent others 
from using quotations from his work for research, review or criticism. 
It is evident that the public interest which exists in works that advance the 
improvement of science, creativity and the arts must be protected. It is possible to 
say that the rights of Allah allow works to be utilized generally for the public 
interest such as educational or scientific purposes. 
This consideration has led all modem copyright laws to provide some 
provisions relating to these exceptions under different labels such as "fair use" or 
"fair dealing" and compulsory licensing. 49 Fair abridgements, reviews and limited 
quotations are different forms of the public right over the work. 
The public interest "maslaha" applies when one uses pieces of a work for a 
46 The Mejelle, p. 7. Haydar, vol. 1. p. 42, Article No. 33. 
47 Al-Dirayni, Haqq al-Iblikar. p. 119. 
48 Al-'Iraq'i Fath al-Mughith. p. 199. 
49 Goldstein, Paul, International Copyright, Oxford, Oxford Press University, (2001), p. 292 and post. 
Cornish, Intellectual Property, p. 434. 
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critique, personal use, research or non-profit purpose, which does not harm the 
copyrighted work. 
In addition, there are rules in Mustalah al-Hadith which contain the same 
notion and describe how to narrate and transmit hadith. 
One of the ways of "tal mmul al- `ilm" is "wijäda" which means; if a person 
finds a hadith in a book or an article, he can narrate that hadith on condition that he 
states clearly that he found it in that reference work and gives its details as much as 
possible 50 Especially, after the compilation and the widespread dissemination of the 
main authoritative collections of hadith, Arabic and figh and so on, the prime 
reliance in this field is on those works. 
This authorization is articulated byfuqaha' usually by giving quotations from 
other early works for comment, teaching and criticism with full references. There 
must be a balance between authors' rights and users' rights, so that the public can 
use all previous works to advance education progress and intellectual thought. 
Educational purpose has a close bearing upon author's rights in order to preserve the 
public interest. 
However, the quotation from a work must be accompanied by adequate 
references to prevent the circumvention of academic protective measures. An 
important consideration is that quoting of another's works must be accurate and 
within the limits that are acceptable by scholars. Al-Shätibi pointed out that what has 
been permitted piecemeal partly can be prohibited if it is done fully. The 
squandering on mubähät becomes haräm 51 Otherwise, they would not infringe 
copyright on the earlier work. 
These conditions protect copyright of the actual creators under the sovereignty 
of Shari 'a and stimulate the dissemination of useful works that are in the public 
interest. Before granting copyright over a given work, it is justifiable to consider 
these necessary conditions of legality, originality and the public interest, so that 
50 A1-Tahhän, Taysir, p. 165. 
51 Al-Shätibi, al-Muwäfagat, vol. 1. p. 92,93. 
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there is no contradiction between Sharia and that work. 
5.4.1 The issue of freedom of expression 
Perhaps the most controversial condition of copyright relates to 
restrictions on freedom of expression. A detailed discussion on the issue of freedom 
of expression is clearly beyond the scope of this study, but a brief consideration of it 
is necessary to adequately cover the limitations of copyright. The approach of 
Shari `a on the question of freedom of expression has been heavily criticized in the 
West, primarily because it implicitly adopts a restrictive view of censorship. Many 
Western studies on controversial issues like this subject have tended to examine 
Shari `a to their own Western values. It is frequently repeated in literature that "In 
Islam unlike their Western counterparts, there is no absolute freedom of expression 
of ideas. s52 
In fact, restrictions on freedom of expression are not new or uncommon 
phenomena in all countries, cultures and ages. 53 All legal systems restrict the 
dissemination of works, which are perceived as opposing the public order and 
against general interest. Societies have different forms of censorship to one extent or 
another, using the criterion of public order to justify the required legislations. 
There is religious, political and economic censorship although the religious 
censorship is more objectionable than the other kinds. For example, copyright began 
in the UK as a royal license granted to the publishing Stationers Company to control 
the spread of religious thoughts that were opposed to the crown. 54 Additionally 
English blasphemy law only protects the Church of England and not other faiths, 55 
and this amounts to some form of censorship. The denial of historical events is 
s2 Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 310 
53 For more details on this point, see httt3: //onlinebooks. libraly. ui3enn. edulbanned-books. html. and 
http: //www. thefileroom. org/documents/CategoryHomePage. htmi 
sa Cornish, Intellectual Property, p. 339. 
ss Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law, London, Butter Worths, (2002) (Tenth Edition), p. 735. 
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punishable in many European laws. 56 Therefore, Shari `a is neither exceptional nor 
illogical in protecting its own creed. 
The main concern here is to realize how the condition of legality can be 
interpreted with freedom of expression. One of the conditions for the grant of 
copyright is that, the work must be lawful in the light of Shari 'a. As with most rights 
and principles, freedom of expression is subject to limitations imposed by Shari `a. 
According to Shari `a, in general, a work which contains or encourages a heresy or 
"bid `a" (innovation or a distorted interpretation), temptation or incitement to 
sensuality, corruption and obscenity or conspiracy, rebellion against lawful 
authorities must be forbidden, because this work is a straightforward affront to 
Islamic principles and standards. 
In the first place, the Qurä'nic verse states: "Allah loveth not the shouting of 
evil words public speech, except by one who has been wronged, " 57 therefore, no one 
is allowed to say evil words whether these are spoken, written or in drawing except 
in very limited cases. 
Shari 'a adopts the broader view in relation to the protection of public moral. 
For example, a verse states "Those who love (to see) scandal published broadcast 
among the Believers, will have a grievous Penalty in this life and in the Hereafter: 
Allah knows, and ye know not. s58 Therefore, the publication of a work, whose topic 
is a scandal, would come within the scope of the verse. 
Another verse reads: "And those who launch a charge against chaste women, 
and produce not four witnesses (To support their allegations), flog them with eighty 
stripes, and reject their evidence ever after: for such men are wicked transgressors". 
 Accordingly, writing or drawing of material that accuses someone of "zinä" 
(fornication) leads to the punishment stipulated by this verse. 
Not only must the meaning be correct but it must be expressed correctly and 
s6 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia 
have laws against Holocaust denial. 
57 Qur'an, 24. v 19. 
sa Qur'än. 4. v. 148. 
59 Qur'an . 24. v. 4. 
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accurately as the verse: "0 Ye of faith Say not (to the Messenger, words of 
ambiguous import, but words of respect; and hearken (to him): 1760 The verse forbade 
using the word (ra'ind) which originally means listen to us, because it had been used 
by unbelievers as an insulting word. 61 The meanings of some words change over 
time, therefore their rulings change accordingly whether in "gadhf " (slander), 
"nadhr" (vow) or other subjects. To apply this verse, if there is a doubt, the current 
usage should be considered in order to reach the correct interpretation of the words 
and in order to know its own ruling in Shari `a. 
The second support is derived from the famous hadIth and rule, which says: 
"There is no injury nor return of injury. "62 and this applies especially if it is 
concerning public injury. It can be applied when a work violates Shari `a such as 
blasphemy, spreading corruption or slander. The fear of spreading mischief is the 
reason for such measures. The author's right of publication and "Freedom of 
expression does not permit exposing the faithful to corrupt influences which violate 
the principles of Islamic. " 63 
The state and individuals are both required to support the commanding of good 
and the forbidding evil in a Muslim society. The state is required to take reasonable 
measures to protect society and the public interest. In order to ensure this essential 
matter, the state is empowered to prevent or withdraw works if they threaten the 
religion, morals or the public interest. 
This is closely connected with the precept that Shari `a prohibits works that 
slander idols. The Qurä'nic verse states: "Revile not ye those whom they upon call 
beside Allah, lest they out of spit Revile Allah in their ignorance". 64 The reason for 
the prohibition is that insulting idols leads to insulting Allah. The verse establishes 
the principle that believers are advised to prevent sources of confusion over 
60 Qur'än. 2. v. 104. 
61 Ibn Kathir, vol. l, p. 320. 
62 http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muwatta/036. html. Book 36, Number 36.26.31. In 
Arabic see al-Zargäni, Sharh Muwatfa', 1ladith No: 1500, vol. 4, p. 40. Ibn `Abd al-Barr, al-Istidhkär, 
vol. 22, p. 221. I; Iaydar, vol. 1 p. 36. 
63 Karnali, Freedom Of Expression 193. 
64 Qur'an. 6. v. 108. 
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principles and corruption. This covers any work leading to unacceptable results. 
Therefore, such works should be prohibited because of the serious consequences. 
Also, there are other situations where the public interest should prevail over 
freedom of expression. The case raises some serious questions about the 
responsibilities of authors and publishers when given the opportunity to publish 
works that contain offensive material. 
However, such prohibited works should be restricted to very limited and precise 
meanings and scope. In large measure, freedom of expression exists merely in virtue 
of the absence of any rule to the contrary. The assumption is that the narrower the 
scope of the prohibition from the permitted authorship, the greater the inducement 
for the authors to write. 
The general rule is that people have been largely at liberty to express whatever 
is not proven to be prohibited. It is reasonable to consider the five categories of 
actions in fiqh which identify all human actions classified as either "wcijib" 
(obligatory), "mandüb " (recommended), "mubäh " (permissible), "makriih " 
(reprehensible) or "haräm" (prohibited). The first four categories cover a much 
larger area than final forbidden one. Therefore, a word or a work is more likely to 
be classified under the obligatory, desirable, neutral or reprehensible categories than 
to be under the prohibited category. 
It must be acknowledged that there is a difficulty in some cases in 
distinguishing a righteous "ra'y" (opinion) from a misguided one. But this difficulty 
should not prevail over the general principle. Freedom of expression would not 
justify violating the law or the public interest. Nevertheless, there remains a gulf 
between Shari a and Western thought on this issue which many researchers believe 
that is difficult to bridge. 
5.5 The duration of copyright 
Although, recognition of copyright under Shari `a is obviously very important, 
another contentious question is that of its duration. There is a good deal of ambiguity 
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about the duration of copyright under Shari `a. It involves at least some serious 
obstacles the first of which is whether the duration of copyright is legal, second, 
whether there a reason for believing it is needed, and, if so, for how long. 
In considering the duration of copyright, if it ever terminates, researchers will 
build their judgment on their own understanding of Shari `a as there is no authority 
or benchmark that can be used for measuring the duration of copyright. Moreover, 
the research has sought to address this question through the complexity of copyright. 
Duration should be determined according to Shari `a with the same 
methodology, which has been applied so far in this study. In order to properly 
consider this subject it is necessary to refer very briefly to the duration of copyright 
under law. 
5.5.1 The position under laws 
The duration of copyright varies greatly from one legal system to another 
beginning with a period of fourteen years as provided by the 1710 Statute of Anne. 65 
Subsequently, the law provided for copyright to last for the author's lifetime plus 50 
or 70 years after the author's death. There are different terms for each type of 
copyright, and it varies depending on whether the work is literary, a sound recording 
and other formats including computer programs. The Berne Convention (Article 
6bis) and the TRIPS Agreement (Article 12) provides that the period of copyright 
protection is for the life of the author plus 50 years. However, the Convention's 
minimum term "is a floor, not a ceiling to duration of protection". 6 It is quite clear 
that there is an increasing tendency to extend the duration of copyright. 
One might ask why the duration of copyright given by law is far longer than the 
term of patent which is only twenty years, whereas the same arguments might be 
applied to both. 67 This might cause inventors to incline to protect their works under 
copyright law rather than patent law if that is possible. In fact, "[t]hey seem moved 
6s Cornish, Intellectual Property, p. 34 1. 
66 Goldstein, International Copyright, p. 230. Cornish, Intellectual Property, p. 404. 
67 Cornish, Intellectual Property, p. 372. 
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by a moral desire to give creators their due -a chance of reward somehow equating 
with the property rights which attract to the production of material things and the 
making of financial gains. "68 
5.5.2 The proposal for a temporary copyright in Shari'a 
In answering the question of duration, al-Dirayni stated that the term of 
exploitation of copyright by the heirs of the author should be sixty years after the 
death of the author. 69 The reason offered is that, any work has no absolute and entire 
novelty even though an author makes his own contribution. It usually depends on 
previous works that are already in the public domain. The public domain belongs to 
the whole nation and subsequently copyright contains hagq Allah, which cannot be 
waived 70 Therefore, ownership of copyright is not absolute or eternal. He chose this 
particular term after considering the maximum duration of "hagq al-hakr ", as he 
found it infiqh, which is sixty years. " 
This reasoning is questionable. Hagq al-hakr is significantly different from 
copyright. Copyright is an absolute right derived from the right of ownership while 
hagq al-hakr is temporal right of "intim "' (utilization) arising from a contract. 
Apparently, there are no related grounds of similarity or consideration on which 
qiyas can be drawn between hagq al-hakr and copyright. It is an unjustified analogy 
and a kind of "giyäs ma' al fariq ", which is invalid. 
Secondly, hagq Allah subsists in copyright, in that no work is copyrighted 
unless it fulfils the conditions imposed by Shari `a, but that does not guarantee either 
perpetual or temporary copyright. 
In fact, copyright is often collaborative and mixed with haqq Allah. It is not 
controversial to say that every work is usually based on previous works and perhaps 
68 Ibid, p. 374. 
69 Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikdr. p. 121 and p. 145 and post. 
701bid, p. 146. 
71 AI-Mawsü'a al-Fighiyya, vol. 18, p. 53, Hakr entry. A right based on contract under which an 
administrator of property, belongs to awgaf (endowment), can grant a tenant exclusive use of the 
property for an agreed term, in return of payment. 
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even that most works are not wholly the product of the author. Their reliance on 
previous works does not deprive them of legitimate ownership or impact on its 
enduring qualities. 
Following the logic of temporary copyright, it can be argued that if `urf creates 
copyright, its terms should be left to `urf and in that case the law defines the 
duration. If we consider that copyright is property of "manfa `a" (utility), then we 
should accept that duration applies to copyright, because property of manfa `a has 
duration, albeit usually of a temporary nature. 2 
The shift has moved from `urf to laws, which Shari `a does not refer to. But 
copyright has been established mainly on many pieces of evidence from Shari 'a 
other than 'urf. There is no evidence as to whether Shart'a determines whether 
property of manfa'a is temporary or permanent. 
Some additional support for the principle of duration of rights may be found in 
the fact that terms of rights vary from one right to another in Shari 'a. For example, 
"khiyär al-majlis" (the option of acceptance or cancellation of sale contract) is 
limited by the time of a meeting. 73 With slight differences, the right of "ha4äna" has 
its own constrained term. 74 Some fugahd' have said that the right of "shuj a" expires 
immediately while other fuqaha' extend it for five years. 75 Therefore, it is not 
surprising to propose a term of duration for copyright. 
The relevant legal maxim is that "the exercise of control over Rayahs, that is to 
say, over subjects, depends on what is right to be done". 76 It means that the state is 
bound to exercise its authority according to what is in the interest of the public. It 
suggests that the state should takes decisions and policies which uphold maslaha of 
its subjects. 
Moreover, the duration of copyright can originate from "maslaha" (the public 
interest), under the rule that the ruler can lawfully restrict what is "mubäh " 
72 Al-Zargä, al-Madkhal, vol. 1, p. 362. Al-Dirayni, al-Ibtikär. p. 49. 
73 Ibn Rushd, Biddyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 214. 
74 Ibid, vol. II, p. 66. AI-Mawsü'a al-Fighiyya, vol. 17, p. 207. 
751bn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. 11, p. 314,315. 
76 The Mejelle, p. l l Article 58. I; Iaydar, vol. 1, p. 57. 
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(permissible) for purposes of the public interest. 
There is a possibility of approving the duration of copyright given by law under 
"Siydsa Shar'iyya" (SharF a-oriented policy). Likewise the duration of many 
mubähät can be at the discretion of the state. Siyäsa Shar `iyya may be applied to the 
duration of copyright, by imposing restrictions on what is permissible in order to 
secure the public interest. An analogy can be drawn from the case of granting "a 
woman whose husband had divorced her in order to be disinherited"77 the right of 
inheritance. There are other examples which lead to the same conclusion. 78 And 
there is consensus on the ruling that "having held craftsmen and traders responsible 
for the loss of goods that were placed in their custody". 79 In anticipation of hoarding 
or the misuse of copyright, the state should clearly define the duration of copyright. 
The state can specify a suitable term for copyright. Understood in this way, a 
Muslim state is obliged to consider its international interests and to honor its 
international agreements. 
This is also convincingly supported by the explicit legal maxim that "The 
decision of the "hdkim " (ruler or judge) terminates a dispute. s8° Therefore, the 
public must abide by the decision made by the ruler regarding a particular term of 
duration of copyright in the same way as for other forms of property because the 
overwhelming evidence of Shari `a requires a Muslim to comply with those 
commands of a ruler that do not conflict with the rulings of Shari `a. 81 
Although there is some sympathy for this attractive argument it cannot be 
allowed to prevail. From a Shari a standpoint, the legislation of rights is determined 
by Shari `a in their foundations, holders, conditions and limitations. 
The state is vested with powers to protect rights granted by Shari `a not to 
impose restrictions on such rights. Copyright is recognized as a right of the author 
77 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 270,271. 
78 Ibid, p. 151,271. Al-Jawziyya, al-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, p. 10 and post. 
79 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 271. 
8° Al-Furüq, vol. 2, p. 177, vol. 4, p. 112. Al-Zarkashi, al-Manthür, vol.!!, p. 69.. Al-Mawsü'a al- 
Fighiyya, vol. 33, p. 338, Qadä' entry. 
81 Qur'an, 3. v 59. Al-Ququbi, al-Jämi', vol. 5p. 166. 
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based on Shari `a, not as a reward granted by the state. Also, this proposal can put 
the whole system of copyright at the discretion of the ruler and then authors have no 
actual title to them. 
Public interest can also propose that the period of copyright should increase, 
decrease or fall, responding to changing views of the public interest. The ability to 
protect and promote copyright does not necessarily depend on their duration. 
5.5.3 The proposal of permanent copyright 
On the other hand, al-Shahräni maintains copyrights must be eternal, because 
defining a term for copyright by any number of years is arbitrary. 82 It is one fixed 
term given to different authors of all subjects of knowledge from different ages who 
have spent very dissimilar time and effort on authorship. 83 Despite this significant 
difference between various kinds of works, all of them are given the same duration. 
Boundaries of the subject matter of property are necessary, while a limit on its 
term is left to nature, practice and experience. There is no provision in the sources of 
Shari `a that provides that the term of any property will expire at some stage. 
The general presumption is that, property embodies an aspect of the 
permanency a strand of continuity that secures an element of longevity within a 
culture. Like other forms of property, copyright must be permanent. The duration of 
copyright should be deemed in the same way as any property. The recognition of 
copyright as a right conflicts with the idea of limiting its duration in the same way as 
with other rights. 
Like physical property, there is no general limitation clause of the extent to 
which copyright may be terminated. There is no clear evidence from Shari `a for 
treating copyright differently. Special evidence needs to be given for the termination 
or limited duration of rights. Copyright is subject only to continuity after death 
prescribed by hadith as it is reported that the Prophet said "When a man dies, his 
82 Al-Shahräni, p. 368 and post. 
83 Ibdi. 
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acts come to an end, but three ... knowledge (by which people) benefit ... s84 
It can be argued that the hadith refers to the continuity of the rewards in the 
hereafter after death, but not to the continuity of the work. In fact, equally the hadith 
proves the continuity of a right of the owner of knowledge after his the death, 
because it still attributes knowledge to the one who produced it, even after death. 
There is no conflict between the commercial profitability of a work and it being 
rewarded in the hereafter. Also, this does not mean that only useful works enjoy 
continuity, but this is to encourage people to strive to perform good deeds as much 
as possible. 
As a general rule, the lapse of time will not end rights. The term of duration of 
some rights in Shari `a is limited by the nature of the objects of these rights. For 
example, legitimate capacity such as right of "haddna" (custody) or the destruction 
of the subject matter or the transfer of a right to another party. The view that 
copyright is ownership of non-material things cannot justify putting limitations on 
its duration. 
On the grounds that copyright isý a form of property having more or less the 
same basis for ownership, it is beyond question to treat that they should be treated as 
perpetual property. Therefore, copyright is a right of ownership which lasts usually 
for eternity. 
The proposal of temporary copyright that terminates ownership over a work of 
authorship after some time is contrary to the assertion that ownership is usually and 
legally recognized as everlasting and not determined after an arbitrary period. As we 
have seen, copyright is a form of "mal" (wealth), therefore, it should be left to its 
nature and to the market. 
It would be fair to say that copyright for whatever duration is valued by mere 
commerce, which is by its very nature both ephemeral and unstable. Secondly, it 
should be noted that the progress of science, the arts and knowledge has been and 
84 Muslim, tr. $addigi, vol. I1I/A, p. 83. Available online: 
http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/013. html, Book 013, Number 4005 
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will no doubt continue to prevail over most of the works previously created. 
Therefore, this might deny the everlasting nature of any work in reality. The 
valuation of works might increase or decrease over time. 
The finite nature of works is inevitable because of the constant changing nature 
of thought even though authors try to make their works immortal. Development in 
science and technology do not grind to a halt because of a collaborative and 
accumulative work from one generation to the next. Through the course of time, 
there are few successful works, which can come to mind. There is no guarantee that 
works will be eternal and profitable forever at the expense of newer ones. 
In terms of the public interest, the enforcement of duration of copyright does 
not appear to support the recognition or protection of copyright. If copyright is just 
an incentive to encourage creation of new works, unlimited duration of copyright 
would further encourage authorship by rewarding an author through his or her heirs. 
The divide is highly efficient in both theory and practice. Amongst the opinions, 
which suggest that copyright is temporary, and others that see that copyright is an 
eternal there is another contemporary opinion, which confines the right of 
republishing works to the direct heirs only, but not to those who come after them. 85 
On balance, there are obviously desirable arguments for applying some term to 
copyrights as there are in law but these views should not prevail over what strong 
evidence considers being just and well founded. That is those rights and ownership 
are eternal as a matter of principal. 
It may be better to say that a closer look will reveal that the proposal of 
permanent copyright can be connected easily to Shari `a, with much benefit for 
copyright as a whole being achieved. 
5.6 Summary 
Although there are no general limitations and conditions on copyright, they 
can be detected from Shari `a in order to ensure that copyright is in harmony with 
other rights and considerations. Islamic copyright can have conditions which bear 
$' Ghäwaji, Wahbi Sulaymän, in al-Dirayni, hfagq al-lbtikär, p. 171. 
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the marks of Shari `a. 
Firstly, the condition of legality should be considered. In line with evidence, it 
is unjustified to take advantage from unlawful works or to derive approval from the 
Shari `a for a work that conflicts with the principles set forth in Shari `a or leads to 
clash within a given society. If copyright is granted it should only be on the basis 
that all the contents of a given work are decent. 
Under Shari `a, there is legal recognition for the destruction of works which 
offend people or preach apostasy, criticize Islam, justify adultery, encourage 
indignity, racial hatred or incite people to commit any sin or criminal offence. 
The condition of originality required for a work to gain recognition is consistent 
with the right of priority in Shari `a. Priority is the essence of copyright and thus it is 
in turn dependant on originality and to prevent anyone from obtaining advantage for 
work that is owned already. As it is often stated copyright on a work is confined 
only to the truly new forms (expressions), and does not cover ideas and concepts 
which must of necessity, be available to the public. 
The public interest in the improvement of science, creativity. and arts leads to a 
requirement that there is access for the public to useful works. However, this access 
should not be for commercial purposes and should be at the copyright owner's 
consent unless there is a case where an author refuses to publish his useful work or 
demands a high price for it. Conditions are needed to harmonize the use of copyright 
and dissemination of knowledge on the one hand with a consideration of the public 
interest on the other. 
The necessary condition of legality prevails over freedom of expression to 
prevent works that bring heresy, "bid `a " (innovation) disbelief, temptation to 
sensuality and corruption or rebellion against lawful authorities. Freedom of 
expression leads to different forms of censorship in different legal systems using the 
criterion of public interest or order to justify the required restrictions over some 
works. Freedom of expression is located within the broader framework of Shari `a. 
As in law, censorship is required by Shari `a for the same reason. Shari `a also 
prohibits even works that slander idols because of the serious consequences. This 
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can be extended to any work that results in unacceptable outcomes. 
There is a good deal of ambiguity about the duration of copyright under Shari `a 
as there is no authority providing that the term of any property will expire at some 
stage. 
Al-Dirayn1 suggested that the term of exploitation of copyright by the heirs of 
the author should be sixty years after the death of the author, comparing it with the 
maximum duration of hagq al-hakr, found in figh books and he also suggested that 
because authors usually depend on previous works, their ownership is not absolute 
and also copyright contains hagq Allah. However, this analogy is invalid because 
Ilagq al-hakr is not similar to copyright. Hagq Allah is presented in intellectual 
works whether copyright is perpetual or temporary. 
There are some arguments for temporary copyright. Viewing copyright as 
property of "manfa `a" (utility) leads to the acceptance of some limitation on the 
duration for copyright, because in general, property of manfa `a is temporary. `Urf 
which was used to create copyright can be used for determining its duration. Some 
rights in Shari `a are limited by different terms such as the right of hac/dna, khiyär al- 
majlis and the right of shuf `a. According to Siyasa Shar `iyya, a ruler can select a 
particular term of duration copyright as this must be respected for many forms of 
evidence in Shari `a. By using the principle that the ruler can restrict what is 
permissible for the public interest, copyright can be limited by a term. 
On the other hand, there is no clear evidence from Shari `a to treat copyright any 
differently than other rights. Putting a limitation on the duration on copyright seems 
to be inconsistent with ownership. It can be argued that the hadith which refers to 
the continuity in the rewards of the hereafter for a work, implies continuity of 
attribution of the author of knowledge even after death. 
The limitation of copyright cannot be justified because it is an ownership of 
non-material objects. Any limitation on the duration of copyright appears to be 
arbitrary. It would be fair to say that perpetual copyright encourages authorship 
more than copyright with a limited duration does because of the reward to authors 
and their heirs. The legislation of rights, their foundations, holders, conditions and 
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limitations is determined by Shari `a, and cannot be left to the state, custom or law. 
On balance, the lack of justifications and the unanswered queries lead to 
rejection or at least weaken the notion of temporal copyright. The experience 
indicates that the valuation of works varies through the course of time and by the 
progress of authorship, while, according to the law, ownership over these works had 
been terminated. It is clear from this chapter that Shari-`a establishes conditions that 
must be satisfied in order for copyright to be established. 
Chapter Six 
Objections against Copyright 
6.1 Introduction 
After the presentation of the arguments supporting copyright in this study, it is 
necessary to open the subject for further discussion. This final chapter presents and 
examines a number of arguments against copyright derived from the sources of the 
Shari 'a. This critical discussion will shed some light on copyright and its obstacles 
within Islamic jurisprudence in a more specific way. 
Although copyright has strong support from Shari-a, there are some strong 
counter arguments to the establishment of copyright which need to be addressed 
from the perspective of Shari 'a. There has been a continuous debate between those 
who think that copyright is singled out by its evidence and opponents of copyright 
who see copyright as in conflict with Shari'a for a variety of reasons. 
Objections to the establishing copyright from Shari-'a can be seen as a supposed 
preference of other rights or considerations. Some fugahd' see copyright as similar 
to some special rights that cannot be subject to exchange. Other fugaha' think that 
copyright is individualistic and an obstacle to the widespread dissemination of 
knowledge, or perhaps a combination of many negative consequences. 
The discussion here will deal with the most common objections that are often 
raised in modem works onfiqh. Also, it is also beyond the purpose of this study to 
engage in a political discussion on copyright. 
6.2 First Objection: being abstract rights 
Copyright is classified as "huqüq mujarrada" (abstract rights), such as "haqq 
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shufa" (right of pre-emption), "hagq al-khiyär" (the right of the option), the right 
of way and the right of water as opposed to "hugz q mutaqarrira" (concrete rights). ' 
According to figh, this kind of rights cannot be the subject matter of sale, exchange, 
compromise, reconciliation or compensation because such rights are purely abstract 
rights. Authors own their copyright but they cannot exchange them. The ownership 
of copyright must not prevail over or deny their nature or their classification as 
abstract rights. Therefore, copyright cannot be sold, hired or the subject matter of 
compensation. 
A simple response to this objection is that no distinction is made between 
hugz q mujarrada and huqüq mutaqarrira in the original sources of Shari `a. To 
justify this classification and its consequences there must be sound evidence from 
Shari `a. 
This classification has not received as much acceptance from fugahä' as other 
classifications have in their treatises. It has been matched by the controversy3 even 
among the Hanafi fugahd' who only adopt this classification. Some fugahd' have 
suggested that the correct classification should be left to be worked out case by case 
and not through a general treatment. 4 Some fugaha' are dismissive of this 
classification while others question whether it is sufficiently comprehensive to 
encompass all rights. 5 
Ibn `Abdin stated that it is possible to identify some exceptions to the 
prohibition of the sale of abstract rights in the hianafi school. For example, the 
prohibition of the sale or exchange of abstract rights should not be regarded as a 
definitive assertion. 6 Moreover, some fugahä' of the Ilanafi school tolerate the sale 
of the right of way, the right of water and the right of waiving a job from "awagäf' 
1 See this thesis, p. 68. 
2 Al-Kurdi, vol. 25 p. 62-63. Tuhmäz, Hagq al-Ta'lif wa al-Nashar wa al-Tarjama, in al-Dirayni, 
Hagq al-Iblikär, p. 179. 
' Madkür, Muhammad Salläm, al-Madkhal Ii al-figh al-IsldmT, p. 430, cited in al-Kabbäshi, p. 77. 
° Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
'Ibn `Äbdin, vol. 4, p. 518. 
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(endowments) in exchange for money. 7 
It is appropriate to comment here that allowing a number of exceptions whereby 
a right may be sold lawfully indicates that the prohibition of sale of "huqüq 
mujarrada" is neither applicable to all rights nor is it coherent. 8 These various 
exceptions to the rule can give rise to uncertainty as regards to the validity of the 
rule. Therefore, there is no uniform use of this classification which can give a clear 
and reliable basis for its application to copyright. 
Recently some fugaha' of the Hana)7 school have considered that although 
copyright is "huqüq mujarrada" (abstract rights), copyright can be sold or 
exchanged. 9 This departure from the standard view of the Hanafi school has been 
justified on the grounds that copyright is conferred by Shari 'a. 
If we were to maintain this classification, not all copyright should be 
necessarily treated as hugrzq mujarrada, but some forms of copyright are huqüq 
mutagarrira. 1° In fact, authors possess two sorts of rights. Not all forms of copyright 
are only moral rights because some of them are also absolute legal rights. Some 
forms of copyright are huqüq mujarrada, because they represent basic entitlements 
of human beings whereas the author's economic rights are only huqüq 
mutaqarrira. " 
Indeed copyright is actually a "bundle" of various rights. It is important to keep 
these different starting points in mind when applying the classification of huqüq 
mujarrada and huqüq mutagarrira to copyright. Therefore, there is no reason that 
can justify a common treatment for different kinds of rights. 
As we have seen, the rights of an author on divulgation, attribution, integrity 
and revocation of a work can be classified under huqüq mujarrada, which cannot be 
waived, sold, hired or the subject of compensation. These huqüq mujarrada are 
separate from economic rights and they subsist in a work even after the creator has 
7 Ibid, vol. 4 p. 15. 
8 Al-Dirayni, Nagq al-Ibtikär, p. 31, footnote No. 2. 
9 Tuhmäz, Hagq al-Ta'lif wa al-Nashar wa al-Tarjama, in al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikdr, p. 179. 10 Al-Dirayni, Nagq al-lbtikar, p. 40, p. 64. Al-Shahräni, p. 254. 
" See this thesis, p. 69. 
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transferred his economic rights. On the other hand, the author's economic rights, 
which are negotiable, can be classified under huqüq mutaqarrira. 
It is difficult to justify this objection, as Shari `a approves the sale or hire of 
"manfa `a" (utility). Obviously the sale contract for a book, CD or a tape transfers to 
the purchaser only the manfa `a attached to that container, but it does not transfer 
copyright subsisting in the object. 12 It is merely a license whereby an author gives 
the buyer, directly or indirectly permission to benefit from the "manfa `a mubdha" 
(lawful utility) contained in an object (that is the book, CD or a tape) on the 
condition that the buyer will respect copyright. Therefore the author still possesses 
the copyright. 
Moreover, the collected evidence not only recognizes copyright but also 
recognizes the potential for exploiting it. In the final analysis, this technical 
argument against copyright is incorrect and unproven. 
6.3 Second Objection: being an obstacle to the widespread dissemination of 
knowledge 
A number of fugahd' have argued against the recognition of copyright because 
they see its existence as obstructive to widespread dissemination of that knowledge13 
that should be free to all human beings. Those fugaha' claim that copyright is used 
as an excuse to deny or constrain access to the widespread of knowledge. Restricting 
access to useful knowledge is strictly unjustified and prohibited in Shari 'a because 
this is against the public interest. 
According to this view, it is difficult to demonstrate that the authors' rights are 
more important than the public interest of having unlimited access to knowledge. 
The purpose of authorship and writing is to spread knowledge and the most valuable 
type of knowledge is the knowledge of Shari `a. The dissemination of knowledge of 
Shari `a is intended to be a religious duty and free. The justification is that it is 
12 Al-BütT, Qa/ayä Fiqhiyya Mu'arira, p. 86. 
13 Al-Kurdi, 58-64. Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 71 and post. 
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reported that the Prophet said: " May Allah brighten a man who hears a tradition 
from us, gets it by heart and passes it to others. Many a bearer of knowledge conveys 
it to one who is more versed than he is; and many a bearer of knowledge is not 
versed in it. s14 The famous hadith and maxim reads: "Knowledge that has not been 
spread is like a treasure that has not been spent". 15 In Shari `a, scholars are expected 
to endorse the republication of their works as widely as possible, even without their 
consent, in order to disseminate knowledge. 
According to many sources of evidence from Shari `a, the maximum 
dissemination of knowledge of Shari `a and of scientific and useful works is 
necessary, highly valued and appreciated. Knowledge, education and teaching are 
kinds of worship16 which exist to spread. Considered from the viewpoint of Shari `a, 
the acquisition of knowledge is more important than the acquisition of money and no 
one should have a monopoly on knowledge as knowledge is essential to human 
beings. 
For the same reason, it is prohibited to conceal knowledge directly or indirectly. 
For example, the Qur`änic verse states: "Those who conceal the clear (Signs) We 
have sent down, and the Guidance, after We have made it clear for the people in the 
Book; on them shall be Allah's curse, and the curse of those entitled to curse, Except 
those who repent and make amends and openly declare (the Truth): To them I turn; 
for I am Oft-returning, Most Merciful. 147 
Al-Qurtubi explained that, this Qur'anic verse is used by fuqaha' to 
demonstrate that it is a duty to spread the teachings of Islam and sound knowledge 
must be available freely to all. The reason is that no one deserves a wage for that 
which is obligatory upon him by the religion. For example, no one deserves money 
for being a Muslim. 18 
14 Sunan Abü Dawüd, http: //www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeethlabudawud/025. htmi , Book 25, Number 3652. Nay! al-Awldr, Hadith No: 1. vol.!, p. 13. 
15 Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Jämi' Baydn a! -'Ilm wa Fadlih, vol. 2, p. 147. 
16 AI-Shahräni, p. 258.262 and 266. 
17 Qur'an, 2. v 159,160. 
18 Al-QurtubT, al-Jämi, vol. 2. p. 124. 
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Another Qur`änic verse states: "Those who conceal Allah's revelations in the 
Book, and purchase for them a miserable profit, they swallow into themselves 
naught but Fire; Allah will not address them on the Day of Resurrection. Nor purify 
them: Grievous will be their penalty. s19 
From the hadth's sources, the prophetic tradition states: "whoever is asked 
about knowledge that he has, but he conceals it, a bridle made of fire will tie his 
mouth on the Day of Judgment . "20 And it is reported that Abü Hurayra said pointing 
to this verse" Had it not been for two verses in the Qur'an, I would not have narrated 
a single hadith ..., then he mentioned the previous verses. ". 
21 
This understanding is supported by the story of the Prophet Yusüf mentioned in 
the Qur'än. 22 The Prophet Yusüf interpreted a vision told to him by two men who 
were with him in prison. Again he interpreted another vision of the king of Egypt. 
He disseminated knowledge charitably without requesting any price or on condition 
of being released from the prison in which he had been unjustly incarcerated. The 
story really indicates that knowledge should be given fully and freely to all. 
Abü Zaid and al-Iiusyyn stated that religious books must be available freely. 23 
The maximum dissemination of religious knowledge is required because every 
Muslim is duty bound to attempt to obtain and spread knowledge of Shari `a as much 
as he can. 
This is the most popular objection in thefiqh literature but it is less serious than 
some writers suppose. 4 There are many remarks on this objection. First the criticism 
is addressed directly to copyright over religious works and it bears no reference to 
other works. It appears that non-religious works of other branches of knowledge 
such as medicine, engineering, technology and so on are not covered by this 
objection. They are not the kinds of knowledge that scholars must deliver to the 
19 Qur'än, 2. v 174. 
20 Al-Albani, al-Jdmi' al-. 'aghir, Iladith No. 6284, vol. 2. p. 1077. 
21 Al-Bukhär7, tr., vol. 1, p. 88, Iladith No. 118. 
22 Qur'än, 12. v 36-54. 
23 Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawazil, vol. 2, p. 77 and after. Al-Hu$ayn. 
24 Al-Kurd-i, 58-64. 
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public freely. Specifically, the duty of dissemination of knowledge is only applicable 
to knowledge of Shari `a. Therefore, authors of non-religious works deserve 
compensation for their works in the same way as any other job. 
The above mentioned verse25 prohibits concealing obligatory knowledge of 
religion only 26because of its religious nature. The verse does not suggest that all 
information or branches of knowledge must be disclosed freely to everyone. 
There is no material evidence in the meaning of these texts to refute copyright 
under the ruling of the prohibition of concealing of knowledge. More precisely, al- 
Shatibi stated that not every section of knowledge must be disseminated and there is 
even some knowledge of Shari 'a pointing out that there are some rulings of Shari 'a, 
which cannot be disclosed to some people in some situation or times. 27 
Within the field of Shari `a, there are two classes of knowledge of Shari `a; 
compulsory and optional. Compulsory knowledge is related to the basics of belief, 
the rules of performance of prayers, fasting during the month of Ramadan, giving 
"zakät" and doing "hajj" if a Muslim is required to do the last two ones. Also a 
Muslim is required to learn the rulings of whatever he wants to undertake, such as a 
contract or a job. 
Therefore the prohibition of concealing of knowledge is confined only to 
obligatory knowledge of Shari'a. 28 And this religious task is also limited to essential 
questions if a member of the community needs that. Apart from this division, 
knowledge of other subjects of Shari'a becomes optional. 
Moreover, a scholar is obliged by Shari'a to provide afatwa or an explanation 
of a ruling of Shari 'a verbally if he. is asked to do so. Therefore, a scholar is not 
obliged to give his answer in a written form. An exception to this generalization 
would be where, in some cases, there is a risk of vagueness or ambiguity. In such 
cases a scholar is obliged to provide his answer in writing. For example, the answers 
Z5 Qur'än, 2. v 159,160. 
26 Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 75 and p. 77. Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikir. p. 100. 
27 Al-Shätibi, al-Muwdfagät, vol. 4. p. 137. 
28 Al-Shahräni, p. 264. 
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to some questions regarding the exact shares in inheritance cases because such 
answers cannot be understood correctly unless they are giving in writing. 29 
As a rule, in Shari `a a scholar cannot be legally enforced to provide his answer 
in a particular form or forced to publish everything that he knows without fair 
compensation. 
A religious answer given by a scholar is based on implied conditions that the 
receiver will use the answer solely for learning or scientific research and that the 
answer is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement. It is merely a duty that a 
scholar gives the questioner an answer. The scholar still retains copyright. The 
obligatory answering and explanation of the rulings of Shari `a can not conceal or 
infringe on copyright. 
The rationale to support this elimination is that the religious nature of answers 
should not prevent scholars from protecting their. legitimate copyright of their 
answers. There is a clear distinction between giving answers for people necessary 
rulings of Shari `a and recording those answers in some form and publishing them 
for commercial benefits. 
On the other hand, it is possible to achieve in a reasonable manner a general 
unity and balance between these accepted considerations without violating any of 
them. The obligatory widespread dissemination of knowledge of Shari 'a does not 
necessarily prevent the author exercising his economic rights30or conflict with 
copyright. Copyright can be well established within Shari-'a without it being at the 
expense of the widespread dissemination of the required knowledge of Shari 'a. 
It would be mistaken to suppose that the approval of copyright necessarily leads 
to a concealment of obligatory knowledge 3' By applying the earlier conditions on 
copyright it is possible to ensure that copyright does not to restrict dissemination of 
useful information. Copyright can be taken in the sense that it equally represents the 
rights of authors and for the sake of the required dissemination of knowledge. 
29 Ibn `Abdin, vol. 6, p. 92. 
30 Al-DiraynT, Vaqq al-Ibtikär. p. 100. 
31 Azmi, Intellectual Property, p. 80. 
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Bearing in mind the evidence of copyright in Shari-`a it is irrational to suppose 
that Shari`a recognizes copyright while being inconsistent with other commands 
ordained by Shari `a, namely the widespread dissemination of knowledge. 
Copyright cannot be established or used as an excuse for concealing knowledge 
of Shari 'a. The objection assumes wrongly that authors are dishonest and copyright 
is meant to be an excuse for their concealing of knowledge. In extreme cases, if an 
author misuses his copyright and unreasonably refuses to publish his work despite 
the fact that such a refusal would lead to a major or an unnecessary harm to the 
community, his work can be published without his consent at a reasonable price. 
Such exceptional cases are not to be considered as a valid ground for preventing the 
establishment of copyright. According to the rules of Shari `a the rights of the 
community enjoy a significant priority in weight over those of individuals. In 
addition, copyright represents the author's rights as well as the right of Allah. 
With open access for all, a student has the right to obtain knowledge which is 
restricted to learning orallyI2 without inferring the right to publish the teaching 
materials without proper permission or use them without sufficient attribution. 
A careful reading of the previous Prophetic tradition: "whoever is asked about 
knowledge that he has, but he conceals it " means that a scholar is obliged to provide 
the answer only if he has been asked to provide it. Another limitation is that the duty 
of clarification as regards obligatory knowledge can be fulfilled orally. The religious 
status of some works should not revoke or prevail over their copyright. 
In fact, the hadith does not appear to support the view that there is a legal 
obligation on the scholar or author to provide his knowledge freely. There is no 
obligation to do so voluntarily. If a scholar has been asked to provide his answer in 
writing, he is entitled to a fair return 33 The hadith only prohibits the concealment of 
knowledge and not the financial return for it. Moreover, the prohibition against the 
concealment of knowledge can be interpreted to mean the prohibition of concealing 
the truth by telling falsehood, hoarding knowledge or other equally valid 
32 Al-Muhalla, vol. 11, p. 337. 
33 Ibn `Abdin, vol. 6, p. 92 
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interpretations. 34 It cannot be taken for granted that the prohibition against 
concealment of knowledge is simply a refusal of copyright. 
Secondly, we might say that the story of the Prophet Yusfif had special 
circumstances. According to Shari`a the true vision is part of prophet-hood, and the 
interpretation of visions is one of the branches of knowledge of Shari 1a. 35 This 
understanding is based on the hadith that the Prophet said: "The good dream of a 
man who is right-acting is a forty-sixth part of Prophet-hood. 
06 The Prophet Yusiif 
interpreted the vision because it was only he who was obliged to do so because there 
was no another person who could answer the question. 
Moreover, according to the story of the Prophet Yusüf, the vision pertained to 
the public survival and safety of the society of Egypt at that time. Therefore, the 
Prophet Yusiif was obliged to answer the question about the interpretation of the 
vision in order to save the lives of people because he saw them at risk. It was not a 
simply a vision relating to an individual in a case where he may not have intervened. 
This is different from the case of copyright. 
However, in the same story, the Prophet Yusüf said to the two men in the 
prison: "And of the two, to that one whom he considers about to be saved, he said: 
"Mention me to thy lord. " 37 The Prophet Yusüf asked that man to mention the 
Prophet Yusüf to his master to free him. This can be considered as a request of a fair 
compensation to his interpretation. As such this is a story that would favor the 
establishment of copyright. 
It is reported that the Prophet Muhammad said: "if I were in his position 
(Yusüf) I would never tell them until I stipulate that they free me". 8 This Prophetic 
tradition seems to be consistent with the previous evidence regarding the 
permissibility of getting a wage for teaching the Qurä'n or for spiritual treatment by 
"rugya ". The rejection of copyright cannot be accepted on such grounds. 
34 Al-Dirayni, Haqq a1-Ibtfhär, p. 102. 
3s Ibn Ilajar, Fat, al-Bail, vol. 12, p. 437. 
36 Ibid, vol. 12, p. 448,1afiith No. 6983. 
31 Qur'an, 12. v 42. 
38 Ibn llajar, Falb al-Bail, vol. 12, p. 473, Hadith No. 6992. Al-Tabar!, vol. 7, p. 233. 
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6.4 Third Objection: being contrary to ownership 
It is claimed that copyright is inconsistent with or detrimental to ownership. A 
book should be treated as the sort of thing that can be a private property. Therefore, 
whoever buys a book acquires full ownership of it. Ownership necessarily 
corresponds to the legal position in which an owner has free use and possession and 
can benefit from the thing owned. Ownership grants unconditional authority for an 
owner over the property in question. An owner must have total, exclusive and 
absolute control over what he owns including the power to copy any book that he 
owns 
39 
This is clearly connected with one of the facts of ownership, namely, that 
people who own legitimate copies of a work have the right to do with these copies 
whatever they see fit. When one buys a book then ownership is transferred to him. 
With reference to the definitions of ownership in Shari `a, there is no wrong 
committed if the one who copies the work attributes that work to its true writer. 
There is no false attribution, mis-attribution or claim of authorship of the work 
by other than the real author or the work is being or appearing to be in a non-integral 
form, all of which are prohibited in Sharr `a. Copying and redistribution of any 
material in any medium is permitted provided that the right of attribution and the 
right of integrity are preserved. 
The prohibition against making copies of any book or selling such copies can be 
seen as a form of deprivation of person's property. 40 Additionally, it might be 
argued that it is confirmed that the Prophet said: " any condition which is not in 
Allah's laws is invalid even if there were a hundred such conditions. "41 In another 
hadith it is reported that the Prophet forbade making a combination of condition and 
sale. 2 The reason why the combination is forbidden is that it is not mentioned in the 
39 Usmani, Buhüth ft Qacläyd Fiqhiyya, p. 124. 
40 Al-Shahräni, p. 256. 
41 Al-Bukhdrl, tr., vol. 3, p. 558, Hadith No:. 889. 
42 Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 192 . Al-Muhalla, vol. 8, p. 415. Ibn `Abd al- 
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book of Allah and because conditions in general lead to uncertainty in transactions. 
These 'ahddith indicate the condition on sale that the buyer of a book or CD will not 
copy it on its sale becomes invalid. Therefore, this condition is not binding. 
This objection seems to ignore the fact that fugahä' have distinguished the 
difference between the form of "tamtk al-intiä "'(taking property of utilization) and 
the form of "tamlik al- manfa `a" (taking property of utility). 
In the form of "tamhk al-int jä`, the owner for himself only can take advantage 
of the owned thing given by the real owner. The owner of this form has a limited 
authority over the owned thing. A license usually includes restrictions on the use of 
the property licensed and these restrictions should be identified and respected by the 
beneficiary. 
While in the form of "tamlik al- manfa a ", the owner can take advantage of the 
owned thing directly or indirectly. 43 The owner of the second form has an adequate 
authority over the owned thing. 
These rules can also be applied to the immediate subject matter. A purchaser of 
a book or CD has only "tamtk al-intim"' of that book so he can only take advantage 
of the book for himself given by the copyright owner. The purchaser has no 
entitlement to reproduce the work presented in that book. 
As previously stated, the conceptual analysis of selling a book, CD or tape is 
that what a seller has bought is the "manfa'a" (utility) which is carried in the book, 
CD or tape and which cannot be detached. 44 An author gives all buyers directly or 
indirectly stipulated permission to take advantage for themselves from that object. 
According to the general rule "What is known by virtue of "`urf ' is like that 
which is known by virtue of an agreed condition" it can be argued that copying and 
redistribution of any work in any medium without the consent of the owner is 
prohibited in Shari `a. Generally, "The dealing by one person with the property of 
Barr, Abü `Umar YGsuf b. 'Abd Allah, al-Tamhid, Morocco, Wizärat Awgäf wa al-Shu'ün al- 
Islämiyya, (13 87AH), vo1.22, p. 186. 
43 A1-Furüq, vol. 1, p. 331. 
44 Al-BUtT, Qa(idya'Fighiyya Mu'äsira, p. 86. 
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another, without his leave, is not lawful". 45 
The contract transfers only the "manta `a mubäha" (lawful utility) contained in 
that object which is measured against the number of copies the author or the 
copyright holder agrees to sell. There is no transfer of copyright in this sale. The 
legal title to copyright in every copy of a work will vest in its author and not with 
each purchaser. 
The famous verse reads, "0 you who believe, fulfill all your covenants". 46 A 
contract between a publisher and an author includes restrictions on exploitation of 
the economic rights and these should be honored by the publisher as well as the 
author. Accordingly, any number of copies that exceeds the agreed number without 
consent is unlawful. 
Making copies of a work and selling them does not necessary appertain to 
arrangements or ingredients of the ownership of the purchased work. It cannot be 
easily inferred from the general rules of a contract of sale or definitions of 
ownership. It is a new case which requires consideration by researchers.. All relevant 
considerations should be incorporated into Utihäd in order to reach a correct ruling. 
Thus, a contract for sale of a copy of a work cannot be rightful grounds to copy 
that work. The contract of sale does not grant the right to copy the work but only 
grants the exclusive use of the sold copy of that work. If a purchaser needs to secure 
the legal title to copyright, there must be an explicit agreement accordingly. 
A buyer, merely because he has bought a copy of a work is not thereby 
authorized to copy the work if doing so would violate any stipulation of contract, or 
legitimate `urf. When someone buys a book he should use it according to what is 
established by custom in addition to what is stated in the contract. An owner cannot 
transfer more than he actually owns. 47 The written and customary condition is that 
the buyer must respect copyright. A buyer can lawfully utilize the ideas contained in 
a work and quotations of a reasonable length from the bought copy. 
45 The Mejelle, p. 15, Article 96. 
46 Qur'an, 5. v 1. 
47 Al-Dirayni, Vaqq al-Ibtikar. p. 114. 
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Correctly Usmani made an analogy between a buyer of a book and a buyer of 
currency who is entitled to use, sell, exchange, save or transfer it, but he is not 
allowed to copy it under the pretext of its ownership. 48 Similarly, making copies of 
works or tapes is prohibited in the same way as making forge notes is. 
The concept of absolute ownership, whereby any use of property is accepted, is 
not found in Shari `a. Shari `a in granting ownership sets limits within which an 
owner is able to use it. For example, an owner cannot destroy his property or cause 
harm to his livestock without lawful reason. 
Also, in Shari 'a it is not permitted to use private property at the cost of 
another's benefit or in a way that prevents others from exercising their rights. If a 
person using his property causes damage to or destroys someone else's property, he 
is liable for that damage. The exercising of any right is not permitted if it amounts to 
a crime or a civil wrong. 
In addition, the permission to make copies of any book and sell them denies 
unlawfully the right of the author to withdraw the work if he changes his views or 
decides to republish the work in another form. The right of integrity of the author of 
a work can be affected and direct harm to the author's honor or reputation may 
ensue if the author has no control over the work. The permission to make copies of 
any work deprives a rightful owner of the legitimate control over a work. Practically, 
there is no middle course between the recognition of copyright and ignoring it. This 
objection also leads to a denial of the author's right to reproduce the work. 
As regards to the validity of conditions on sale, firstly there are 'ahädith which 
prove the contrary assumption. For example, the Prophet bought a camel on 
condition that the seller should ride it until they reached Medina. 
9 It may be that the 
best approach is to use all these 'ahddith establishing a correct balance between 
them 50 The prohibited conditions are those that go against the essence of a contract 
48 Usmani, Buhüth fi Qadäyä Fighiyya Mu'äcira, p. 124. A1-Shahräni, p. 256. 
49 A1-Bukhdri, tr., vol. 3, p. 550, Iladith No:. 878. 
so Ibn Rushd, Bidäyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 194. 
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such as the use of the subject-matter of the sale 51Accordingly, the condition of non- 
reproduction of the sold materials on its sale contract is valid and binding on the 
buyer. It means that when a buyer purchases a book, he is only given a copy of the 
book on that condition and if he breaches the condition, he is liable even if 
ownership has been transferred to him. 
Moreover, there are many potential consequences of corruption stemming from 
denial or violation of copyright. The authorization of making copies leads to the 
potential loss of the correct original version of that work especially in the case of 
scientific authoritative references. This has a negative impact on the research 
process. According to the general and knowable principle of "sadd al-dharäi `" 
(blocking the means of evil), it is prohibited to do what leads to unlawful practices 
or things. 52 
Therefore, violation of copyright is accordingly prohibited. The printing of 
works without the consent of their authors violates their rights unjustly and causes 
serious harm to society. In considering all these arguments, a sale of a book CD or 
tape does not allow a buyer to make copies from that material and sell them. 
6.5 Fourth Objection: reproduction of works is not genuine threat to copyright 
Some fuqaha' have stated that the worst practical consequence of allowing 
people to copy any book is that it may reduce the amount of money that its author 
can obtain from his work. 53 The rule is that there is "no reliance on mere 
imagination". 4 There is no real and calculable harm to an author in the publication 
of his book without his consent. The harm has only some degree of probability of 
occurring. 
The expected decrease in profit of publishing a book can hardly justify 
obstructing the publication of the same book by others. There is a distinction 
sl Ibn Rushd, Biddyat al-Mujtahid, tr. Nyazee, vol. II, p. 194. 
52 Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 310. 
s3 Usmani, Buhüth fi Qadäyd Fiqhiyya, p. 124. Al-Shahräni, p. 257. 
54 I; iaydar, vol. 1 p. 73. 
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between causing harm to authors and the expected decline in return from their 
works. In addition, copying a book requires a degree of labor and money spent on 
materials in order to create copies which bestow the one who copies rights of 
property in respect of their copies. Many early fugahä' copied and sold copied 
books. 55 
Recently, some fugahä' have stated that copying and selling useful materials are 
permissible if the original owner gains an adequate return from those works. It is 
then permitted for people to copy and sell . 
56 
Therefore, there is no justification in preventing people from publishing useful 
works57 if they make proper attribution and put the works in reasonable format. 
There is no validity in obliging people to obtain permission from authors to copy 
their works. 
The objection seems to be based more on expectation than on principles. 
Usmani's response to the latter objection has been to argue that the harm is real and 
calculable58 to the author personally and financially if his work is published without 
his prior consent. There are many levels of corruption stemming from violation of 
copyright. 
This introduces a mistaken priority, which leads to a transfer of the profit from 
the only person entitled, namely, the author to others and threatens the future of 
intellectual efforts. For authors, it means obstructing access to the economic 
exploitation by publishers. It is unreasonable to require authors to share with other 
people the exploitation of their works. Ownership gives the owner an authority to 
exclusively control and use what is owned. It is obvious that whoever publishes a 
work without the consent of its author is simply benefiting himself as well and he is 
harming the author. Another observation is that whoever publishes a work without 
the consent of its author is in the same position as one who acquires money at the 
ss Shalaby, p. 89. Azmi Hadth Literature, p. 195. Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawazil., p. 80 and post. 
56 A1-Shahräni, p. 523 and post. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Al-Shahräni, p. 523 and post. 
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expense of the rightful owner of the work. 
The consequences to the potential market and the value of that work of the 
unauthorized reproduction of a work cannot be denied. In reality, the reproduction is 
not a victimless action. The fact is that making money from someone else's work 
without permission is a type of oppression, unlawful interference with the owner's 
property and prevents or blocks an owner's opportunities to do so. 
If copyright is recognized in the light of evidence from Shari 'a, all oppressive 
actions against copyright is obviously unjustified and unlawful. Effective 
recognition must be supported by protection. Also the principle of "la Barar wa-la 
dirär" (removing of harm) may be particularly useful in answering this objection. If 
copyright is recognized according to Shari 'a, those who publish a work without the 
consent of the author should be treated as traders in stolen goods. The necessity for 
copyright results very much, if not entirely, from requirement to prevent the injustice 
of theft from authors and publishers. 
The argument is that copyright is legitimate regardless of whether the harm of 
publishing works without the owner's consent is present or not. Unlawful actions are 
prohibited irrespective of the amount of harm that they might apparently yield. 
The reason for the distinction is simple and profound. When a person copies an 
author's work, the person who makes the copy deprives the author of his rightful 
exploitation of the work. Instead, if someone simply takes either information, 
enjoyment or advice embodied in the work, its author still has as much use of the 
work as it has before. There is a significant difference between the reproduction of a 
limited quantity of a work to be utilized for approved and specified purposes, such 
as "research or private study" and the reproduction for direct or indirect commercial 
ends. 
Basically, the exploitation of works should be reserved to people who create 
them, namely, authors. This is an argument based, essentially, on fairness. The 
owner has the right to use his property lawfully in the most absolute manner without 
interference from others. The owners of copyright require purchasers of copies to 
pay for each copy sold in order to authorize its, use. 
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No evidence from Shari `a says that people other than the owners must share 
their profitable belongings simply on the basis that such sharing is not, in certain 
cases, detrimental. This objection denies the rightful authors of their right to receive 
the complete and full value of what they have created. It simply ignores mental and 
physical labor that went into producing any work. 
Shari `a has a definite, general direction and application in respect of the 
prohibition of any kind of "ghasb" (usurpation), violation or infringement of rights, 
59 whether it is a major or minor right. Even the wide definition of ghacb, fugahä' 
have relied upon includes here not only any kind of intentional taking or using of 
another's property without permission as ghacb, but also any kind of interference 
with another's property or obstructing access to that property. 60 
Ibn Hajar stated that the right of priority is a general and knowable universal 
principle equally applicable to all people in all cases. It has given valid ownership to 
whoever is the first to appropriate something. Therefore, the taking of that thing 
without permission becomes a kind of usurpation, which is prohibited and 
actionable. 61 
It is reported on the authority of Abu Umäma that the Prophet said: "He who 
appropriated the right of a Muslim by (swearing a false) oath, Allah would make 
Hell-fire necessary for him and would declare Paradise forbidden for him. A person 
said to him: Messenger of Allah, even if it is something insignificant? He (the Holy 
s62 Prophet) replied: (Yes) even if it is the twig of the Aräk tree. 
Al-Nawawi interpreted that "the right of a Muslim" in this hadith means all 
rights whether they are financial or not and that wealth includes filthy things that can 
be used. 63 It is obvious that copyright is covered by this general statement. Al- 
Nawawi pointed out that this hadith also prohibits the taking of another's property 
without false oath. 
59 See this thesis p. 123. 
60 Al-Duszigl, vol. 3, p. 683. 
61 Al-Maws l'a al-Dhahabiyya. 
62 http"//www. muslimaccess. com/sunnah/hadeeth/muslim/001. html, Book 001, Number 0252. 
63 AI-Nawawi, Sharh . ahih Muslim, Hadith No. 218, vol. 2, p. 134-138. 
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The prohibition of misappropriation includes, emphatically, cases of teasing, 
where there is no actually intention of doing so. 4 On these grounds, the violation of 
another's rights wholly or partially is prohibited even as regards a trivial thing. 
Moreover, there are severe punishments for misappropriation of the property of 
others in this world and the hereafter. 
It is a concept that by definition has been applied equally to the violation and 
infringement of copyrights. It is ghacb to take anything, money, property or right 
from the rightful owner without lawful reason. Copying and selling works without 
proper consent is a kind of ghasb. The prohibition of ghasb extends to any right or 
property whether the owner has any continuing need for it. 
It is reported that the Prophet prevented a Muslim from making a proposal of 
sale if his brother has already made a proposal for it. 65 By an analogy, making and 
selling copies of an author's work should be prohibited, because it has the same 
result. 
In addition, it is reported that the Prophet prohibited purchasing from suppliers 
before they reach the town's market place. 66 A group of middlemen or free-riders 
stand to benefit personally from the useful works and refuse to obtain permission or 
pay for the benefits they receive. 
Hijackers make excessive profits from general public necessities without lawful 
right. Copying works and selling them has a similar impact on the free market as the 
prohibited purchase of articles from suppliers. 
This objection might produce a state of confusion in which these principles are 
misapplied as to their direct meanings. 
This objection is irrational because it denies the obvious harm caused by the 
violation of copyright. The violation of copyright leads to personal harm to authors 
and ultimately a major and general harm to society. The disapproval of copyright 
contributes towards the decline in the conditions of society in terms of justice, 
Nay! al-Aw(dr, IIadith No: 2424. vol. 5, p. 378. 
6s See here p. 144 and post. 
66 A1-Bukhari, tr., vol. 3, p. 207, Hadith No: 371. Al-Majmü , vol. 12, p. 98. 
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ownership, knowledge and science. 
With a view to protecting the interest of both authors and consumers, copying 
useful works must be disallowed. It seems that this objection has turned out to be 
groundless, as nobody has denied that copyright is worthy of protection. 
6.6 Fifth Objection: Copyright has not emerged from Islamic history 
The fugahä' of all schools never spoke about or discussed the issue of 
copyright. 67 During many centuries, there was no intention or expectation of having 
economic reward from intellectual productions. Copyright was not considered at the 
time when the movement of writing and authorship is well known and active. The 
knowledge in Muslim societies has been transferred through the generations without 
restrictions. 
Instead of imposing copyright or a similar institution, there were a large number 
of "warrdgin or nussäkh " (copyists) in Islamic cities. 68 Despite their great 
importance in Islamic history copying books was very common69 and it was a way 
of life for many scholars across the history. 70 
From the first written works in the history of Islam onwards scholars have 
confined themselves to the pursuit of work intellectual production whilst at the same 
time no one referred to a concept such as copyright, except to the extent of the 
proper attribution. Instead of claming monopoly or property over works or 
attempting to exploit them, scholars always encouraged people to facilitate and 
disseminate knowledge as much as possible and warned that it is forbidden to claim 
that work is one's own. In addition, this objection can explain the widespread 
"pirating" of intellectual works in the Muslim world. 
As this account is undisputed, some scholars have interpreted silence of the 
early scholars on this issue as proof that a consensus gradually established itself to 
67 Al-ShahränT, p. 267. 
68 Shalaby, p. 89. Azmi ffadith Literature, p. 195. 
69 Shalaby, p. 74. 
70 Abü Zayd, Fiqh al-Nawäzil, p. 80 and post. 
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the effect that copyright or a similar concept cannot be built or justified within the 
boundaries of Shari `a. 
In answer to this objection, there is no problem if copyright is to be investigated 
with reference to evidence in Shari `a, regardless of whether it is a new case or old 
one. This can not be taken to suggest that the introduction of copyright is entirely 
alien to figh. 
Historically, not all copyright is new in figh. For example, the author's right of 
attribution is well established and known infiqh. Before modern times, the question 
of economic rights of authorship was not conceived. But the rapid development in 
technology has created the possibility of the unscrupulous exploitation of copyright 
as regards authorship. Copyright has been developed in response to the new situation 
in which authors finds themselves, namely, the loss of rights and the injustices done 
to them rather than just intellectual diversions. 
The theoretical position is that figh is flexible and constantly subject to 
reinterpretation to meet the change of life norms and new needs. It is a well known 
legal principle that rulings which are custom-based can change according to change 
in custom. By its plain terms, article 39 of the Mejelle states that "It cannot be 
denied which a change of times, the requirements of the law change" 71Customs that 
do not conflict with Shari `a become binding rulings on people. Infiqh, rulings are 
based on all relevant considerations and circumstances of the milieu that produced 
the issue. 
On closer inspection, the emphasis is on commercial interests, especially in a 
case where a conflict between the copyright holder and hijackers occurs. This is 
because the economic exploitation of works has become possible. Throughout the 
history, the copying of works was by hand only. This is a very difficult and long 
process, and economic exploitation was unlikely. Now, an rich array of new 
electronic machines is available to facilitate the process of copying. 
The earlyfuqaha' were not gifted with the ability to foresees mass reproduction 
71 The Mejelle, p. 8. Ilaydar, vol.! p. 47. 
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of works by new technology. It would have been impossible for them to have 
anticipated the economic exploitation of copyright that has occurred in modem 
times. Similarly they were unaware that many substances have several new usages72 
and therefore works are subject to industry and commerce which were not available 
before. 
The early fugahä' could not have foresee all of the ways in which intellectual 
works are now used, and it could not have been expected. Hence the ruling on 
copyright has to be achieved by a reasonable degree of flexibility in the investigation 
and interpretation of the sources of Shari `a. Nevertheless, the writings of early 
fugaha' can be taken as guidelines for ascertaining the extent of rights but not as to 
their strict boundaries. It might be possible to draw an analogy with the case of 
exploitation of materials found in nature. 
Several discoveries of elements and materials in the environment were made in 
the past but the practical significance of these discoveries was unknown or un- 
exploitable because of their high cost. The difficulty is as regards their availability 
rather than their legality. 73 
The issue of copyright is brought to the fore for the first time by scientific 
developments. It cannot be deemed as a restitution of something, which has been 
researched before. Indeed, whilst there are some aspects of the issue which had been 
known previously, the whole issue as it is understood now, has never been addressed 
by fugahä `. Copyright has emerged in circumstances which the early fuqaha' could 
not have imagined. It is unnecessary for us now to follow our fuqaha' in not 
addressing the concept of copyright, which was entirely unknown at their time. On 
the contrary, as we have seen, ijtihäd leads to the conclusion that copyright is 
correctly established on plenty of evidence in Qur'än and Sunna. 
72 Al-Dirayni, Hagq al-Ibtikär. p. 28. Al-Büti, Qadäyä Fiqhiyya Mu'äsira, p. 90. 
73 AI-Büfl, Qacfäyd Fiqhiyya Mu'äsira, p. 84. 
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6.7 Sixth Objection: being alien to Shari`a 
Some fugahä' see copyright as an individualistic concept based on capitalism. 
They argue that copyright is a result and a model of western thought and the 
acceptance of copyright is an attempt to introduce an alien theory into Shari `a. The 
argument runs that copyright is created by de facto man-made laws to protect 
commercial interests in the capitalism environment. Copyright is fundamentally 
incompatible with Shari `a because Shari `a encourages human beings to assist each 
other in good causes such as knowledge. The well-known verse reads "Help ye one 
another in righteousness and piety but help ye not one another in sin and rancor". 74 
In contrast, the argument concludes, the main drive behind copyright is to help the 
hoarding of knowledge and the interest of industry. 
Copyright needs to be understood in its modem economic context only. 75 The 
Western and capital society have spawned intellectual property. Copyright does not 
follow or generate from the criterion of Islam because it is an artificial property. 
In general, it is argued, copyright and intellectual property are used by 
industrial countries as an excuse to maintain their superiority and obstruct 
developing countries from economic growth or development. In fact, the argument 
runs, "copyright is not the property of creative individuals; rather it is the property of 
massive musical corporations who are defending their position through litigation 
under the guise that the individual author is harmed when a copyright is stolen. s76 
Only authors and publishers would prefer that the knowledge remains proprietary. 
The scope of copyright has been broadened and developed even more by new 
technologies. If a new ruling is needed to protect works from mis-attribution or 
misappropriation, it may be better to address this need only rather than force-fitting 
concepts into Shari 'a. 
When copyright and intellectual property impede the progress of poor countries, 
these countries have no choice other than to eliminate copyright. Under the regime 
74 Qur'än, 5. v 2. 
75 Samara, Huqüq al-Milkiyya al-Fikriyya wa Dawäbitihä fi al-Islam. A1-IHuýayn. 76 Halbert, Resisting Intellectual Property, p. 80. Muräd, p. 36. 
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of intellectual property including copyright, poor countries are left at the mercy of 
rapacious corporations and can never afford to improve their situation. For example, 
international pharmaceutical companies refuse to open access to HIV/AIDS 
medication or at least at make it available at an affordable price to poor countries 
deploying the argument of intellectual property. 77 
The West runs the argument, to continue seizing the grand-stand seat of 
international position by using international agreements as regards intellectual 
property. 78 Copyright leads to the concentration of various kinds of power in the 
hands of a few large countries and every country should have the right to 
knowledge, health and prosperity and to publish works and reproduce what a 
country needs without requiring it to obtain permission. 
Finally, it is argued, the purpose of intellectual work must be to facilitate human 
life and enable them to be used as sources and to acquire the same interests as 
powerful nations. The international system of intellectual property rights including 
copyright does not help developing countries which pay, for example, for computer 
programs, medicines and seeds and so on. It is based only on the interests of 
industrial countries. 9 
These arguments should not preventfiqh from dealing with the issue and giving 
it suitable judgments through its own legal approach as other legal systems have 
done. It is worth noting that there is no complete Islamic intellectual property or 
copyright theory which maintains a balance between the different interests. 
The role of Utihdd is to find Islamic solutions for new issues in a systemically 
way. Copyright is only representative not only of Western cultural values and 
traditions. Copyright establishes real rights, not an interpretation of specific 
commercial or social norms. Historically, copyright has been developed in response 
to the reality of authors suffering and to the injustices done to them and not merely 
77 Halbert, Resisting Intellectual Property, p. 87 and post. Murad, p. 134 and post. 78 Samära, Hugiiq al-Milkiyya al-Fikriyya wa Dawi bi/ihä ft al-Isläm, p. 3. 79 The report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, London, Septemper, 2002, at: 
http: //: www. iprcommission. org/graphic/documents/final-report. htm 
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as regards Western thought. As we have seen, copyright has its roots in Islamic law 
and civilization. 
Based on many forms of evidence the fiqh should recognize and provide 
copyright protection regardless of who bears such rights or is prevented from 
exploiting them. According to the general and knowable universal principles of 
Shari `a the violation of another's rights is prohibited whether the rightful owner is 
rich or poor Muslim or non-Muslim. The verse reads "0 ye who believe! stand out 
firmly for justice as witnesses to Allah even as against yourselves or your parents or 
your kin and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both. 
Follow not the lusts (of your hearts) lest ye swerve and if ye distort (justice) or 
decline to do justice verily Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do. s80 
The threat of the abuse of copyright must not prevent copyright being 
established because any right can easily be turned into an instrument of abuse. The 
solution is to prevent or limit the abusive exercise of rights not threaten the existence 
of those rights. 
It is no surprise that as a result of the lead West industry and technology, the 
West has dealt with these problems before other nations. So rather than adopting 
completely the Western approach or rejecting it entirely, it is wise to examine 
copyright in Shari `a. 
6.8 Summary 
A number offuqaha' have leveled criticism at copyright for its preference over 
other rights or considerations derived from the sources of Shari `a. Copyright is 
considered as huqüq mujarrada, which cannot be sold, hired or the subject of 
compensation. In fact, it is difficult to justify this classification of rights which is 
controversial even among the hlanat school who made this classification. 
However, copyright comprises two sets of various rights: moral rights which are 
huqüq mujarrad and economic rights which are huqüq mutaqarrira. Also, copyright 
80 Qur'an, 4. v 135. and see Qur'an, 5. v 8. 
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is conferred by Shari `a on an author not as a remedy to any damage. 
Some fuqaha' have argued against the recognition of copyright because they 
regard copyright as restriction on the ways in which the widespread dissemination of 
acquired knowledge, prohibited in Shari `a. According to many sources of evidence 
in Shari `a, a maximum dissemination of religious knowledge is required. However, 
this only applies to obligatory knowledge of Shari 'a and this religious duty can be 
achieved by disseminating knowledge verbally. The widespread dissemination of 
required knowledge of Shari 'a does not necessarily conflict with copyright. There is 
a line between exploitation of a work for commercial purposes and the use of a work 
for approved purposes. The exceptional case when the author misuses his copyright 
and refuses to publish his work unjustly cannot be a valid ground of objection to the 
whole copyright. 
Contrary to another objection, the sale of a book, CD or tape transfers to the 
purchaser only the lawful "manfa `a" (utility) attached to that work but there is no 
transfer of copyright. Therefore, whoever buys a book has limited scope in using the 
book and the sale is based on a condition that the purchaser must respect copyright 
and only take advantage of the book for himself. 
It is suggested that allowing anyone to print material may reduce the amount of 
money that an author can obtain from his work. This does not; however, justify 
preventing people from publishing useful works. 
On balance, if copyright is recognized all actions that contravene such a right is 
clearly unlawful and should be treated as a kind of "ghasb" (usurpation) regardless 
of whether the harm is to the author personally or financially and whether the loss is 
real and calculable or not. 
With respect to the writings of the early fugaha', copyright was not considered 
or discussed at the time, a time when intellectual development was well known and 
active. Some scholars have argued that this means that copyright or similar concept 
cannot be built on Shari 'a. 
However, as we have seen copyright can be established on plenty of evidence 
from Shari`a. Violation of copyright is prohibited regardless of the copyright holder. 
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It cannot be deemed as applying to something that had been researched before. 
Widespread and sometimes unscrupulous economic exploitation of works has now 
become possible in circumstances, which could not have been imagined before. 
Ijtihäd is necessary in order to find Islamic solutions for new issues such as 
copyright. 
There is a similar and related objection suggesting that copyright is an 
individualistic concept based on the western capitalism thought used by the 
industrial countries which is incompatible with Shari a. However, copyright has 
been developed in response to the reality of authors suffering and to the injustices 
done to them in any society. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This thesis commenced by stating that a comprehensive and systemic 
examination of copyright is required. Copyright can be understood in figh via its 
own terms, classifications and conventions by a gradual approach. In researching 
copyright all sources of Shari`a have been examined, arguments for and against 
copyright have been considered, and these arguments have been set out in a 
systematic way based on zc a1 al-figh. The methodology of this thesis and its 
effectiveness lies in the fact that only genuine sources of Shari 'a have been 
consulted and the specific approach of Shari `a has been used in order to construct a 
proper foundation for copyright. 
By applying the method described above, this thesis retraced the history of 
copyright in frgh in some detail and assessed its developments. A sound survey of 
Arabic and the English works on this subject is contained here in a more recent 
review. Previous writings on the subject have been followed and examined in order 
to build on the right results. The author has attempted to summarize a number of 
interesting conclusions derived from these studies. The literature review on 
copyright infiqh shows the inadequacy of some approaches and the shortcomings of 
others. It has shown that each of the discussed works was built on specific evidence 
and has its own limitations. 
This thesis has set out a brief and intensive analysis of the trends of defining 
"hagq" (right). This is done in order to establish the basic framework upon which 
copyright can be built. In the early writings of the fugahd' there was some reluctance 
in defining "hagq ", but some fugahä' have attempted to define it and can be broadly 
categorized into two groups: those who think that right is singled out only by 
"ikhticäs" (exclusiveness) and those who think that right is mere "maslaha" 
(interest). Some fugahä' have taken the position that is intermediate between these 
groups with some variations. The majority offuqaha' remained attached to the wide 
literal meanings of hagq. Perhaps the most obvious reason for this approach is to 
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maintain all possible usages of the term hagq. Hagq is a general principle that 
encompasses various manifestations, whether it is maclaha or ikht4c4 However, 
fugaha' have held to the opinion that a right needs the approval of Shari `a. 
Therefore, the thesis has progressed to explore whether copyright can be 
established on the sources of Shari 'a. As elaborated in the study, the term hagq is 
applied to copyright whatever the definition actually is, if it is needed at all. 
It also explores how hagq categorizations are multi-faceted, generally 
distinctive and definitely varied because fugahä' have given a great weight to the 
practical classifications of hagq. 
The study applies the various definitions and classifications of hagq to the 
concept of copyright. These classifications are useful in that copyright is a collection 
of huqüq. The thesis concludes that some forms of copyright are hagq Allah, abstract 
and cannot be inherited compromised or waived. Other rights are huqüq al-'abd, 
concrete, inheritable and can be subject to exchange or consideration. The 
application of these classifications represents a new contribution to the subject. 
The study deals with the understanding of concepts related to copyright. It 
presents a constructive review of the terms: "milkiyya" (ownership), "mal " (wealth) 
and "manaf a" (utility) because this review is prerequisite for the recognition of 
copyright in Shari 'a. The Islamic concepts of right, ownership and wealth are part of 
a detailed framework preparing for the possible foundations of copyright. Right, 
ownership, and wealth are important determinants in the assessment of copyright. 
They are inextricably linked with each other. 
Based on many sources of evidence mal is any lawful thing where " `urf" 
(custom) confirms its commercial value, and which is usable in trade. A further 
point is that milkiyya and mal do not have to remain in the possession of the owner 
or to be physical. From this investigation, the thesis establishes that the terms 
milkiyya, mal and manaf'a are properly applicable to copyright. 
Copyright represents a clear profit obtained by expenditure, intellectual effort 
and time. It becomes clear that the language of fiqh in defining these concepts 
provides a strong foundation for copyright. 
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Another important step of studying copyright is to understand the nature of 
copyright. There are some consequences of these characteristics, which have a 
profound effect on one's assessment. Copyright is in the nature of personal attribute, 
abstract, intangible and exclusionary. These fundamental characteristics must not 
deprive copyright from being recognized as a right and as property. 
As the famous hadith of Mu`ädh specifies, the search attempted to find any 
guidance and indications in the original sources: the Qur'än and Sunna, and the 
second sources respectively. There are some new indications from Shari `a which 
support the notion of copyright. These sources of evidence and their presentation are 
new additions to the subject. 
Several verses of the Qur'an together with their interpretations result in 
copyright becoming established in Shari `a. The thesis argues for a broad 
interpretation and application of the verses which impose the principles of honesty 
and justice and consider copyright as trust. Copyright is approved on grounds of the 
principles of justice. Islamic teachings consider intellectual works as trusts and 
individuals are commanded to respect all trusts within the limits of Shari `a. There is 
ample evidence to indicate the prohibition against oppression, mistrust, deception 
and injustice. 
Other Qur'änic verses prohibit the diminution of others' rights and properties, 
pretending to be a scholar and the making false claims. These prohibitions are 
applicable to all forms of violation or infringement of copyright. The generalization 
of these concepts does not weaken the recognition of copyright because, for the most 
part rulings of Shari `a tend to be general and in broad statements. The role of figh is 
to elaborate and renew the applications of these rulings in different circumstances. 
General Qur'änic references prohibit generally any kind of violation of copyright. 
The second source of Shari 'a, that is the Sunna, went more fully into the detail of 
the recognition of copyright. In the light of the fact that Islam considers knowledge, 
teaching, learning and authorship as acts of worship and that it gives all useful 
knowledge a significant position, there are several 'ahädith and other indications 
which lend support for the establishment of copyright. 
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In the first hadith, there are indications that knowledge is a type of work and 
that there is a link between an author and his work which gives it its attribution and 
continuity. Copyright can be based on those 'ahädith that establish that the right of 
priority and "`am! ' (labor) is the best way of earning and establishing ownership. 
Generally, the 'ahddith, which impose the duty of sincerity and advice and prohibit 
giving false impression, give support to copyright because violation and 
infringement of copyright are opposed by these 'ahddith specifically. One hadith 
prohibits the making of proposal of sale or marriage in competition with a currently 
outstanding offer (unfair competition). This can be extended to the prohibition 
against the violation and infringement of copyright. Significantly, therefore, the 
disciplines of "Hadith", "71m Mustalah al-Iladith"; and their detailed rules on 
narration, reception and correction of hadith were established within the themes of 
Shari 'a. Islamic sciences give particular attention to "isnäd" and "fi za" which can 
be seen as the roots of modern copyright. The recognition of economic exploitation 
of copyright can be based on the hadith that provides that the earning of profits from 
any property is properly attributed to the assumption of the risk by authors for all 
responsibilities arising from their works. The original sources, therefore, are 
consubstantial in that they support copyright. 
This thesis shows that copyright is not only based on a general, sympathetic 
approach or moral foundations but on concrete evidence from Shari 'a. Qiyäs, 
maslaha and `urf are long-standing general sources of law that support copyright on 
separate strands of evidence. 
By using giyäs the thesis argued for copyright on the basis of similarity between 
acceptable entitlement to a financial return for teaching, reciting, copying and hiring 
of the Qurä'n and Sunna with an entitlement to authorship. The case of acquiring 
ownership of barren land by its cultivation can be applied to copyright because the 
revival, which is the effective cause, is common to -both cases. The prohibition 
against unauthorized listening can be applied to hacking and unlawful publishing of 
works without permission. It can be argued also that the approval of the waiver of 
many rights in Shari a for financial exchange can be applied to the waiver and 
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reimbursement to an owner of a copyright. Moreover, according to "istihsän " 
(juristic preference) copyright is accepted because copyright supports the general 
principles of Shari `a. 
Therefore, the thesis shows that Shari `a has proved sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate modern institutions such as copyright. A general finding of the 
research is that there is a distinctive and `authentic' Islamic conception of copyright 
which can be developed. 
The study proves that copyright can be convincingly established within the 
concept of "maslaha" (the public interest). Copyright reflects the "magdsid" 
(principles) of Shari 'a as well as its spirit. It explains that because of the widespread 
establishment of copyright in customary national and international laws and because 
copyright does not contradict Shari `a, it can be considered as an acceptable `urf 
under Shari `a. Recognizing copyright through maslaha and `urf should be with 
considering certain conditions that seek to harmonize copyright the principles and 
rulings of Shari `a. 
In addition, copyright has received support from several "al-Qawd'id a! - 
Fiqhiyya" (legal maxims) such as "the appropriation of permitted things gives rise to 
ownership in Shari `a" which justifies ownership of copyright. The legal maxim "the 
necessary condition for the fulfillment of obligation" and "public or private "häja" 
(need) must be treated as "darüra " (necessity)" can introduce copyright for the 
purposes of the perceived public need to stimulate research as a preliminary 
condition for scientific and art development and as a private need of scholars and 
authors. The legal maxim: "removing of harm" is used to prevent any kind of 
violation of copyright. To ensure and impose respect for copyright, the legal maxim: 
"A person, who is owner of a thing, is owner also of things which are indispensable 
for that thing" is appropriate. The ownership of authored works implies ownership 
of all rights related and necessary for it. 
It is possible now to realize new foundations of copyright from Shari `a. The 
collection of arguments presented in this thesis support the recognition of copyright 
in Shari 'a. 
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The study illustrates that copyright is subject to several conditions. Copyright is 
based on conditions and is limited by other rights and by the public interest. The 
author has carried out a survey of Shari `a in order to identify what turns out to be 
three different conditions. In collective arguments, this study uses evidence from 
Shari `a to establish copyright on clear authoritative conditions arising from the same 
source and without opposing its principles. The conditions presented in this form are 
completely original and unique. 
The first condition is that the contents of a work must not be illegal or offensive 
to the public interest. Secondly, a work must be original (leaving some room as to 
how to interpret originality). The recognition of copyright requires that a work must 
respect the principles of Shari `a. Thirdly, there must not be contradiction with public 
morals or interests. From the perspective of Shari `a, it is necessary to achieve a 
balance between copyright, other rights and the users of intellectual products. The 
application of freedom of expression must be understood in the Shari `a context. 
From this study it appears difficult to justify, based on qiyas on "hagq a! -hakr ", 
the suggestion of a term of sixty years for the duration of copyright. There is no 
benchmark that can be used for measuring the duration of copyright specifically. 
Legislation of rights cannot be left to the ruler. In considering the duration of 
copyright, the thesis has argued that copyright should be perpetual based on the 
general principles of rights and ownership for other forms of property. 
Finally, the thesis has considered objections raised by some scholars to the 
notion of copyright in Shari `a. The study reviews the critics of copyright in some 
details and provides robust responses to those. The objections are that copyright is 
"huqüq mujarrada" (abstract rights) which cannot be subject to exchange: that 
copyright restricts the widespread dissemination of acquired knowledge; that 
copyright is inconsistent with the idea of property because property gives an owner 
the right to copy materials they have bought. The early fugaha' reviewed did not 
point to copyright or some other similar institution even whilst the intellectual 
movement was very active. In addition, the anticipated harm of reproducing 
materials does not prevent someone from publishing useful works. It is also, 
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suggested that copyright is an individualistic concept based on western capitalism 
thought. 
In contrast to these objections, this thesis has argued that even though the 
classification of copyright as such is controversial, not all forms of copyright are 
"huqüq mujarrada". This thesis has argued that copyright does not necessarily 
conflict with the dissemination of obligatory knowledge of Shari `a or the 
widespread dissemination of knowledge. The purchase of a book, CD or tape does 
not transfer copyright. The sale is made on `urf and a written condition that the 
buyer must respect copyright. Any kind of "ghasb" (usurpation) of copyright is 
prohibited whether or not there is a harm. The harm to authors, if their works have 
been published without their prior consent cannot be denied. Copyright is built on 
many strands of evidence from Shari 'a notwithstanding the writings of the early 
scholars and whether the rightful owner is rich or poor, Muslim or non-Muslim, 
Western or not. As the study demonstrates, the objections to copyright have not met 
with support from the standpoint of Shari `a. There is no reason to assert that 
copyright needs to be imposed by some outside authority in order to take its place 
within Shari `a system. On the contrary, on the basis of many proofs within Shari `a 
itself approval of copyright is the only sound legal ruling. 
This thesis seeks to offer, therefore, a systemic approach to the subject as 
determined by uciil al-figh. Some arguments presented in this thesis might be less 
new than the reader might suppose. The commitment, however, to the systematic 
and productive approach to the subject of copyright is new. Each argument resolves 
part of the problem of how copyright is derived from Shari `a or may assist other 
aspects in relation to copyright. 
This thesis has been undertaken in an attempt to understand the viability of 
copyright under Shari`a. At this point, the author asserts that copyright can no 
longer stay in a grey area between absolute rights, moral recommendations and 
indifferent matters. The position of copyright in Shari `a is settled by reviewing the 
technicalities of usül al-figh and applying them to copyright. 
This thesis shows that copyright can properly be accepted within the framework 
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of Sharia rather than establishing it as a concept alien to Shari `a. Copyright can be 
developed piecemeal within Shari 'a as a reasonable coherent body of rules based on 
the principles of Shari `a. This thesis has shown that it is possible to generate a 
detailed and clear set of rules relating to copyright from Shari 'a. 
It is hoped that this thesis will now provide a way forward for the accord of 
copyright within Shari `a. Further work needs to be carried out in order to go beyond 
the current discourse of the roots and basis of copyright so as to construct an 
efficient and effective Islamic regime for copyright and intellectual property. 
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Glossary 
1. 'adl : (n) justice 
2. adhdn : (n) raising the call to prayer 
3. ahya : (v) means give life or restore to life 
4. `Ämm: (n) a word that applies to unlimited things. 
5. amäna (n) pl. amänc t : honesty trust 
6. `agär: (n)immovable, real property 
7. asbäb al-nuzzll: (n) the occasions of the revelations 
8. asl : (n) original 
9. a$dla: (n) originality 
10. bay': (n)sale 
11. Bayt 1-mäl: (n) the treasury 
12. bid `a: (n) means heresy disapproval innovation in religion. 
13. clamän: security, guarantee 
14. Barar : injury mischief, harm 
15. clarüra: (n) necessity, emergency 
16. diya: (n)blood-money 
17. diywän: (n)official register 
18. far' : in the process of giyas it means a new case 
19. frkriyya: (adj. ) intellectual 
20. ghacb: (n)usurpation 
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21. gharar : (n)uncertainty or risk 
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22. hacläna: custody 
23. hadith (n) pl. ahadith : prophetic tradition 
24. häja: (n) need, want or requirement. 
25. hafiz: (n) pl. hujäz people who recite and memorize the Qurä'n 
26. hdkim : (n) ruler or judge 
27. hagq 'dabi: (n) moral right 
28. hagq mal : (n) economic right 
29. hagq pl. huqüq: (n) right, rights 
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30. hagq hakr: (n) A right based on contract under which an administrator 
of property, belongs to awgäf (endowment), can grant a tenant exclusive 
use of the property for an agreed term, in return of payment. 
31. haräm : (n) forbidden 
32. hisba: (n) means enjoining good and preventing evil voluntarily within 
the community. 
33. hirz: (n) means a reasonable place or custody, which an owner can keep 
his property usually according to its value and nature. 
34. hukm p1. Ahkdm: (n) command, ruling, legal decision 
35. huqüq mujarrada: (n)abstract rights 
36. huqüq m'nawyya: (n)moral rights 
37. huqüq mutaqarrira: (n)concrete rights 
38. huqüq al-mwa'liff. (n)author's rights 
39. huqüq yniyya: (n)real rights 
40. hudüd: (n)punishments of crimes 
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41. `illah : (n)effective cause 
42. `ilm: (n) knowledge 
43. `ilm mustalah a1-hadith: A science, which comprises a collection of 
rules, measures, and terminology that can verify the authenticity of the 
prophetic traditions and classify them. 
44. ibä ia: liberty 
45. ibtikdr : novelty, originality 
46. idhn: permission 
47. ihiyä' al-mawät: the revival of the waste land 
48. ihtikär: hoarding 
49. jmä': consensus 
50. ijdra : hire, lease 
51. ydza: authority or license of narration 
52. Utihdd: conscientious reasoning 
53. Ytihädät pl.: legal opinions 
54. Ikhtirä': invention 
55. ikhtisds : exclusiveness 
56. intim-': utilization 
57. isnäd or sand: licensing chain of narrators 
58. istingd : entitlement 
59. itihsdn: judicial preference 
60. ka ra (n) pl. kaff-rdt: expiations 
61. käss: means a word that applies to limited things. 
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62. kharäj: land tax, interest, return 
63. khiyäna: mistrust, dishonesty 
64. khiyär al-majlis: The right of both parties in a business transaction to 
withdraw as long as they have not separated. 
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65. khiyär al-ru'ya: The right of the buyer to rescind or ratify a sale contract 
upon visual inspection. 
66. khiyär al-shart: The right of both parties of a contract to withdraw from 
the contract during a specific period if that party stipulated that. 
67. khul': an agreement between husband and wife terminating the contract 
of marriage. 
68. mal p1. amwäl: money, wealth 
69. mal manqül: movables 
70. mal mithll: standard property 
71. mal giyml: remediable property 
72. mslaha (pl. masdlih) means interest, benefit etc. 
73. mafa-sid: corruptions 
74. mahr: a dowry 
75. makrüh : reprehensible 
76. mandzlb: recommended 
77. manfa'a: pl. manäfi': means utility, advantage, interest 
78. magäsid: objectives, aims 
79. matn: textual contents of prophetic tradition 
80. al-mwa'liff pl. al-mw'allifiyyn : author 
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81. milkiyya: ownership 
82. muhtasib is a religious person' who enjoins people what is right and 
forbids them what is wrong. 
83. mubdh pl. mubähdt are `indifferent' things are free and lawful to 
acquire or do 
84. mucldraba or girdcl: contract of partnership 
85. mufti: a scholar who gives fatwa. 
86. mut `a: gift of consolation 
87. muzdra `a: sharecropping 
88. nafaqa: maintenance 
89. nadhr: vow 
90. nass: text 
91. nisäb: it is a fixed amount of money which zakät alms is due. 
92. qadhf: slander, defamation 
93. al-Qawd `id al-Fiqhiyya: legal maxims 
94. gisäs: legal retaliation 
95. giyds: analogy 
96. Ruqya means a Qur'änic recitation and making supplications to Allah 
for seeking a cure for any illness. 
97. sadd al-dharäi `: blocking means of evil 
98. Siyäsa Shar'iyya: legal policy 
99. a! - Shari': The law-giver 
100. Shar ai: legal, legitimate 
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101. shay': a thing 
102. shay' mamh7k: owned thing 
103. shuf `a is a right of priority to purchase a property which is for sale given 
to (shaft ) the neighbor, co-sharer or partner in the real property. 
104. sulk: settlement or mediation 
105. sulta: authority 
106. to `addi : transgression 
107. tad/is: fraud or deception 
108. täCff. authorship 
109. falaq: divorce 
110. taklif : commission 
111. tasarruf: authority 
112. al-t'suffi isti'mäl al-hagq: Abuse of right 
113. tasnif authorship 
114. `urf: customary law 
115. wäjib: obligatory 
116. wäjib gadd'an: juridical order 
117. wäjib diyänatan: religious obligation 
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118. wad' al yad: appropriation 
119. walä': (patronage or allegiance) A relationship established between a 
master and a slave after emancipation which confers some mutual rights 
on them, for example the former can inherit from the latter in some 
cases. 
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120. wagf(n) pl. awagdf: endowment 
121. waciyya: a bequest 
122. zanadigah: heresy 
123. zinä: fornication, adultery 
124. zulm: oppression 
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